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The energy system is undergoing a fundamental transformation – from 
fossil to renewable energy, from central power plants to distributed, 
decentralised generation facilities such as rooftop solar panels or wind 
parks, from utilities to private residents as producers of energy, and 
from analogue to digital.
This book looks at the energy transformation from two complementa-
ry angles: governance and business model innovation. On the one side, 
governance is a decisive factor for the success of the transformation 
because it can act as an accelerator, or it can delay the process. On the 
other side, entrepreneurs and corporate decision-makers provide new 
business models for a decentralised energy world.
Based on best practices, country studies and interviews with CEOs and 
founders of startups from all over the world, the “Global Game Changer” 
suggests eight key principles for political decision-makers to success-
fully implement the transformation, and six core competencies for cor-
porate decision-makers to thrive in the new marketplace.
“Everyone knows that renewable energy’s time has come. An increasingly important 
issue relates to decentralised resources, and how to use them most efficiently. Gov-
ernance frameworks and developing new business models are important for both. This 
book uniquely takes a global view of these intertwined issues, and is a fascinating read 
for anyone interested in the acceleration of GHG reduction and in coordination factors 
for a cost effective energy policy.”— Dan Kammen,  Professor and Chair, Energy and 
Resources Group, UC Berkeley,  Former Science Envoy, US Department of State
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Praise for Decentralised Energy
“In the last few years, renewable energy has broken through the cost barrier. But, if 
it is to become widely adopted, it has to break through an array of country-specific 
institutional, technical and political barriers. The strength of Decentralised 
Energy is that it takes seriously each country’s context through a range of coun-
try case studies. And yet, it pulls the messages together to give us the common 
challenges that advocates and promoters of renewable energy and decentralised 
resources must address to take forward and complete a clean energy transition.”
Navroz K. Dubash, Professor, Centre for Policy Research, India
“Everyone knows that renewable energy’s time has come. An increasingly impor-
tant issue relates to decentralised resources, and how to use them most efficiently. 
Governance frameworks and developing new business models are important for 
both. This book uniquely takes a global view of these intertwined issues, and is a 
fascinating read for anyone interested in the acceleration of GHG reduction and 
in coordination factors for a cost effective energy policy.”
Dan Kammen, Professor and Chair, Energy and Resources Group, UC Berkeley, 
Former Science Envoy, US Department of State
“Accelerating the energy transformation is in all likelihood this generation’s most 
significant challenge to solve with little room for error. The authors write: “The last 
decade has witnessed the beginning of what is likely to be a fundamental, irrevers-
ible transformation of the power and wider energy sectors, […] [which] entails both 
regulatory incentives as well as entrepreneurial initiatives.” This book delivers on the 
high ambition to compare different models and derive critical success factors: it pro-
vides a review of different country archetypes with differing needs on their transition 
paths; on that basis the authors formulate requirements for decisive, transformative 
top-down governance; they study start-up success stories and categorise underlying 
business models; and they place these in a three-phased transformation model, con-
cluding on relevant core competencies and success factors. In its essence the book sub-
stantiates the “D3” – decarbonisation, digitalisation, decentralisation – as key drivers 
for the energy transition through a rich range of top-down and bottom up examples. A 
relevant, timely, and compelling transition synthesis and precious resource for energy 
transformation practitioners!”
Christoph Frei, Partner, Emerald Technology Ventures (and former CEO & 
Sec Gen of World Energy Council)
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A note from the authors–editors
The energy system is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation. From 
fossil to renewable energy, from central power plants to distributed, decentral-
ised generation facilities such as rooftop solar panels or wind parks, from utili-
ties to private residents as producers of energy, and from analogue to digital.
The transformation has been triggered by governments and policy makers, 
who have provided incentives and the regulatory framework for the changes to 
happen. It is then shaped and accelerated by private individuals, entrepreneurs, 
and founders, who seize opportunities that emerge within the new configura-
tion of the system. Both groups of stakeholders must deal with a high level of 
strategic uncertainty: Which regulatory instruments provide an optimal path-
way, reconciling environmental objectives with economic efficiency and system 
reliability? Which business models of start-ups and founders will succeed, and 
which core competencies are needed in corporations during the transforma-
tion process?
This book is intended to reflect the dual, complementary structure of the 
transformation – top-down and bottom-up – and to provide answers how to 
deal with strategic uncertainty on both sides. It thus aims to combine the top-
ics of governance and business model innovation. Catherine Mitchell, Exeter 
University, and Antony Froggatt, Chatham House, are in charge of the top-
down governance perspective, while Christoph Burger and Jens Weinmann, 
both at ESMT Berlin, provide a closer look at business model innovation and 
the bottom-up perspective.
xiv Decentralised Energy — a Global Game Changer
Chapter 1 of this book introduces the main features driving decentralised 
renewable energy generation. In Chapter 2, Froggatt and Mitchell analyse 
energy systems from the governance perspective. They invited country experts 
to describe the regulatory frameworks and governance of renewable energy 
and distributed energy resources in selected countries, including Australia, 
China, Denmark, Germany, India, Italy, as well as parts of the United States. 
The authors use insights into these exemplary countries to review the impact 
of these policies and structures on developments in the energy sector and draw 
conclusions on how to improve the policy framework in different stages of the 
transformation and varying sociocultural contexts.
Chapter 3 has been written and edited by Burger and Weinmann. They 
observe the global ecosystem of entrepreneurs aiming to leverage opportuni-
ties that emerge with the energy transformation: Which innovations do they 
push into energy markets? How do they experiment with new business mod-
els? The authors have interviewed a sample of key innovators and founders 
in the field of decentralised energy, whose new ventures aim not to rely on 
state subsidies. The interviews are complemented by one contribution that has 
been written by one of the founding members of Mobisol, a start-up operat-
ing mainly in Eastern Africa. Burger and Weinmann develop a taxonomy of 
business models based on the insights and identify six core competencies for 
corporate stakeholders.
Chapter 4 reunites both governance (top-down) and business model innova-
tion (bottom-up) within a three-phase model of the energy transformation. 
It summarises the conclusions of Chapters 2 and 3 and aggregates core com-
petencies relevant for policy makers, corporate players, and start-ups to deal 
with strategic uncertainty in a future energy system where all three phases of 
the energy transformation might co-exist. The book closes in Chapter 5 with a 
wrap-up and outlook.
The book has been written for policy makers, investors, executives of utilities 
and corporations, entrepreneurs, as well as a broader academic audience. Espe-
cially for readers in developing countries and emerging economies, digitalisa-
tion and the internet have made access to scientific literature easier than ever 
before. However, a major remaining hurdle is the cost to legally acquire digital 
contents. The authors have therefore chosen Ubiquity as a publisher that fol-
lows an explicit open access approach of the dissemination of research.
The authors are greatly indebted to the individuals who volunteered to con-
tribute to this book with country reports: Ranjit Bharvirkar, Søren Djørup, 
Michele Gaspari, Frede Hvelplund, Arturo Lorenzoni, Dörte Ohlhorst, Liao 
Maolin, Helen Poulter, Wei Shen, Zhou Weiduo, as well as Klara Lindner for 
the description of the start-up Mobisol in Chapter 3. Burger and Weinmann 
would particularly express their gratitude to the founders and entrepreneurs 
Reza Alaghehband, Jemma Green, Sebastian Groh, Lars Krückeberg, Timo 
Leukefeld, and Oliver Stahl, who volunteered with their time – the most pre-
cious resource that a founder may have – to narrate their stories.
A note from the authors–editors xv
Empirical research, both quantitative and qualitative such as this book, typi-
cally suffers from a positive selection bias. Successful examples – countries as 
well as start-ups – are more likely to be portrayed than flawed policy experi-
ments and founders who failed to achieve lasting commercial success with their 
ventures and went out of business. The authors, also in their function as editors, 
tried to avoid neglecting these sobering experiences in the narratives of coun-
tries and start-ups.
November 2019,
Christoph Burger, Antony Froggatt, Catherine Mitchell, and Jens Weinmann
This work was in part supported by The Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) [EP/N014170/1]
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Introduction – what are the drivers 
of decentralised renewable energy 
generation?
The entire world is moving towards decentralised energy generation. A couple of 
years ago, this statement would have been the vision of a distant future. No one 
would have believed that within less than a decade the existing configuration of 
power supply would be fundamentally challenged. In large parts of the world, 
decentralised energy generation means renewable energy generation, because 
solar photovoltaic panels and wind turbines are scattered across residential 
rooftops and and dispersed on acres and farmland. They constitute a funda-
mental reversal of the paradigm of economies of scale that used to dominate 
the economics of the energy supply industry in the 20th century.
Of course, the old system of large thermal and nuclear power plants, central-
ised dispatch, and long-distance transmission lines will co-exist for several dec-
ades to come. It brought nation states a reliable supply structure, even though 
future generations may have to bear the welfare losses for its legacy with respect 
to climate change, nuclear waste, and stranded assets.
Curbing greenhouse gas emissions has become a global imperative to prevent 
a lasting, negative impact on the development path of future generations. One 
of the least contested policy options is a carbon-neutral energy supply. Regula-
tors and politicians have significantly contributed to the rise of renewable gen-
eration that promotes a shift towards a sustainable supply structure. In many 
industrialised countries, they opted for generous subsidy schemes that helped 
manufacturers of renewable generation technologies, in particular solar and 
wind, to scale their operations and drive costs down. Now politicians have to 
find solutions about how to maintain a resilient system in spite of a substantial 
share of intermittent, weather-dependent, and decentralised renewable supply.
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Many emerging economies, most notably China, whose domestic energy 
policy is discussed in Section 2.3 of this book, but also highly industrialised 
states such as California, which we explore in Section 2.8, experienced gov-
ernment regulation that has led to a centralised dissemination of renewable 
energies, with large-scale, utility-owned installations of photovoltaic fields 
and wind parks. Often, this is a fast and efficient way of reducing the car-
bon footprint of energy supply. However, we believe that the true revolution-
ary potential of these recent changes of the supply structure relates to the 
empowerment of the final consumer to transcend into a local, sometimes even 
autonomous producer of energy, as it occurred in countries such as Australia, 
Germany, or Denmark.
Most importantly, in developing countries decentralised renewable genera-
tion may lead to leapfrogging of certain stages of infrastructure development, 
analogous to the usage of cell phones instead of building a fixed network for 
landline telephony services. Especially in rural areas, it may provide a comple-
mentary service to the existing energy infrastructure, with individual house-
holds establishing micro-grids that enhance commercial activities and, literally, 
improve the quality of life of local residents.
In industrialised countries, the looming age of decentralised generation does 
not mean that all utilities will disappear within the next decade. But those utili-
ties that are unable to adapt to the new market environment may one day be 
swallowed by players from the information and communication technologies 
or manufacturing sectors, or shrink in their position from providers of a criti-
cal infrastructure service to the equivalent of a telephony retailer or private 
insurance company. A whole range of new players will enter energy markets 
and redefine business models, revenue streams, and risk allocation. Informa-
tion and communication providers as well as start-ups occupy commercial 
niches in decentralised energy generation that utilities are not capable or will-
ing to enter; they provide financing options, technical advice, operation and 
maintenance of assets, and care for their customers’ needs.
Most importantly, though, this movement is not only a global transforma-
tion, it is an individual transformation too: across the globe, private consumers 
decide to turn into micro-investors for their personal generation and, increas-
ingly, storage devices. Collectively they contribute to the renewal and recon-
figuration of the energy system.
In the remainder of this first chapter, we want to highlight six key trends 
that characterise and shape the momentum of change within the energy sector, 
namely the competitiveness of renewables and decentralised generation ( Sections 
1.1 and 1.2), the rising role of storage (Section 1.3), the decoupling of growth and 
energy intensity (Section 1.4), enhancing local value creation ( Section 1.5), and 
digitalisation as enabler of smart grids and new business models (Section 1.6). 
We will focus on electricity as the segment of the energy sector that is most fun-
damentally transformed. An analysis of other changes,  in particular the role of 
efficiency and the electrification of transport, would generate equally relevant 
insights, but is unfortunately beyond the scope of this research.
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The introduction will then serve as the basis for the discussion on diverging 
regulatory models of the electricity supply industry, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, and the emergence of new business models in the context of devel-
oping and industrialised countries in Chapter 3. We will conclude the book 
with a chapter on concrete policy recommendations and the main attributes 
of successful business models in Chapter 4, which describes the three stages of 
current, decentralised energy supply, and Chapter 5 as an executive summary 
of the major findings of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to promot-
ing renewable energies on a global scale.
With this endeavour, our desire is to encourage political and corporate deci-
sion makers to assess the most appropriate model to support a future electric-
ity system, adapted to local market conditions, encouraging entrepreneurial 
activity that minimises the carbon footprint, while ensuring that the conflicting 
energy triangle of security of supply, resource efficiency, and sustainability is 
secured for the generations to come.
1.1 Renewables becoming competitive
We may perceive the recent rise of consumer empowerment as a more funda-
mental disruption than previous changes. Energy policy has undergone major 
shifts in priorities since the beginning of the 20th century, and each change was 
perceived as a radical break with the status quo.
Prior to the 1970s, energy policy was primarily focused on affordability; 
increasing the proportion of the population which had access to energy net-
works and adding capacity to match economic development. The oil crises of 
the 1970s led to new directions for energy policy in many parts of the world, 
including Europe, the US, and Japan. These new energy policies can be broadly 
divided between those countries or states which tried to improve energy secu-
rity through reducing oil use by developing other sources of primary energy 
supply, particularly for electricity, and by using energy more efficiently (for 
example, California, Denmark, and Japan); and those countries which by and 
large continued to be dependent on oil – either by developing their own oil 
resources or attempting to diversify their supply.
Energy policies around the world continued to be dominated by security 
concerns until environmental matters – including acid rain, the ozone layer, 
climate change, and local air pollution – began to gain importance in the 1980s 
and 1990s. In December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was the first global effort to 
curb greenhouse gas emissions. Simultaneously, the liberalisation and priva-
tisation of many public infrastructure services also affected regulation in the 
energy sector. With a focus on increasing efficiency via market mechanisms, 
liberalisation paved the way to implement competition in the generation and 
retail segments of the electricity supply industry.
The combination of emission reduction targets with a competitive, market-
oriented regulation of the electricity sector has led to an unprecedented rise 
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of renewable energies. This both reduces the dependency on fossil fuels and 
accelerates the deployment of decentralised, climate-friendly energy sources. If 
humankind wants to curb carbon dioxide emissions to ensure that global tem-
perature rises remain well below 2°C and strive towards a rise of ‘only’ 1.5°C, 
as stated in the Paris Agreement in 2015 and ratified by almost 180 countries, 
as of August 2018, decentralisation is increasingly seen as a ‘no regrets’ strategy 
for meeting the core energy policy goals.
For governments, there is no single trajectory, no ‘one size fits all’ strategy. A 
few countries choose nuclear as an (almost) carbon-neutral power generation 
technology, while in most other countries the nuclear power fleet faces decom-
missioning within the next decade or two. Cost overruns and severe delays 
in the majority of new nuclear plant constructions in Europe (Schneider & 
Froggatt 2019) makes it seem unlikely that the technology will experience 
a renaissance in the Western world. Similarly, carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) as a means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions faces severe opposition 
from local residents, and many pilot projects in the Western world have been 
 prematurely ceased. As these two options do not seem to be politically desired 
and economically feasible in multiple jurisdictions, it is renewable energy that 
is the most likely substitute for fossil fuels.
The price of renewable electricity technologies, such as onshore and off-
shore wind and solar photovoltaics, has fallen rapidly in the last decade. This is 
because of lower prices due to increased competition, a shift in production to 
lower-wage economies (from Europe to Asia), technology improvements, and 
economies of scale. In Europe, the cost of solar modules decreased by 83 per 
cent between 2010 and 2017. According to an International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA) estimate, the global weighted average LCOE of utility-scale 
PV plants has fallen by 74 percent between 2010 and 2018, from US$3,300–
7,900 per kW range in 2010 to US$800–2,700 per kW in 2018. The utility scale 
solar PV projects commissioned in 2018 had a global weighted-average LCOE 
of US$0.085 per kWh, which was around 13 percent lower than the equivalent 
figure for 2017 (IRENA 2019).
While even for the more mature wind turbine industry, costs have fallen. 
For wind in 2018, new capacity was commissioned at a global weighted 
average LCOE of US$0.056 per kWh, which was 13 percent lower than the 
value for 2017 and 35% lower than in 2010, when it was USD 0.085 per kWh 
(IRENA 2019). These falling technology costs and ongoing policy sup port 
have led to renewables now dominating new build in the power sector. In the 
global  electricity supply, an additional 181 GW of new renewables capacity 
was installed in 2018, the largest ever annual increase, 65% of all new  supply 
investment (Ren21 2018). Going forward the trend is expected to continue 
with solar and wind, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, to attract 
73 per cent of investment in the power sector between 2017 and 2040 (Henbest 
2017). As a consequence, onshore wind and solar PV power are now, frequently, 
less expensive than any fossil-fuel option, without financial assistance.
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India 37 Solar Indian developer ACME Solar emerged as 
the winning bidder for a 200 MW project 
with a tender price of ₹2.44 per kWh.
Germany 63 Wind The introduction of auctioning for wind for 
the first time for onshore wind installations 
led to an average bid of 5.71 cents per kWh 
for 70 bids with a total installed capacity 
of 700 MW – 93% of the bids (65) or 96% 




An average price of $US32.5 per MWh 
was awarded for 600MW of solar and wind 
capacity.
India 38 Wind A wind energy auction for 500 MW 
of capacity and  organized by the state 
government of Gujarat revealed a tariff of 
Rs 2.43 per kWh as the lowest bid. 
2018
Germany 55 Onshore 
wind
In total 83 bids were awarded for a total 
of over 700MW of capacity.  The range of 
successful bidders was €38 per MWh to 
€52.80 per MWh with an average of  
€47.3 per MWh.
United States 36 Onshore 
wind
The levelized cost of wind also hit an 
all-time low, averaging $36 per MWh for 
plants built in 2018 across the United States.
Brazil 21 Wind In April 114MW of wind was contracted in 
a tender at a price of R$67.6 per MWh for 
capacity contracted from four projects in 
the north-eastern state of Bahia.
India 35 Solar In July 2018, ACME Solar quoted the 
lowest tariff of ₹2.44 per kWh for 600 
MW of solar projects in the Solar Energy 
Corporation of India (SECI)’s 2 GW ISTS 
Phase I auction.
2019
Saudi Arabia 17 Solar Saudi Arabia’s Acwa Power submitted a 
tariff of just US$c 1.6953 per kW for the 
900MW fifth phase of Dubai’s Mohammed 
bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MBR) Solar Park 
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A broader experience in the siting of renewables, faster installations, and 
lower related costs, as well as an increase in conversion efficiencies have 
 contributed to further reduce the cost of energy produced from renewables. 
Significant improvements have been achieved because of a move to renewable 
auctions, although there are critical voices as to the long-term viability of these 
cost reductions and their impact on the diversity of market actors. (Klessmann 
& Tiedemann 2017). Nonetheless, these have resulted in a decrease in the price 
per megawatt and contracts for large-scale renewable technologies, as can be 
seen in Table 1.
Although globally renewables are still a relatively small share of total power 
production, around 5 per cent, in selected countries and regions they have 
become significant providers of electricity. In 2018, wind energy provided 
an estimated 11.8 per cent of EU annual electricity consumption – including 
Denmark, which met 41 per cent of its annual electricity consumption with 
renewables. Globally, at least 12 countries, including Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
and Uruguay, met 10 per cent of their demand from wind. In 2018, solar PV 
accounted for 12.1 per cent of total generation in Honduras. Significant shares 
can also be observed in Italy and Greece (both about 8.2 per cent), and by late 
2018 one in five Australian households generated at least some of their electric-
ity with solar energy (Ren21 2019).
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) has published its analysis for 
investment in global clean energy which shows that 2017 was the second high-
est ever, with US$333.5 billion, despite falling technology costs (Louw 2018). 
 Globally, the solar sector in China dominated, with a total of US$132.6 billion of 





US 19.9 Solar In June a 400MW project in Los Angeles 
was agreed at US$c1.997 per kWh.
Portugal 16.6 Solar In July, the Direcção-Geral de Energia e 
Geologia awarded a series of contracts to 
provide 1.15GW of solar energy. Within 
that, 150MW was secured for a price of just 
€0.01476 per kWh.
Saudi Arabia 20 Wind In August it was announced that the costs 
of electricity from the 400MW Dumat Al 
Jandal onshore wind farm would be US$c 
1.99 per kWh.
UK 50.0 Offshore 
wind
12 projects, including 5.5 GW of offshore 
wind projects, at record low prices as low 
as £39.65 were contracted.
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shows, growth in solar investment has continued at pace over the last decade. 
The graphic also indicates the extent to which the deployment of renewable 
energy, including hydropower, has come to dominate total new capacity in the 
power sector, moving from around 50 per cent at the turn of the century to, in 
2016, comprising of 62 per cent.
In regional terms Asia, largely China, dominates the global landscape, with 
Europe, once the world leader, continuing to decrease the level of investments. 
In 2017, European investment totalled US$57.4 billion, down from US$137.8 
billion in 2011. In the United States, investment in clean energy grew margin-
ally to US$56.9 billion in 2017, with a peak in 2011, similar to Europe, in the 
United States at US$62.3 billion. Mexico and Australia saw 2017 investment 
levels at an all-time high of US$6.2 billion and US$9 billion, respectively.
In terms of installed capacity and output, the European Union still is a global 
leader in renewable energy. In 2017 across the bloc, renewables, including 
hydropower (9 per cent), renewables provided 33 per cent of electricity, more 
than any other source (Sandbag 2019).
While renewable energy deployment has been initiated by national poli-
cies and measures, with 179 countries having renewable energy targets on the 
national or state or provincial level (Ren21 2019), this is expected to accelerate, 
as equipment and production costs for small-scale renewables continue to fall 
and reach grid parity1 in many regions of the world. However, this is only the 
first step. The next step is when renewables are able to achieve ‘energy system 
 1 Grid parity (or socket parity) occurs when an alternative energy source can generate 
power at a levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) that is less than or equal to the price 
of purchasing power from the electricity grid. 
Figure 1: Global investment in clean energy by sector (US$ billion).
Source: BNEF (2018), UNEP 2010–2017 Status Reports.
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parity’, which would include the system integration costs (the costs of balanc-
ing and reserves). Energy system parity is likely to be achieved once integrated, 
smart energy systems or decentral storage solutions come into place.
1.2 The global spread of decentralised energy generation
From a global perspective, energy technologies, energy system operation, and 
energy ownership are also decentralising,2 with investment in distributed energy 
continuing to grow, especially for solar PV, as is shown in Figure 2. In 2017, both 
large-scale and small-scale solar picked up again close to 2015 figures.
As the country reports in Chapter 2 demonstrate, there are some countries 
in which decentralised energy is playing an increasingly important role in the 
supply structure.
In 2017 the worldwide investment in solar projects of less than 1 MW was 
US$49.4 billion, installing 29 GW. China rapidly increased its investment five-
fold in 2017, totalling US$19.6 billion of investment in small-scale projects, 
almost 40% of the global total. While the global investment in small-scale 
renewables is much less than the peak in 2011, of US$76.2 billion, as the cost of 
solar has fallen 57% over the same period, the annual installed capacity is the 
largest yet (Frankfurt School-UNEP 2018).
For a couple of years, Japan dominated the country ranking of investments in 
decentralised renewable energies, with a total of US$31.7 billion in 2015. The 
rise of renewable deployment in Japan was, in part, a response to the accident 
at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in 2011 and the subsequent temporary 
closure of all nuclear power plants. Since then, much to the discomfort of the 
national government, restart of the reactors has been extremely slow. At the 
end of the year 2018 only nine plants were in operation, down from 54 prior to 
the accident.
Australia has seen rapid growth in the deployment of solar, especially on the 
household level. Despite cuts in government support, deployment of PV has 
continued, because its decreasing costs turn them into economically attrac-
tive alternatives to paying the retail price of electricity. By the end of 2017, 
 2 By decentralising we mean: technologies themselves are in smaller capacity units, 
and their geographic distribution is wider. The system is moving from a one-way, 
top-down, supply-orientated operation of a few, large conventional fossil power 
plants to a system operation in a bi-directional way, demand focused, with mul-
tiple, varied power generating units of all sizes. Whereas ownership used to be 
state-owned monopolies, or large utilities, increasingly there are new entrants with 
non-traditional business models which provide particular services, for example 
suppliers that only sell renewable energy; former municipal utilities that diversify 
their services; independent platform providers which establish local energy markets; 
intermediaries who manage demand-side response.
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cumulative installed capacity for solar PV systems in Australia stood at 6401 
MW with close to 1.8 million installations, an increase from 5463 MW and 
1.64 million installations the previous year (AEC 2018). By the start of 2018, 
over 30 per cent of homes in Queensland and South Australia had solar panels 
(Australian PV Institute 2018).
Across Europe around two thirds of solar systems are located on the roof-
tops, be they residential, commercial, or industrial. In Germany, there are 
approximately 1.5 million solar PV systems (GTAI 2018) with a total installed 
capacity of nearly 43 GW by the end of 2017, but only a small amount of utility-
scale solar units. By contrast, utility-scale solar accounts for 20 per cent of the 
approximately 20 GW PV capacity within the Italian system – there are still 
over 700,000 separate solar installations (Gianni 2017).
In the United States in 2017, around 28.5 GW of electricity generating infra-
structure was deployed – 25 GW utility scale and about 3.5  GW of distrib-
uted (that is, smaller than 1 MW) solar power – of the total, wind and solar 
were 55.4 per cent. However, when looking at net additions with the closure 
of 11.8 GW of utility-scale fossil fuel plant retirements, the net new volume of 
US generation was 16.7 GW of generating capacity, with 94.7 per cent of that 
coming from renewables (Weaver 2018). In comparison, India’s rooftop solar 
accounts for 9 per cent of the country’s solar capacity. In Japan, around 11.8 per 
cent of new solar additions are on rooftops (REN21 2018).
China has experienced a massive increase in deployment of decentralised 
renewable technologies. Over the last few years, China has shown that without 
the engagement of customers and the public, renewable energy, in particular 
Figure 2: The global deployment of solar and wind power (GW).
Source: BNEF 2018.
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solar and wind, can be deployed at scale too. These deployment rates, 53 GW in 
2017 alone, have had a profound impact on global technological manufactur-
ing costs. There has also been a shift towards distributed capacity, with about 
19.4 GW of capacity added in 2017, up from 4.2 GW in 2016, including a three-
fold increase in rooftop solar to 2 GW (REN21 2018).
The rapid increase in the deployment of renewables has most often been driven 
by specific targets or policy interventions. In the case of Germany and Italy, the 
availability of feed-in-tariffs (FiTs) led a boom in PV deployment, including 
 significant small-scale and individually or community owned.  In some countries, 
the effect of price guarantees was underestimated. Programs were exploited in 
a short time leading to high overall costs for the support schemes and started 
to affect other market actors, traditional generating companies, and the grid 
 operators. Consequently, fiscal support schemes – reductions in the FiTs and 
more recently changes in rules about grid access – have slowed done, and in 
some cases completely stopped.
By contrast, the developing world is leapfrogging into a decentralised energy 
supply infrastructure. In developing countries, micro-grids and solar-storage 
kits for individual households co-exist at the periphery of the central grid and 
may in future substitute the rollout of the public transmission network, compa-
rable to the phenomenon of leapfrogging from no telephone service to hand-
held devices without passing the stage of line-based telephony.
1.3 Decentralised storage gaining importance
The greater deployment of renewables, particularly those with weather- 
dependent, variable production, is increasing the need for grid flexibility and 
reducing the need for traditional base-load generators. A key technology to 
increase flexibility is storage technology. An assessment by the US Department 
of Energy suggests that storage will increase the possibility of economic deploy-
ment of variable renewables from 16 per cent to 55 per cent (NREL 2016).
Storage technologies will also enable the greater use of electricity in other 
sectors, such as heat and transport. Recognising these cross-sector benefits has 
resulted in increased efforts in research and development, leading to greater 
deployment and creating a virtuous circle of falling, higher technical potentials, 
and further deployment.
Advances in storage technologies are especially important for electric vehi-
cles, as they face the trade-off between weight of the batteries and restrictions in 
the range, which may lead to so-called ‘range anxiety’ of drivers. Nonetheless, 
the race to electrify the transport sector is speeding up. Significantly, Volvo, 
the Chinese-owned Swedish car manufacturer, announced in June 2017 that 
all its cars built after 2019 would be hybrid or purely electric, the first major 
automotive firm to do so (Vaughan 2017). Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
have revised their forecasts and have suggested that, by 2040, 57 per cent of all 
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new car sales will be electric and that electric vehicles (EVs) are expected to 
be at parity with internal combustion vehicles by the mid-2020s in most mar-
kets (BNEF 2019). However, some countries are likely to move much quicker 
than the BNEF global average, with France and the United Kingdom announc-
ing that they will ban the sale of petrol and diesel cars by 2040 (Chrisafis & 
Vaughan 2017). The rollout of electric vehicles will have profound impact on 
the power sector, through increased and flexible demand, cheaper electric 
storage technology, and the cross-over between actors in the utility and car 
manufacturing markets. Directly competing with premium EV manufacturer 
Tesla,  traditional car producers such as BMW, Honda, and Nissan have already 
started  selling household-level storage units, both to capitalise on their existing 
battery research, but also as a potential use for second-life batteries.3
This combined potential use has resulted in overall cost reduction in lithium 
batteries that are in line with those seen in the wind and solar PV sectors. The 
cost of the latest electric vehicle by car manufacturer Tesla, which entered pro-
duction in 2017, has costs of US$190 per kWh (Voelcker 2016), BNEF expect that 
costs will continue to decline reaching as low as US$70 per kWh by 2030 (BNEF 
2018). In the power sector, the costs for consumer level (Lambert 2016) or grid 
level storage are also falling fast, helping to accelerate their rate of deployment.
Progress in developing and commercialising new storage technologies, in 
particular solid-state batteries with a higher energy intensity than lithium-ion 
batteries and less use of scarce raw materials, is likely to accelerate the usage 
of batteries not only in automobiles, but also in applications around the smart 
home (Forschungszentrum Juelich 2018).
1.4 Decoupling growth and energy intensity via renewables 
and energy efficiency
Renewable deployment and storage technologies must go hand in hand with 
energy efficiency, if the system is to meet overall objectives of decarbonisation. 
The developments in energy demand vary hugely across the world’s economies. 
The most striking feature in recent decades has been the increase in consumption 
in China and India, as can be seen in Figure 3. Although China’s consumption is 
now three times larger than it was at the turn of the century, the overall growth 
rates seem to decrease, which is the case for energy, as seen in the graphic, but 
also for electricity. While the growth in India has been slower, there is currently 
no tapering off, with an expectation that by 2035 it will exceed that of China’s 
(BP 2017).
 3 Once batteries have degraded to some 80 per cent of their capacity, they may longer 
be suitable for vehicle usage, but may still be suitable to stationary storage where size 
and weight are no longer critical factors. 
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The energy intensity of the global economy is decreasing due to technologi-
cal progress and systemic changes. Despite rising GDPs in many OECD coun-
tries, demand for energy and electricity are stable or falling, also because of 
structural changes in their economies – with less reliance on energy-intensive 
industries and a shift to services and digital production, as is shown in Figure 4.
In emerging economies, increase in energy demand has slowed significantly, 
mainly due to improved efficiencies, a reduced rate of infrastructure construc-
tion, for example, use of cement, and to some extent the increasing role of the 
service sector.
1.5 Value creation with decentralised renewable energy 
generation
Many countries still rely on a fully regulated electricity supply industry, often 
with vertically integrated utilities and a single-buyer model. For these coun-
tries, one driver for a stronger push towards decentralised supply structures 
may be motivated by over-arching policy objectives, namely local value crea-
tion and employment.
IRENA estimate that in 2016 renewable energy employed 9.8 million peo-
ple, of which 3.1 million were in photovoltaics sectors and 1.2 million in wind 
power. Globally, China accounts for 3.6 million of the global jobs, of which 
solar PV accounted for 2.0 million. Within the sector, 1.3 million were for the 
Figure 3: Relative increase in energy consumption in selected countries.
Source: BP Statistic Review (2018).
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manufacturing of the PV panels, with 635,000 for construction and installa-
tion and 26,000 for operation and maintenance (IRENA 2017a). In Bangladesh, 
solar photovoltaics accounted for 140,000 jobs (ibid.). On a global basis across 
the value chain of a medium sized solar installation (50 MW), 22 per cent of the 
jobs are related to construction, while 17 per cent are in the installation, and 56 
per cent in the operation and maintenance (IRENA 2017b).
An analysis of the US Department of Energy reveals that employment in the 
solar and wind industries totalled 374,000 and 102,000 individuals, respectively, 
out of a total workforce of 1.9 million in electric power generation and fuels 
technologies. Compared to 2015, employment in solar and wind industries 
increased by 25 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively, in 2016 (US Department 
of Energy 2017). If these figures are combined with the energy output by tech-
nology, they translate into 7724 MW hours per worker in the case of coal, 3812 
MW hours per worker for natural gas, and 98 MW hours per worker for solar 
(Perry 2017). As Perry states, ‘to produce the same amount of electric power as 
just one coal worker would require two natural gas workers and an amazingly 
high 79 solar workers’ (ibid.) Perry interprets these comparative figures as an 
indicator for the lack of productivity in generating electricity from renewable 
resources, but if a government’s emphasis is on communal value creation, the 
new technologies offer unprecedented opportunities for local employment.
For the year 2012, the independent research institute IÖW investigated the 
impact of renewable energies on local value creation in Germany. With 36 per 
Figure 4: Relative change in energy intensities 2000–2015.
Source: World Bank (2018).
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cent, the manufacturing of components has the highest overall share in value 
creation, but this activity does only marginally take place on the municipal or 
regional level. However, the other elements of value creation, including plan-
ning and installation (13 per cent), operation and maintenance (23 per cent), 
trading (6 per cent), and revenues for owners (22 per cent), are strongly tied to 
the location of the installations: ‘The direct value added by renewable energies 
in Germany in 2012 adds up to 16.9 billion EUR with a municipal value added 
of around 11.1 billion EUR. Therefore 66 per cent of the total value added in the 
Federal Republic benefit local communities. In addition to that, nearly 380,000 
jobs were created in 2012 by renewable energy in Germany’ (Aretz et al. 2013).
In off-grid locations, for example in Sub-Saharan Africa, the effects of value 
creation by decentralised supply may be even more pronounced, because they 
may not only contain the direct financial benefits for local communities, tech-
nicians, and owners of the installations, but may also include indirect effects. 
For example, they may positively affect quality of life in impoverished rural 
neighbourhoods, thus reducing urban migration and brain drain. In Chapter 3, 
the business models of start-ups Mobisol, Solarkiosk, and SolShare are pre-
sented, which target off-grid communities and enhance the local economy.
1.6 Digitalisation as enabler of the smart grid and new 
business models
In all facets of our lives we have entered the digital age. Not only communica-
tion, social interaction, and entertainment, but also shopping via the internet, 
the smart home with assisted living, e-government, or individual mobility with 
autonomous and connected cars. New information technologies and systems 
are revolutionising the energy sector, too, through the generation of individual 
data and the ability to process and analyse it, to the opportunities for machine 
learning, improving energy performance, and the increasing use of distributed 
ledger technologies, in particular Blockchain.
While the electricity supply industry has been slow to become aware of the 
opportunities and threats that these data management technologies can bring, 
the degree of interest and speed at which pilots are being undertaken indicate 
that rapid change is likely. Predictive maintenance of devices, such as turbines 
in thermal power plants, and more precise forecasts of consumption patterns 
have already become reality. The next step for data management will be to inte-
grate micro-producers of electricity – so-called prosumers – into the balancing 
of the distribution network.
The rollout of smart meters and the installation of smart devices, such as 
sensors, in transmission and distribution networks is rapidly increasing the 
volume of information and the ability to process this. On average, a smart 
meter recording every 15 minutes transmits 400 MB of data each year. This 
information serves as an enabler of new markets, allowing businesses to collect, 
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anonymise, and analyse it, to potentially increase efficiency, better match sup-
ply with demand, and also – vice versa – enable demand to increasingly match 
variable supply.
However, smart meters and the linking of a wide range of electronic devices 
raises security concerns, specifically over privacy implications, despite sugges-
tions that these fears maybe over-stated (Wang & Lewandowski 2016; Burger, 
Trbovich & Weinmann 2018).
Machine learning, whereby computers can improve their decision-making 
capabilities with minimal human intervention, has been part of the develop-
ment of information technologies since the 1950s. However, the success of its 
usage and its potential have only been recently widely recognised in the energy 
sector. For example, machine learning is envisaged to improve the efficiency 
of generation, both conventional and renewable (Murgia & Thomas 2017). By 
machine learning with their Deep Mind computer power, Google estimates 
that it saves 40 per cent of consumption by optimising the efficiency of opera-
tion and predicting future data and energy usage. Information technology 
has become a major consumer of energy, but Google claims that because of 
super-efficient servers and rapid improvements in computer power they have 
increased the level of computer power they can produce per unit of energy 
consumed by 3.5 times over the last five years (Deepmind 2016).
Blockchain may be another source of digital disruption of the energy sector. 
It is a distributed database of data records that links transactions to each other, 
thereby providing transparency. Blocks are verified by a distributed network of 
computers. Transactions are encrypted. This cuts out the middlemen, allowing 
not only payment transactions but also smart contracts, the technology might 
provide a basis to embed prosumers into the energy system and deal with the 
resulting increasing complexity by reducing process costs and enabling plat-
forms for smart contracts beyond a single energy provider (Burger et al. 2016; 
PwC 2016).
The above-mentioned key trends of competitiveness of renewables, the rising 
role of decentralised supply and storage, decoupling growth and energy inten-
sity, enhancing local value creation, and digitalisation as enabler of smart grids 
and new business models describe the uncertainty policy makers and company 
leaders are facing. By looking at cases of country transformations and business 
models beyond subsidies, the next two chapters build a basis and guide through 
this uncertainty, including the necessary changes for governance, as introduced 
in the next chapter.
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Regulatory and policy incentives – how 
to establish governance for decentralised 
energy systems?
Antony Froggatt and Catherine Mitchell
2.1 The role of regulation and governance
2.1.1 Regulation as accelerator or decelerator 
of the energy transformation
There are multiple ways to meet the 2°C reduction target of the Paris Agree-
ment and to reach a ‘deep decarbonisation’ of our economies, including a 
reduction of primary energy consumption, the use of low-emission generation 
technologies such as nuclear power, or the use of carbon capture and storage. 
However, the most likely and cost-effective path of decarbonisation is that of 
renewables supplying the majority of electricity, if not the entirety (GEA 2012; 
IPCC 2015; Greenpeace 2015) alongside significant energy efficiency meas-
ures, whether minimising energy use in buildings through retrofit programmes 
or via the markets, ensuring the demand side is as valuable as the supply side. 
That will require not only new policies and significant changes in incentive 
schemes for generators and the associated grid infrastructure, but also a more 
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encompassing transformation of governance mechanisms – policies, institu-
tions, market design and network rules, and the ‘politics’ behind them.
The starting point of today’s regulatory framework was centralised systems. 
Historically, only one, or a few, entities owned and operated the grid and its 
associated infrastructure. Customers were passive receivers of a public infra-
structure service. Many countries have not yet undertaken any reforms in the 
power supply industry at all, and vertically integrated, state-owned utilities are 
in charge of all operations along the value chain of the power sector. In other 
countries, reforms have been initiated, such as in South Korea, where competi-
tion is in principle allowed, but a single state owned company still dominates 
the market.
As described above, many countries are experiencing a phase of rapid decen-
tralisation, however. This means new roles for, and new relationships between, 
stakeholders – whether resource providers, buyers, transmission operators, 
and so on. The idea of ‘grids’ will have to alter. They will be extended, inter- 
connected, and more dynamic to operate flexibly, thereby incorporating vari-
able renewables most cost effectively. Flexibility may become a key system 
function affecting large groups of dispersed individual suppliers. 
In competitive electricity markets, such as in Western and Northern Europe, 
different customer segments emerge. Some individual consumers, as well as 
groups of consumers such as consumer co-operatives, may become producers 
and investors, and get involved in managing grids, whereas other consumers 
may choose to continue in their traditional role as customers and recipients 
of energy services. Some residential consumers may not even have an inter-
est in switching their supplier, as their energy bill is just a small share of their 
income. For example, in Denmark – despite being a country where customers 
are invested in community projects – households have not tended to change 
electricity suppliers.
In situations where both individuals and groups of customers choose to 
become active agents, commercial opportunities for new entrants to provide 
services also occur. However, the energy system and its operations, the coordi-
nation and integration of smaller-scale services, and dispersed ownership, are 
also becoming more complex. Not only does it require greater flexibility for 
efficient operation, but it also requires greater data transparency and process-
ing power of that data.
2.1.2 An assessment of governance practices 
in key transformation countries
Decentralising the energy system and establishing local markets, including 
local balancing markets, provide commercial opportunities for customers or 
producers, thereby adding a new dimension to the energy system – distributed, 
decarbonised, digitalised, and potentially democratised. Therefore, the role of 
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regulation will change. It needs to be able to assign value to new services, to cre-
ate a means of coordination between networks, markets, and new platforms in 
ways that are cost effective to customers, but also nimble and adaptive enough 
to enable, rather than undermine or block, innovation, new business models, 
and customer wishes.
The business models of these developing energy systems will differ depending 
on geography and sociocultural context, the legacies of the previous systemic con-
figurations, and the size and pattern of demand. However, the way the  business 
models develop in these different types of energy systems is also determined by 
where value – or payments – can be accessed within the energy value chain; and 
this in turn depends on the extent to which governance enables, constrains, or 
channels energy system innovation. Governance is at the centre of energy system 
transformation including the rate at which it is able to decarbonise.
The deployment and the development of decentralised energy differs across 
countries and regions, depending on the policy situation in which they develop. 
Within each country there are often distinct periods of renewables deployment, 
driven by different priorities in the policy regimes:
•	Some countries, such as Denmark and Germany, which both have a long 
history of renewable energy deployment, have put renewables at the centre 
of their energy and electricity policy. The high level of deployment subse-
quently implies that an efficient integration of current and future volumes 
of renewables requires an increase in the flexibility of their energy systems.
•	Emerging economies – such as China and India, characterised by rapidly 
growing power demand – have become global leaders in renewable tech-
nologies, including both manufacturing and deployment. These unprece-
dented high annual renewable installation rates may make small differences 
to their countries’ overall power mixes, given the size of the existing supply 
portfolio, but the scale of these investments have indeed affected technol-
ogy adoption internationally by driving down the price.
•	There are regions in which renewable deployment is already affecting grid 
operation, such as South Australia or California.
•	In other countries, where renewables play a less significant role, institu-
tions have been slower to reform, so that the governance structure itself 
is becoming a limiting factor in the efficient deployment of decentralised 
renewables. For example, the Italian market is characterised by a remarka-
ble increase in decentralised renewable capacity installed, despite the dom-
inance of former incumbent utility Enel and the hesitation of regulatory 
bodies to introduce a coherent regulatory regime that embraces the next 
wave of the transition towards a fully decentralised system.
This chapter of the book looks at the current deployment practises in these 
countries, to assess the effectiveness of the policies and the impacts that 
higher contributions of renewables and decentralisation are having on system 
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operation. The countries and regions were selected based on their historic, 
current, or expected importance to the global deployment rate of renewable 
energy and the contribution that renewables make to the overall electricity 
supply, and the system consequences. Some countries, for example the United 
States, which has a federal political model, have multiple, differing policies in 
different devolved states, which can illuminate the value of different govern-
ance mechanisms. The US chapter has been written as a comparative chapter in 
order to reflect this diversity. These country chapters can be allocated into two 
main categories:
•	Countries or states with a high share of new renewable energies, but low or 
stagnant growth of per-capita primary energy consumption:
 {Australia




•	Countries or states with a low share of renewable energies and currently low 




The following sections of this chapter depict the diverging options governments 
have chosen to promote decentralised renewable energy supply. All contribu-
tions are independent yet interdependent narratives of the global momentum 
of the transformation of the energy supply industry. All of them emphasise 
the importance of regulation in the systemic changes, but they also show how 
the spectrum of trajectories – and their outcomes – are embedded in a path-
dependent sociocultural and economic ecosystem that differs fundamentally 
across nations and continents.
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2.2 Australia: from central electricity to solar/storage systems
Helen Poulter
2.2.1 Introduction
Australia has one of the best solar resources in the world and also some of the 
highest electricity prices. It also has the highest per capita of domestic solar 
PV installations worldwide, at almost 25 per cent of households. In September 
of 2016, South Australia experienced severe storms which led to a state-wide 
blackout and prompted a review of the governance of the National Electricity 
Market (NEM). A heatwave in February 2017 caused the NEM to cut power to 
90,000 of its domestic customers. This load shedding event prompted a further 
peak in the installation of behind-the-meter distributed generation and enquir-
ies for domestic storage.
This chapter will give an overview of the NEM in Australia, the renewable 
energy resources, the current situation regarding distributed energy, and the 
future plans for the governance of the NEM.
2.2.2 The Australian electricity framework
Australia’s electricity networks are separated into three regional markets and 
one state owned system. The NEM is the largest and operates in Eastern Aus-
tralia, covering five interconnected state-based networks and is the focus of this 
chapter. The three other smaller systems operating in the western and north-
ern states (The Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM), the Northern Territory 
Electricity Market (NTEM), and the North Western Interconnected System 
(NWIS)) operate under different rules to the NEM and as such will not be 
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 covered here. The NEM is governed and regulated by a central federal system. 
This section will give a brief overview of the governance institutions of the 
NEM and its market operation.
Federal departments
Council of Australian Governments
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) was initially established in 
1991 to drive microeconomic reform in the energy, communications, trans-
port, and water industries (AEMC 2014b), and to replace the Special Premiers 
Conferences, a similar body who met at frequent intervals to discuss matters 
of Commonwealth importance. The members are the Prime Minister, State and 
Territory Premiers, and Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian 
Local Government Association.
The reform of the electricity industry (the goal of which was to separate 
policy and regulation from industry; the restructuring of industry; and to 
introduce competition) resulted in the commencement of the NEM in eastern 
Australia in 1998 and the Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM) in southern 
Western Australia in 2006. Since its formation COAG’s role has been to pro-
mote reforms that are of national significance and/or need the co-operation 
of all the state and territory governments. These reforms include themes for 
economic and social participation, national economic competition, sustainable 
living, health, and reducing the disadvantages of the indigenous people.
Council of Australian Governments Energy Council
The COAG Energy Council was established in December 2013, replacing the 
Standing Council on Energy and Resources (SCER) and consists of the energy 
and resource ministers from the Commonwealth, state and territories of 
 Australia, and New Zealand. The council was established in response to a need 
for energy reforms within both the gas and electricity markets, which included 
energy efficiency and productivity and energy security, whilst also promoting 
the competitiveness of Australia’s mineral and energy resources, as shown in 
Figure 5 (COAG Energy Council 2016).
Energy Security Board
The Energy Security Board (ESB) was established in August 2017 following 
a review of security and reliability of the NEM (Finkel et al. 2017). The ESB 
consists of the CEO from each of the Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC), the Australian Energy Regulator (AER), and the Australian Energy 
Market Operator (AEMO) and an independent Chair and Deputy Chair. The 
function of the ESB is to provide coordination of the implementation of the 
reforms put forward by the Finkel Review. The ESB will also ‘provide whole 
of system oversight for energy security and reliability to drive better outcomes 
for consumers’ (COAG Energy Council 2017). The ESB reports directly to the 
COAG Energy Council.
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Australian Energy Market Commission
The AEMC was established in 2005 with the objective to ‘promote efficient, reli-
able and secure energy markets which serve the long-term interests of consumers’ 
(AMEC 2016). Their function is to review on possible reforms to the current 
regulatory and market arrangements for both gas and electricity and advise the 
Energy Council, in conjunction with the AER and the AEMO. This includes 
managing rule change requests under the National Electricity Rules (NER) and 
the National Electricity Retail Laws (NERL).
Australian Energy Market Operator
The AEMO is the independent energy markets and power systems operator. It is 
responsible for the wholesale energy markets (electricity and gas) and manage-
ment of the NEM. They are a limited company with operating costs recuperated 
through market fees (AEMO 2016a).
Australian Energy Regulator
The AER regulates the wholesale market of the NEM in compliance with NEM 
legislation and rules. It works in conjunction with, and is funded by, the Com-
monwealth with staff, resources and facilities provided from the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). They are the economic 
regulator of the energy networks and set a maximum price for network charges 
in collaboration with the network service providers, which is reviewed every 
five years. They monitor and enforce compliance with the obligations in the 
Retail Law, Rules and Regulations and provide a price comparison website for 
retail markets for those states which are compliant under the NERL, which 
includes Tasmania (TAS), Australian Capital Territory (ACT), South Australia 
(SA), New South Wales (NSW), and Queensland (QLD) (AER 2009).
Energy Consumers Australia
Energy Consumers Australia (ECA) is a not-for-profit advocacy set up by the 
COAG Energy Council in 2015 and funded through AEMO to represent the 
long-term interests of residential and small businesses within the NEM and to 
provide advice on energy issues to these consumers and represent their views 
to the Council. They work in conjunction with stakeholders from the energy 
industry, energy ombudsman, government and market bodies, the research 
community and media (ECA 2016).
National Electricity Market
The National Electricity Market is the wholesale electricity market covering the 
eastern coast of Australia. It is governed by the National Electricity Rules (NER) 
as set out by the regulatory framework of the NEL. It has over 100 participants 
including generators (the majority taken by coal power plants, transmission 
network service providers (TNSPs), distribution network service providers 
(DNSPs), and market customers).
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The NEM is a transmission and distribution grid covering 5 interconnected 
state-based networks (South Australia (SA), Tasmania (TA), Victoria (VIC), 
New South Wales (NSW) (including the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)), 
and Queensland (QLD) covering a distance of approximately 5000 km and is 
operated by AEMO. It is an energy-only gross pool market with 5 minute spot 
prices averaged for half-hourly periods in each of the six states. Bids are taken 
for each of the 6 trading intervals and the averaged spot price is received by all 
generators dispatched in the trading interval. A recent rule change, which will 
take effect in 2021, is to reduce the settlement period from 30 minutes to five 
minutes. This change is to provide a better signal for investment into the mar-
ket for new technologies and business models, such as batteries and demand 
response. It has been suggested that it will also reduce the ‘gaming’ of the 
half-hourly settlement by gas peaking generators and should therefore reduce 
prices (McConnel & Sandiford 2016; Parkinson 2016). Risks in price volatility 
are reduced using hedges, options, and futures contracts (AEMO 2016c).
Figure 5: Electricity network governance structure of Eastern Australia.
Source: Author based in information sourced in this chapter.
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2.2.3 Australia’s renewable energy resources
Australia‘s renewable energy resources comprise of solar, wind, hydro, ocean, 
and bioenergy. Australia has the highest solar irradiation of any continent and 
average wind speeds in the southern part of the continent in excess of 6 m/s 
(the minimum average wind speed used in assessing wind farm potential). Due 
to the presence in the south of a westerly wind known as the ‘roaring forties’, 
wind farms in South Australia have reported capacity factors of, on average, 
33 per cent. The excellent solar resource is able to produce capacity factors of 
around 30 per cent in summer and 15 per cent to 18 per cent in winter (AEMO 
2016c). The high potential of these resources has meant that new renewable 
installations (Tasmania installed its first hydropower station a century ago) 
have been predominantly wind and solar.
By the end of June 2018, installed capacity, including operating and under-
construction facilities of large-scale wind and solar had reached 7565 MW 
with a further 774 MW of projects signing power purchase agreements (Clean 
Energy Regulator 2018). Small-scale PV (systems under 100 kW) split into two 
categories currently have:
•	commercial systems (10–100 kW) of 1063 MW installed capacity
•	residential systems (under 10 kW) of 5556.8 MW of installed capacity 
(APVI 2018a).4
In 2017–18 Australia had 44.8 GW of electricity generation capacity (AER 2019). 
Small-scale distributed solar now makes up 14.8 per cent of installed capacity.
2.2.4 Distributed Renewable Generation in Australia
The quality of the solar resource, falling prices for PV and storage, and high 
electricity prices have made self-generation an excellent proposal for residential 
and business consumers in Australia. Since 2008, the NEM states have offered 
their own version of feed-in-tariffs, and this, in conjunction with the Small-
scale Renewable Energy Scheme, has led to the current size of the domestic 
market. This section will look at this in more detail.
Solar schemes in the NEM
In 2008 as part of their own renewable energy targets, and to encourage early 
adopters at a household and commercial level, each of the Australian states 
introduced their own incentives for small-scale solar (<100 kW). These state 
designed schemes were a Solar Bonus Scheme (SBS) in New South Wales 
 4 Animation for PV installations from 2007–2018 can be found at http://pv-map.apvi.
org.au/animation.
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(NSW) and a Premium feed-in-tariff (FiT) in Tasmania (TAS) and the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The SBS and Premium FiT paid between 
44c per kWh and 60c per kWh dependent on state regulated tariffs for all PV 
generated electricity. South Australia (SA) and Queensland (QLD) had a net 
FiT which paid 44–60 per kWh for electricity that was fed back into the grid. 
All state schemes were initially open to unlimited size of domestic system but 
then curtailed to 5 kW. In 2012, the schemes closed to new entrants and the 
tariff reduced to around 8c per kWh. Those whose systems were registered and 
installed before the 2012 deadline would receive the initial Premium or Net 
FiT or SBS until 2028. Future FiTs will be set and paid by the retailer with no 
minimum requirement but with the states able to set minimums or provide 
benchmark ranges as a guide for retailers if they wish (Table 2).
The small-scale renewable energy scheme
In 2011 the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) was introduced as 
a measure to encourage individuals and small businesses to invest in eligible 
renewable energy (RE) systems (CER 2018). The scheme will run until 2030. 
SRES certificates are produced for new renewable generation by solar PV, wind, 
or hydro and for the energy displaced by a solar water heater or heat pump 
over the course of a designated period. The certificates can be generated by 
Table 2: FiT rates for NEM states (2017).
STATE Scheme Rate c/kWh Max size








New South Wales Recommended 
benchmark range for 
retailers











South Australia No minimum Depends on 
retailer: currently 
6–12
First 45 kWh 
per day
Tasmania Set rate 7 10 kW single phase
30 kW three phase
Source: Energy Matters (2017).
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the owner of the eligible technology or by an installer who has been assigned 
the right to generate the certificate by the owner. As one certificate is equal 
to 1 MWh, small-scale renewable energy (RE) installers can aggregate smaller 
RE systems to reach the 1 MWh target and pass on savings to the customer. 
The certificates are sold to energy retailers, who are required to surrender an 
amount of certificates each year, through a spot market or through a Govern-
ment Clearing House (RET 2018). The value of the certificates is dependent 
on the spot market price, currently Aus$35.50/MWh. Alternatively, certificates 
can be traded through the government Clearing House at Aus$40/MWh. Cer-
tificates will only be traded through the Clearing House if there are no certifi-
cates available through the spot market. The added benefit of the scheme is that 
it gives the AEMO visibility of the location and density of behind-the-meter RE 
which allows for better forecasting for grid demand.
The rise of DER in Australia
During the years between 2010 and 2012, Australia saw a huge uptake of dis-
tributed solar PV with 900,000 of the current 1.7 million systems being installed 
in those three years (Figure 6).
This led to the highest percentage penetration rates of domestic PV systems 
worldwide, double that of Belgium and three times that of Germany and the 
United Kingdom (AEC 2016), as shown in Figure 7.
The result of this uptake has meant that in SA there has been a shift in the 
time of operational peak demand as the capacity of residential PV systems 
Figure 6: Number of domestic solar PV systems installed by year in the NEM 
states.
Source: Clean Energy Regulator (2016).
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(679 MW) reduced the daytime peak demand profile by almost 10 per cent in 
2015–16 (AEMO 2016c), producing what is now being called a ‘duck-curve’. In 
its National Electricity Forecasting Report (AEMO 2016a), AEMO (the market 
operator) predicts a reduction and flattening of consumption for grid supplied 
electricity due to further uptake of PV from both business and residential cus-
tomers, and an increase in the energy efficiency of households and appliances. 
It also recognises that maximum demand for generated power will continue to 
shift to both later in the day and year, towards the Australian winter evenings. 
This shift has led to a reduction for demand in baseload power but an increase 
in demand for peaking plants.
Australia has been the obvious choice for the introduction of residential 
storage due to its dominance of the rooftop PV market. In 2016, companies 
competing for this market included Tesla, Enphase, GCL Poly, Sonnen, and 
RedFlow, with Tesla launching its new Powerwall 2.0 energy storage device at a 
cost to Australian consumers of Aus$0.23 kWh-1 (Peacock 2016). In some states 
of the NEM it is now, and will be in the future, cheaper to install, generate, and 
store electricity than to buy retail and, dependent on pricing structures, be grid 
connected e.g. retailers are now charging a standing rate for meters which is 
between 80 and 150 c per day or between Aus$292 and Aus$547.50 per year – 
with the average price for installing a 5 kW PV array plus storage cAus$16,000 
(Mountain 2016).
In Figure 8, the cost of the PV/storage system in the NEM states has been cal-
culated for a 10 year lifetime (the average lifespan of a battery system), however, 
Figure 7: Comparison of state/territories of Australia at year end 2016 (Clean 
Energy Regulator 2016), end of May 2017 (Roy Morgan Research 2017) and 
world averages in 2015.
Source: AEC (2016).
Regulatory and policy incentives – how to establish governance 33
if costs were to be spread over a 20 year lifetime, QLD and TAS would also see 
DER costs cheaper than retail prices. These figures do not include government 
FiT schemes in order to indicate the cost of the system assuming the customer 
wanted to disconnect from the grid. In AEMO’s South Australian Electricity 
Report (AEMO 2016b), with figures based on information available until July 
2016, expected uptake of combined PV and storage systems was predicted to 
begin slowly and not see growth until after 2020. It also predicted that retrofit 
of storage systems would be uneconomical. However, nationally in 2016, 6750 
storage units were installed, up from the previous year’s figure of 500, and this 
with no government or policy support. It was estimated that in 2017, due to the 
late arrival of the Powerwall 2.0 and new technology that would ease the ret-
rofitting and installation of storage units, that Australia would install as many 
as 20,000 domestic scale units (Morris 2017). A report from the Clean Energy 
Council (Clean Energy Council 2018) using figures from SunWiz has now 
stated that the current number of installations (as at the end of 2017) stands at 
28,000 with 12 per cent of installations in 2017 also incorporating storage, up 
from 5 per cent the previous year.
After the commencement of the NEM the real term cost of retail electricity 
fell until 2007. In 2010–12 there was steep rise with various factors combining 
causing this rise i) a growth in peak demand requiring new infrastructure and 
Assuming lifespan of 10 years for both (after 10 years costs drop to Aus$0), costs for PV 
taken from solar choice.net.au and solar resource and household electricity use for each of 
the capital cities calculated for each of the NEM states. As it is assumed that these house-
holds would not use the grid, no allowance has been made for FiT payments
Figure 8: Cost of a solar/storage system.
Source: Australian Government (2017), Peacock (2016), Solar Choice (2017).
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generating capacity, ii) retirement of old coal thermal plant, and iii) switching 
to gas generation for peaking plants and baseload power at a time when global 
gas prices were increasing (Simshauser & Laochumnanvanit 2011).
Forecasts had predicted an increase in electricity demand which would 
require new infrastructure and generating capacity. In fact demand fell which 
meant that electricity companies invested in unneeded infrastructure (Saddler 
2017). The incorrectly forecast increase in demand meant that the electricity 
networks augmented their power lines for an expected increase in a one-way 
flow of energy. These investments then formed part of the networks regulated 
asset base (RAB). The return on these investments accounts for more than half 
of the network businesses total revenue. This high revenue and hence a con-
tinuing high RAB leads to high network charges for consumers. In Australia 
the network charges currently make up around 40 per cent of customers’ bills.
Old coal thermal power plants were retired and replaced with combined 
cycle gas thermal power plants (CCGT). At this time there was an increase 
in global gas prices which led to the development of 3 LNG export projects in 
Queensland. These developments limited the availability of local gas for the 
domestic market and caused wholesale gas prices to rise, affecting the cost of 
electricity supplied by gas generation in the NEM (Oakley Greenwood 2016) 
and therefore increasing prices for consumers. Forecasts predict more increases 
for residential electricity prices in 2020, between 15 and 20 per cent higher than 
2016 levels.
Future price rises have been attributed to a reliance on gas for future elec-
tricity supply and an unexpected reduction in electricity demand leading 
to over-investment in generation capacity (Reed 2016). In particular South 
Australia (SA) and Queensland (QLD) are more reliant on gas generation for 
baseload power. It is forecasted that commercial and industrial users could 
see increases of 20–40 per cent compared to 2016 levels by 2037 (Parisot & 
Nidras 2016).
For domestic customers the retail cost of electricity is made up of two s eparate 
charges, a daily supply charge, between 80 and 150 c per day dependent on state 
and supplier, and the volumetric charge, which includes costs for distribution, 
transmission, retail, and wholesale costs, and environmental  policies. On 1st 
July 2016 the network prices in the ACT and NSW increased, but decreased 
in QLD, SA, and TAS (Duffy & Johnston 2016) therefore the rise in retail 
prices seen in the latter states could be attributed to an increase in generation 
costs and/or environmental policies, or due to the reduction in volume of sales 
from customers.
Following the continuing price rises the Australian Competition and Con-
sumer Commission (ACCC) released a report on retail pricing in the NEM 
(ACCC 2018). The report recognises that competition in the NEM is not work-
ing and that the current approach to policy, regulatory design, and promotion 
of competition is not working in the best interests for consumers. The report 
has 56 recommendations around four broad areas:
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1. Boosting competition in generation and retail.
2. Lowering costs in networks, environmental schemes and retail.
3. Enhancing consumer experiences and outcomes.
4. Improving business outcomes.
2.2.5 Disruption within the electricity industry
There has been both climatic and technological disruptions within the electric-
ity industry in Australia. Climatic disruption resulting in blackouts (as a result 
of extreme heatwaves), and technological disruption – the unprecedented pen-
etration of DER, causing some commentators to suggest that Australia may be 
soon in the grips of a utility ‘death spiral’.
Box 1: Climatic events
On the 28th  September 2016 storms in northern South Australia, 
including tornados with wind speeds in the range of 190–260 km/h 
caused a state-wide blackout. The update report (AEMO 2017b) from 
AEMO and also a recent review by the Chief Scientist, Alan Finkel (Fin-
kel et al. 2017) have recommended that value services for Frequency 
Controlled Ancillary Service (FCAS) and System Restart Ancillary Ser-
vices (SRAS) from distributed energy and other storage technologies 
should be investigated.
In addition, on February 8th 2017, a heatwave with temperatures of 41.6°C 
left 90,000 homes (AEMO 2017c) in South Australia without power as 
AEMO committed to load shedding due to failures of its fossil fuel gen-
erators. The demand forecasts they had received had not anticipated the 
cooling demand for the period and the reduced wind power due to a drop 
in wind speed. A 165 MW gas plant was ‘unavailable’ and unable to start-
up in the time requested, needing 4 hours notice, leaving homes without 
power in the evening on one of the hottest days of the summer.
The 28th September 2016 events in detail:
•	The northern South Australia Storms, including tornados 
with wind speeds in the range of 190–260 km/h, caused mul-
tiple network faults and downed 3 major transmission lines;
•	the resulting voltage disturbances caused settings on the wind 
generators to reduce their output;
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The death spiral effect
A death spiral is a positive feed-back loop. This occurs when, due to rising 
network charges within electricity prices, consumers switch to their own on-
site generation and/or leave suppliers. This then leaves the initial network com-
pany supplier with either less customers or less kWhs from which to recoup 
costs thus having to raise prices, and so on, until demand eventually collapses. 
Within energy this phenomenon has been recognised as a utility death spiral.
The term ‘utility death spiral’ saw a re-emergence recently in Australia. The 
term was originally coined with the new era of competition as energy markets 
opened up and the rising costs of some utilities meant that consumers could 
switch to cheaper alternatives/sources (Costello & Hemphill 1990). Then, it was 
much more a conceptual argument – a threat – to ensure policies which did 
not lead to a death spiral. A perfect storm of requirements would be needed 
to induce such a spiral – inflexible pricing structures, large defections and the 
utilities unable to change their behaviour (Graffy & Kihm 2014). Increasingly, 
the possibility of consumers generating and storing their own power and add-
ing in a new type of disruptive competition has added to the potential drivers 
for a death spiral.
As can be seen from the current situation in Australia, the combination of 
a high percentage of householders already with PV installed, access to cheap 
storage, and high priced retail electricity means that the Australian electricity 
markets could be experiencing the beginnings of a death spiral which could 
threaten the existing incumbents.
•	a necessary increase in imports through the Heywood inter-
connector from Victoria caused a loss of synchronism and led 
to one of the interconnectors tripping;
•	the FCAS capability of the gas generators – which should 
have stopped a collapse of system frequency was unable to 
respond at the required speed;
•	the SRAS – which also should have stopped a collapse of 
system frequency – were unable to start due to unexplained 
failures;
•	this led to a collapse of electricity system frequency.
These two events happened in an Australian state which has over 30 per 
cent of households with rooftop PV and in which installing combined 
domestic scale solar and storage is cheaper than buying grid electricity. 
As can be seen from Figure 12 there has been a 5.5 per cent rise in the 
number of domestic PV installations in the first half of 2017 which has 
been attributed in some way to these events.
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Utility costs – those for network charges currently make up 40–50 per cent of 
the Australian retail price (AEMC 2016), in comparison to the United Kingdom, 
where network costs are approximately 27 per cent (Ofgem 2017). There are high 
retail costs currently and further rises expected in the future, which will invari-
ably mean that the rate of return for the customers installing DER systems will 
be favourable. In response to this, and the need to reduce the percentage of the 
retail charge for network costs, retail companies include a standing charge (aver-
age Aus$400 per year) for domestic customers as well as the volumetric charge. 
It is now affordable for domestic customers to generate and store the majority 
of their electricity needs (Mountain 2016). If a larger and larger percentage of 
people install DER, so a smaller proportion of grid-generated electricity is 
needed. Should storage costs continue to fall, and domestic generators not given 
value for their contribution to decarbonising the energy system,  disconnecting 
from the grid may become a viable choice for Australian householders. This 
suggests that, if Australia wishes to limit the possibility of a death spiral for 
its utilities, it will need to create value for DER for both the utilities and the 
consumer. Certainly, continuing in its current position is widely recognised as 
not an option.
2.2.6 The future of the Australian electricity system
Australia is in a unique position as high electricity prices, falling costs for DER, 
and issues concerning the reliability of electricity supply has caused, as of 2017, 
just over a quarter of households to install solar PV. There has also been signifi-
cant rises in larger (50–100 kW) installations for business and small commer-
cial properties (APVI 2018b). The threat of a possible death spiral for utilities 
and the increase in frequency and ferocity of climatic events, as predicted for 
anthropogenic climate change, have highlighted the need for a more reliable 
and flexible grid; and a market which rewards DER – something that Australia 
does not have currently. AEMO (the market operator) has recently appointed 
Audrey Zibelman, ex Commissioner of the New York (NY) Public Service Com-
mission in New York state (NYS), United States, as the new Head of AEMO. Ms 
Zibelman was the driver of the NYS’s progressive market and network regula-
tion known as the NY Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) (Mitchell 2016), 
and one can expect therefore similar ideas as those set out in the NY REV to 
occur in Australia. In a recent interview (ABC Radio 2017) Audrey Zibelman 
explained how Hurricane Sandy caused New York to rethink its energy strategy. 
She also talked of the implementation of a solar-based micro-grid in Brooklyn 
and said she hopes to see such schemes, of which there are a few being trialled 
within the Australian electricity markets, soon being an integral part of the new 
energy system in Australia.
In December 2017, following AEMO’s (and particularly Ms Zibelman’s) sup-
port of trialling demand response to alleviate extreme demand peaks during high 
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summer temperatures (AEMO 2017a), the AER commenced a Demand Reduc-
tion Incentive Scheme and Innovation Allowance Mechanism (AER 2017). The 
Incentive is targeted at the distribution companies to use non- network solutions 
to provide reduction in demand and the Mechanism provides a small amount 
of funding for R&D in demand management projects. There is also an allow-
ance (Aus$200 K) to help with the roll out of any innovation projects. One trial 
has been for a community-based pilot project, Power Changers (Jemena 2018). 
The trial is being led by Jemena, one of the Victorian distribution companies. 
The project uses an app to encourage users to complete challenges to reduce 
their demand. If the challenges are completed, they receive reward points. These 
reward points are then collected and converted into a monetary reward given to 
an organisation chosen by the community, such as a school.
The NEM also has the problem of many rural customers at the end of long, 
thin distribution wires. In some cases these wires can extend, over terrain with 
a high bush fire risk, for 100 km to serve just a handful of customers. The costs 
of maintaining this wire are exorbitant and, as all network costs are spread over 
all consumers; microgrids would enable a more reliable service for rural cus-
tomers and an overall reduction in customer bills. Although an excellent solu-
tion, there are problems arising from this for a privately owned, competitive 
market such as the NEM. The question currently being examined is how to 
introduce competition for retail, generation, and storage in micro-grids whilst 
ensuring consumer protections
In the NEM the big 3 ‘gentailers’ – Origin Energy, AGL, and EnergyAustralia – 
have been encouraging the use of battery systems by offering PV and battery 
packages through their retail services. Although this seems contrary to what 
would be expected from fossil fuel generating companies, it shows that some 
of the Australian generators are accepting that the future energy system will 
need to include a large proportion of DER and are therefore already deciding 
to enter the field.
As well as offering a residential and commercial storage package, AGL are 
trialling a Virtual Power Plant (VPP) in Adelaide, SA (AGL 2017). The VPP is 
made up of 1000 domestic solar PV and battery systems which are aggregated 
and so can be seen on the network. These can then be used for network services 
such as peak demand reduction and frequency control. This will help to create 
resilience for the network and reliability for the consumer. A similar scheme 
is also underway in Bruny Island, Tasmania. Reposit Power in collaboration 
with the Australian Renewable Energy Association (ARENA), TasNetworks, 
and academia in Melbourne and Tasmanian Universities, have set up a VPP to 
reduce the islands reliance on back-up diesel generation (Reposit Power 2017).
In 2017 in SA the previous Labor government and Tesla began a trial of a 
VPP of 50,000 homes. The initial trial installed 5 kW of rooftop solar and a 
15.3 kWh Tesla Powerwall battery on 100 housing association homes. This trial 
is the first stage which will see another 1000 homes with solar and batteries 
installed in the second stage. The original trial was then to extend this to a total 
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of 50,000 homes in a third stage. However, after a recent change of government 
it is expected that this will change to the election promise of Aus$100 m of 
grants towards domestic battery storage, an estimated 40,000 homes. The new 
government has still shown an interest in the Tesla proposal and is also inter-
ested in other battery companies such as Sonnen and is promising that SA will 
still lead the way in renewable energy transformation (Parkinson 2018).
Due to the rise in DER there has also been the question of tariff reform to 
reduce the ‘death spiral’ effect and increase visibility of DER. One idea being 
spoken about is to change from a kWh charge to a kWp (kilowatt peak) charge. 
This tariff would be similar in effect to a mobile phone data plan. The customer 
would choose a plan based on their peak kilowatt usage e.g. not going above 3 
kW of demand at any one time. If they go over this limit they would have to pay 
a fee. They would then be given the option to increase their plan if they thought 
that this would be something that would happen often e.g. they install an air 
conditioner which uses energy when their PV system is not generating or charge 
an electric vehicle at peak times. This would then give the customer the option of 
(1) changing their consumption patterns, (2) changing to a new plan, or (3) buy-
ing energy storage dependent on the economics and/or customer preferences. 
The idea behind this is that high costs for the consumer come from the need for 
peaking generators and distribution capacity to cover these peaks. By customers 
committing to a peak level this will give the distribution companies and the mar-
ket operator visibility of where, and how much, generation and network capacity 
is needed.
The Finkel Review
Following the events of September 2016 the federal government undertook a 
review of the governance of the NEM. The review was undertaken by the Office 
of Australia’s Chief Scientist – Dr Alan Finkel. The review ‘An Independent 
Review into the Future Security of the National Electricity Market: Blueprint 
for the Future’ (Finkel et al. 2017) made recommendations on the themes of:
•	increased energy security within the NEM for increased penetration of 
variable renewable resources, including valuing frequency response, syn-
thetic inertia, demand response, and voltage control and also cyber security 
due to the increase of IT services within the system;
•	policy stability with recommendations for a long ranging Clean Energy 
Target (CET) which would see certificates issued for all types of generation 
with more certificates issued for the least polluting technologies;
•	efficiency within the gas markets to ensure that electricity generators are 
able to maintain reliability of supply;
•	improved system planning to include a transmission and distribution plan 
to recognise areas of future economically viable VRE penetration, also a 
review of regulation to remove the incentives for networks to prioritise over 
non-network solutions;
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•	rewarding consumers including the facilitation of a DER market and a change 
in role for the distribution networks to provide a platform for new technologies;
•	stronger governance to include the establishment of an Energy Security 
Board (ESB) to oversee the implementation of the plan and to be a single 
point of responsibility and accountability between market institutions and 
the Energy Council. This area will also review the rule-change process to 
accommodate the rapidly changing energy market.
In total there were 50 recommendations contained within the main points 
above. In July 2017 the review was presented to the COAG Energy Council for 
approval and 49 out of the 50 recommendations were approved. The council 
felt that the Clean Energy Target would need further consideration.
The Energy Security Board was appointed in September 2017 and announced 
plans at the end of 2017 for a National Energy Guarantee (NEG). The NEG 
will combine a Reliability Guarantee and an Emissions Guarantee. In order for 
the policy to take effect, it will need approval from all members of the COAG 
Energy Council. Following consultation in April 2018 the final version of the 
NEG will be published in August 2018 (note that, following a review by the 
Energy Council, the NEG has not been approved and Australia currently has 
no energy policy post 2020).
Following the Finkel Review recommendations AEMO have released their 
Integrated System Plan (ISP) (AEMO 2018). The plan recognises that there are 
fundamental changes happening within the Australian energy system:
•	flattening of grid demand due to the rise in behind the meter DER and 
energy efficiency (even assuming a rise in EV ownership);
•	the coal power stations that currently provide the majority of power are due 
to be retired in the next 20 years;
•	the costs and capabilities of new supply resources have changed significantly 
and are expected to do so in the future;
•	renewables, storage technologies, and flexible gas-powered generation are 
expected to be the core components to a low cost and reliable energy future.
In order to incorporate renewables, both at grid scale and at domestic scale, the 
Integrated System Plan makes recommendations for increased interconnec-
tion between the states, investment into Renewable Energy Zones (REZ), and 
coordination of behind the meter DER. AEMO and Energy Networks Australia 
(ENA) have also released a consultation paper on ‘how best to transition to a 
two-way grid that allows better integration of Distributed Energy Resources for 
the benefit of all customers’ (AEMO & ENA 2018). AEMO and the ENA have 
given possible frameworks for integrating DER:
a. a single integrated platform where the market operator provides a central 
platform in which all distribution level actors are able to participate;
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b. a two-step tiered platform in which the DNOs are responsible for optimi-
sation and DER dispatch within their own network areas;
c. an independent distribution service operator (DSO) or AEMO optimis-
ing distribution level dispatch which would involve either an overarching 
iDSO or multiple iDSOs at the individual network level.
Within the report the agencies recognise the value that DER could bring if 
given an effective framework in which to operate. This is in comparison to a 
lack of coordination which would increase costs for everyone.
2.2.7 Conclusion
2018 saw the beginning of many changes to the Australian electricity 
system with the COAG Energy Council agreeing to implement 49 out of the 
50 recommendations made by the Finkel review, in particular the replacement 
of the current Renewable Energy Target with the controversial National Energy 
Guarantee. For DER the Finkel review includes giving value to  customers 
for demand management, changing the role of the distribution networks to 
 facilitate a DER market and a review of network regulation. Should the NEM 
governance institutions follow the advice given within the review, then this 
will help to avoid new network costs and promote alternative non-network 
 solutions which will enable all customers to benefit from a flexible, low- emission 
electricity system.
Australia is experiencing particular governance issues due to the disruption 
caused by the rapid increase in DER and the effect of this on a huge intercon-
nected transmission grid such as the NEM. A new system operation which 
offers a cost-effective solution to both these challenges can be provided by 
DER, and we can expect – given the Finkel Review, the acceptance of DER by 
some of the utility companies, and Audrey Zibelman’s new appointment – that 
this is where the momentum is within Australian system operation.
Author’s note
A small amount of the above chapter was previously published by the author on 
the IGov New Thinking for Energy blog, found at http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/
igov/new-thinking-tales-of-the-unexpected/
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2.3 China: bureaucratic and market hurdles to move from a 
central towards a decentral energy system
Antony Froggatt, Liao Maolin, Wei Shen, and Zhou Weiduo
2.3.1 Introduction
In its submission to the Paris Climate Summit in 2015, China committed to 
peak levels of CO2 by 2030. Following the ratification of the Paris Agreement in 
September 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission (NRDC) 
released the Energy Revolution Strategy (2016–30) to put in place domestic 
measures to ensure the pledge was met. This included a commitment to lower 
the carbon intensity of GDP by 60–65 per cent below 2005 levels, increase the 
share of non-fossil energy of the total primary energy supply to 20 per cent, and 
increase its forest stock volume by 4.5 billion cubic metres, compared to 2005 
levels, by 2030 (Carbon Action Tracker 2018).
Meeting these commitments will be challenging as China’s energy system 
is dominated by fossil fuels, as can be seen in Figure 9, where coal accounted 
for 60  per cent of energy consumption in 2017. These figures also highlight 
the rapid increase in growth of energy consumption during the first decade 
of this century, however it is important to note that this trend has tailed off in 
recent years. China’s National Bureau of Statistics’ 2017 assessment of National 
 Economic and Social Development (NBSC 2018) show that the Chinese econ-
omy grew by 6.9 per cent during that year, an increase of 0.2 per cent over the 
previous year. While in 2017, total energy consumption increased by 2.9 per 
cent, leading to a decrease in energy intensity of 3.7 per cent, carbon  intensity 
fell by 5.1 per cent as a result of a gradual move away from coal. During 2017, 
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the consumption of coal grew by 0.4 per cent, which although only slight, was 
an increase for the first time in three years. There has been an increase in the 
use of ‘non-coal and oil sources’ (the government statistics include natural gas, 
nuclear, hydro, and other renewable sources) which rose to 20.8 per cent of the 
energy mix, an increase of 1.3 per cent.
There are a number of drivers of change in the energy sector, which have 
impacts over different timescales. An overarching consideration is the  economic 
transition towards innovation and a more service-led economy. While decar-
bonisation, along with energy security, are important drivers of change in the 
energy sector, urban air pollution remains highly influential. (McMullen-Laird 
et al. 2015) Even the official government statistics suggest that of the monitored 
338 cities at prefecture level and above, 29.3 per cent reached the required air 
standard, however, 70.7 per cent failed to do so. (NBSC 2018) In some cities, 
such as Beijing, pollution levels have been reduced as a result of the switch from 
coal to gas and the closure of older factories (Bloomberg 2018).
The grid system is run by two companies, State Grid and China Southern Grid, 
which have a monopoly of retailing to all customers except large consumers that 
can self-generate. They are vertically integrated, owning transmission and dis-
tribution networks as well as generation and retail. In 2014 the companies were 
not evenly matched in relation to geographical coverage, size or by assets; State 
Grid is four times larger than China Southern Grid (Pollitt, Yang & Chen 2017).
2.3.2 Growth in renewable energy
Despite its heavy dependency on fossil fuels and its massive levels of coal con-
sumption China has become a – if not the – key country in the global shift 
Figure 9: Energy consumption in China 1965–2017.
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2018).
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towards the greater use of renewable energy, due to its manufacturing base and, 
more recently, renewable energy deployment rates. China is the world’s largest 
producer of solar PV panels and wind turbines. The annual utilised amount of 
renewable energy resources in China has steadily increased since 2005. In the 
power sector in 2017, renewable energy produced 1627 TWh of electricity (25 
per cent of the total), with large hydro the largest source, making up 18 per cent 
of the total, as can be seen in Figure 10.
Hydropower, despite its controversy, remains a significant part of China’s 
energy mix and its growth according to the International Hydropower Asso-
ciation has been ‘remarkable’. Although the rate of growth has slowed, in 2017 
9.12 GW of capacity was added, leading to a total of 341 GW. Growth for hydro 
is still on the Government’s agenda as new projects, including a 16 GW project 
in Beihetan, are being developed as it strives to meet the 13th Five-Year Plan 
target of 380 GW installed capacity by 2020 (IHA 2018).
However, despite the relatively low percentage of power that is coming from 
new renewable energy, particularly solar and wind, its growth has been rapid 
and unprecedented globally (see also Figures 11 and 10). In 2017, China added 
52.8 GW of solar PV capacity and 19.5 GW of wind, as can be seen in Figure 11.
However, there are concerns in China and internationally about the effect of 
government measures to control the rate of new solar deployment. In the first 
half of 2018 the government announced new measures to slow the approval 
for new subsidised utility-scale PV projects in 2018 and put a 10 GW annual 
cap on distributed generation (DG) (Renewables Now 2018). The government 
Figure 10: Source of electricity in China in 2017.
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2018).
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has also cut feed-in tariffs (FiTs) for solar PV and announced that new utility-
scale projects would have to compete in auctions.
Furthermore, in mid-June 2018, government announced that biomass and 
waste to energy plants would no longer be eligible for energy subsidies. ( Reuters 
2018). Biomass remains an important provider of renewable energy and at pre-
sent the annual biomass resource for energy use in China displaces about 460 
million tons of standard coal (320 mtoe).
2.3.3 Phases of the development of distributed energy development
Over the last decade the rate of connection of renewable energy to the electric-
ity distribution grid in China has fallen behind that in other countries, despite 
various government attempts to stimulate its growth. During the period from 
1990 to 2000, the implementation of distributed energy in various fields and 
industries was attempted. In China the phrase ‘distributed energy’, tends to be 
related to ‘combined heat and power generation’ or ‘combined cooling-heating-
power cogeneration’, without the specific objective of developing what is now 
defined as ‘distributed energy’ more widely in a global sense.
From 2000, some larger distributed energy projects began to be put in place 
in cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, etc., however, these were still 
focused on the development of distributed natural gas. Larger cities were chosen 
Figure 11: Growth in solar and wind deployment in China (2000–2017)– 
MW/TWh.
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2018).
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to pilot developments due to the high set up costs, which these areas, with better 
developed economies and a higher capacity to afford energy prices, were better 
able to absorb.
The 11th Five Year Plan (FYP) 2006–10 further recognised the need to 
strengthen the distribution networks for both gas and electricity, and for the 
further development of combined heat and power and ‘distributed cogenera-
tion’ with clean energy as the fuel will be developed. Furthermore, energy stor-
age and integrated technologies for heat, power, and refrigeration for micro gas 
turbines were defined a key frontier technology for the FYP. The plan recog-
nised the potential of renewable energy, including wind, biomass, and solar and 
the need to scale up to increase commercialisation. Renewable energy was also 
to be developed for rural energy development, with specific targets on the devel-
opment of solar thermal, small-scale wind, and biogas digesters. (NDRC 2007)
The 12 FYP (2011–15) called for the further development of large and decen-
tralised renewable energy. This included medium and small hydro resources, 
including pump storage, as well as solar, biomass, and geothermal. It also called 
for the strengthening of the grid and the effective development of wind. Spe-
cific installation targets were proposed for wind (70 GW) and for solar (5 GW), 
which were met and exceeded, with installed wind capacity in 2015 at 131 GW 
and solar at 43 GW. The plan also calls for the government to ‘promote the 
extended application for distributed energy systems’ (NDRC 2011).
In 2013, the State Council issued ‘Several Opinions on Promoting Healthy 
Development of the Photovoltaic Industry’ (hereinafter called Development 
Opinions), which proposed to vigorously explore the distributed photovoltaic 
power generation market. This encourages all types of power users to construct 
distributed photovoltaic power generation systems in accordance with Power 
Line Communication. Furthermore, it not only has clear requirements to pro-
mote the integration construction of photovoltaic building and large-scale 
demonstration and application of distributed photovoltaic power, but also 
encourages the promotion of photovoltaic power in the areas of urban street 
lighting, urban landscape, communication base stations, traffic lights, etc.
Distributed generation and in particular solar is also seen as a tool for pov-
erty alleviation. In October 2014, the Solar Energy for Poverty Alleviation Pro-
gramme (SEPAP) jointly issued by the National Energy Administration and the 
State Council suggested that carrying out photovoltaic poverty alleviation pro-
jects, by utilising barren hills and agricultural greenhouses in poverty-stricken 
areas or facilities to construct photovoltaic power plant, could directly increase 
the income of the poor. In April 2016, the National Energy Administration 
along with five further departments, jointly issued Opinions on the Implemen-
tation of Photovoltaic Power Generation to Alleviating Poverty to further clar-
ify the specific rules and regulations about the implementation of photovoltaic 
poverty alleviation projects.
The current and 13th FYP 2015–20 for Energy Development, published by 
the National Energy Administration, based on the larger Economic and Social 
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Development plan, further develops the concept of decentralised energy and 
sets more ambitious targets for the deployment of renewable energy. The plan 
set proposals for total energy consumption from DG to grow by more than 
2.5 per cent per year and for the energy intensity of the economy to improve 
by 15 per cent. Non-fossil energy consumption should reach more than 
15 per cent; natural gas consumption should reach 10 per cent, and the propor-
tion of coal consumption should fall to below 58 per cent. During this period 
there should be 210 GW of wind power, and 110 GW of solar, of which 60 GW, 
should come from distributed sources. By the end of 2017, installed wind 
capacity had reached 164 GW, so was on track to meet its target, while solar 
had already exceeded it, with 131 GW.
The 13 FYP also calls for clean energy technology development, including 
the support of smart grid, energy micro-grid, electric vehicle and energy stor-
age technology, and the development of distributed energy networks including 
the acceleration of the development of the smart grid, and the active promo-
tion of the intelligent substation, and intelligent dispatch system construction 
(NEA 2016). According to the Renewable Energy 13th FYP, by 2020, total RE 
electricity installations will reach 680 GW, with electricity production of 1900 
TWh (in 2017 this had reached 1627 TWh) and account for 27 per cent of elec-
tricity production. The plan proposes that by 2020, the wind tariff should reach 
grid parity, meaning that the feed-in price for wind will be the same as for coal 
plants. In parallel to the main Energy FYP, there are 14 supporting FYPs, such 
as the Renewable Energy 13th FYP, Wind FYP, Electricity FYP etc., which were 
all released around the same time (Livzeniece 2017).
2.3.4 Lessons from the five-year plans
The IEA and others note that the distributed energy goals, particularly those 
for gas, have not been met, which is ‘unusual in China’. The IEA highlight that 
to accelerate the deployment of distributed energy a number of improvements 
could be made which include (IEA 2017):
•	Setting out detailed development goals for distributed energy at different 
government levels: in particular, for national government to provide guid-
ance to local provincial and municipal governments for subnational plans 
to harmonise with the national plans.
•	Distributed energy integration policies: while there may be a recognition of 
the need to develop distributed generation and that it needs to be connected 
to the grid, there remain disputes on how and who pays for the connection. 
Therefore, ‘the development of distributed energy will be greatly promoted 
by introducing standards on integration and operation to clarify the techni-
cal demand, procedures for integration and the obligations and responsi-
bilities of each stakeholder’. This can be achieved in China through defining 
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the obligation of the grid companies to provide access and integration ser-
vices, to simplify integration procedures, and to strengthen regulation.
•	Coordinating the development of energy infrastructure: optimising decen-
tralised energy needs to ensure that the scale and layout of new sources 
needs to be matched both the renewable resource and the existing distribu-
tion network.
2.3.5 Developing distributed solar energy systems 
in China: challenges and prospects
The Chinese solar PV industry has gone through several developmental stages 
since the late 1990s (Zhang, Andrews-Speed & Ji 2014).
Solar PV was initially encouraged for lighting and other off-grid activities 
to enable energy access for remote and nomadic communities. In 1996 the 
national government introduced a programme designed to help those com-
munities without access to the grid in Western China, through the Brightness 
Programme. This was expanded between 2002–2007 to North-Western China, 
through the Renewable Energy Development Project, which reached an esti-
mated two million people. In 2009 the government further promoted the use 
of solar with the Golden Sun Programme, to encourage its use in the Tibetan 
plateau (Geall, Shen & Zeren 2017).
However, these developments were relatively small, and before 2012 Chi-
nese solar panels were often sold for export, particularly to the EU and the 
US markets. Yet the EU and the US trade dispute with China has had dev-
astating impacts on Chinese panel exporters (Meckling & Hughes 2018). In 
2013, the Chinese government launched ambitious feed-in tariffs for develop-
ing domestic solar energy market (State Council 2013) to rescue the Chinese 
solar panel manufacturers in crises amid rising protectionist policies (Lewis 
2014; Shen 2017). China has since become the world’s largest solar nation. 
Since 2015, China has moved ahead of Germany, becoming the largest investor 
in solar energy capacities with a total of 131 GW installed in 2017. However, 
the majority of these investments are for large-scale solar parks, and the dis-
tributed solar system5 only accounts for 13 per cent of the total installed, with 
around 10.32GW (NEA 2017). This is in contrast to other big solar nations 
like Germany and the United States, where distributed systems take the lion’s 
share of the market. An interesting question being, why is there such a notable 
difference?
 5 In the Chinese context, distributed solar systems refer locally consumed small-scale 
projects with 35 KV or below voltage level for grid connection, which includes both 
roof-top systems and mini solar parks. The electricity can be used either for self-
consumption or for sale.
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Currently, there is a dramatic (yet diminishing) gap between the manufactur-
ing capacity of PV panels and their deployment into power generation facilities 
such as solar parks. In 2016 Chinese companies produced 53 GW solar PV 
modules and panels (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 2017), 
while annual deployment within China was around 35 GW (NEA 2017). The 
18 GW gap is mainly for exports, particularly to the emerging markets and, 
much less nowadays, to the western markets. Considering there are many 
Chinese manufacturers still not operating at their full capacity, the actual gap 
between manufacturing and domestic deployment capacity could be even 
higher. As a result, there has been a constant pressure of capacity over-supply 
in Chinese solar industries throughout the years of its development. Such pres-
sures drove PV panel producers to focus on the large-scale projects to increase 
sales in the short run. In addition, for project developers and investors, large 
projects are also preferred due to their economies of scale. Small and distrib-
uted systems are often associated with high transaction costs. Lastly, most of 
China’s North Western provinces, such as Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia, and 
Gansu, are vast and sparsely populated, with sufficient sunlight intensity, there-
fore ideal for developing large solar parks.
The preference for large-scale projects over small-scale distributed solar 
systems is a consequence of a combination of market rules and regulations in 
China, as this is a consequence of geography and pressure on manufacturers 
to install a lot of panels very quickly. In particular, policies and regulations at 
the provincial and local level can impact upon the rate of deployment, espe-
cially relating to housing regulation and grid access, which can slow down the 
deployment of renewables at the distributed level. It has become clear, however, 
that focusing only on large-scale solar parks in the barren Western and remote 
inland regions is not sustainable in the long-run. The mushrooming solar parks 
in these areas present tremendous pressure for the grid companies to accom-
modate all the newly installed solar capacities, as some of them are far from 
the main grid networks.6 Even if some of these can be connected, electricity 
cannot be consumed within the local region as Western provinces are relatively 
under-developed and the energy demand is consequently low. Yet, long dis-
tance transmission to the coastal developed provinces is not only economically 
unviable but also technologically difficult. As a result, curtailment of energy 
generation from solar parks has been increasingly rampant.7 Therefore, Chi-
nese policy makers believe distributed systems are the future of the industry 
 6 Although China achieved 100 per cent rural electrification in 2016 (Geall, Shen & 
Zeren 2017), the capacity and reliability of the grid connection in many places is 
still inadequate to meet the accommodation and distribution requirement of large 
renewable energy facilities. 
 7 In some provinces, the curtailment can be as high as 30 per cent, which means one 
third of installed capacity would remain idle and not generating any electricity.
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and have been designing various policy tools since 2015 to promote this.8 The 
key purpose of these new policies is to ‘distort’ market preferences for large 
projects over distributed solar system.
Some concrete measures for promoting distributed solar systems include:
•	Provinces with existing curtailment problems must be prohibited from con-
struction of large-scale projects; distributed systems only to be allowed.
•	Simplification of the approval process for distributed systems to lower the 
bureaucratic hurdles. Government approvals on land use and access to 
rooftops, and environmental or social impacts are to be exempted.
•	Grid companies to be required to provide unconditional grid connecting 
services to distributed solar systems.
•	Additional subsidies or tariff support to be provided by both national and 
local government. In China, there have been significant delays in the pay-
ment of subsidies. However, the subsidy payment for distributed solar sys-
tems is prioritised.
•	Access to upfront capital.
•	Some localities legally require that high energy consumption enterprises 
have to install roof-top solar systems; some also require that all the newly 
constructed rooftops, once exceeding a threshold area, are to be installed 
with solar systems; generated ‘clean energy’ from rooftop solar installa-
tions would be counted towards the contribution made by Corporations 
for achieving energy saving and emission reduction targets as set by the 
government annually.
•	Distributed solar systems to be further promoted as a poverty alleviation 
programme.9
These policies only take effect gradually. In 2016, the frenzy of investment in 
large-scale infrastructure in the north-western provinces was restricted, with 
their share of newly added capacity dropping to less than 30 per cent. Mean-
while, there has been a notable increase of investment in distributed systems, 
mainly among the eastern coastal provinces. The annual instalment of dis-
tributed solar capacities doubled compared to the previous year, reaching a 
 8 Since late 2014, NEA issued several specific policies to promote and regulate distrib-
uted solar systems (NEA 2016; NEA 2017). These policies require local government 
to provide more generous subsidies and assured grid connections. NEA senior offic-
ers have stated clearly in different public speeches and media conferences regarding 
their preference of distributed system over large-scale solar parks. 
 9 In 2014, China announced an ambitious plan to help alleviate rural poverty through 
the deployment of distributed solar systems in poor areas. The solar energy for pov-
erty alleviation programme (SEPAP) initiative aims to add over 10 GW capacity 
and benefit more than 2 million households from around 35,000 villages across the 
country by 2020.
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record high of 4 GW. However, there are still significant technical, political, 
and economic constraints for the further development of distributed systems, 
as explained in the following section.
Roofs
It is estimated that only 30 per cent of buildings in urban areas have suitable 
roofs. In rural areas the situation is even worse, which has become a major 
problem for companies trying to implement SEPAP (solar energy for poverty 
alleviation) programmes.
In addition to issues of quality, the allocation of ownership, distributing rev-
enues of electricity sales, and sharing the payment obligation are all reasons 
why rooftop solar installation is not as high as it might be; these are barriers 
that must be addressed.
Grid connection
As mentioned, rural grids are often less robust in China, and this significantly 
constrains the expansion of distributed solar systems at village level. In  addition, 
local grid officers also often lack sufficient knowledge and expertise to deal 
with growing applications for household solar systems, and consequently are 
 reluctant to accept applications for connecting the distributed system. Delaying 
or denying applications is also not unusual.
Subsidy payment
The dramatic expansion of China’s renewable energy industries, particularly in 
the wind and solar energy sectors, has put the renewable energy subsidy sys-
tem on the brink of collapse.10 China’s renewable energy subsidy is paid from 
a national fund that collects additional charges from energy end users. Yet the 
explosive growth of the solar and wind markets far exceeds the fund’s revenue, 
which has created a mounting shortage of the subsidy. The unofficial estimation 
of the deficiency of the subsidy can be around RMB 50 to 60 billion by 2016 
(Xinhua News 2017). The delay of subsidy payments to the project developers 
can be several years. In addition, Chinese regulators wish to reach grid parity 
for wind and solar energy by 2020. Therefore, significant reduction in the sub-
sidy is expected in the coming years and is starting to be seen despite the strong 
lobbying efforts made by the industry. This expectation is likely to significantly 
affect investor decisions in the years to come.
Project finance
As distributed projects became increasingly popular, innovative financial 
arrangements emerged, such as a leasing contract, carbon credit finance, and 
 10 Currently, the subsidy programme, Renewable Energy Fund, is mainly collected 
from the industrial electricity bills. 
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the energy performance contract (EPC). However, access to project finance is 
still the largest barrier for many investors in distributed solar systems. Unlike 
the wind energy sector, where the investors are mainly giant state-owned utility 
corporations, the investors in solar energy facilities (particularly the distributed 
systems) are small or medium private enterprises (SMEs). In China’s unique 
political economic system, it is usually difficult for these companies to get 
access to state-controlled banking services. In addition, the transaction costs 
and repayment risks attached to distributed systems are very high; projects are 
dispersed and small in size compared to other energy infrastructure and have 
very long project cycles for regaining the initial investment, often beyond 15 or 
even 20 years.
The policy implications for distributed solar systems in China are:
•	First, clearer policies and regulations are needed to solve the technical issues 
of the quality of building roofs in rural areas, plus ownership any other legal 
issues associated with urban residential buildings.
•	Second, integrating more diversified incentive mechanisms to encourage 
financial institutions to be actively involved in supporting the distributed 
 systems. Climate, development and energy policy tools, such as carbon 
offsets, poverty alleviation funds, or green energy certificates, may help to 
enhance the financial prospect of the distributed system even if government 
subsidy is to be reduced. However, the integration of these policy instruments 
requires tremendous coordination among various segments of bureaucratic 
systems, which is always a big problem in China due to its rather fragmented 
political system (Andrews-Speed 2012; Mertha 2009).
•	Thirdly, the grid strategy requires adjustment to present a friendlier approach 
for distributed systems, prioritising grid upgrade for local consumption and 
distribution. If all these policy changes were realised – although it is still 
unrealistic to expect distributed solar systems to dominate the market devel-
opment in the near future – they would surely play a more important role in 
China’s fast changing energy landscape.
2.3.6 Creating system flexibility
A widely accepted narrative around China’s solar and wind development is that 
the introduction of clear and binding targets in Europe for the deployment of 
renewable energy and the subsequent rapid deployment of new  technologies, 
led to the establishment of large manufacturing capabilities within China. Then 
as prices fell and the market slowed in Europe with the economic downturn 
in 2008, China adopted, and has exceeded domestic targets to maintain its 
 manufacturing capabilities. (Gang 2015). This strategy has led to the global 
domination of both manufacturing and deployment capabilities.
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China is now looking to dominate the manufacturing of the other ‘new’ tech-
nologies to enable the integration of renewables including smaller decentral-
ised generation. In particular, the focus is on batteries, both static and mobile, 
and electric vehicles.
In 2018, global sales of electric vehicles topped one and a half million for 
the first time, of which around 1 million were in China. The majority of these 
sales were from domestic manufacturers, with only 25,000 of these sales from 
imported vehicles (EV Volumes 2018). As EV sales are expected to expand 
to 11 million in 2025 and 30 million in 2030, so the need for batteries will 
increase, leading to lower prices (BNEF 2018), which will benefit grid level 
storage. In addition, the introduction of smart charging and potential two-way 
flows of power to EVs will aid system flexibility. China is also dominant in the 
manufacture of batteries, producing three quarters of the global capacity.
According to Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, China’s dominance in the 
manufacture of batteries is set to continue with 26 large-scale manufactur-
ing plants under-construction and due to be in operation by 2021. These have 
a combined capability of producing 344.5 GWh of batteries per year (com-
pared to today’s capability of 100 GWh), half of which is being built in China 
(BMI 2017). Whilst a number of the world’s largest EV manufacturers have 
announced they are opening up manufacturing bases in China, including Tesla, 
BMW, and Volkswagen.
Stationary storage has not, to date, been given the same level of policy sup-
port, with a tendency towards other balancing mechanisms such as high voltage 
transmission (IEA 2016). However, there are examples of significant piloting of 
new developments, including the construction of 3 MW/12 MWh vanadium 
redox flow battery (VRB) in Zaoyang, Hubei Province, which is expected to be 
the test for a 40 MWH project which in turn will be superseded by a 500 MWh 
project (Energy Storage 2017). There are also further lithium-ion storage pro-
jects under development across China, including a 6 MW project by BYD and 
a 3 MW from China Aviation.
China is also the world leader in the deployment of smart meters with upwards 
of 469 million in the autumn of 2017; over two thirds of the global total. In 2016 
China also exported 130 million units. (Smart Energy International 2018).
2.3.7 Conclusion and prospects
The energy sector in China is changing although, due to the large number of 
coal power plants, even unprecedently large deployment of new renewable and 
other technologies result in slow changes in the supply mix. However, there has 
been a gradual acceptance of distributed renewable sources, especially photo-
voltaic power. The pattern of the distributed energy industry is maturing, pro-
moting the transition of the power grid in China in the direction of intelligence 
and micro-grids, as well as boosting poverty alleviation development in China.
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The current structure of the power sector and administrative control restricts 
the development of renewable energy in general, including distributed energy. 
The reform of the energy market in China is long overdue. Although the reform 
of the energy industry in China has taken the first step with liberalisation of the 
coal market, oligopoly competition for oil and gas, and operational (although 
not ownership) separation of generation and grid, the market-oriented reform 
is far from complete.
A major barrier to the development of DER remains the lack of a pricing 
mechanism that accurately prices its value to the system. Therefore, renewable 
deployment relies on either direct subsidies or fixed prices to ensure develop-
ment. As with other countries, the Chinese government is keen to reduce the 
financial support given to renewables as they move towards parity with other 
generators. This is both understandable and expected. However, it is important 
that this move is undertaken transparently and in such a way that does not 
lead to the abrupt halt of the industry. This would have unwelcomed knock-on 
implications for manufacturers and installers. In the case of China this could 
also have global implications. The cuts in support for solar PV in the first half 
of 2018 may well have a disruptive impact across the solar sector in China, and 
possibility internationally.
China’s electricity grids are controlled by two monopolies – the State Grid 
and China Southern Power Grid – and although policies have been introduced 
to enable direct power purchases for large users, there are still significant tariff 
and non-tariff barriers for connections for smaller-scale and distributed gen-
eration. This is partly due to a lack of clarity over the roles of the grid operators.
China has many of the components to put decentralised energy front and 
centre of its energy policy. Furthermore, with large manufacturing capabili-
ties for renewables, storage and smart systems, China also has the capability 
to capitalise on global trends. However, without governance reforms, enabling 
smaller actors to enter the market, through regulatory reform and further price 
disclosure, the opportunity to capture this massive global market and avoid 
wasted investment could be lost.
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2.4 Denmark: centralised versus decentralised  
renewable energy systems
Frede Hvelplund and Søren Djørup
2.4.1 Introduction
In 2012 the Danish parliament voted by a large majority for Denmark to 
become 100 per cent renewable by 2050 (Klima- Energi og Bygningsminis-
teriet 2012). This decision was the result of a conflict laden political energy 
transition process (Hvelplund 2013), which had been underway since the first 
oil crisis in 1973. It was, at the normative level, a Danish ‘end of the beginning’ 
of a transition from the fossil fuel era to an energy system based upon renew-
able energy technologies. The 2012 decision has been confirmed – again with a 
large majority – by the Danish parliament in an energy agreement dated 20th 
June 2018.
However, good intentions and political aims are not enough to meet this 
target. For the transition from fossil fuels to a system based on 100 per cent 
renewable energy and energy conservation to succeed, there must be a better 
understanding of the needed technical and institutional changes and its regula-
tory framework (Hvelplund & Sperling 2018).
The political process to deliver both the renewable energy capacity already in 
existence by 2012 and the later commitment to 100 per cent renewable energy 
generation did not flow smoothly. For development to proceed in the period 
2018–2050, a number of areas must be addressed, including: development 
of new policies, the competition and conflicts between interest groups, and 
acceptance questions regarding new renewable energy projects.
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This ambitious goal for 100 per cent renewable energy by 2050, can only be 
reached with continued policy support for the development of both energy 
conservation measures to reduce consumption and the implementation 
and integration of renewable energy technologies that deliver a fluctuating 
supply (Hvelplund, Østergaard & Meyer 2017; Hvelplund & Djørup 2017; 
Mathiesen et al. 2015). Policies to deliver new renewable technologies, such 
as wind turbines, solar energy, and biomass energy (Ridjan et al. 2013), are, 
on their own, inadequate to enable the successful integration of an intermit-
tent supply into the energy mix. However, despite recent governmental activ-
ity demonstrating a greater recognition and acceptance of such requirements 
inherent in this shift to renewables (Energinet.dk 2015), this has not been 
followed up with an accompanying shift to concrete policies to support the 
necessary inter-sector integration that is required (Hvelplund,  Østergaard & 
Meyer 2017). In their place there is an unclear assumption that the increas-
ing amounts of renewable energy sources can be managed by building addi-
tional electricity interconnectors from Denmark to Holland, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, etc. At the same time, the integration of the supply side 
and energy conservation measures have not yet been sufficiently dealt with 
( Energinet.dk 2016).
For the following discussion it is worthwhile realising that the paradigmatic 
character of the ongoing change is a transition from relatively scarce green-
house gas emitting stored fossil fuels that can be used when needed, to clean 
and abundant renewable energy sources that are fluctuating, and have to be 
harvested, when the sun shines and the wind blows, and stored so that they 
can be used when needed. It is worth noting that the switch between these 
models of energy generation can be made more easily with the support of 
a small  amount of biomass-based energy production (Connolly et al. 2013; 
Lund et al. 2011).
This country report focuses on the organisational consequences of such a 
transition from fossil fuels to mainly fluctuating renewable energy sources and 
increased energy conservation, and considers questions such as: can this change 
be managed within a centralised model where surplus wind power is exported to 
neighbouring countries through a network of power interconnectors, where wind 
power plants are mainly owned by the large former fossil fuel power  companies; 
alternatively, should the transition rely on a decentralised model with smart 
energy systems and flexible energy consumption delivered by integrating heat, 
power, transportation, biomass, and energy conservation; furthermore, should 
this be organised by cooperatively owned wind power plants  synchronising 
supply-side and energy conservation investments? These questions help shape 
the agenda of current development of the Danish energy system.
Before discussing the merits of decentralisation versus centralisation, we will 
analyse what can be learned from the energy transition that has already taken 
place from 1975 to the present, dividing this analysis into two phases from 1975 
to 2000, and 2000 through to the present.
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2.4.2 Phase 1: 1975 to 2000 – the development of 
efficient single renewable energy technologies
From the mid-1970s to around 2000, the main focus was on the development 
of cost efficient and well-functioning single renewable energy technologies such 
as biogas plants, wind turbines, solar heating technologies, etc. In this period, 
renewable energy only had a minor share of both heat and power production 
(Hvelplund 2013). The result was that wind power only produced around 3–5 
per cent of total electricity consumption annually in the mid-1990s, and in 
windy periods, not more than 10 to 15 per cent. Wind power was a minor player 
on the field of energy generation, meaning that fossil fuel plants could continue 
with business as usual in the existing fossil fuel based infrastructure.
This first phase of development of modern renewable technologies began 
45–60 years ago, with roots back to wind powered electricity in 1903 (Thorn-
dahl 2009) and Poul La Cours experiments with hydrogen storage of energy 
by electrolysis in 1895 (Quistgaard 2009). Today, both photovoltaic and wind 
power can be produced at a similar cost per kWh to fossil fuel based electricity 
when external costs are excluded. In fact it is actually much cheaper to produce 
when external costs are included (Ea analyse 2014).
The development of the first phase is characterised by unstable policy devel-
opments with constant conflicts between a centralised model of development 
based upon the interests of the large fossil fuel-based companies and Dan-
ish Industry,11 and a decentralised model of renewable energy development 
driven by NGOs,12 skilled innovators developing new technologies, and small 
industrial companies (Kooij et al. 2018). It should be noted that this early 
developmental phase, in the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, took place 
against the status quo of a centralised energy policy favoured by the majority 
of politicians and in the face of strong lobbying by the large power companies 
(Jensen 2003) and the Association of Danish Industries. These organisations 
regarded wind power and renewable energy as unrealistic and too expensive, 
opting instead for coal and nuclear based power production (Beuse et al. 2000; 
Christensen 1985).
However, in the latter part of this first phase, the share of wind powered elec-
tricity production grew to 13 per cent of total electricity consumption and wind 
turbines were made ‘ready’ for large-scale deployment with relatively large wind 
turbines of 2–3 MW. At the same time as these developments were taking place, 
Denmark saw the creation of around 400 flexible combined heat and power 
(CHP) systems based on biomass and natural gas, which due to their flexibility 
in producing energy, provided a more stable environment for integrating wind 
power, with its intermittent generation levels.
 11 The organisation of Danish industries.
 12 The organisation OOA, against nuclear power and OVE, For renewable energy, 
NOAH, an environmental organisation.
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The development and implementation of technically and economically effi-
cient single technologies did not happen automatically, but as a result of 20 to 
30 years of technology developments since the mid-1970s, based on a combina-
tion of active, small and medium-sized industries, energy focused NGOs, and 
a democratic process that enabled the policy suggestions from these NGOs to 
be taken seriously by parliament and implemented despite resistance from the 
established fossil fuel based power companies (Kruse 1983; Faurby 1982; Hvel-
plund 1984; Beuse 2000).
One of the most important policies from the beginning of the 1980s was 
a type of13 feed-in payment system for wind power sold to the public grid. 
Another very important policy was that shares in wind power should be local 
and distributed to many owners; a tax exemption was put in place for incomes 
from wind power production of less than 150 per cent of the owner’s annual 
electricity consumption. Wind turbine owners were required to live within a 
9 km radius from the turbine. In this phase wind power was locally owned 
(Gorroño-Albizu, Sperling & Djørup 2019), and in the mid-1980s there were 
between 120,000 and 140,000 local wind power shareholders.
Consequently, wind power gained a strong and widespread political base 
resulting in parliamentary support despite opposition from fossil fuel compa-
nies in the critical period 1987 to 1990, where a 40–80 MW/year home market 
was required for wind to survive. This was despite the post-1987 collapse of the, 
roughly 200 MW/year California market, and a situation with almost no world-
market sales (Madsen 1988; Beuse et al. 2000).
In this period, Danish wind power survived on a fragile home market due to 
a continuation of parliamentary support and subsidies for wind power which 
may not have prevailed without the policy pressure exerted by energy NGOs 
and the more than 120,000 wind turbine shareholders.
In parallel with this development of wind power that took place up to the 
early 1990s was an ongoing debate regarding the introduction of small, mainly 
natural gas-based, CHP units to be established in existing consumer owned 
district heating systems in small cities. After a longer political dispute, and with 
resistance from the established power sector, rules were introduced that made 
these CHP units economical; approximately 400 units were built between 1990 
and 1995 amounting to 1.8 GW or 25 per cent of total thermal power capacity. 
Over the same period, large coal fired power plants lost around 30 per cent of 
their market share.
What can we conclude from this first phase?
One thing to conclude is that transition takes time, especially when there is no 
real consensus regarding the direction of development. It took around 40 to 
 13 To qualify, this was a price equal to the payment per kWh for a 20,000 kWh/year 
consumer in their respective Distribution System Operator region.
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50 years – from 1974 to 2018 – to develop the current new generation of wind 
turbines. This development had its roots in the Danish wind power experiences 
dating back to around 1900 (Christensen 2013). Taking a longer-term perspec-
tive, one could say that this current generation of electricity generating wind 
turbines took 120 years to be realised, with a long fossil fuel period during 
which wind power development was paused, taking place from 1920 to 1967 
or 1977.
From about 1980, when wind power again made its presence felt, develop-
ment has been slow, but despite resistance from the fossil fuel based power 
companies, it has been a success. Possibly as a result of its low share of power 
production, wind power has been viewed as a relatively harmless technology by 
the members of a hostile fossil fuel-based power infrastructure.
Again, it is important to note that from this first phase of development, wind 
power and energy conservation in Denmark did not happen automatically but 
was, to a large extent, driven and developed by small industries and energy 
NGOs in a conflict-laden political process, often with persistent resistance 
from the large, established fossil fuel companies, and the Danish Association 
of Industries (Sønderriis 1998). It is important to emphasise that this develop-
ment was the result of concrete policies implemented by the Danish parlia-
ment in liaison with the relevant actors in society that were, to a large extent, 
supported by organisations such as energy NGOs, with no vested interests in 
the old fossil fuel technologies, or in a process that could be described as an 
‘innovative democratic process’ (Hvelplund 2013).
Denmark has a long and strong tradition for non-profit consumer and 
municipality ownership. This is also the case within the electricity infrastruc-
ture which, until 2004, was 100 per cent owned by municipalities and consum-
ers. In 2004 the power plants were sold and subjected to market competition on 
the Scandinavian Nordpool market. The power plants were sold to the Swed-
ish state-owned company, Vattenfall, and the Danish state-owned company 
DONG, and thus changed from consumer and municipality ownership to state 
ownership.
The natural monopoly distribution system operators (DSO) remained con-
sumer and municipality-owned, and subject to a non-profit regulation regime, 
where energy companies generally do not have the right to use profits for pur-
poses other than to lower consumer prices, although they do have the right to 
charge consumers for production costs. This could be called a double regula-
tion that, by means of a combination of a non-profit regulation and consumer 
ownership, provides an incentive for low prices.
This regulation has lately been changed to a new type of double regulation 
where the non-profit regulation has been replaced by a cost ceiling benchmark-
ing regulation (Hvelplund 2018).
As a result of popular allegiance to consumer and municipality ownership, 
proposed development of new energy plants in Denmark, especially wind 
power plants, engender consumer opposition if they are not consumer and/or 
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locally owned. On the other hand, the association of Danish energy companies 
(Dansk Energy14) – a strong lobbying group – has members that include the 
large power companies Vattenfall and Ørsted (formerly DONG), which have a 
strong inclination towards Vattenfall and Ørsted ownership of the new electric-
ity production technologies, especially wind power. This has created a situation 
of conflict within Denmark where the large power companies wish to own the 
new power production technologies, whilst consumers and those living close to 
wind power plants tend to accept new wind turbines only if they get a signifi-
cant share in ownership (Warren & McFadyen 2010).
It is important to emphasise that the consumer ownership share of the value-
added chain historically did not include fossil fuel extraction and transporta-
tion nor the value-added linked to production of power plants, power grids, 
etc. In reality the consumer ownership share of power production value added 
was only linked to the conversion part of a fossil fuel system and amounts to 
around 25 per cent of the total value-added chain (Hvelplund 2001). It is worth 
noting that the share of consumer ownership may potentially increase in future 
renewable based systems, if the fossil fuel share is replaced by a smart energy 
system consisting of renewable energy supply systems in combination with 
technologies for the integration of large shares of fluctuating energy.
Finally, it is important to be aware that a district heating infrastructure, cov-
ering around 60 per cent of the heat demand, has been successfully developed 
and implemented. This represents an important part of an infrastructure that 
potentially integrates both large amounts of fluctuating renewable energy and 
can embody high percentages of heat conservation and low temperature heat 
in district heating systems.
2.4.3 Phase 2: the need for an integration infrastructure
It is relatively easy to develop and implement new renewable energy technolo-
gies with intermittent supply if they only supply a small share of the energy 
demand and consumption, because a minor supply from these single technolo-
gies can be fitted into the existing energy infrastructure without fundamental 
changes in the socio-technical energy system.
It is more difficult both at the normative, cognitive, and regulative level to 
establish energy systems that can handle large shares of fluctuating renewable 
energy supply. As such, in the second phase of renewable energy development, 
it is necessary to deal with the development of an integrative energy system that 
can handle large amounts of intermittent renewable energy supply by means 
of, amongst other things, integration of power production and heat in dis-
trict heating systems with heat pumps, solar heating, geothermal heating, etc., 
 14 An association made up mainly of electricity companies.
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combined with heat storage systems. Such systems were already discussed 40 
years ago, when the need for integrating heat and electricity was analysed and 
described (Illum 1982). In Denmark, the basic district heating infrastructure to 
facilitate this integration has, without having the future integration as its pur-
pose, been developed since the 1930s. Furthermore, a renewed expansion of the 
district heating infrastructure was established at the start of the 1990s both in 
the large cities and as a part of the 400 decentralised cogeneration plants estab-
lished between 1989 and 1995. This resulted in an increase of district heating 
by 40 per cent from 1990 to 2015 (Energistyrelsen 2016). However, there has 
not been a systematic integration of heat and electricity; heat storage and heat 
pumps have not been added to the system for example, mainly due to the very 
high taxes placed on the use of electricity for heat production.
Denmark is now in a phase where integrating heat and electricity is a must, 
as wind power is becoming the dominant supplier of electricity, necessitating 
policies for the establishment of an infrastructure that can handle the intermit-
tency inherent within wind power generation. In this phase the question is not 
any longer, whether a single wind turbine, biomass plant, or photovoltaic unit 
can produce electricity cheaper than a fossil fuel plant. This is an often used, but 
wrong comparison. Denmark is in a situation where a 50 to 80 per cent share of 
energy is supplied by intermittent renewable sources that cannot be compared 
to single energy supply technologies. Instead, the comparison is between differ-
ent energy systems that can supply energy when needed, in the right amounts 
and quantities. This means that we must compare the economics of fossil fuel 
energy systems with renewable energy-based energy systems, which has been 
done by Mathiesen et al (2015) and Lund (2014 amongst others. Their work 
shows that a renewable energy system can be cheaper than a fossil fuel-based 
energy system, and can deliver energy in the right amounts, at the right time 
and in the right quality.
But are we establishing the needed infrastructure for the integration of the 
fluctuating wind power?
In 2015 Danish wind power produced 42 per cent of total electricity consumed, 
and more electricity in 600 hours of the year than the Danish total electricity 
consumption during these hours. This is expected to increase to 1400 hours 
per year in 2020, and already, wind power is exported to countries around 
Denmark at continuously reduced prices (Hvelplund & Djørup 2017; Bach 
2017). At the same time wind powers close to zero short term marginal costs, 
outcompetes the CHP power production on the Nordpool market, and thus 
reduces the full-time production hours at both the large and the many small 
CHP systems, undermining the economic case for these types of production. 
This is a serious issue, as small CHP systems are likely to become an impor-
tant part of a flexible infrastructure by supplying electricity in periods where 
there is only a little wind. Furthermore, the cogeneration plants are to some 
extent being replaced by inflexible biomass-based district heating systems in 
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the small and large cities of Aarhus and Copenhagen for example, with CHP 
systems that generate a rather inflexible power supply. Thus, there is an ongo-
ing development towards biomass-based district heating that limits the poten-
tial of integrating heat and wind power by reducing the size of the heat market 
that can be supplied with the less stable supply available from wind power in 
combination with heat storage and heat pumps. This is caused by an almost 
zero taxation on biomass for heat, and a high taxation, around €0.05 per kWh, 
on wind power for heat.
This development regrettably is occurring at the same time as the need to 
 integrate the increasing shares of wind power in a socially and  economically 
 efficient way is being highlighted. This is due to the merit order effect 
( Hvelplund, Möller & Sperling 2013) that has resulted in continuously reduced 
wind power prices on the Nordpool market (Sorknæs, Djørup, Lund & 
Thellufsen 2019). Prices went down from around €0.04 per kWh to around 
€0.03per kWh in the period 2005 to 2015 (Hvelplund & Djørup 2017). This 
process of reduced wind power prices may continue in the future with plans 
for a 50 per cent to 60 per cent share of wind powered electricity  consumption 
which could undermine the economics of wind power to an extent that, unless 
the market is reconstructed, will hamper further wind power  expansion 
(Djørup, Thellufsen & Sorknæs 2018).
The hitherto reason behind district heating has been its fossil fuel efficiency 
caused by co-production of heat and electricity in cogeneration plants. This 
reason will be excluded in the future, as a large majority in the parliament in 
2012 decided to phase out fossil fuels from the heat and electricity production.
In tandem with this fossil fuel phase out, a set of new argument for a renew-
able energy-based district heating is developing.
As hot water storage is cheaper by a factor of 100 per MWh for large heating 
systems compared to electric battery storage systems (Lund et al. 2016), hot 
water storage for heat at this stage of development are a first step towards han-
dling an increasing share of wind power (with its intermittent supply), for use 
within the heat market. Hot water storage systems cost approximately €24,000/
MWh stored for single houses, and between €500 and €2,500/MWh stored in 
the larger repositories in a city with district heating, it is a cheaper by a factor 
of 10–50, to store intermittent energy in district heating systems than in single 
house systems (Lund et al. 2016).
In cities it is therefore in 100 per cent renewable energy systems more eco-
nomical to have district, instead of single house, heating systems. Also, for 
district heating systems, it pays to have low temperature systems because of 
the increased efficiency in the heat pumps and the reduced loss in the district 
heating network. Therefore, the system for integrating fluctuating wind power 
in Denmark is a low temperature district heating system in combination with 
heat pumps, and hot water storage systems. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that district heat pipes of good quality have a technical lifetime of around 50 
to 70 years.
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Along with this development on the energy supply side, it is important to note 
that in the envisioned 100 per cent renewable energy system of 2050, heat con-
servation of around 40 per cent compared to current heat use per m2 appears 
economically optimal (Lund et al. 2016). In transition from a fossil fuel sys-
tem to a renewable energy system it is becoming technically and economically 
increasingly important to synchronise supply and demand. Firstly, because 
Denmark is currently in a transition process characterised by active investors 
on the supply side and much less active investors in energy conservation on 
the demand side: this is a serious problem that must be resolved. Secondly, 
because heat conservation must be implemented ‘in time’ to avoid costly over-
investments in the new renewable energy-based supply system for an uninsu-
lated heat market. Thirdly, because the temperature in district heating systems 
should be lowered to 50-60 degrees celcius, as low temperature heat supply 
increases the efficiency of heat pumps ( ie. the Coefficient of Performance 
(COP)), and of solar heating, geothermal heating, and low temperature heat 
from industries. This reduction in temperature can be implemented  without 
having to invest in larger district heating pipes, if the heat consumption is 
reduced by heat conservation. This means that Denmark is now in an era 
where the synchronisation of investments in heat supply systems and energy 
 conservation is increasing in importance.
What can we conclude from the second phase?
The rationale or justification for district heating is changing from being based 
on energy efficiency in a fossil fuel-based cogeneration system to being based 
on technology that can handle both an increased share of fluctuating renewable 
energy, and the implementation and use of a variety of renewable energy-based 
fuels (Lund et al. 2014).
It is important not to forget that this ability on the supply side should be 
underpinned by a systematic technical and organisational synchronisation of 
investments in the heat supply and heat conservation sides. Heat conservation 
should also further both low temperature systems that increase the efficiency 
of heat pumps and the use of industrial waste heat and be implemented in time 
to avoid overinvestments in supply side systems. This establishment of a new 
rational base for district heating may also help wind power from an ongoing 
steady fall in electricity prices resulting from the merit order effect (Hvelplund, 
Möller & Sperling 2013).
The first step in creating a rational economic basis for wind power is to 
increase its market size by integrating electricity and heat and thereby ena-
bling wind to enter the heat market. Later steps should be taken to integrate 
electric based transportation and establish wind to fuel systems (Ridjan et al. 
2016;Lund & Kempton 2008; Mathiesen et al. 2015). In this way, by integrating 
wind power into a smart energy system, the economics of wind may improve 
to a level where it escapes falling prices created by the merit order effect, mean-
ing that it may pay to build the needed wind power capacity to deliver the 100 
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per cent renewables by 2050 scenario. However, this can only happen with a 
taxation policy where taxes on wind power for heat are set at the same level, or 
lower, than taxes on the scarce resource, biomass for heat. This is not in place 
today, where tax on wind electricity is high in comparison to the levy of zero 
tax on biomass for heat.
2.4.4 Decentralised smart energy systems versus 
centralised power transmission line scenarios
In this second phase of the transition to renewable energy, we have arrived at a 
crossroads where we are confronted with a choice between a mainly centralised 
development with large transmission lines and wind power plants owned by 
large power companies, or a decentralised smart energy system (Lund 2014) 
development with integration of heat and electricity, electric cars, etc., sup-
ported by local and regional ownership.
What follows, is a discussion of these divergent second phase strategies.
The decentralised integration paradigm: development of a 
smart energy system
When analysing the centralisation versus decentralisation question, it is useful 
to make an adequate description of the techno-economic character of a smart 
energy system.
Fossil fuels are stored energy that can be used when needed, however, the 
investment and management of the extraction of stored fossil fuel energy is 
only a possibility for large energy companies, and therefore is an inherently cen-
tralised technology.
The nature of renewable energy is that it is an intermittent source and must 
therefore be harvested when available. This necessitates the existence of an inte-
grated infrastructure that can either store the energy for later use or transport 
it by means of interconnectors to other regions or countries where there is an 
energy need.
In a decentralised smart energy system (Lund et al. 2012), the storage fea-
ture of fossil fuels is replaced by coordination and integration technologies and 
facilities in smart energy systems.
Instead of a distant fossil fuel supply chain with extraction, transportation, and 
refining located far away from consumers, a smart energy system is established 
with investments in district heating systems, heat pumps, solar panels, heat 
 storage, energy conservation, electric cars, wind to fuel systems, etc. This means 
that a value-added share in coordinated and integrated technologies based closer 
to consumers, replaces a relatively distant fossil fuel based value-added chain.
Consequently, smart energy system technologies may inherently be more 
suitable for decentralised socio-technical solutions than the fossil fuel-based 
system it replaces.
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The question then, is what characterises the organisational and economic 
requirements linked to the development and implementation of smart energy 
systems?
First, smart energy systems need a multifaceted governance system that fur-
thers investments in, and management of, integration technologies. As such, 
investments in district heating, heat storage systems (Ridjan et al. 2013), heat 
pumps, and solar heating should be structured in such a way that they can cope 
with intermittent renewable energy technologies, and must be combined with 
‘in time’ investments in energy conservation. In later stages, the establishment 
of infrastructure for electric vehicles, wind to fuel systems, geothermal energy 
etc., will be needed.
The development and implementation of a smart energy system also requires 
coordination and collaboration between owners of wind turbines, the TSO 
(Transmission Supply Operator), district heating companies, power distribu-
tion companies, and the municipalities and central legislative authorities. This 
coordination is much more multifaceted than ‘just to’ develop cost efficient 
renewable energy single technologies, and requires new organisational models 
that can develop, implement, coordinate, and manage these many transaction 
activities, both with regard to long-term investments and day-to-day manage-
ment. This presents a complex and potentially difficult task of coordination, 
possibly from a distance.
Due to proximity to consumers it is reasonable to presuppose that the com-
plex coordination and integration involved in smart energy systems, both at the 
investment and the operation and management levels, may have lower transac-
tion costs in a decentralised than in a centralised governance model (Hvelplund 
& Djørup 2019). This hypothesis is supported by both transaction cost theory 
in the Coaseian tradition (Coase 1937; Coase 1988) and the epistemological 
arguments against central planning in the Austrian tradition (Hayek 1937; 
Hayek 1945). As coordination becomes more complex, it becomes increasingly 
costly to convey the adequate level of information to a distant central planning 
agency – whether industry or government.
Large companies may find themselves, as a result of the following, ham-
strung by relatively high transactions costs in any transition to smart energy 
system solutions. This is due to, amongst other reasons, the fact that they 
would have to:
•	Buy the local consumer and municipality owned district heating systems, 
which would be very difficult, as these companies are municipality or con-
sumer owned and governed by a non-profit or consumer profit regime. 
Consumer profit means that any company surplus must be paid back to the 
consumers in the form of lower prices.
•	Invest in heat pumps and heat storage systems linked to district heating 
systems owned by municipalities and consumers, or to make sure that these 
investments are implemented.
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•	Develop a multitude of coordination activities such as, dimensioning 
investments in the different technologies so that they supplement each 
other’s, and concurrently establish the right amount of energy conservation 
‘in time’ with a conservation level that supports the right low temperature 
 district heating systems. Activities that all seem much easier to perform 
when the owners of the smart energy system components are the same heat 
consumers that should also implement the heat conservation investments.
•	Distant ownership of onshore wind power is difficult in Denmark, as local 
citizens due to a long historical tradition, want influence upon such plants 
by means of, for example, a large ownership share.
•	Handle politically conflict-laden negotiations between distant potential 
owners like the Swedish power company Vattenfall, paying no local taxes 
and supplying no profits to local actors. The local inhabitants of such dis-
tant owner models tend to experience the noise and visual disadvantages of 
energy generation without receiving benefits from the projects. One ongo-
ing case is the conflict between the Swedish state owned power company 
Vattenfall and the local Nørrekær Enge wind power community (Olsen & 
Christiansen 2016).
Due to complicated regulations and the requirements in terms of communica-
tion, large distant power companies may struggle to design appropriate invest-
ment schemes and to operate these in an efficient way in accordance with local 
wishes, capabilities, and technological conditions. These companies do not 
have ownership or control of the smart energy system technologies, nor the 
ability to handle large amounts of information, in order to behave in a strategic 
and tactically efficient way. They therefore are comparatively hindered as actors 
in a decentralised smart energy system.
Consequently, from a political economy point of view, large energy compa-
nies may tend to support other more centralised solutions, where their com-
parative advantages are stronger. Such centralised scenarios will be discussed 
in the next section.
The centralised on- and offshore wind and transmission line solution
Established power companies, or other distant owners, appear then to face 
difficulties in implementing and managing smart energy system integration 
infrastructure. At the same time, these companies and their associations, 
 Danish Energy for example, systematically advocate for ‘solutions’ that are 
within the reach of their members within the electricity sector (Energinet.dk 
2014). Such ‘solutions’ mainly consist of offshore wind power in combination 
with large power transmission grids, which are seen as a way of geographically 
‘sending surplus wind power to another place’ and receiving needed capacity 
from other countries as reserve power in periods with too little wind power. 
In Denmark this is combined with large inflexible biomass cogeneration plants 
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that behave almost in the same way as coal fired power plants in the larger 
cities of Copenhagen and Aarhus. These types of solutions are supported by the 
Danish TSO, (Energinet.dk 2016), where priority is given to the development 
of transmission lines between countries. If there is ‘too much wind power’ in 
Denmark, it is exported to Germany, the Netherlands, or Scandinavia. When 
there is too little wind power compared to consumption, additional capacity is 
imported from neighbouring countries. This is the model in Denmark today, 
and it is also the model at present proposed for the future, as supported by 
the TSO, Energinet.dk. Denmark is therefore building, and planning to build, 
transmission lines to its neighbouring countries without first examining the 
possibilities and the economics of establishing a smart energy system with 
a local and regional cross-sectoral integration infrastructure. In practice 
local and regional cross-sectoral integration is, in the scenarios of the Danish 
TSO and of the association of Danish power companies (Danish Energy), a 
second priority.
At present, a centralised transmission line model is favoured by TSOs at both 
European and Danish levels (Energinet.dk 2017). As suggested, this has already 
resulted in building large transmission lines to the Netherlands; the COBRA 
cable received a subsidy of €85.5 million out of a €700 million investment and 
plans exist to build the Viking cable to the United Kingdom (Djørup 2016; 
Energinet.dk 2016) which will also receive EU subsidies. The main solution in 
Denmark today, is this centralised and transmission line model. However, the 
Danish TSO has also argued for a ‘we do both’ model, which would mean sup-
porting both the local and regional integration smart energy system model and 
the transmission line model. Sadly, in reality, the smart energy system model 
is not supported, and in Energinet.dk background reports it is assumed that 
only around 5 per cent of the heat market will be integrated in 2020 and 15 per 
cent in 2035 (Energinet.dk 2016), when in fact three times as much would be 
possible. Meanwhile this centralised transmission line model does not seem to 
solve the renewable energy intermittency challenge on a long-term basis. With 
increasing shares of such intermittent renewable energy, Denmark’s neighbours 
are also increasing their wind power capacities and the Danish wind regime is 
similar in the North European countries (Bach 2017). So far the cost-benefit 
analysis made by the TSO, and justifying investments in transmission lines has 
been questioned as not being transparent and disregarding alternative courses 
of action (Djørup 2016; Lund et al. 2017; Mathiesen, Lund & Djørup 2018). 
The above analysis indicates that the solution lies in smart energy systems with 
more flexible electricity consumption delivered by means of local and regional 
integration of heat, electricity, transportation, wind to gas, etc. (Lund et al. 
2012; Mathiesen et al. 2015; Bach 2017).
Solutions that integrate increasing amounts of intermittent renewable energy 
in a smart energy system are needed and are already supported by thorough 
calculations showing that it is possible and cheaper to develop and implement a 
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decentralised model, where surplus wind power is integrated into the heat and 
transportation market (Lund et al. 2012).
2.4.5 Conclusion and policy recommendations
The above discussion of the first phase of renewable energy development has 
shown that a technological transition takes time and that it does not happen 
on its own. A sort of innovative democracy is necessary, where the influence 
from new NGOs independent of the old fossil fuel-based companies is needed. 
It also demonstrated that the development of single renewable energy tech-
nologies is ‘easy’ in the way that these could be absorbed into the old fossil fuel 
infrastructures without major changes to these, due to the very minor share of 
total electricity supply that these single technologies contribute.
In the second phase of renewable energy development, where wind power 
produces more than 40 per cent of electricity production, the basic infrastruc-
ture has to be changed, to absorb large amounts of intermittent energy. As 
with the changes in phase one, such changes do not happen unilaterally in the 
inherited market arrangements. Concrete policies are necessary to bring this 
change about.
The viability of decentralised smart energy system models has been theo-
retically well documented for decades and practiced to some extent by a few 
district heating companies. In comparison, the model supporting large heat 
pumps and large heat storage systems based on wind power is in a  start-
up phase with only a few projects, and as such, it has not yet reached a 
full-scale implementation.
A decentralised smart energy system model seems to be able to solve the 
problems linked to a transition to intermittent renewable energy sources, but 
under present policies has not been fully realised. The present high tax on wind 
power for heat and zero tax on biomass for example, mitigates against such 
a transition.
On the contrary there still is a strong tendency towards realisation of the cen-
tralised offshore transmission line scenario in combination with distant owner-
ship of wind power plants and biomass heat based on imported biomass in the 
largest cities. Furthermore, this development is still subsidised, and in upcom-
ing years, several billion Euros will be invested in interconnectors, despite 
there being little evidence that this model will solve the problem of integrating 
increasing shares of intermittent wind power, either technically or economi-
cally. Technically because Denmark’s neighbouring countries are expanding 
their wind power capacity and have similar wind regimes, and economically 
because it relies upon huge EU subsidies and might not be able to compete with 
smart energy system solutions on an economically equal playing field.
So, it looks as if Denmark and the European Union are in a situation where 
billions of Euros will be invested in a centralised model that will prove to be a 
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blind alley, incapable of integrating increasing amounts of intermittent energy, 
and at the same time hindering the development and implementation of a 
decentralised model that does have the ability to solve the problem of intermit-
tency. It is therefore necessary, to level the playing field to make it possible to 
establish the new smart energy system infrastructure.
This could be achieved by introducing the following policies:
•	An EU directive that introduces a subsidiarity principle where local inte-
gration via smart energy systems has priority and, if needed, investments in 
transmission lines take second priority.
•	The European Union should give the same level of subsidies to a decentral-
ised smart energy system infrastructure, as the present EU subsidy provides 
to transmission interconnectors.
•	Denmark’s taxes on wind power for heat should be set to at least the same 
level as taxes on biomass.
•	Renewable energy tenders should be designed so that it is possible for local 
citizens to participate as a foundation, where the profit goes to both local 
citizens and to the common good of the region.
•	Introduce legislation whereby wind power project managers are compelled 
to sell at least 51 per cent of a wind power project to local consumers, 
municipalities and local companies; that this local ownership percentage 
should be kept during the lifetime of a renewable energy project.
•	Allocate 30 per cent of the surplus from a wind power project to a foun-
dation with the deed to use the money for the common good. This could 
be for environmental purposes and for the development of smart energy 
system integration technologies. It could also be used to support energy 
conservation in the region.
•	Introduce changes to the role of the Danish TSO, Energinet.dk, so that it is 
obliged to support integration of intermittent renewable energy in accord-
ance with a subsidiarity principle.
•	Introduce transmission tariffs, where the payment is a function of consumer 
use of the transmission system. Payments are currently charged only for 
transmission in situations of bottleneck limitations in the transmission line.
The implementation of a decentralised smart energy system-based integration 
of renewable energy could become a realistic possibility if the above policies 
were introduced at both the EU, and the national level, in Denmark.
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2.5 Germany: from feed-in-tariffs to auctions and 
the question of diverse actors
Dörte Ohlhorst
2.5.1 Summary
The stakeholder structure of the formerly oligopolistic German electricity mar-
ket has changed significantly during the energy transition process in the last 
two decades. The big energy supply companies have lost high market shares 
to smaller, heterogeneous actors that generate renewable electricity. Both the 
structure of electricity generating technologies and the ownership structure of 
the facilities are increasingly decentralised. In this chapter about Germany, the 
term ‘decentralised’ is used in the context of community-scale renewable elec-
tricity generation and ownership.
The increasingly decentralised system has advantages in terms of resilience, 
social acceptance, democratic participation in the use of universal goods, and 
the development of value added in municipalities and regions. This chapter 
describes how decentralised renewable energy in the hands of communi-
ties and citizens has developed in Germany. It elaborates on how the politi-
cal framework has recently changed, which actors have gained influence and 
which effects can be expected from the changes in the funding regime regard-
ing decentralisation, local and regional development, democratisation of 
energy business, the variety of actors and stakeholders, as well as regarding the 
involvement of citizens in renewable energy supply.
2.5.2 Decentralised citizen energy in Germany
Although primary energy consumption is still dominated by fossil fuels (about 
79 per cent in 2018) and some nuclear energy (6.4 per cent in 2018), Germany 
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aims to obtain 60 per cent of its total energy (final energy consumption) and 
80 per cent of its electricity generation from renewables by 2050. The govern-
ment has goals for phasing out nuclear by 2022 and simultaneously decarbon-
ising the economy by reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80 to 95 per cent 
of 1990 levels by 2050. This transformation is known as the ‘Energiewende’ 
(BMU/BMWI 2011), which contrary to popular opinions, is more than just a 
reaction to the Fukushima nuclear accident.
The beginnings of what is now known as ‘Energiewende’ date back decades. 
The transformation was strongly driven from the bottom up. Social movements 
starting in the late 1960s, such as the peace movement with regard to nuclear 
weapons, the anti-nuclear power movement, and the environmental movement 
triggered a change in awareness in large parts of German society. These move-
ments were closely linked to the events of the oil, nuclear, and environmen-
tal crises of the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. oil price crises in 1973 and 1979–1980; 
nuclear accidents in Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986; smog 
and air pollution, especially in coal mining regions and large cities). They 
mobilised significant resistance against the prevailing policy positions and 
economic conventions of the time, and activated social engagement for struc-
tural changes in energy policy and the supply system. With the founding of 
the German Green Party (1980) the topic was carried into the political system. 
Decades of critical social debates about the existing energy policy, starting in 
the late 1960s and continuing into the present, have led to a counter-proposal 
to conventional energy supply and resulted in its transformation. The strong 
desire of many citizens to be concretely involved in the energy transition can 
only be understood in light of this history (Schreurs 2008).
In Germany, renewables accounted for less than 12 per cent of electricity 
consumption in 2006. At the end of 2017, they accounted for 38.5 per cent, 
a materially important expansion achieved in just a few years. Decentralised 
renewable energies, supported or initiated by citizens, made a significant 
contribution to this success. Many citizens in Germany have the desire to be 
involved in the value creation and employment of the energy transition (EWSA 
2015; Dunker & Mono 2013). Financial participation – as an active shareholder 
or passive donor – provides an opportunity for profitable investments. From 
the ownership of renewable generation facilities local added value can be gen-
erated and jobs as well as apprenticeship training positions can be created. A 
further component of participation is an active citizen engagement in the sense 
of not only a financial but also a conceptual initiative to implement renewable 
energy projects.
In Germany, citizens have organised themselves to initiate and operate 
renewable energy projects. Currently, almost half of the renewable electricity 
generation capacity subsidised by the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) 
(except for offshore wind) is in the hands of small private investors. These actors 
include individuals, households, energy cooperatives, civil law partnerships, 
limited liability companies or limited partnerships, decentralised initiatives in 
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municipalities and regions, farmers and civil wind farms. These diverse forms 
of citizen energy (‘Bürgerenergie’) are an important driver for the dynamics 
of the energy transition. Moreover, citizen energy encourages more diverse 
acceptance and support for renewables and thus increases the stability of the 
German renewable energy sector (BBEn 2014; Zuber 2014; Debor 2014; Müller 
& Holstenkamp 2015; Ott & Wieg 2014, see also country report on Denmark).
§ 3 (15) EEG 2017 (Renewable Energy Sources Act 2017) defines a citizen 
energy company as an entity,
•	‘Which consists of at least ten natural persons with voting right,
•	in which at least 51 per cent of the voting rights are held by natural persons 
which live in the urban or rural district in which the onshore wind energy 
installation is to be erected,
•	in which no member or shareholder of the undertaking holds more than 10 
per cent of the voting rights of the undertaking’ (Renewable Energy Sources 
Act 2017).
Figure 12: Installed capacity of renewable energy by owner group in Germany 
in 2016.
Source: Author’s contribution based on figures published by trend:research 201815
 15 The distribution of ownership to these groups may change in the future due to the 
shift from fixed feed-in tariffs to tenders for renewable projects. The number of new 
start-ups of energy cooperatives has fallen by 60 per cent in 2014 due to uncertainties 
with the new funding system and because the obligatory direct marketing for generat-
ing facilities with 500 kWp or more makes the entry less attractive (Kahla et al. 2017).
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Cooperatives and companies in which small private investors hold at least 
50  per cent are summarised under the term ‘citizen energy’, see figure 12, 
(trend: research & Leuphana University of Lüneburg 2013). Cooperative mod-
els are a particular legal form: on the one hand they are an economic actor, and 
on the other a civil society actor. Energy cooperatives have a democratic legal 
structure, in which the members are protected from the dominance of majority 
owners. Each member, regardless of the level of participation, has one vote in 
the General Assembly and has a say on the use of resources. Members to a large 
extent come from the locality or region. The deposits are typically long-term 
investments. Investors have some protection against financial loss, because 
each member is only liable for their deposits. Secondly, each cooperative must 
belong to an auditing association, through which the finances of the coopera-
tive are regularly checked. The cooperative business model is usually long term 
and requires less return on the investment than other business models with 
high short-term profit goals. The debt ratio is lower, compared to other legal 
forms, and the control by supervisory board members and members is often 
more intense. It is true that cooperatives are not safe from bankruptcy, but 
this happens less frequently to cooperatives than to conventional companies. 
Profits are often reinvested in the cooperative goals. The interest on coopera-
tive deposits, though, is lower compared to the return to the investors on their 
deposits in stocks and risky bonds.16
Citizen energy is characterised by a high degree of identification with the 
local energy supply because most of the electricity is produced close to the 
consumption points in the neighbourhood (Zuber 2014).17 The commitment 
and investment of citizens represents a key driving force of the Energiewende: 
citizen energy has a market share of at least 31.5 per cent of the installed renew-
able electricity capacity in Germany (see Figure 12; trend:research 2018; Zuber 
2014). Between 2007 and 2014 the total number of registered energy coop-
eratives in Germany grew from 94 to 973 and has since increased more than 
tenfold. In the years 2011 (195 newly registered cooperatives), 2012 (187), and 
2013 (172), the increase in energy cooperatives reached an all time high (Müller 
& Holstenkamp 2015). In the year 2012, cooperatives invested €1.67 billion in 
renewables, and built up electricity generation capacities with an output of 933 
MW (DGRV 2015; Kemfert & Schäfer 2012; trend: research & Leuphana Uni-
versity Lüneburg 2013). The German energy cooperatives founded since 2006 
have about 130,000 members (DGRV 2015; Janzig 2015).18 Hubert Waiger from 
 16 http://www.sozialinvestieren.de/blog/insolvenzsicherste-rechtsform- 
genossenschaften-bleiben-unangefochten-sieger/
 17 There are also German cooperatives that are committed to the repurchase of local 
electricity networks or the concession for the operation of local networks. However, 
these are not directly affected by the amendment to the EEG.
 18 Not all energy cooperatives are also citizen energy cooperatives. The DGRV data and 
the database from Degenhart, Holstenkamp, and Müller are not directly comparable. 
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the Federation for Environment and Nature Conservation Germany (BUND) 
called this commitment the ‘Largest civil movement in the history of our 
country’.19 Cooperatives are seen as a possible economic model for eco-social 
transformation and as a learning environment for civil societal and democratic 
values (Walk 2014).
The high number of renewable energy projects in the hands of citizens, 
organisations, and affiliated companies has led to a pluralistic stakeholder and 
ownership structure in the German power generation market. Farmers, public 
utilities, and small and medium enterprises complete the spectrum of power 
generators, which has expanded enormously since the expansion of renewables 
(Moss, Becker & Naumann 2014).
Previously, the electricity market was divided between a few large energy 
utilities. The German government repeatedly declares the target to maintain 
actor diversity in energy transition efforts and that regional and local efforts 
towards a low-carbon energy transition are welcome. This also corresponds to 
the coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU parliamentary party (Chris-
tian Democrats) and the SPD parliamentary party (Social Democrats), which 
promises that the local communities will be more involved in the added value 
of renewable energy facilities and the opportunities for project participation of 
citizens will be improved.
One advantage of raising capital through the private investment of citizens is 
the lower yields that are deemed acceptable by this group, as opposed to larger 
companies (Mono 2013). The enhanced decentralised participation in financ-
ing can then ensure a large part of the investments necessary for the expansion 
of renewable energy. However, the mobilisation of private capital required to 
meet investment needs requires suitable investment models and incentives that 
need to be set by governance (Jacobs et al. 2014; WBGU 2012).
2.5.3 Drivers for – and against – decentralised 
renewable energy in Germany
The national funding regime has acted as a central driver in the development 
of renewable energy in Germany. With the Electricity Feed-In Act and its suc-
cessor, the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), a priority for grid connec-
tion and electricity feed-in as well as fixed feed-in tariffs for renewables was 
introduced. The Electricity Feed-In Act, passed in 1990, was one of the first 
laws in Europe that obliged public energy utilities to purchase and remunerate 
The former only covers energy cooperatives founded from 2006; the latter recognise 
registered energy cooperatives.
 19 Public Hearing of the Committee on Environment, Nature Conservation, Build-
ing and Nuclear Safety; June 4th, 2014. https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/text 
archiv/2014/eeg-novelle/281434.
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renewable electricity on a yearly fixed basis. During the 1990s, not only the 
renewable electricity support policy, but also the general legal framework for 
the energy sector was important for the promotion of renewable energy in 
Germany. The Renewable Energy Sources Act was adopted in 2000, replacing 
the Electricity Feed-In Act and establishing a new, pioneering support policy 
with improved investment security for generators: while under the Electric-
ity Feed-In Act compensation rates were expressed as percentages of average 
customer tariffs, the new rates were now fixed for 20 years. The EEG has been 
amended regularly since the year 2000. The feed-in tariffs set out in the law 
have been the central prerequisite for the expansion of renewables during the 
following 15 years. The renewable energy share in electricity supply increased 
 dynamically – today it covers more than one third of the power supply. Due to 
the declining, but guaranteed feed-in tariffs, investments in renewables were 
able to be deployed with low risks for investors.
Besides the funding regime, a strong citizen engagement favoured the 
production of decentralised renewables in Germany. Citizen engagement is 
motivated by a desire for autonomy, freedom of action, control, and for shap-
ing one’s own living conditions. People have relatively high confidence in the 
objectives and values of citizen initiatives, whereas there is increasing distrust 
towards state actors and short-term-profits-oriented economic operators, 
and the non-transparent relations between them (Büscher & Sumpf 2014; 
Sumpf 2014). One motivation for self-generated electricity is (partial) energy 
independence, and for some households it is even the idea of a self-sufficient 
power supply. A consumer survey in 2013 showed that six per cent of all Ger-
mans are so-called prosumers – they do not only consume, but also generate 
electricity (both for own consumption and for sale, Verbraucherzentrale Bun-
desverband 2013).
The decentralised initiatives are improving local value added income and 
employment options (Deutscher Landkreistag 2014a). In 2012, citizen energy 
projects brought a (gross) value of €5.3 billion to the respective regions (Hauser 
et al. 2015). Adverse local developments like declining municipal revenues due 
to shrinking population numbers can be compensated through wind, solar and 
biogas projects (Deutscher Landkreistag 2014b). About 113,600 permanent 
jobs, particularly in the field of plant operation, are assigned to citizen renew-
able energy projects (Hauser et al. 2015).
It is assumed that participation in citizen energy projects increases not only 
local acceptance of renewable energy plants, but also the experience of self-
efficacy as well as social inclusion of vulnerable people (Tews 2018). However, 
acceptance depends on whether the implementation of the projects corre-
spond with the ideas of citizens about democratic decision-making processes, 
transparency and participation, sufficient decision options, an inclusive plan-
ning culture, and an adequate distribution of costs and benefits (Mono 2013; 
Bauknecht, Vogel & Funcke 2015; Schweizer et al. 2014; 100 prozent erneuer-
bar stiftung 2012; Bovet & Lienhoop 2015).
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Due to recent changes in the political and legal framework however, decen-
tralised initiatives appear to be at risk. The changes have resulted in the termi-
nation of price-based feed-in tariffs and premium systems. Moreover, a shift 
from an optional to a mandatory direct marketing system for new renewable 
energy plants has taken place. The obligatory direct marketing presents new 
challenges for suppliers and operators.
2.5.4 Change of funding regime by amendment of the Renewable 
Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare Energien-Gesetz)- EEG in 2014
With an amendment to the EEG in 2014, the government set the course for 
the introduction of a tendering model that replaces the system of fixed feed-in 
remuneration (e.g. Kahles 2014). Previously, the level of the feed-in tariff (dif-
ferentiated by technology and based on forecasts) was determined by parlia-
ment, but the actual cost could differ from the forecasts. As a result, the level of 
financial support could prove to be excessive or too low. According to the Ger-
man Government, the introduced bidding procedure will address this matter.
In the new procedure, annual quotas of renewable electricity generating 
capacity are tendered via auctions. First experiences with the tender model 
where gained in a pilot phase for photovoltaic ground-mounted systems 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2014). From 2017 onwards, the compensation rates 
for all renewables are determined via a tender procedure.20 Only those mar-
ket participants that have been selected by the tender process are allowed to 
build renewable energy plants. The aim is to carry out the construction of new 
renewable energy installations as economically as possible and in accordance 
with European state aid rules. Small systems with a capacity below one MW, 
however, are not subject to the tendering procedure.
The change in the funding mechanism was carried out not only due to 
national but also supranational pressure by the European Commission (Beer-
mann & Tews 2016; Tews 2014; Vogelpohl et al. 2017). The Commission con-
siders quota systems as the most appropriate instrument for an integrated 
energy market. Its harmonisation efforts were intensified at the end of 2013, 
as the European Commission revised state aid guidelines and consequently 
initiated an infringement procedure against the German funding system with 
fixed feed-in tariffs. Large energy utilities and actors pursuing a market-liberal 
policy in the European Commission supported this policy.
Not only on the European level, but also in Germany, the control of costs 
and capacities of renewables has been increasingly debated. Influential players 
 20 The feed-in tariff, which is determined through the tender procedure, is adapted to 
the dynamics of renewable energy expansion when the expansion has exceeded or 
fallen below the corridor of annual quotas during the reference period (‘principle of 
breathing lid’).
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argued that the promotion of renewable energy should be better adapted to the 
existing market structure (Wassermann, Reeg & Nienhaus 2015). By adopting 
and fundamentally changing the funding system, the German federal govern-
ment (a grand coalition) thus not only pursued the aim of decarbonising the 
electricity production in compliance with the EU law, but also had the inten-
tion to improve the predictability of the expansion of renewable energy dynam-
ics and to achieve the government’s renewable energy development objectives 
in, what the government argued was a more cost-effective way. In contrast, the 
critics of the EEG amendment argued that these objectives could also have been 
achieved with the existing funding regime. They are afraid that the expansion 
of renewable energies in Germany will stagnate and, consequently, the climate 
protection targets cannot be met. The government, however, argued that the 
new funding scheme can promote more market and technology competition 
and at the same time avoid the protection for specific technologies.
2.5.5 Decentralised citizen energy and actor diversity at risk?
It is becoming apparent that new risks are arising from the new procedure 
that was introduced by the German Bundestag, initiated by the Ministry of 
Economics. It is feared that with the conversion of a regime with fixed feed-in 
tariffs to an auction based system the financially strong supra-regional pro-
viders will have improved opportunities to increase their market share. The 
results of the pilot bidding rounds on ground mounted PV (2014–2016) veri-
fied the concerns regarding a decline in the diversity of actors and the exclu-
sion of small players (Tews 2018). For decentralised, small projects with local 
character, the amendment constitutes a much bigger challenge (EnKlip 2015; 
Kahl, Kahles & Müller 2014; Leuphana Universität of Lüneburg & Nestle 2014; 
BNetzA 2015). The maintenance of actor diversity is a politically defined goal21 
that is both explicitly mentioned in the coalition agreement and in the EEG 
2014 (§ 2 para. 5 sentence 3). A specific focus on citizen-based energy com-
panies is officially explained and justified in §36g EEG 2017: ‘In particular, 
locally anchored citizen energy companies have made a significant contribu-
tion to the necessary acceptance of new on-shore wind energy projects. With-
out this acceptance, the expansion of wind energy cannot be achieved in the 
planned amount’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2016, author’s translation). Neverthe-
less, many scientists and practical actors consider the new funding regime a 
serious threat to the continued commitment of the small, local and civic actors 
(Niederberger & Wassermann 2015; Tews 2018). It is feared that competition 
 21 See § 2 para 5 sentence 3 EEG 2014: ‘When switching to the tender procedure, actor 
diversity in renewable electricity generation is to be obtained’ (translated by author).
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decreases and the plurality of actors cannot be obtained in the renewable 
energy market, because:
Participation in a tendering procedure requires high operating expenses, is 
time consuming, complex, and costly. In coping with the complex requirements 
large providers have significant advantages over small ones. The transaction 
costs incurred can be intercepted more easily by larger companies (Leuphana 
Universität Lüneburg & Nestle 2014; Kahl, Kahles & Müller 2014; Klessmann 
2014). Citizen energy actors usually find it more difficult to spread the risk or 
protect themselves against the risks through their own private capital. They 
have a lower credit rating and hardly any opportunities for interim financing. 
This is demonstrated by international experience with tendering mechanisms 
(BWE 2014).
There is uncertainty to tenderers whether the contract is awarded in an auc-
tion participation. Accordingly, uncertainty for investors about the expected 
returns increases (Grießhammer & Bergmann 2015; Nestle 2015).22 The return 
on capital investment equity for investors decreases because the final price 
they receive for the renewables is lower due to rising costs and additional 
risks (Grau, Neuhoff & Tisdale 2015). Even if an actor has been awarded the 
contract, it may occur that the site-specific costs are higher and revenues are 
lower than projected. As a consequence, the plant may not be realised. In this 
case, significant penalties may be accrued (Ecofys 2014; Hauser et al. 2014; 
Hauser et al. 2015).
In the course of compulsory direct marketing, plant operators have to either 
bring their electricity to market themselves (this can also be to regional mar-
kets), or they can employ external services. This results in costs for marketing, 
forecasting, and profile service. Furthermore, the operator (electricity supplier) 
incurs many obligations, including the sale of excess capacity and the purchase 
of additional electricity in the event of equipment failure or under-production, 
in order to ensure security of supply for customers. The effort and cost can 
be problematic, particularly for civil energy projects and energy cooperatives, 
because they generally are run by volunteers and have fewer opportunities 
to diversify risk (BEE 2015; Leuphana Universität Lüneburg & Nestle 2014). 
The obligatory direct marketing increases the financial risk for plant opera-
tors. They must compensate for uncertainties in marketing with risk premi-
ums. Moreover, it is assumed that banks require long-term power purchase 
agreements with economically powerful direct marketers for project finance. 
As part of the credit assessment of the direct marketers, it is possible that large 
marketers are favoured.
A new characteristic of the tender procedure is not only the determination of 
the level of compensation via competing offers, but also the waning influence 
 22 Also changes of the Investment Code and concession law have contributed to uncer-
tainty (Kahl et al. 2014). 
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of the parliament: previously, the actual level of remuneration was set through 
the feed-in tariffs in the Renewable Energy Sources Act, which was developed 
and changed by parliament. The tender procedure is performed by the Grid 
Agency, allowing no influence of parliament on the compensation rate.
Overall, the new funding system is characterised by a lower market open-
ness, lower actor plurality, and lower investment security than the previously 
applied principle of fixed feed-in tariffs. It is therefore feared that tenders and 
the obligatory direct marketing represent a massive market entry barrier for 
citizen energy operators. Under the new system, they are hardly able to com-
pete against larger competitors and hardly able to afford the huge transaction 
costs for developing legally sound and competitive bids (BEE 2015).
There is some evidence for these concerns: since 2014, the formation of new 
energy cooperatives has been rapidly declining. According to the German 
Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisenverband (German Cooperative and Raiffeisen 
Confederation, DGRV), the number of newly registered energy coopera-
tives in 2014 declined by 60 compared to the previous year. In 2014, only 54 
energy cooperatives were founded, whereas in 2011, 167 such enterprises were 
launched nationwide, see figure 13 (Müller & Holstenkamp 2015).
This sharp decline in growth illustrates the effects of the amendment to the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act (Grießhammer & Bergmann 2015). Investment 
activities of the existing energy co-operatives have dropped significantly.
Figure 13: Start-up of energy cooperatives 2006–2015.
Source: DGRV23
 23 German Cooperative and Raiffeisen Confederation, DGRV; https://www.erneuerb 
areenergien.de/buerger-muessen-teil-der-energiewende-bleiben/150/437/88921/.
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Surprisingly, in the first auctions in 2017, the majority of the awards were given 
to citizens’ energy companies. The bidders made use of the specific rules for 
citizen energy: they could take part in the bidding procedure without having 
a construction permit, and could make use of the longer time span between 
awards and realisation of the project deadline (up to 4 to 5 years). However, it 
turned out that the successful bidders, privileged as citizens’ energy companies, 
were set up by a small number of professional project developers, contractors 
or service providers (Tews 2018). They transformed their projects and found 
constructions that made them look like citizens’ energy projects because they 
were adapted to the official rules of citizen energy. As such, the project devel-
opers could make use of the respective privileges in the bidding procedure. 
Moreover, they were – at least organisationally – assigned to one single pro-
ject developer (Bundesnetzagentur 2017). The exceptional rules – intended to 
support rather unprofessional and small citizen-based projects – were used by 
business actors in an economically rational way to meet the legal requirements 
of a citizen energy company. This leads to the need to re-amend the Renew-
able Energy Sources Act if the goal of preserving the variety of actors is to be 
achieved and if ‘real’ citizens’ energy projects should be addressed. It also leads 
to the need of a clear definition of the term ‘citizen energy’.
According to the German Renewable Energy Federation (BEE), environ-
mental organisations and green electricity providers, tenders change the level 
playing field to the detriment of the variety of actors and generate new risks 
that are difficult to manage. In order to maintain the diversity of actors, the BEE 
repeatedly demands that projects up to 18 MW should be excluded from the 
tendering procedure. This approach proposed by the BEE has been confirmed 
by the EU Competition Commissioner – a derogation to this extent would be 
permissible under European law (BEE 2016). Until now, only projects up to an 
installed capacity of one megawatt are excluded from the tendering procedure. 
It is proposed that new citizen`s energy projects should receive an administra-
tively fixed remuneration without having to go through the tender procedure, 
because with adequate project sizes, a regional balance between supply and 
demand and a high acceptance they produce the best power solutions for local 
and regional markets (Hannen & Enkhardt 2015).
2.5.6 Conclusions
Germany has multiple goals for the implementation of the energy turnaround: 
not only a decarbonisation of the electricity supply by 2050, but also a cost-
efficient power supply and a diversity of electricity-producing actors. The ful-
filment of the latter goals is important because efficient energy generation at 
a reasonable price as well as electricity production by community and citizen 
energy projects helps to gain acceptance for the large-scale transformation with 
high transition costs and new technologies emerging all over the landscape. As 
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the number of wind farms across the country increases, the acceptance factor 
becomes increasingly important.
The recent replacement of fixed feed-in tariffs by a technology-specific and 
volume based auction system, not introduced by a regulator, but by the German 
Bundestag, represents a fundamental change in the funding regime of the Ger-
man Renewable Energy Sources Act. The government launched the new fund-
ing model (auction system), even though experiences in other countries have 
shown that auction systems often did not reach the desired results and cost-
minimising effects (AEE 2014; Agora 2014; Ecofys 2014; Hauser et al. 2014). 
It is not clear whether the European guidelines actually require opting out of 
the feed-in tariff. The legal situation would probably allow wider exemptions 
for smaller market participants than is provided for in the amended Renew-
able Energy Sources Act (Münchmeyer, Kahles & Pause 2014). Therefore, it is 
assumed that the German Government used the EU requirements to realise 
its own national reform ideas (Vogelpohl et al. 2017). It is expected that the 
modification of the funding regime will not lead to a return towards centralised 
power generation technologies, but to a more centralised ownership structure 
of generating plants.
In the first tender rounds in 2017, almost exclusively citizens’ energy com-
panies were awarded. This was a great surprise for all who accompanied the 
design of the tender scheme in the new Renewable Energy Sources Act. With 
less than six Euro cents per kWh, the bidding prices where about one cent 
below the previous average remuneration – and are thus very low. Evidence 
shows, professional investors have applied under the cover of alleged citizens’ 
firms, who were able to construct their bidding company according to the 
privileging exception rules for citizen energy.
In the 2019 tender rounds for wind turbines, the level of competition was 
lower than ever before. A trend that has already been observed over several 
rounds in 2018 has been continued. In January 2019, with a tendered volume 
of 700 megawatts (MW), only 72 bids totalling 499 megawatts were submitted. 
A total of 67 bids with a volume of 476 megawatts were awarded a supplement. 
Only eleven of these supplements went to citizens’ energy companies. The com-
petitive level for the second round of calls in May 2019, with a 55% signing, had 
a new worrying dimension. Again, insufficient bids were submitted to cover the 
tendered amount of 650 MW. Of the 650 MW tendered, only 270 MW could 
be awarded for the construction of new wind turbines. The reasons for this 
dramatic decline in the expansion of wind energy are manyfold: the complex-
ity of the tendering process, increasing citizen protests against wind energy, a 
great uncertainty in the market and high penalties in case of failed implemen-
tation. The capping of tenders at a level of 2.5 gigawatts and the debate over 
new regulations regarding the minimum mandatory distances to residential 
buildings caused uncertainty. In addition, more and more citizens are resisting 
wind turbines in their neighbourhood – and often take legal action. A project 
that has been awarded a contract, has a time frame of only two to a maximum 
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of two and a half years to actually realise the wind farm. Otherwise the bidder 
faces penalties ranging from 150,000 to 200,000 euros per turbine.
It remains unclear whether the future design of the tender rounds actually 
serves the achievement of the desired wind power capacities on the one hand 
and the preservation of the diversity of actors on the other – and thus the pro-
tection of operating models with local investors, local and regional value added, 
mixed ownership structure, distributed voting rights, a participatory legal 
structure, and social inclusiveness. It is possible that the different energy policy 
sub-processes and the legal framework in Germany will reduce the citizens’ 
commitment to the energy turnaround and lead to more centralised ownership 
structures of the generating plants. However, there will continue to be citizen 
engagement for renewable energies in the future, because it is increasingly cost 
effective to produce electricity with sustainable resources. Therefore, organi-
sational and institutional niches are likely to be found for citizens’ coopera-
tives. In addition, the possibility of self-supply with renewable electricity may 
increasingly be used in the future. If, however, the detour through the tendering 
procedure slows down the dynamics of citizen participation, this poses a risk 
for the acceptance of the energy projects in the electricity sector. A diversity of 
stakeholders, acceptance, participation and active involvement of citizens are 
essential success factors for the energy supply in Germany, because these fac-
tors help place the energy transition on a broader footing within society.
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2.6 India: dirty versus clean decentralised energy generation
Ranjit Bharvirkar
2.6.1 Introduction
Typically, in most of the developed world (and China), provision of electricity 
to customers has evolved from a decentralised version (e.g. a building served 
by a small coal-thermal generator in its basement, as seen in the early 1900s in 
New York city) to massive power plants connected by high voltage transmis-
sion lines serving hundreds of thousands of customers over wide swathes of 
areas (referred to as ‘centralised’ systems). It is only in the last decade – with 
the advent of increasingly affordable solar PV – that customer-sited electricity 
generation has made a comeback in the developed world.
The developing world – including India, which is the focus of this chapter – 
is still somewhere on this path of moving from a decentralised to a centralised 
electricity system. Unlike the developed world, customers in India still meet 
their electricity needs through a combination of the centralised power system 
and decentralised systems served by the private sector (e.g. diesel gensets, kero-
sene lanterns, lead acid batteries, gas water heaters, etc.). As per India’s Cen-
tral Electricity Authority, as of 31 July 2018, the centralised sector accounts 
for ~345 GW of installed generation capacity with an additional 60–90 GW 
of captive generation installed by large commercial and industrial consum-
ers on their premises (Central Electricity Authority 2018a). Good quality and 
comprehensive data on the existing decentralised systems mentioned above is 
non-existent. It is estimated that ~250 million Indian citizens are not yet con-
nected to the grid – accurate data is non-existent although a few organisations 
have started conducting surveys to ascertain this figure. The remainder of the 
population face highly unreliable supply as estimated by relatively crude efforts 
such as www.watchyourpower.org.
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The adoption of these decentralised systems had nothing to do with any 
environmental or policy objectives. They are simply improving the custom-
ers’ quality of service beyond what was being provided by the centralised sys-
tem. The decentralised electricity systems are both dirty (in an environmental 
sense) and expensive. They are also modular and hence, customers are able 
to invest in them in an incremental fashion. Consequently, the quality of ser-
vice as received by the customers is a function of their ability and willingness 
to pay. However, even the combined centralised and decentralised systems are 
still unable to meet all the electricity needs of millions of customers. Many are 
simply forced to forego some of their needs.
Historically, there have been no policies or programs to encourage decentral-
ised systems – on the contrary, the policymakers have constantly been under 
pressure to improve the centralised system so that customers would not have to 
depend on the dirty and expensive decentralised systems.
The easy availability of clean decentralised technologies (e.g. solar PV, vari-
ous battery technologies, etc.) that are now significantly cheaper than the exist-
ing dirty decentralised technologies is now altering the value proposition and 
allowing customers to make the substitution both from centralised to decen-
tralised, and within decentralised from ‘dirty’ to ‘clean’.
The performance and cost effectiveness of these new clean decentralised 
technologies has improved so quickly and significantly, that in many parts of 
the country, more than half the grid-connected load already finds it signifi-
cantly cheaper – relative to the marginal retail tariff they face – to install roof-
top PV in an attempt to minimise purchasing power from the grid. Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance (2017) has estimated that the compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR) since 2013 for adoption of rooftop PV systems for large consum-
ers (typically, commercial and industrial) who face high marginal tariffs across 
India is ~117 per cent. The centralised grid in India may never become what it 
used to be in the developed world – i.e. the sole provider of reliable and cheap-
est electricity to all customers. In fact, India appears to be moving towards a 
hybrid system – i.e. a mix of centralised and decentralised systems – that is 
better able to meet its energy needs.
2.6.2 A brief history of systemic changes
Historically, electricity generation started with small generators serving small 
loads that were located next to the load itself – e.g. the Pearl Street Station 
in New York in the 1880s served ~400 lights and 85 customers and was liter-
ally located in the neighbourhood. As the benefits of economies-of-scale were 
recognised, the sizes of the generating stations grew to 100s if not 1000s of 
megawatts serving 100s of millions of customers. Inevitably, these stations were 
located away from the load centres and electricity had to be transmitted over 
high voltage transmission lines. And over time the small-scale neighbourhood 
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or customer-sited generators were eliminated except for a small portion of cus-
tomers that have a requirement of extremely high levels of reliability.
In most of the developed world (and China), today the main source of elec-
tricity is this centralised system (i.e. large-scale generators, high voltage trans-
mission networks, and low voltage distribution networks) that is both reliable 
and affordable.24 The use of centralised systems, driven by their low costs due 
to economies-of-scale has been common across the developed world outside 
the power sector also – e.g. natural gas, heat, water, phone/cable, etc. All of 
these centralised systems are extremely complex – in terms of the number of 
components in the supply chain that have to work well and in concert with each 
other – and yet they are also extremely reliable in these countries.
It is only in the last decade or so that customers have begun to adopt distrib-
uted generation – e.g. solar PV – largely encouraged through policies/programs 
where the objectives at least initially did not include either reliability or cost 
effectiveness. The objectives were numerous including but not limited to envi-
ronmental protection, climate change mitigation, etc. For a detailed discussion 
of these objectives see Deshmukh et al. (2012). The value proposition – i.e. 
quality of the electric service and its cost – from the centralised system for 
most customers in the developed world (and China) appears to be no longer 
true across the world as cost of rooftop PV (even unsubsidised) have started 
edging below the retail tariffs faced by consumers – see for example, Australia 
and Hawaii.
India, too, embarked on a similar trajectory where the centralised system 
was expanded rapidly, especially, after gaining Independence in 1947. It is 
important to note that the data and information presented in this paragraph 
represents only the centralised system. The installed capacity at that time was 
~1.4 GW serving a population of ~345 million (Central Electricity Author-
ity 2018b). Today, after more than seventy years, the installed capacity has 
reached ~345 GW (or more than 200 times that of 1947) while the population 
has quadrupled.
Of order 250 million citizens in India still do not have access to electricity – 
in as basic a sense as having a wire reaching inside their household. Several 
efforts to validate the claims of ‘electrification’ (i.e. www.garv.gov.in) indicate 
that the definition of ‘electrification’ continues to be suspect – see for example, 
Patel (2016), Bansal (2016), Sharma, Josey and Sreekumar (2016), etc. Those 
who do have access to electricity routinely face power outages that can stretch 
into several hours per day (Sengupta 2016). Unfortunately, rigorous data on the 
exact level of ‘true’ electrification and quality of service is not available in India 
 24 The exceptions in the developed world in terms of affordability are few – e.g. Austral-
ian customers are increasingly finding solar PV (including batteries) to be cheaper 
than the centralised system. Most of the other examples where distributed solar PV 
makes sense in the developed world are limited to isolated systems such as those on 
islands or located in remote areas. 
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in a comprehensive manner. Efforts such as Prayas Energy Group’s Electricity 
Supply Monitoring Initiative (ESMI) are providing at least a glimpse about the 
quality of service.25
Rolling blackouts are – in fact – so common for most Indian citizens that in 
many states the local electricity distribution companies (commonly referred to 
as ‘discoms’ in India) provide formal schedules by location and time in local 
newspapers and online. These schedules are approved by electricity regulators 
and consumer advocates. Of course – as there is no way to monitor accurately, 
the discoms can and do deviate from these formally announced schedules. In 
fact, the infamous power outage in 2012 that blacked out two thirds of India 
simultaneously, as experienced by citizens in India, was no different in its 
length than the usual outages they face on a regular basis.
The two key characteristics of electricity from a centralised system in India – 
lack of access and when connected albeit with poor reliability – have, obviously, 
not resulted in citizens simply foregoing end-uses (e.g. lighting, water heating, 
electronics, etc.) that rely on electricity completely. After all, the Indian econ-
omy has been growing rapidly for several years – averaging 6–7 per cent annu-
ally over the last decade – that has in turn led to a rapid growth in the income 
albeit not uniformly across all income classes. Consequently, Indian citizens 
have always sought to supplement their consumption of electricity from the 
centralised system with a wide range of alternatives.26 The alternatives that are 
most prevalent in India include:
1. Electricity: diesel generators and lead-acid batteries.
2. Lighting: kerosene lanterns.
3. Water heating: liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), wood, etc.
4. Water pumping: diesel-fired pumps.
The variations and combinations in which these alternatives are deployed by 
each user range widely and are driven by factors such as the requirements of 
the user, ability and willingness to pay, availability of alternatives, etc. These not 
only vary among users but also vary over time for the same user. And – most 
important of all – these alternatives are not even acknowledged by the central-
ised system (i.e. the local electricity distribution company and policymakers) 
let alone being encouraged and supported. On the contrary – whenever there 
are periods of the centralised system being able to provide electricity at high 
level of reliability, the investments of users in these alternatives get completely 
stranded without any possibility of recourse.
 25 http://www.watchyourpower.org/the_initiative.php.
 26 And this observation applies to other sectors also – e.g. natural gas provided in cyl-
inders in the form of liquefied petroleum gas, water supply service quality is similar 
to electricity (i.e. unreliable and poor), and phones/cables have been usurped by 
distributed technologies such as satellite dishes and cell phones. 
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2.6.3 Potential for decentralised energy
A thriving marketplace exists all over India that provides these alternatives to 
individual customers under a wide range of contractual arrangements such as 
leasing diesel gensets, outright purchase, and others. However, comprehensive 
data of a high quality about this marketplace is not available for India. Not only 
is basic data – e.g. sales of diesel generators –not readily available, there is not 
much data available about the usage of these alternatives (e.g. hours of use for 
a typical lead acid battery). Market research firms provide estimates – see for 
example 6WResearch (2016). To be sure, lack of data does not imply that these 
alternatives do not exist. In reality, the Indian end-user demand for electricity 
has always been met through a combination of centralised system, and decen-
tralised alternatives in sharp contrast to the situation in the developed world 
(including China). The extent of the decentralised system is not comprehen-
sively quantified although numerous case studies have been done that provide 
a useful qualitative picture.
From a cost-effectiveness perspective relative to the centralised system – 
most of the alternatives listed above are massively more expensive than the 
centralised system. For example, running a diesel generator is twice as expen-
sive as even the most expensive retail tariff for electricity from the central-
ised system. Similarly, kerosene lanterns are among the most expensive ways 
of providing lighting. However, given the unreliability and often availability 
of the centralised system, the user is – in fact – assessing the cost effective-
ness of the alternatives relative to having to forego the service (e.g. lighting) 
in its entirety.
It is in this context that one has to examine the role of new technologies such 
as distributed solar, batteries, more efficient equipment (e.g. LEDs), and oth-
ers and assess the factors that influence their adoption. In India, distributed 
solar PV systems are – fundamentally – not competing with electricity from 
the unreliable Indian centralised system but with the substantially expensive 
distributed alternatives (e.g. diesel generators, etc.) that have been historically 
used to supplement the centralised system. Initially, solar PV was significantly 
more expensive than these alternatives.
From a meeting of the reliability needs of a consumer – the comparison 
between the two sources of distributed generation (i.e. rooftop PV and diesel) 
is not straightforward for two reasons:
•	solar PV is available only during day-time and if there is sufficient space 
available for its installation while diesel generators are available on demand 
and have a relatively small footprint;
•	the upfront (or fixed) costs of the current alternatives (e.g. diesel generators 
or kerosene lanterns) are relatively low with high variable costs in sharp 
contrast to that of solar PV – as availability of cheap credit is limited for 
most consumers.
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Yet – the value proposition has started becoming so compelling that even the 
key manufacturers of diesel generators in India (e.g. Jakson, Sukam, Kirlo-
skar, etc.) have added solar PV to their portfolios – whether independently or 
hybridised with diesel generators (Paul 2015). For example, Jakson Inc. – one 
of the main diesel generators in India – forecast in 2014 that within three years 
half of their sales would be from solar PV (Pearson 2014).
Not only is solar PV successfully competing against alternatives such as die-
sel generators, it has also now started competing against the retail tariffs faced 
by commercial and industrial (C&I) customers in India for the electricity they 
purchase from the centralised system – see Prayas Energy Group (2017) and 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2017. The high retail tariffs for C&I custom-
ers in India is a consequence of the distinct policy environment which is dis-
cussed in more detail in the next section. For now, we simply note that these 
high retail tariffs are unlikely to decrease in the future – see Central Electricity 
Authority (2018) for trend in Average Revenue Recovered (i.e. average retail 
tariff) by discoms.
The Indian national and state policymakers have in recent years announced 
and initiated the implementation of several policies to support distributed solar 
PV. Forty GW out of a total of 100 GW of solar PV that is set as the national 
target for 2022 is allocated to rooftop PV. However, discoms have started con-
fronting the distinct possibility that the early adopters are likely to be their 
larger and wealthier consumers. These consumers provide the cross-subsidy 
that sustains the utility cash flow. If the utility sales to these large consumers fal-
ter, then there would be an immediate and significantly adverse impact on the 
utility financial situation. Consequently, utilities in many parts of India have 
started resisting the growth of rooftop PV that has led to rumours that the 40 
GW policy target may end up being revised downward significantly. However, 
there is not much anyone can do when consumers install behind-the-meter 
rooftop PV systems that simply and passively offsets their consumption from 
the grid. From the discom’s perspective, this appears similar to load that has 
vanished somewhat akin to but a potentially significantly larger impact than 
that of energy efficiency or demand response.
2.6.4 The drivers of decentralised energy
These circumstances – i.e. unreliability, increasing costs of the centralised sys-
tem, and cost effectiveness of rooftop PV relative to retail tariff for a grow-
ing number of its customers – are unlikely to change in the future creating an 
attractive market for distributed solar PV without any policies and programs 
designed to promote it. In this section, we discuss in more detail why these 
circumstances are likely to persist in the future.
Historically, electricity has been one of a number of public goods for which 
the government was seen to be the sole provider. On paper – there are specific 
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departments for each type of infrastructure – e.g. the state electricity distribu-
tion companies, municipal transport and housing authorities, centrally owned 
railways, etc. However, from the citizens’ perspective, it was the state govern-
ment that was supposed to provide them with electricity, just as it was meant 
to provide roads, healthcare, education, water, sanitation, public safety, etc. The 
electricity ratepayers of the government-owned utility also are the voters that 
state governments care about at election time. Issues like the cost of electricity 
to consumers not only come up in regulatory proceedings but also routinely 
show up in politics – see for example Dubash, Kale and Bharvirkar (2018).
Within India’s federal division of power, state governments have the lion’s 
share of authority in the electricity sector. After independence in 1947, the 
hundreds of small private utilities that generated and distributed electricity 
throughout the subcontinent were gradually subsumed into State Electricity 
Boards that were wholly owned by the respective state governments. In the first 
few decades post-Independence, the majority of the investment in the power 
sector was made by the state governments.
Over the last 15–20 years, these SEBs were unbundled into generation, 
transmission, and distribution companies. The national government has been 
attempting to introduce amendments to the 2003 Electricity Act with the goal 
of introducing full retail competition. However, there has been sustained resist-
ance from the state governments to this step.
Significant investment from the central government and private sector has 
been made in the generation-side of the power sector, even today, state govern-
ments own most of the electricity distribution companies in India.
The world of the state government-owned distribution companies consists of 
trying to both expand massively its electricity distribution network (remember 
the 200–300 million customers with no access and the fact that India’s popu-
lation is still growing rapidly) and maintain the existing one, which has high 
wear-and-tear and as customers need increasing amounts of electricity to power 
air conditioners and other conveniences. All of this must take place in a context 
in which the retail tariff at which electricity can be sold to customers (also vot-
ers!) is fundamentally subject to political constraints and therefore remains low.
Given that India is still a poor country with many competing demands for 
limited government resources, it is difficult for state governments to come up 
with direct subsidies to keep the price of electricity low for its citizens, particu-
larly the electorally significant agricultural users and low-income households. 
The alternative, which most state governments have chosen, is to achieve that 
outcome by charging richer and larger customers, who are typically commer-
cial and industrial users, higher-than-cost tariffs while charging low income 
and agricultural customers tariffs that often approach zero.27 This cross-subsidy 
 27 From a techno-economic perspective, the cost of providing service to large (e.g. C&I 
and urban residential) customers is the least due to economies of scale and density 
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system—in effect, based on the same principle as a progressive income tax 
 policy—runs into obvious limitations. Beyond a certain point, richer and larger 
customers will either invest in their own electricity supply and/or leave the ser-
vice territory completely. Either circumstance worsens the already difficult sit-
uation of the state-owned distribution utilities. Consequently, the distribution 
companies are constantly trying to strike a balance between their mandate to 
provide reliable power to all customers (also voters!) while keeping the costs at 
a level that are deemed politically acceptable.
From a broader perspective – i.e. how Indian citizens have received a wide 
range of services similar to electricity – the experience has been that the cen-
tralised system has consistently been unable to keep up with the demand. 
Consequently, Indian citizens have been forced to develop alternatives to the 
centralised systems in many aspects of their lives. Barring some solely central-
ised and publicly provided services (e.g. national security, roads, railways, etc.), 
decentralised and privately provided services supplement (even substitute) the 
centralised system in case of services such as education, transportation, elec-
tricity, water, healthcare, food, and others.
The service most analogous to electricity is water. And this example, too, 
is telling. Unlike in western countries, most Indian cities have not been able 
to supply their citizens with 24-7 water through a centralised pipeline system. 
Consequently, almost all households and businesses have water storage tanks. 
Some households have multiple. Many households have private ‘bore wells’ that 
run deep underground to access subterranean aquifers; others hire companies 
to deliver water in private tankers. Similarly, since the quality of the water is 
poor, households rely on a host of purification technologies installed and oper-
ated at the point of consumption.
As the costs of decentralised systems in the electricity domain continue to 
decrease – i.e. rooftop PV (analogous to bore wells in the water infrastructure 
above) and batteries (analogous to water storage tanks in the water infrastruc-
ture above) – it is quite possible that the electricity system would also evolve 
into a hybrid system similar to the water supply system. The problem is that the 
current water system (and the future potential electricity system) is not opti-
mally designed, implemented, and operated in this hybrid form – but has sim-
ply evolved in a haphazard manner. A more thoughtful approach that actively 
incorporates both forms of centralised and decentralised systems in order to 
minimise the overall costs to society would be beneficial. For example, the dis-
tribution utilities may want to formally incorporate the decentralised systems 
(both spatially and temporally) while designing and operating their distribu-
tion grid infrastructure and making their wholesale level procurement deci-
sions. Retail tariff designs could be considered that provide appropriate signals 
and highest for the small (e.g. rural and agriculture) customers. Consequently, the 
cross-subsidy mechanism is, especially, unattractive for large customers. 
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to consumers as they determine which decentralised systems to invest in. Cur-
rently – the distribution utilities have either ignored the existence of the ad hoc 
decentralised systems or resisted them outright.
Acknowledging that there are important variations across states in India, we 
can nevertheless make some general observations about the prevailing equi-
librium: distribution companies are starved of capital to expand, an Indian 
population equivalent to that of the United States remains without electricity 
connections, and everyone else has a poor quality of service. However much 
the bureaucrats, engineers, and politicians who work in India’s central and state 
governments might yearn to achieve their ultimate objectives of 24-7 power 
for all through the centralised system, they are constrained by political and 
economic conditions. Consequently, the status quo for the quality of the service 
provided by the centralised system is unlikely to change in the near term.
2.6.5 Outcomes
As discussed in the previous two sections, the existence of decentralised alter-
natives in India, albeit non-RE-based, long pre-dates the current interest in 
the United States and European Union for supporting decentralised RE-based 
alternatives. The circumstances that sustain the existence of these decentral-
ised alternatives are unlikely to change substantively in the near term. And as 
the cost of RE-based decentralised technologies drops below that of existing 
decentralised technologies and the cost of electricity from the centralised grid, 
the uptake of RE is likely to continue. This uptake of decentralised RE is likely 
to take place independent of government policies and programs. For example, 
Prayas Energy Group (2017) has estimated that when the levelised cost of roof-
top PV system reaches Rs. 5 per kWh in India – in nine major states in India, 
more than 50 per cent of the non-agricultural sales would find it cost effective 
to start switching to rooftop PV. In five of those nine states, the proportions is 
more than 70 per cent. As per BNEF (2017), all across India, prices for rooftop 
PV discovered through auctions have already sunk well below Rs. 4 per kWh 
with the minimum prices being observed as low as Rs. 2.38 per kWh.
Appropriately designed and implemented government policies and pro-
grams could expedite this uptake significantly. While poorly designed and 
implemented policies and programs may at best not influence the rate of 
uptake but at worst, is likely to slow it down. In this section, we discuss the 
implications of the existing policies/programs and suggest some approaches 
worth considering.
Most of the policy mechanisms currently being implemented or considered 
in India are adapted from those in the developed countries (e.g. the United 
States) where the value proposition for decentralised technologies is fundamen-
tally different than that in India. To reiterate – decentralised technologies in 
India compete with an unreliable (sometimes non-existent) and an increasingly 
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expensive centralised system. Unlike a typical customer in the developed world 
that expects the centralised system to be extremely reliable and affordable, the 
expectation of a typical Indian customer is to be able to pay for the level of relia-
bility they seek and can afford. Indian policies can better take into account these 
two unique conditions in order to develop approaches that are better suited for 
the Indian context.
One possibility is a national-level program similar to the successful LED-
distribution program (http://www.ujala.gov.in) for solar PV panels, batteries, 
and inverters could be implemented that would streamline the availability of 
those products significantly while ensuring their quality at the lowest cost pos-
sible (through aggregation of demand and negotiating with manufacturers). 
Further, storage in the form of electricity (i.e. batteries and inverters) is not 
necessarily the only way to store useful energy. Thermal storage systems such 
as ice for space cooling and water heaters are a mature technology that could 
be deployed where appropriate. Other distributed systems such as geothermal 
heat-pumps can also be considered as the technology matures.
There would be no subsidies involved as the program is designed in the form 
of a loan that is recovered through an on-bill financing mechanism in partner-
ship with the local utility. A wide range of sizes of technology (i.e. make full use 
of the modularity of the technology!) could be available to customers through 
this program for procurement either individually or in the form of cooperative 
arrangements. In conjunction with this technology dissemination program, 
retail tariffs could be re-designed to ensure that the costs/benefits are shared 
fairly between the utility and the customers. Both the approaches described 
here don’t’ rely on large financial commitments from the government and 
instead attempt to make full use of the existing demand for these technologies. 
For programs aimed at specific end-uses – e.g. agricultural pumps – the design 
must ensure that negative indirect impacts (e.g. water/land overuse) are mini-
mised if not avoided through the use of a comprehensive portfolio of policies 
that go beyond the power sector (e.g. crop selection, water-use efficiency, etc.).
In India, the centralised power system will continue to provide a certain level 
of reliable electricity supply at prices established through a process that remains 
essentially political.
Outside of this bound, though, customers will continue to enhance their sup-
ply from the outside, where options have evolved from no electricity to lead-acid 
batteries and diesel generators, and now to solar PV and advanced batteries. In 
the absence of a more thoughtful approach to designing and operating the grid 
(e.g. retail tariff design) – the hybrid form of the power sector will evolve in a 
chaotic manner thereby imposing needless costs on the society. The goal of the 
policymakers – then – is to find ways to ensure their thinking about the future 
power sector is not largely restricted to the centralised system with decentralised 
systems a mere after-thought at best or outright nuisance at worst – but one of the 
important components of the power sector that can yield even lower costs for all.
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2.7 Italy: network costs versus decentralised system
Michele Gaspari and Arturo Lorenzoni
2.7.1 Introduction
The diminishing economies of scale and the gradual cost reductions of renew-
able technologies make distributed generation (DG) the most convenient alter-
native for new electricity generating installations (Lorenzoni 2014; Lorenzoni 
2015; REN21 2016). The establishment of a decentralised electricity market is 
essential for compliance with the decarbonisation commitments of the Paris 
Agreement (UNFCCC 2015; IEA 2016), even if in the framework of European 
targets (European Commission 2014) each member state may implement dif-
ferent instruments for the transition to sustainable energy (Kuzemko et al. 
2016). The Italian market represents a significant case for the analysis of the 
evolution towards low-carbon electricity systems as a remarkable increase in 
renewable capacity installed in the last six years was possible within a mar-
ket characterised by a real liberalisation process even with a large share of 
the former incumbent Enel (ARERA 2018). However, whilst Italy has already 
met its 2020 decarbonisation goal for the electricity sector, some policies cur-
rently in place may be detrimental for the further development of decentralised 
energy resources (DER): in order to revert this trend, the draft National Energy 
and Climate Plan presented in December 2018 set ambitious goals to further 
increase decarbonisation (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero 
dell’Ambiente, Ministero delle Infrastrutture 2018).
This chapter provides an overview of the most significant regulatory and 
market aspects that have enabled Italy to meet its target, and of the barriers 
that are hampering further actions. The second section describes the institu-
tions and characteristics of the Italian electricity market as well as the most 
important decarbonisation policies; the third section analyses the outcomes of 
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such policies. The fourth section focuses on the main governance drivers and 
barriers for decentralisation, and the fifth section provides concluding remarks.
2.7.2 The impact of European policies on the 
decentralisation of the Italian electricity market
From nationalisation to liberalisation: a short description of institutions 
and market players
In 1962 the per-capita electricity consumption in Italy was still lower with 
respect to other comparable countries; the centre-left government decided to 
nationalise the industry and to establish the single vertically integrated utility 
Enel, in order to give access to every consumer under the same conditions, and 
to sustain economic growth (Ranci 2014).
The establishment of the National Regulatory Authority (NRA), thirty-
three years later, to promote competition, efficiency and transparency whilst 
maintaining a high quality of supply, was a precondition for the liberalisa-
tion of the market (Legge 481/1995). According to the European Directive 
1996/92/CE, the first step to promote the participation to the free retail 
market was to give access to ‘eligible consumers’; the Italian decree (D.Lgs. 
79/1999) declared ‘eligible’ those consumers with a decreasing annual con-
sumption threshold (from 100 GWh down to 0.1 GWh from 1999 to 2007), 
while the others were supplied in the regulated captive market, where supply 
conditions were defined by the NRA. This hybrid solution was unstable: since 
July 2007 everyone has access to the free retail market; however, the captive 
market, where a single buyer ensures electricity supply, is still available and 
serves the majority of households (ARERA 2018). The wholesale market is 
managed by Gestore dei Mercati Energetici (GME), which sets criteria for 
neutrality, transparency, and competition amongst producers: Terna is the 
transmission system operator.
Enel remains dominant across supply and distribution: with respect to distri-
bution networks, in 2017 Enel Distribuzione (currently e-Distribuzione) man-
aged 85 per cent of total electricity supply volumes (ARERA 2018). Enel is also 
the largest supplier in the retail market (85.4 TWh): a deliberation from the 
NRA is stricter in terms of the obligation of functional unbundling (ARERA 
2015d). In general, the Italian territory is provided with scarce natural resources 
and fossil fuels are not available: the dependence from foreign sources is 75 per 
cent, with oil and gas still accounting for around 60 per cent of the energy mix 
(Unione Petrolifera 2016).
With respect to the electricity market agenda the Italian Government has 
acted as a policy-taker, building its policies according to EU priorities (Font 
2002; Clò 2014). The same approach has been adopted with respect to decar-
bonisation commitments to be implemented in Italy after the EU signature of 
the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015).
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The governance of decarbonisation policies
The generous incentive schemes for renewable energy sources (RES), the cost 
reductions of low-carbon technologies and the flattening electricity demand 
due to the economic crisis have made possible that sustainable sources rep-
resented around one third of the Italian electricity generation mix in the last 
6 years, as can be seen in Table 3 (GSE 2019a).
Since 1991 the Italian law declared RES projects of ‘public interest’ and ‘pub-
lic utility’, and the related works ‘urgent’ and ‘not deferrable’ (Legge 9/1991). 
After the Directive 2001/77/EC, Italy promoted a policy (D.Lgs. 387/2003) that 
simplified the permitting process for these facilities. Gestore dei Servizi Ener-
getici (GSE) is the legal entity in charge of managing the incentives for RES and 
purchases electricity from these generators.
The main support schemes adopted by GSE are:
•	Tariffa Onnicomprensiva (feed in tariff): for renewable generators 
(excluding PV and including wind, hydro, bioenergy) entered into opera-
tion before 31 December 2012 with a capacity installed up to 1 MW (200 
kW for wind); it envisions a fixed amount for each kWh produced, differ-
entiated according to the source, for 15 years.
•	Green Certificates (GC): for net electricity produced by RES facilities 
entered into operation before 31 December 2012; from 1 January 2016 GC 
are replaced by feed-in-premium incentives until the end of the right to 
obtain GC (20 years).
Table 3: Electricity generation (GWh) by renewable energy sources in Italy.
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018**
Hydro 52,773 58,545 45,537 42,432 36,199 49,28
Wind 14,897 15,178 14,844 17,689 17,742 17,492
Solar 21,589 22,306 22,942 22,104 24,378 22,653
Geothermal 5,659 5,916 6,185 6,289 6,201 6,08
Bioenergy* 17,09 18,732 19,396 19,509 19,378 19,219
TOTAL 112,008 120,677 108,904 108,023 103,898 114,724
Gross National 
Consumption
330,043 321,834 327,94 324,969 331,765 332,849
RES/Gross National 
Consumption
33.94% 37.50% 33.21% 33.24% 31.32% 34.47%
 *Bioenergy includes: solid biomass (including the organic fraction of municipal solid 
waste), biogas, bioliquids, and biomethane.
 **Provisional estimations.
Source: GSE, 2019a.
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•	Conto Energia, incentive scheme for PV, which comprises:
− A feed-in-premium scheme for PV projects entered into operation 
before 26 August 2012.
− A scheme for PV plant entered into operation from 27 August 2012 to 
6 July 2013: feed-in tariff for projects with a capacity installed lower 
than 1 MWp and feed-in-premium for larger units, with a prize for net 
self-consumed electricity (GSE 2016).
The diversity of instruments and dates highlights the fact that the Italian regu-
latory framework has not provided reliable instruments for the promotion of 
DER. The policies to support PV provide a particularly interesting story in 
these terms, with frequent and sometimes random changes of rules. For exam-
ple, support for PV started in 2005, and the incentive was then modified in 
2007 (D.M. 19 February 2007), in 2010 (D.M. 6 August 2010; Legge 129/2010), 
in 2011 (D.M. 5 May 2011), and finally in 2012 (D.M. 5 July 2012). During 
these years, the cost of installations decreased faster than the premiums and 
in 2011 nearly 10 GW were installed. In 2012 the Government passed a decree 
to end support for PV as soon as the overall cost of the programme reached 
€6.7 billion/year.
Other very important support schemes in relation to the development of a 
decentralised system are ‘Scambio Sul Posto’ and ‘Ritiro Dedicato’ (Nextville 
2013). ‘Scambio sul Posto’ or net metering (ARERA 2012), is a commercial 
agreement with GSE valid for low-carbon units up to 200 kW: the electricity 
generated by an on-site installation and injected into the grid can be used to 
offset the electricity withdrawn from the grid itself. A total of 524,600 users 
have adopted this method of net metering, a total capacity of 4.5 GW (ARERA 
2016a). Since 2009 this has been based on market values: users pay the total 
amount for their consumption and in return receive a fair contribution set at 
retail market prices for the electricity produced. Until 2012 this scheme was 
compatible with other incentives, but this is no longer the case. ‘Ritiro Dedi-
cato’ (Simplified Purchase and Resale Agreement) (ARERA 2007) is a simpli-
fied formula for low-carbon facilities under 1 MW of capacity. Producers sell 
the electricity generated to GSE instead of selling it through bilateral contracts 
or directly on the wholesale market; they are remunerated with guaranteed 
minimum prices, while larger units receive the average monthly price set on 
their zonal wholesale market. 51,119 plants adopted this scheme voluntarily, a 
total capacity of 11.6 GW (ARERA 2016b).
In spite of the numerous regulatory turnarounds, Italy successfully com-
plied with its decarbonisation targets, reaching 69 per cent of its target in 
2011: at the end of 2015 the reduction in CO2 emissions was 34 per cent 
higher than the 2020 target (ENEA 2016a). With the steady growth of the last 
decade, RES gained a central role in the energy sector, in both operation and 
policy. This was at the expense of fossil thermal electricity generation, which 
accounted for 82.6 per cent in 2007 and 56 per cent in 2014; electricity-related 
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CO2 emissions amounted to 591.1 gCO2 per kWh in 1990 falling to 323.6 
gCO2 per kWh in 2014 (ENEA 2016b).
National/regional policies and geographical dimension
In the Italian Constitution of 1948, energy production, transmission and dis-
tribution became state competencies, but with a constitutional reform in 2001 
(L. Cost 3/2001) a division of legislative powers made the subject a matter of 
concurrent competencies between national and regional entities: the Italian 
Government establishes the general principles of the sector, complying with 
the supranational EU framework, while regions legislate within their territories 
according to such principles. The aim of this configuration was to relieve the 
state from an excess of tasks and to simplify the administrative procedures in 
the sector. A constitutional reform, which among other objectives, aimed to 
give back exclusive responsibility to the state in the energy field (D.D.L. Cost 
2016), was rejected following a referendum in December 2016.
The geographical dimension is significant not only in terms of legislative 
competence: in general, northern regions consume more electricity and are 
characterised by a larger number of installations from RES (including hydro). 
Southern regions are affected by lower consumption and higher prices for elec-
tricity, mainly due to bottlenecks in the transmission grid: it often happens that 
RES generation is higher than total load (ARERA 2016a). Figure 14 illustrates 
the geographical distribution of DG in terms of number of substations involved 
for more than 5 per cent of total time in power flow inversions.
Figure 14: Number of HV/MV substations with power flow inversions > 5 per 
cent of total time.
Source: ARERA (2016a).
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Importance of consumers in policy debate
In the last few years, the NRA devoted increasing attention to unfair commer-
cial activities from suppliers, mainly with regards to billing processes. In gen-
eral, consumer unions complain about high bills and lack of transparency from 
suppliers: from 2011 to 2013 the number of complaints increased from 335,000 
to 500,000, 70 per cent of which related to households’ contracts (Federcon-
sumatori 2014). The liberalisation also raised concerns related to energy poverty 
for low-income users and a social bonus was made available for households in 
need (D.Lgs. 102/2014, ARERA 2015c). In spite of this, energy policy is still 
dominated by the supply-side operators and the diffusion of new contractual 
relationships based on DG hardly finds proper support from NRA.
2.7.3 The status of decentralisation in the Italian electricity market
In 2017, the Italian gross domestic product slightly increased and the elec-
tricity demand followed the same dynamics (provisional results account for 
+2 per cent with respect to the previous year). Despite this signal, and as a 
result of improved efficiencies in the system and reduction of demand from 
energy-intensive sectors, the electricity demand stabilised at the same level as 
in 2007 (319 TWh) (Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico 2018). The electri-
fication of heat and transport, proposed in some decarbonisation scenarios, 
has not yet impacted on demand, as electricity consumption still accounts 
for approximately 20 per cent of total final energy consumption. This shrink-
ing demand pattern does not by itself facilitate the full transition to a sus-
tainable system, with the sector still relying on centralised regulation and 
managing overcapacity.
The contribution of RES
PV and hydro together account for around 70 per cent of total installed renew-
able capacity (in 2008 hydroelectricity represented 95 per cent of total RES in 
Italy). From 2010 to 2015, 23 GW of renewable facilities were installed, with 
nearly 20 GWp of PV; however, the decrease of incentive schemes in 2013 
brought about an interruption in the constant growth of decentralised sources, 
as seen in Figure 15 (GSE 2019b).
Overcapacity and low profitability in the wholesale market
In 2004 the Italian electricity market (IPEX) started as a pool (central dis-
patch), and allowed bilateral contracts. IPEX is managed by GME and it actu-
ally entails a spot electricity market (MPE), a forward electricity market (MTE) 
and a platform for physical delivery of financial contracts. MPE is currently 
divided into three specific segments: day-ahead market (MGP); intra-day mar-
ket (MI); ancillary services market (MSD, operated by Terna). MGP is a zonal 
market, with the particularity of a single price on the consumer side (PUN, the 
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weighted average zonal price) and a zonal price whenever congestion rises on 
the supply side. In general, the average price in the IPEX is higher with respect 
to other European countries (except France) because of a market largely based 
on gas supplies.
The large share of RES impacted the operation of IPEX, with a negative spark 
spread for combined cycles occurring in many months since 2012 and negative 
results for most of thermal generators.
Figure 15: Subsidised electricity (TWh) generated from RES, according to 
incentive instrument.
Source: ARERA (2018).










2004 51.60 28.52 28.91 27.93 28.13
2005 58.59 45.97 29.33 53.67 46.67
2006 74.75 50.78 48.59 50.53 49.29
2007 70.99 37.99 27.93 39.35 40.88
2008 86.99 65.76 44.73 64.44 69.15
2009 63.72 38.85 35.02 36.96 43.01
2010 64.12 44.49 53.06 37.01 47.50
2011 72.23 51.12 47.05 49.93 48.89
2012 75.48 42.60 31.20 47.23 46.94
2013 62.99 37.78 38.35 44.26 43.24
Source: RSE (2015).
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In general, GSE operates on IPEX as a non-programmable RES collector and 
bids in the day-ahead market at zero; this behaviour drives marginal units out 
of the market and favours the decline in the clearing wholesale electricity price. 
Conventional generation facilities are excluded from the merit order in a grow-
ing number of hours, especially during day-time. In order to recover the profits 
lost on the day-ahead market, they are therefore obliged to bid at higher prices 
at night (when PV plants do not generate) and on the ancillary service market 
(MSD) (Clò, Cataldi & Zoppoli 2015). In the first third of 2016, such activities 
brought to an increase in dispatching costs for an amount of €745 million with 
respect to the previous year (Biancardi 2016), and were considered as improper 
manipulations by the regulator.
Considering these aspects, the establishment of a proper capacity market 
would guarantee an adequate generating capacity to meet expected consump-
tion and reserve margins (ARERA 2015f). The approved scheme (D.M. 30 
June 2014) will replace the transitory system in force since 2004, which was 
structured as capacity payment, and entails a mechanism according to which 
producers will receive remuneration for the generated capacity that they make 
available. The final approval of the capacity market design was planned for the 
end of 2017, but was delayed.
Towards full liberalisation in the retail market
Twenty years have passed from the beginning of the liberalisation process, 
but still the majority of households (58 per cent) purchase electricity accord-
ing to the regulated price. However, this trend is changing and the number 
of households accessing the competitive retail market is increasing: in 2017 
most supply contracts for new consumption units were signed according to 
the liberalised framework (ARERA 2018). On average, families in the captive 
market consume less than families supplied in the free market (1.852 kWh/year 
against 2.119 kWh/year), because larger consumers are more likely to search 
for cheaper options; nonetheless, prices on the free competitive retail market 
can be higher than regulated ones, often because these offers include forms of 
electricity-related services.
Reforms (ARERA 2015c) are in place to encourage this shift to the free mar-
ket model and reduce the role of the single buyer: the end of the captive market 
is expected by June 2020. However, in the presence of significant informative 
asymmetries, the single buyer is still a useful benchmark for the market.
In general terms, the energy bill structure is composed of 4 sections (ARERA 
2018): in 2017 the energy-commodity cost section, which is related to the 
wholesale market price of the energy and the commercial margins of the 
retailer/reseller accounted for 44%, while taxes and network costs represented 
13% and 20% of the whole amount, respectively. The second most significant 
portion of the bill is represented by general system charges, which cover the 
costs that the system bears for the incentive schemes to renewables and high-
efficiency cogeneration, as well as other costs which are generally referred to 
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the electricity system (including the nuclear plants decommissioning, the sup-
port to national railways electric systems, the bonus for fuel poverty, etc.). This 
latter portion accounts for 22 per cent of the total bill, and nearly 80 per cent 
of such overheads are devoted to incentive schemes for RES. Each of these cost 
items can be split into a ‘trinomial structure’ already presented above: a fixed 
value (€/connection point/year), a power capacity value (€/kW/year, based 
on the power capacity of the connection point), and a volumetric variable value 
(€ per kWh), as seen in Figure 16.
2.7.4 The Italian regulation for distributed energy resources
The previous paragraphs have already described the Italian electricity 
market, which complies to the requirements of the European Directives 
(unbundling and Third Party Access): with respect to the grid connection 
of renewable  generators, network operators are obliged to connect them at a 
cost that is proportional to the distance from the connection point. However, 
the owner of a renewable energy plant does not have alternative solutions 
to self- consumption or sale to the grid. The direct sale of electricity to other 
consumers, as well as load aggregation, is forbidden, with the exception of 
the one-to-one supply under SEU (Sistemi Efficienti di Utenza, efficient user 
system) scheme, a regulated business model for electricity sales from DG, 
described below.
Figure 16: Costs structure for a household consuming 2,700 kWh per year and 
with a withdrawal capacity of 3 kW in the captive market.
Source: ARERA (2018).
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The biggest concern for the Italian regulator is related to the payment of sys-
tem costs when a growing number of consumers are becoming self-producers, 
reducing the withdrawal from the grid (and the related participation to grid 
costs), but taking full advantage of grid services. As a matter of fact, in the cur-
rent framework, innovated by the Decree 244/2016, all the electricity consum-
ers are obliged to pay network tariffs and general system charges only on the 
energy withdrawn from the public network.
The current system for the recovery of the costs for transmission and dis-
tribution services is based on a price cap mechanism on operating costs 
(to encourage cost reductions in managing infrastructure) and a rate of 
return mechanism on capital costs (to stimulate investments for network 
adequacy) (Legge 290/2003). This regulation until 2012 made possible sig-
nificant investments in transmission (€7 billion) and distribution networks 
(€18 billion) (Polo et al. 2014). In a recent consultation the NRA proposed 
to introduce an approach based on total costs (totex) for the remuneration of 
services, suggesting also the aggregation of smaller DSOs (ARERA 2015a). 
In general, the NRA itself recognises the need to establish mechanisms to 
coordinate the strategies of generation facilities and to take advantage of the 
flexible demand.
Governance barriers for distributed energy resources
Households’ electricity tariff reform: displacing efficient consumers and 
on-site generators
As highlighted in the previous section, only around 40 per cent of the total 
costs included in the electricity bill is exposed to market competition. This 
structure (Ranci 2014) was aimed to keep the electricity costs for small capacity 
withdrawals for households (3 kW) as low as possible, without being affected 
by volatility. Tariffs were given a progressive structure for the recovery of net-
work costs (transmission, distribution and measurement) and overheads: the 
charges grew proportionately to consumption and therefore larger consumers 
were burdened with the recovery of fixed costs.
Under the current scheme (ARERA 2015b), a growing portion of the bill 
is due to a fixed charge, and the final price is more cost-reflective. According 
to the NRA, the new tariff structure is favourable for consumers that put in 
place energy savings initiatives, because the energy component still represents 
at least 70 per cent of the total bill; on the other side, this scheme also supports 
the development of the electric options for transport and heat (electric vehicles 
and heat pumps), see Figure 17.
However, even if larger consumers are granted with economic savings (€164/
year for families consuming 4,000 kWh/year), this reform seems detrimental 
for families with an annual consumption which is lower than the average and 
that own an on-site generation plant. Moreover, the adoption of information 
and control technologies in energy management to reduce electricity loads and 
shifting consumption to off-peak periods is delayed, if not fully displaced.
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Demand response and grid services from renewables and storage
Since 2004, eligible consumers have been allowed to bid on the demand side of 
the wholesale market, however, demand-side resources do not have access to 
the balancing market and are not allowed to provide ancillary services, which 
are only provided by generators with installed capacity above 10 MVA. With 
regard to balancing responsibilities, RES are charged for their imbalances 
since 2012 with a given tolerance, under a continuously changing regulation 
(ARERA 2012). This rule exposed the balancing market to expensive manipu-
lations and the rules are again under revision.
Thanks to the fact that Italy was the first country in Europe that adopted smart 
meters on a large scale, with more than 95 per cent of low-voltage consumers cur-
rently equipped with this technology (Meeus & Saguan 2011), the use of demand 
resources to manage the grid is feasible. Since 2010, a time-of-use tariff (peak and 
off-peak) has been mandatory for consumers in the captive market, and retailers 
offer time-of-use prices to all types of consumers; in spite of this only consumers 
with contracted capacity higher than 55 kW are charged on an hourly basis.
The Italian NRA, with Resolution no. 300/2017/R/eel (ARERA 2017), has 
started a process to open the ancillary services market to non-relevant and 
non-programmable generation units, as well as to consumption units and to stor-
age systems. To this aim, such installation can be aggregated in virtual units (UVA, 
which stands for Unità Virtuali Abilitate – Virtual Enabled Units) and take part in 
the market as a single aggregated participant. In the abovementioned Resolution, 
four types of virtual units are addressed:
Figure 17: Comparison of total costs of the electricity bill pre and post reform 
for 3 kW user.
Source: Energy and Strategy (2016).
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•	UVA-C, aggregation of consumption units situated in the same area (areas 
are defined by Terna);
•	UVA-P, aggregation of non-relevant generation units (either programmable 
or non-programmable and including storage systems) situated in the same 
area;
•	UVA-M, aggregation of non-relevant generation units (either programma-
ble or non-programmable and including storage systems) and consumption 
units situated in the same area;
•	UVA-N, aggregation of both relevant and non-relevant generation units, 
and possibly of consumption units, connected to the same node of the 
transmission grid.
Currently (June 2019), pilot projects have already been activated and these 
units have already taken part in the ancillary services market, but it is too soon 
to evaluate their effectiveness.
The case of small islands
The Italian coastal areas are characterised by several small islands, which are 
not connected to the mainland electricity network. While they can represent 
an opportunity to develop local systems entirely reliant upon low-carbon 
sources, most of these islands are supplied by fossil-fuel generators, largely 
oversized compared to winter demand, in order to cover summer peak loads 
(Smart Island 2016). The decarbonisation of these local systems has never 
been undertaken because consumers on these islands have been subsidised by 
the rest of final consumers (€60 million/year) (ARERA 2014a): they pay the 
same tariffs as the rest of the country, plus local operators can recover costs 
in entirety, leading to significant profit and opposition to establishing more 
innovative solutions.
Governance drivers for distributed energy resources
A regulation-driven model for decentralisation: SEU
The business model created by the Italian regulatory framework for distributed 
generation, Sistemi Efficienti di Utenza (SEU), is affected by significant limita-
tions. A SEU is a system where one or more plants (RES or high-efficiency CHP 
plants) managed by the same producer (which could also differ from the end 
user) are directly connected through a private connection (with no obligation 
to connect third parties) with one final consumer and all the elements of the 
SEU (plants, consumption site, connection, network) are included in an area 
available to the final consumer itself (ARERA 2013). The regulation for SEU, 
which has already been affected by retroactive changes, has so far mainly sup-
ported PV projects with an installed capacity lower than 20 kWp (GSE 2016), 
and represents a significant barrier for the development of the scheme with 
regard to the one-to-one restriction and the ownership of the whole area where 
the plant is installed.
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In January 2019, Italy submitted to the European Commission its draft 
proposal of the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) (Ministero dello 
Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’Ambiente, Ministero delle Infrastrutture 
2018). The Plan is aimed to accelerate decarbonisation, to enhance the energy 
decentralisation and to ensure security of supply, while promoting energy effi-
ciency and the electrification of consumption. Among the main goals of the 
Plant there is the increase of the quota of energy generated by RES up to 30% of 
the national gross energy consumption and a 33% reduction of greenhouse gas 
for non-ETS sectors emissions.
The NECP also declares the intention to proceed with the transposition of 
the Directive 2018/2001 (Directive 2018/2001), with particular reference to 
 individual and collective self-consumption initiatives (energy communities). To 
enhance their development, the main instrument should be the application of 
network and system charges only on the electricity which is procured from the 
network, while the electricity which is self-consumed should not be  burdened 
by such charges. The transposition is still in process at the time of writing 
(June 2019), but it is likely that it will enhance the quota of self-consumption, 
with particular reference to renewable generation units: 80% of self-consumed 
energy is currently produced by gas-fired cogeneration plants (GSE 2018).
Other support policies for decentralisation
Various support measures are available, but they are not conceived in the per-
spective of creating a full, decentralised energy system.
In 2004 the Italian legislator introduced a white certificates system (D.M. 20 
July 2004) with an obligation placed on electricity and gas distributors (with a 
threshold of 50,000 consumers). Distributors are allowed to invest in energy 
efficiency initiatives themselves or to purchase the certificates from ESCOs that 
undertake investments in this field.
Tax deductions (Legge 296/2006) of up to 65 per cent of the investment cost 
over a ten-year time span are available for energy efficiency measures such as 
solar heating collectors, condensing boilers, high-efficient heat pumps and bio-
mass boilers. Such deductions have been the key driver for energy efficiency 
improvements in the building sector in Italy, with more than 14.2 million inter-
ventions from 1998 to 2016 (Servizio Studi Camera dei Deputati 2016).
Further incentive for energy efficiency initiatives and renewable thermal 
energy is provided by ‘Conto Termico’ (D.M. 28 December 2012; D.L. 91/2014), 
a contribution available for public authorities and households that covers part 
of the costs incurred and is paid off in annual instalments, from 2 to 5 years.
Storage tests and smart grid tests
Many European and national programmes provided funding for storage facili-
ties and smart grid solutions, in order to facilitate the integration of RES and 
establish new modalities for the operation of transmission and distribution 
grids; one of the largest project in Italy financed the refurbishment of 1,605 
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km of transmission and distribution lines in Southern Regions (Ministero 
dello Sviluppo Economico 2014). Moreover, several smart grid projects were 
also implemented by the incumbents themselves, thanks to the possibility to 
include these expenses in the cost-recovery mechanism: Enel Distribuzione in 
2015 committed itself for a total amount of € 343 million under different finan-
cial agreements (Mori 2015). Terna installed 35 MW of storage units in south-
ern regions to increase the flexibility of the system and to absorb excess power 
from non-dispatchable RES in off-peak hours (Terna 2016).
NRA defined the mechanisms for the selective promotion of investments 
towards smart distribution systems in areas with a large penetration of DG 
(ARERA 2015a). These projects are related to new anti-islanding protection 
schemes, and real-time operation, monitoring and control strategies. However, 
the NRA itself encountered barriers in carrying out these projects, and the most 
significant one has been the lack of involvement and participation of active 
users. Even if the distributor covered all the costs, some users have rejected the 
experiment because they lacked direct immediate benefits and were scared by 
the problems that could occur during the process.
Relying on conventional network operators to test smart grid solutions is 
preferable in terms of the stability of the system, but this solution is risky with 
respect to the exclusion of other operators that could supply more innovative 
technologies to regulate DG.
2.7.5 Conclusions
Italy complied with the European decarbonisation targets, even if the regula-
tion of the electricity system was not able to promote a proper coherent govern-
ance for the transition towards a decentralised paradigm. As a matter of fact:
•	The reform of the household’s tariff is not in favour of efficient consumption 
units and does not support local generators; moreover, the expected results 
in terms of electrification of final uses are not guaranteed;
•	The restrictions on aggregation and on the provision of services from DG, 
as well as the barriers to coupling storage units and generators, hamper the 
adoption of innovative technologies; in this perspective, the adoption of 
Virtual Enabled Units can represent a significant innovation, which how-
ever is still at its early stage;
•	In principle the authors agree with the opportunity to fully implement the 
liberalisation process, but considering that significant informative asym-
metries are still available in the market, an aggregator with no-profit target 
like the single buyer still represents a useful benchmark for the market;
•	The prohibition to sell electricity from local plants to adjacent entities is 
preventing the establishment of decentralised supply, but the commitment 
for the transposition of the Directive 2018/2001, with particular reference 
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to energy communities and to jointly acting renewable self-consumers can 
be a driver for decentralisation.
In spite of the latest improvements, these policies have resulted in the protec-
tion of the rent of incumbents. Conversely, the low-cost technologies avail-
able allow sustainable facilities and demand aggregators to provide network 
services; the integration of thermal and electric loads could also facilitate the 
management of intermittent electricity sources if efficient solutions are in place.
Driving the change in the energy sector requires great regulatory vision 
and the ability to balance the needs of the incumbents with the opportunities 
opened up by the innovative options. The flattening electricity demand and 
the shrinking prices do not make it easy to put in place novel instruments, 
but the new market design should fit with low-carbon and decentralised 
energy sources.
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2.8 California versus New York: policy implementation via 
Investor-Owned Utilities or Distribution System Provider?
Catherine Mitchell28
2.8.1 Introduction
Energy systems are changing all over the world. In the United States of America 
(USA), the different states follow very different energy policies. Some are at 
the forefront of global energy policy thinking, including California (CA) and 
New York state (NYS). However, CA and NYS, whilst both progressive in terms 
of greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction policies, have very different principles 
underlying their energy system governance29 and therefore implement their 
energy policies in very different ways. CA is one of the world’s earliest movers 
in terms of energy system transformation and, on most metrics, outperforms 
NYS. However, NYS in 2014 put in place the New York Reforming the Energy 
Vision (NY REV), and although it is too early to judge how successful it is, 
it has introduced new ideas and arguments about the necessary governance 
constituents for energy system transformation, and is acting as a first mover in 
certain significant ways.
 28 Work undertaken as a result of the UK EPSRC IGov Research award http://projects.
exeter.ac.uk/igov/; and thanks to Carl Linvill of RAP, and Rudi Stegemoeller, ex of 
RAP and now NY PSC, for their conversations.
 29 Governance is thought of as the combination of policies, institutions, regulations, 
market and network rules and incentives, and the process by which the governance 
design details (i.e. the details of a RE policy, or a market rule) are agreed.
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This country report endeavours to capture those differences and similarities 
between CA and NYS. In many ways, the heart of a comparison between CA 
and NY is:
•	whether the more cautious governance approach of CA with respect to 
markets and the ways it places responsibility via regulation on its utilities 
to execute its policies, often through procurement, is working as well, or 
better, than the NYS’s avowedly new ‘balance’ approach between regulation 
and markets of the Reforming the Energy Vision (REV);
•	whether, at the end of the day, there is not a great deal of practical difference 
in outcomes between the two in terms of practical innovation and change, 
even if their avowed governance principles might suggest there is, and this 
therefore implies their differences do not really matter.
CA is far ahead of NYS in some ways in terms of renewable energy deployment. 
However, the changes within the global energy system are increasingly cluster-
ing around decentralisation of technologies; the move to decarbonisation; the 
inclusion of digitalisation within energy system operation and market/platform 
transactions; and the increasing preference for some degree of democratisation 
of the energy system via customer choice, new ownership or involvement of 
new stakeholders or investors. Together, these four ‘Ds’ are known as D4.
At this point in time, NYS’s intended energy pathway might appear to be 
better suited to these changes (because of its efforts to encourage new entrants; 
and new, dynamic ways of system operation and valuation of DER; and cus-
tomer choice) and therefore may – relatively – better benefit the citizens of 
NYS than CA in terms of energy system transformation over the longer term. 
On the other hand, NYS may find it just too hard to push through fundamental 
changes across the spectrum of energy system operation and markets. Only 
time will tell whether CA or NYS is the more successful governance model for 
energy system transformation.
Notwithstanding this, the chapter is arguing, at root, that any comparison 
between them has to be put in context. CA has been supporting sustainable 
energy since the 1970s. What NYS was able to do in 2014 was ‘start afresh’ and 
has enunciated a new approach to energy system regulation to enable a new, 
more dynamic system operation, with a new value proposition in keeping with 
D4. There are multiple documents which describe, or predict, a very different 
global energy system by 2030 (for example see Navigant 2017). However, there 
are very few country energy systems around the world which are ‘walking the 
walk’ and changing rules and incentives so that the value of D4 is available and 
accessible for new actors and new ways of doing things. This is why both CA 
and NYS are so interesting.
For any other US state or country which is trying to work out what govern-
ance system would most suit them for energy system transformation, valuable 
lessons can be learned from both CA and NYS.
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Overall though, the chapter argues that the underlying principles of the NYS 
regulatory reform are potentially transformational because it is trying to create 
a new ‘value’ proposition within energy system governance [1] by arguing to 
move the ‘heart’ of the energy system to the distribution level; [2] to create dis-
tribution system providers to facilitate and coordinate markets at that level, and 
then to ‘nest’ up that local market up to the wholesale level enabling a dynamic 
valuation of distributed energy resources; and [3] to both confront, and pro-
vide solutions, to the altered and changing nature of energy system provision. 
The NY REV is illuminating the fundamental issues (including the difficulties) 
which need to be addressed when undertaking energy system transformation, 
and in this way the efforts of the NY REV can only be helpful to wider global 
energy system transformation practice.
Countries may enact this new value proposition differently from NYS, but 
the ideas that the NY REV have unleashed can be expected to roll out around 
the world. This chapter, however, also argues that the governance principles 
or Vision of the NY REV should be viewed distinctly from what is happening 
in NYS on the ground. The latter, so far, is more about getting information, 
processes, methodologies and value of DER sorted out rather than delivering 
much practical change. These are the vital building blocks for that transfor-
mational change, and even if NYS runs into difficulties – as a first mover, it 
is acting as a laboratory for the rest of the world. However, all countries and 
States have different cultures, geographies and energy system history. Simply 
transferring NY REV regulation to a country cannot be expected to work. 
What can be expected to be useful is to understand what energy system issues 
the NY REV principles and processes were chosen to address (and why), and 
then to assess whether those principles and processes could be of help in 
other countries.
This chapter first (very briefly) reviews the CA energy policies, regulation 
and ethos; then NY’s energy regulation and ethos; and then provides the com-
parison. This chapter is not attempting a complete overview and comparison of 
the CA and NYS energy policies. It is attempting to highlight the key charac-
teristics and pieces of legislation of both places for DER governance. For those 
who would like to have a more detailed overview of how the United States regu-
lates its energy industry, please see.30 The United States is very different from, 
say, Europe because ‘utilities’ are often combined distribution and supply, and 
often with a default tariff and limited, or no, competitive retail at the domestic 
level. Notwithstanding these differences, there is still a lot that the rest of the 
world can learn in terms of DER governance ideas.
 30 http://www.raponline.org/knowledge-center/electricity-regulation-in-the-us- 
a-guide-2/. 
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2.8.2 California
Overview of Californian energy policy
CA has been at the forefront of global energy policy since the 1970s. Their reac-
tion to the oil crises and energy insecurity of the early 1970s was to put in place 
policies to support energy efficiency measures and renewables.31 The Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 was one of the first countries/
US states in the world to legislate to support renewable energy implementa-
tion.32 CA is an example of a state/country which has had long-term, politi-
cal commitment and leadership with respect to sustainable energy, via both 
Republican and Democrat Governors. One result of this early mover advantage 
has been that the air quality aspects of energy use are also an important and 
integrating focus of CA energy policy. Another result is that policy is driven by 
the CA legislature and the various agencies – of which CA has many – are then 
responsible for implementing the state policy. It is therefore a top-down system.
The main CA implementation agencies are the CEC (the California Energy 
Commission); the CPUC (the California Public Utilities Commission); CAISO 
(the Californian Independent System Operator); and CARB (the Californian 
Air Resources Board). There has been criticism in the past that those agencies 
do not work well together.33 However, in November 2016, the California Public 
Utility Commission (CPUC) published a 7 page Distributed Energy Resources 
(DER) Action plan – intended to provide a Vision for the way forward for 
energy within CA, and as part of that a way to integrate the different energy 
institutions and their activities (California State 2016).
Energy and climate trends in California
GHG emissions in CA have been reasonably similar between 1990 and 2014. 
Senate Bill (SB) 32 (discussed below) is intended to bring them down signifi-
cantly by 2030 (California State 2006). However, it is the transportation and 
electricity sectors which have managed to reduce emissions34 between 2000 and 
2014, whilst industrial, commercial and residential, agriculture, recycling and 
waste have more or less stayed the same. The provision of electricity genera-
tion capacity has increased significantly since 2001 (around 56,000 MWs) to 
 31 During the 70s, a new nuclear program was considered but once PURPA was in 
place this receded. 
 32 The other country, at that time, which reacted in a similar way to the 1970s oil crises, 
and which also set about supporting renewables, was Denmark. Both those coun-
tries have gone on to become world sustainable technology leaders.
 33 For a rather old analysis of this see http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/
research/docs/127600810-renewable-and-distributed-power-in-california.pdf. 
 34 http://docketpublic.energy.ca.gov/PublicDocuments/16-IEPR-01/TN215418_ 
20170118T122654_Proposed_Final_2016_Integrated_Energy_Policy_Report_
Update_Clea.pdf.
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around 80,000 MWs in 2014, with natural gas and renewables making up the 
majority of the new capacity.35 Renewable electricity now provides about 30 per 
cent of retail electricity sales, which includes electricity imported from other 
states (CEC 2018). Solar has increased from 6800 MW in 2001 to 16,200 MW 
in 2017. Out of a total of 27,800 MW of renewables.36Moreover, California is 
a leader for implementation across technologies for the United States. ‘Cali-
fornia represents 49 per cent of all the distributed solar that’s been installed; 
it represents 49 per cent of all the distributed storage that’s been built; and it 
represents 47 per cent of all the plug-in electric vehicles in the United States 
(Wesoff 2017).
The pillars of Californian energy policy
Within this pro-environment context, CA energy policy had a major existential 
crisis in 2001 which has had a profound effect on subsequent energy policy, 
and their attitude to markets. CA implemented a privatisation of their electric-
ity system in 2001 – which failed (Sweeney 2002).37 Since then, CA has been 
extremely cautious about introducing more avowedly ‘market’ based policies or 
institutional reforms to the CA energy system.
Broadly, CA has three main investor owned utilities (IOUs) – Pacific Gas and 
Electric, San Diego Gas and Electric, and Southern California Edison which 
are joint distribution and supply companies which supply about 70 per cent 
of electricity. The other 30 per cent is supplied by Municipal-Owned Utilities 
or ‘munis’, with the biggest being Sacramento Municipal Utility District and 
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. The IOUs buy electricity 
from wholesale markets; and are the main executors of CA state energy policy 
by procuring renewables, providing contracts for energy efficiency measures, 
demand response, storage and so on, as they are mandated to do. They then sell 
to customers in what was their monopoly areas, via distribution grids that they 
own. This institutional set up has also meant that the problems and solutions of 
energy system transformation – such as working out how to pay for networks 
with increasing amounts of onsite generation; how to fulfil state energy policy 
goals, such as energy efficiency programmes; how to integrate rate design (or 





 37 See James L Sweeney, The California Electricity Crisis (2002) Hoover Press, or for a 
condensed version: http://web.stanford.edu/~jsweeney/paper/Lessons percent20for 
percent20the percent20Future.pdf; or for a very quick overview http://projects.
exeter.ac.uk/igov/lessons-from-america-worrying-analogies-between-the-emr-
process-and-the-california-electricity-crisis-2001/. 
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tariff structures as they are often known in other jurisdictions) has been imple-
mented via regulation and the IOUs.
Technically, there is retail competition although in a de facto sense competi-
tion mainly occurs in the non-domestic sectors. It is possible to have Com-
munity Choice Aggregation (CCA) which is when a community (and therefore 
domestic customers) is able, under certain rules, to procure energy for the 
community (CPUC 2012); and for Electric Service Providers (ESP, the equiva-
lent of the European supplier concept) that offer electric services directly to 
retail (including domestic) customers within the main IOU service areas. Some 
CCAs can be large, although they are still reliant on their IOU or muni for 
billings and so on (Trabish 2017). In practice, ESPs do not provide energy to 
domestic customers. As a result, a domestic customer in CA who does not live 
in a CCA area can de facto only buy their electricity from the IOU which works 
in their area. CA is therefore a state with limited domestic retail competition. 
There is competition in the IOU take-up of resources to the extent that the 
utility either buys via a wholesale market or procures resources (as a result 
of regulatory requirements) based on competitive bidding.38 The utilities have 
therefore become the executor of the state energy policies.
In 2003, the California Energy Commission (CEC) established the California 
Statutory Energy Loading Order via the CA Energy Action Plan, 2003, and 
then updated it in 2008 (CEC 2008). This Loading Order required IOUs to 
procure energy efficiency and demand response ahead of all other resources, 
including ahead of priority access for renewables.
In parallel to the CEC’s Loading Order, ‘modern’ Californian energy policy 
was founded in State Assembly Bill (AB) 32 (California State 2018) – the Global 
Warming Solutions Act, 2006 – which formally brought air quality and climate 
change together along with security and affordability issues. The 2006 bill has 
been strengthened over time by Senate Bill (SB) 35039 in 2013; SB 32 in 2016 
(which has a target of 40 per cent reduction of GHG from 1990 levels by 2030); 
and AB 197 in 2016 which aims to ensure that the State’s implementation of 
these policies is transparent and equitable, and that their benefits also flow to 
the disadvantaged (for an overview of state papers please see40).
An Integrated Energy Policy Report (IEPR) is published every 2 years by the 
California Energy Commission (see CEC 2018). The IEPR reports attempt to 
provide an overview, and explain the inter-relationships, of the CPUC, CAISO, 
CARB and CEC policy measures. But it has been the CPUC’s 7 page Distributed 
Energy Resources Action Plan (CPUC 2016), published in November 2016, 
which has set out a time plan for Actions to integrate, and take forward, all the 
various measures within California and its Agencies with respect to DER.
 38 For a rather old analysis of this see http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/
research/docs/127600810-renewable-and-distributed-power-in-california.pdf. 
 39 http://www.energy.ca.gov/sb350/. 
 40 http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/sb350/.
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Arguably, because of this, CA energy policy has five key pillars, and it is 
important to note the different agencies involved in these different pillars:
•	Electricity system decarbonisation through renewables implementation 
and energy efficiency policies (RETI 1.0,41 RETI 2.0,42 and Long Term Pro-
curement Planning) via the CEC.
•	Decarbonisation through strengthening regional markets and creating a 
Regional Independent System Operator (RSO) and Energy Imbalance Mar-
ket (EIM) via CAISO.
•	Decarbonisation by building distributed energy resources (DG, EE, DR, 
storage, and EVs) via the CPUC.
•	Optimising decarbonisation across sectors (electricity, building and trans-
portation) via Integrated Resource Planning, coordinated by the CPUC.
•	Valuing carbon, and air quality, policies (including the cap and trade 
scheme) via CARB.
This section focuses on the decarbonisation by building distributed energy 
resources (DG, EE, DR, storage, and EVs) via the CPUC, since it is most analo-
gous to the NY REV Public Service Commission work. As in NYS, the CA state 
is providing support and a process to deliver renewables, energy efficiency and 
so on. There is a clear expectation that the Regulator (the CPUC in CA and the 
PSC in NYS) delivers regulatory mechanisms which complement policies.
Decarbonisation by building DER
The CPUC Scoping Note (CPUC 2014) of 2014 set up Distribution Resource 
Plan (DRP) proceedings (CPUC 2013) (the CA equivalent of the 2015 NYS 
Distribution System Implementation Plans) whereby CA IOU utilities are 
required to produce a DRP (DRPWG 2013). The Scoping Note argued that the 
underlying rationale for promoting increased deployment of DERs is that they 
have a critical role in meeting CA’s GHG reduction policy. The goals of the DRP 
Plans were to:
•	modernise the electric distribution system to accommodate two-way flows 
of energy and energy services throughout the IOU networks;
•	enable customer choice of new technologies and services that reduce emis-
sions and improve reliability in a cost efficient manner, but not to the extent 
that domestic customers can switch suppliers if not in a CCA area;
•	to animate opportunities for DER to realise benefits through the provision 
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The intent of the Scoping Note was very little different in terms of outcomes 
from that set out in the 2014 Vision Paper of the New York Reforming the 
Energy Vision (NYREV 2014) and discussed below. Moreover, the DRPs were 
also to be aligned with More Than Smart (RENSWICK Institute 2015), a pro-
gressive initiative which paints a much more integrated and market-based 
future and puts forward ideas about how to get there (CPUC 2014). Whilst this 
might imply a future with more domestic customer choice, CA has not clarified 
the point.
The DRPs have been followed up with the November 2016 CPUC DER 
Action Plan, as described above CPUC (2016), which has five Actions to be 
undertaken in 2017; three in 2018 and one in 2019. At root, the DER Action 
Plan process should work out:
•	How to accommodate more DERs cost effectively, and work out the value of 
DERs when they are procured either individually (i.e. DG PV alone) or as a 
portfolio (DG PV plus storage etc).
•	Make the wholesale and retail markets more responsive to DERs.
•	Link DER more with CAISO, including with storage (CAISA 2014a; CAISA 
2014b). CAISO has long had contracts for demand response and so forth 
but it now beginning to develop contracts with DER providers, or DERPs, 
which must register to (potentially) access a new revenue stream (CAISA 
2018).
•	Encourage a more integrated CA energy system.
Whilst the intentions are very similar to those in NYS, the means of assessing 
DER resource and value – as set out through the ICA and the LNBA) were very 
different in CA from NYS. The CA methodology was technical, economically 
static and set within the conventional institutional and market structure, and 
therefore the outcomes are very different (Brockaway 2017).
2.8.3 New York state
The New York reforming the energy vision
In April 2014, Governor Cuomo of New York kicked off the New York Reform-
ing the Energy Vision (NY REV). This encompasses multiple dimensions of 
regulated administrated programs (such as support for renewable energy), 
regulatory reform and new institutions – all of which are intended to work 
together to create an enabling environment for a transition to a sustainable 
energy future for New York state (NYS 2018).
At part of this, the New York Public Service Commission (NY PSC, the Energy 
Regulator) initiated a regulatory reform aspect of the Reforming the Energy 
Vision (NYREV 2014) with a Regulatory Order in April 2014 from the Commis-
sioners of the PSC to ‘transform New York State’s industry with the objective of 
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creating market-based, sustainable products and services that drive an increas-
ingly efficient, clean, reliable, and customer-orientated industry. A podcast (Lacy 
2014), by the then-Chairperson of the NY PSC, Audrey Zibelman, described 
how Hurricane Sandy was a major driver in the NYS decision to articulate a new 
Vision for energy. Hurricane Sandy provided the appetite for change of the NYS 
people, as well as the PSC focus of providing customers with the services they 
want – which includes security, cost effectiveness and so on.
In brief the NY REV is:
•	Envisaging a decentralised energy system, with a new ‘heart’ at the distri-
bution level, which is coordinated in a new way via a distribution system 
provider (DSP) with more values for more services via transactive energy 
markets/platforms.
•	Envisaging a ‘new’ regulatory framework and basis, with more performance 
based regulation, more suited to meeting the challenges faced by the NY 
energy system, and where appropriate, incentivising the solutions rather 
than regulating for certain outcomes.
•	Envisages services aimed at fulfilling individualised customer choice, 
including providing value to customers when they add value to the system.
•	Argues that bottom-up optimisation via decentralised energy resources 
is more cost effective and resilient than traditional top-down centralised 
operation.
•	Uses administered/regulated programs (i.e. to support renewable energy, 
energy efficiency measures etc.) to develop the necessary building blocks 
for efficient market activity, and then envisages the administered programs 
decline in importance relative to markets as, for example, RE becomes com-
petitive or as companies delivering EE services become more mature etc.
NY REV building on a decade of supportive policies
The REV has not come out of nowhere. NYS has had a decade of sustainable 
energy policies. It now has a comprehensive NYS Energy Plan (SEP) (NYS 
2015) which (so far continues to) fit with the Obama US Clean Power Plan, 
NYS has a Greenhouse Gas (GHG) target for a 40 per cent reduction from 1990 
levels by 2030 (and by 80 per cent by 2050). NYS also has multiple adminis-
tered/regulated programs (NYS 2015). For example, a Clean Energy Standard 
(Cuomo 2016a) which has a target to generate 50 per cent of electricity from 
clean and renewables by 2030 (NYISO 2016);  an energy efficiency program 
via a Clean Energy Fund (CEF, CEF Order (NYS)) and an Affordability policy 
(Cuomo 2016b).
However, NYS is behind CA both in terms of sustainable energy capacity 
implementation, and in terms of length of time that serious sustainable energy 
policies have been in place. For example, in 2018, solar deployment in NYS had 
increased by orders of magnitude from 2010 to 1.3 GW, well under the GW 22 
of solar that CA had (in 2018) (SEIA 2018). In 2016, for the first time, New York 
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obtained more than 1 million MWh of electricity from solar generation, and 
84 per cent of that power came from distributed sources such as rooftop solar 
panels, New York obtained 24 per cent of its electricity from renewable sources 
in 2016 (US EIA 2018a).
An upside of the newness of the NY REV is that it is less constrained than CA by 
historical developments, and the momentum /inertia developed by ‘ways of doing 
things’. Transforming to a new energy system is still in the early stages in NYS, 
and as a result, NYS has been able to be innovative in deciding where it wants to 
get to; what the underlying philosophy should be; and what is the best process for 
delivering the Vision. The NY state government, while setting the overall goals, 
has been less controlling of the PSC than is the case in CA, where the state effec-
tively sets the decisions that the CPUC (and other agencies) follow through with.
An upfront and clear vision for change
The NY PSC’s Vision, as described above, has been upfront in its questioning 
of two central assumptions of the traditional utility paradigm: (1) that there 
is little or no role for customers to play in addressing system needs; and (2) 
that the centralised generation and bulk transmission model is invariably more 
cost effective than decentralised, due to economies of scale. Thus, the NY REV 
rhetoric argues that the current business-as-usual regulation cannot deal with 
the current challenges that energy systems face, nor can it capture the available 
opportunities. This is a very ‘upfront’ and challenging Vision.
The intention of the Vision was to find a ‘new’ energy system paradigm (and 
its institutions and actors) which suits the current challenges that energy sys-
tems face (and NYS in particular), and which can capture its opportunities 
for the benefit of NYS customers and the NYS economy. It was from the start, 
therefore, open to a new means of regulation; a ‘new’ balance between regula-
tion and markets; a new role for actors within the energy system, including the 
regulator itself, as well as the utilities and customers.
The NY REV envisages an evolutionary rather than revolutionary transi-
tion and the 2015 Market Design and Platform Technology Report (MDPT 
2015) set out ‘an end’ of where it expects the NY REV to get to after about 
10 years (or the mid-2020s). This is a smart, primarily decentralised, market/
platform-based transactive energy system with a new basis of regulation; new 
institutions; new roles of central actors; and new ways of making money.
Whether, the NY PSC would be so upfront, with hindsight after three years, 
about the need for change is an interesting question. On the one hand, it sign-
posted where it wanted to go and achieved support from a wide range of stake-
holders, including NYS citizens. It also encouraged new companies to come 
in to the market – for example, the Brooklyn micro-grid (a Peer to Peer (P2P) 
blockchain using platform43) On the other hand, it also immediately signposted 
 43 http://brooklynmicrogrid.com/.
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to utilities (and utilities in the wider world) that change was coming – and 
therefore set them up to, at best, be wary.
The transformational institution of the 2014 NY REV, expanded on by the 
2015 MDPT, was that of the role of distribution system providers (DSPs). The 
six main distribution utilities within NYS are expected to transform to DSPs – 
essentially distribution energy and system service market facilitators and coor-
dinators – who would also be responsible for the public service obligation (PSO). 
The MDPT report set out the argument behind why utilities need to understand 
their area distribution energy resources (DER) in detail; the requirement for 
them to produce a distribution system implementation plan (DSIP); and an 
explanation of what a DSIP should consist of, what methodology to use when 
writing one, and how long it would take (about 2 years). The writing of the 
DSIPs is the process which essentially forces the utility, and other stakeholders 
(i.e. providers of resource, customers, new entrants, the utility itself), to under-
stand at the most detailed level what the implications are for all stakeholders of 
being in a regulatory environment which is transforming the distribution utility 
environment into a DSP environment (NYDPS 2016). Having understood the 
DER resource in an area, the DSIP was to provide confidence to the wider com-
munity that DSPs would, over the 10 year period, develop into:
•	DSP platform/markets to support 3rd party investment in DERs;
•	benefit utility customers by reducing overall electric system costs and pro-
vide them with new services;
•	‘animate’ the distribution level markets through various mechanisms; and
•	provide efficient, linked role between the DSPs and NYISO.
The 2015 Market Design and Platform Technology Report also kicked off vari-
ous working groups to work out various technical and economic issues of the 
NY REV, which included in 2018 a Comprehensive Energy Efficiency Initiative 
(NYREV 2018).
On 19 May 2016, a White Paper on Ratemaking (two years after the NY REV 
kick-off) was published which sets out the different ways that utilities will be 
expected to make money in the DSP future, and the timelines for doing so. In 
general, the Ratemaking Order (SNYPSC 2016a) made less difference to utility 
revenue over the next 3 years than might have been expected from the rhetoric 
of the 2014 Vision.44 However, it did show that the way of regulating utilities 
and the revenue base of the utility is expected to fundamentally change over 
 44 The EAMs should not add more than 2 per cent of their delivered revenues to the 
distribution companies in the first phase (i.e. over the next 3 years). Given that 
current performance-based regulation is related to slightly less than 6 per cent of 
total delivered revenues in NY, this takes PBR up to about 8 per cent, which is a 
small change.
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time; and provided a means for linking the utility revenue base and wider NY 
state energy program (Mitchell 2016).45,
A new world for utilities
The Ratemaking Order represents a new balance of regulation and markets for 
the distribution utilities where the respective role of regulation and markets is 
different, and the ways of obtaining revenue also changes. The three main ways 
of making money will change over the 10 or 15 years from being mainly from 
traditional cost of service to partly:
•	A continuation of the usual: money will continue to be made through tra-
ditional cost of service
•	a new bringing together of regulated performance incentives mechanisms 
to fulfil Government policies through Earning Adjustment Mechanisms 
(EAMs) – by helping to enable public policies and goals are delivered (for 
example, the renewable energy or energy efficiency programs); and
•	a new performance-based regulation where revenues are accrued through 
platform service revenues (PSRs), which are linked to the developing trans-
active energy markets.
Markets are central to this new REV Vision. Innovative, local markets/plat-
forms and new ways to operate the energy system are already being stimulated 
in NYS. However, whilst markets are central, so is regulation. The NY REV 
took a philosophical choice that distribution utilities would continue with this 
public service requirement. The NY REV therefore is an experiment in:
•	Facing the new utility challenges, including the increasingly serious issues 
of how to pay for networks given changing technologies and means of 
provision,
•	traditional concerns of ensuring vulnerable customers remain able to access 
affordable energy; and
•	trying to encourage innovation and new behaviours via markets.
Together, as shown in Figure 18, this is transforming the revenues and activities 
of the distribution companies. This is discussed further below.
Valuing distributed energy resources
In mid-November 2016, the methodology for valuation of DER in NYS (VDER) 
(SNYPSC 2016b) was published and explained (1) that the current support for 
DER, mostly through net energy metering (NEM), would continue for a period 
 45 See Mitchell at: http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ 
Distribution-Service-Providers-Update-November-2016.pdf. 
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of time; but that (2) support for NEM would gradually move to a new valuation 
methodology of DER, which would take account of various aspects. The VDER 
4 basic components and known as the value stack (Walton 2017), are:
•	the base locational marginal price of energy (LMP);
•	the capacity value;
•	the credit for the environmental benefits of carbon-free, distributed energy 
resources;
•	a market transition credit.
The VDER agreement to transition away from retail rate net metering for resi-
dential customers  is largely unprecedented in the United States – it being a 
major source of contention in most States which have increasing proportions 
of solar energy. Dubbed the ‘Solar Progress Partnership (Shallenberger 2016)’, 
the NYS deal brought together members from both sides (Yahoo Finance 2016) 
of the distribution grid, including Consolidated Edison, SolarCity, SunEdison, 
Central Hudson Gas and Electric, New York State Electric and Gas, National 
Grid, Rochester Gas and Electric, Orange and Rockland Utilities, and Sun-
Power Corp.
The VDER market transition credit in the VDER was a placeholder for the 
value of the distribution level benefits which DER provides. Having estab-
lished the methodology in the November 2016 VDER, and taken account of 
Figure 18: Sources of utility revenue (rate of return on equity) over time within 
NY REV.
Source: Own contribution.
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the various MDPT projects, practical steps valuing DER moved forward in 
March 2017, with three dockets from the PSC (Baldwin Auck 2017): (1) an 
introduction to the Value of Distributed Energy Resources,46 (2) Distributed 
System Implementation Plans,47 and (3) the Interconnection Earnings Adjust-
ment Mechanisms.48 All these Orders are more detailed workings of previous 
more generally stated agreements, and will be central to how different entities, 
including distribution utilities, can make money (Stein & Ucar 2018).
 46 http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx? 
MatterCaseNo=15-E-0751.
 47 http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx? 
MatterSeq=44991.
 48 http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx? 
MatterSeq=44991.
Figure 19: The Value Stack of Distributed Energy Resources in NYS.
Source: SNYDPS (2016a).
Notes:
1. The ‘retail NEW Credit’ column represents compensation NEW provides per kWh
2. The ‘Old Distributed Gen. Value’ column represents the potential value that maybe 
provided under NEW prices signals where the kWh and kW benefits are calculated 
and then expressed on a per kWh basis
3. The ‘REV Distributed Gen. Value’ represents the potential locational kW and kWh 
value that could be created if NEM prices signs are replaced with most efficient 
prices signals.
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The NY REV distribution system provider – the new heart of  
the energy system
The NY REV argued for a new value proposition, or ‘heart’ of the newly envi-
sioned NYS energy system – a distribution system provider (DSP). The idea of 
a DSP is transformational in the sense that it is a new function:
•	able to coordinate system operation and balance markets within their ser-
vice areas;
•	whilst at the same time working towards meeting state policy goals
•	regulated via PBR so that incentivises new behaviours of the DSP itself, its 
customers and its service providers, turning the current ‘passive’ distribu-
tion utilities into ‘active’ market facilitators and system coordinators.
As Figure 19 above shows, revenue comes from three main sources (two of 
them new): traditional cost of service, EAMs (which help meet state goals); and 
PSRs (from transactions – as many as possible market based and involving new 
entrants and new services).
All of this depends on a detailed understanding of the value of distributed 
energy resources in the distribution area. Only when those values are under-
stood can the DSP coordinate and balance the area as cost effectively as pos-
sible. This is why the DER plan was instituted; why the value stack was created; 
and why a placeholder for DER value was established.
The DSP is the institution which will dynamically be able to value DER. As 
the system operation situation changes in any one place at any one time – for 
example, because of EV take up; increased energy efficiency; more DSR; more 
DER etc. – then it, as the coordinator can promote new transactions which 
best suit customer/user wishes. This is unlike the CA DRP which is static and 
coordinated by the monopoly utility.
The DSP in NYS is envisaged as a combined energy and system services mar-
ket facilitator; the combined wires and energy local system operator and bal-
ancer, and provider of last resort. It is the coordinating and balancing platform 
for an area – but one which coordinates other third-party providers of DER 
(which may also have their own platforms) which would sell those 3rd party 
services (of all types) to customers (of all types) via the new 3rd party markets/
platforms to create value for both customers and the system.
This, in theory, allows independent DER to bypass the wholesale market 
and the transmission operator, thereby creating a new value proposition for 
decentralised energy and the distribution utilities – all the while revealing a 
new economics of energy provision. This is opening up potential new market 
possibilities which the DSP, in theory, could, and according to the NY REV phi-
losophy, should, facilitate; and which they are not in control of.
Thus, on the whole, the DSPs in NYS are expected to be facilitators and 
coordinators rather than ‘doers’ themselves. If they want new services in their 
areas, then they are expected to provide incentives, contracts or stimulate 
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tariffs (and necessary data and analysis) to enable a third party to provide those 
new services.
But, importantly, if customers/users want to do something, then that would 
either occur under a ‘normal’ market situation or they can/should approach 
the DSP to develop a market or a new means (non-wire option) of provid-
ing the service. The idea is that the DSP would be incentivised sufficiently for 
each transaction it encourages to make the economic choice to do that rather 
than to continue with conventional wires options. This is different from CA – 
where CCAs are the nearest way for users to do something that they want – as 
opposed to being controlled by the utilities – in the system.
There are various on-going discussions within the NY REV evolution about 
the extent to which the traditional utilities are able to maintain their incum-
bent competitive advantage over the new entrants and new services which the 
Vision says it wants to encourage. It is clear that the distribution utilities are 
going to undergo significant threat to their conventional means of operation. It 
is too soon to be able to say that the way that the NY REV has been undertaken 
is the ‘right’ way for energy system transformation. It can be said, however , 
that it is illuminating issues which have to be addressed if energy systems are to 
reduce GHG and become resilient; and it seems right in this very technologi-
cally fluid time that system operation and economic regulation is designed to 
be dynamic and flexible.
2.8.4 Comparison of California and New York energy policies
Similarities
Both CA and NYS are major US states in economic and population terms. They 
both have very high total energy demand by state ranking (2nd and 4th respec-
tively) and they both have low per capita consumption (49, 3rd lowest) and 51 
(the lowest) (US EIA 2018b). They are both trying to ensure vibrant economies 
whilst at the same time meeting their progressive energy policies. CA has had a 
longer-term, supportive policy for sustainable energy than NY, but both have a 
reasonably environmentally literate public that has been slowly built over time. 
Moreover, NYS is very proud of its energy history – being the home of the 
first Edison power plant. They both take an enabling environment approach to 
their policies where legislated policies, such as support for renewable energy, 
energy efficiency etc., intertwine with pro-environmental transport, security 
and affordability issues. They are both moving towards a greater importance 
of the distribution level within their energy systems, in part due to the decen-
tralising opportunities of energy technologies; they both support integration 
between electricity, buildings and transport; and they both support a move to a 
flexible, smart future. Both have political buy-in for their governance changes.
In their different ways, both CA and NYS have had events which have shaped 
the development of their energy policies. In CA, the failure of the electricity 
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privatisation has led to wariness of, and difficulty in moving towards, markets – 
and therefore a reluctance of moving away from the traditional regulatory 
model. The CA State Legislature continues, effectively, to mandate change and 
the various CA agencies then implement it. In NYS, Hurricane Sandy has led to 
openness for change, and a questioning of the ‘old’ way of doing things. CA was 
an early mover with respect to energy system transformation and has therefore 
got various institutions and ways of doing things in place. Hurricane Sandy 
effectively allowed the past to be reinvented in NYS.
Differences
CA and NYS do, however, have very different approaches to how they com-
municate and execute those policies. NYS was upfront in the PSC 2014 Vision 
arguing that traditional energy regulation is no longer fit for purpose, and that 
new roles for utilities, customers, and the Regulator are required. Moreover, 
NYS has been clear that it sees a rebalancing between Regulation and Markets 
as necessary – with both regulation and markets as having important roles: 
Regulation ensures direction and maintains a public service obligation whilst 
more markets enable innovation, cost effectiveness, and customer choice.
CA has not been as strident in its public pronouncements. CA still effectively 
delegates executive responsibility for its sustainable policies to its IOUs, which 
then generally procure renewables etc. for sale to their customers. Regulation 
remains the more important aspect of the alternative tools of regulation or 
markets. The role of the different actors in energy system transformation have 
not been so openly questioned in CA. Whilst CCAs are making some inroads 
in CA, most domestic customers remain served by the incumbent IOUs, and 
even CCAs are reliant on the IOUs for billing and so forth.
Whilst NYS utilities remain at the centre of the energy system transforma-
tion, the basis of their future revenues is set to alter fundamentally, and part 
of that revenue is related to transforming institutions (the DSP) and enabling 
new players and new transactions. So far, whilst it is clear to all concerned that 
energy systems are having to grapple with all sorts of change, including the 
roles and business models of those involved, the CA Regulator has not added 
details of how the basis of the utilities revenue will change over the next decade 
or so. In this sense, the environment for the CA IOUs is far less threatening 
than in NYS.
NYS has also been clear that utilities can earn more if they change – so there 
is a strong carrot and stick element within the NY REV, which in theory should 
be attractive to utilities. At the same time, in theory, new entrants and new 
ways of doing things should be more attractive in the NY REV world of DSPs 
and markets and, certainly, it seems that the ideas are squarely positioning NYS 
to complement D4 and transactive energy. However, CA continues to be the 
major market for DER in the USA, and whilst it may be a utility which pro-
cures, for example, DSR or solar from new entrants because of regulation rather 
than from via a market in NYS, CA is still providing greater amounts of value 
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to DER than NYS. From a practical perspective therefore, whilst new entrants 
may like the NYS philosophy, it is still CA which is coming through with value 
which can be captured.
Nevertheless, while utilities may prosper in the new world, systems are also 
moving quickly and forcing issues upon all system stakeholders. CA has had 
negative prices in electricity markets for the first time – a sign that the system 
has moved to a new existential phase (US EIA 2017).
The NY REV has engendered a much more an in-depth, transparent dis-
cussion than CA about what the role of the energy system should be in the 
21st century energy system, and what would be appropriate regulation. NYS 
has tried to open up the debate about what energy policy is good for the NYS 
economy, as well as what customers want from the energy system and the ways 
in which it could connect customers, including domestic customers, to their 
energy use. This has shifted the debate from the interests of companies to one 
of public interest and resilience. Moreover, at its very roots, the NY REV is de 
facto arguing that an energy policy built around public interest is likely to be 
more successful in meetings its public policy goals than the old ‘private’ interest 
model – this is both radical but also very different from CA.
NYS is also arguing that customers will still need protection in this new 
world whilst placing them and their customer propositions at the centre of the 
energy system service. This is exploring new ground. Whilst it is the same cen-
tury old mandate, it is a new compact with customers. The NY PSC has opted, 
at this time, to say that the utilities have to continue with this public service 
obligation. New entrants, and new ways of providing services, currently do not 
offer an alternative to the regulated route of public service provision. The rapid 
changes of the energy system are exciting but the NY PSC has said, much as 
they support and want to encourage new markets and new roles, customers, 
particularly vulnerable customers, have to be looked after. In this way, the NY 
PSC is marrying a traditional regulatory role with the opening up of markets 
and new forms of performance based regulation via EAMS and PSRs. It is this 
triad approach, which together is unique and interesting.
NYS has been able to capture the position of regulatory innovator because 
it is the first state to put forward – and take steps to execute – such innova-
tive ideas, centring on the Distribution System Providers for DER. CA has 
implemented much of the same actions around distribution development – for 
example, DRPs, Action plans, and ways to value DERs – but it is implementing 
them a very traditional way.
Nevertheless, both CA agencies and the NY PSC are cautious when it comes 
to dealing with the distribution utilities in their respective states. There are 
concerns on the part of the distribution companies about the impacts of the 
transformations on their businesses and neither CA nor NYS are pushing the 
utilities too hard, as yet, for change. Moreover, whilst the NY PSC continues to 
see the utilities as providing the public service of final resort, the utility future 
still seems reasonably assured.
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The transformational nature of ideas
NYS appears to be trying to create a process where either regulation or markets 
can be chosen as the tool to reach a desired outcome, depending on which is 
best for each desired outcome. Their arguments in support of local balancing 
markets, platforms, DSPs as coordinators, performance incentives and so on 
are new institutions and new regulations coming together in new ways. The 
idea is that this will lead to a more cost effective regulation which provides the 
services and propositions that customers actually want.
The unknowable issue, and in a sense the most important question, for States 
or Countries which are thinking about transforming their energy systems, is 
whether the more regulated approach of CA is preferable, cheaper, quicker, eas-
ier in moving those States or countries towards GHG reduction than the NYS 
model. Whilst NYS is arguing that innovation and a customer focus is neces-
sary in order to achieve a cost effective energy system transformation – and 
that markets, the decentralised value proposition of DSPs, and performance 
based regulation is integral to that – we cannot as yet know if that is the case. 
NYS is placing customers at the centre of the energy system, and wants the ser-
vices that they want to be provided – and incentivised via performance based 
regulation. In other words, NYS is attempting to move beyond a narrow cost 
effective service for individual anonymised customers towards enabling indi-
vidual customer choice – of any type – to buy and sell to and from whomever 
they wish to.
This is a fundamentally different approach. From a theoretical point of 
view, this chapter prefers the NY REV model to avowedly free up innovation 
to develop in ways ‘it’ (the innovation) wishes to and which ‘we’ (the regu-
lator/industry) cannot know about now. The chapter also in theory agrees 
that a DSP like value proposition is best able to work with, and coordinate, 
with D4 and the developing transactive energy platforms, and other changes. 
Moreover, the NYS DSIP and its valuation methodology, being dynamic, 
seems to be preferable.
This chapter is impressed that NYS has attempted the NY REV. It recognises 
that NYS has undertaken a major program in trying to deliver new regulatory 
approaches across a number of fronts. This may prove to be too big a step, in 
which case the CA approach may turn out to be preferable in terms of on the 
ground, GHG reducing, practice change. On the other hand, the NY REV may 
all come together in a few years to meet the challenges of D4 and to take up 
its opportunities in a way that CA may find itself unable, or constrained, to do 
because of its lack of customer choice.
It also seems that some of the lessons learnt from Europe could also be 
 beneficially incorporated into the NY REV – and that includes separating out 
distribution utilities from ‘supply’: in other words, turning DSPs into energy 
and wires companies but removing their supply base.
Data, and its availability as a public good versus a source of revenue is also 
being hotly debated in Europe, as it already is in NYS. This chapter takes the 
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view that data should be freely available and seen as a public good. Another 
similar debate in Europe and NYS, is whether DSPs should own or not own 
DER. This chapter takes the view that it should not.
It is true that the changes on the ground in NYS itself have not occurred as 
fast as some would hope. However, if the 2014 Vision and principles are sepa-
rated from the on-the-ground change in NYS, the NY REV is offering a new 
answer to the challenges of the 21st Century. In this sense, it is inspirational. If 
the goal is energy system change – then it is a case of ‘watch this space’ to see 
just how fast NYS is able to alter, and what the problems and difficulties have 
been so that lessons can be learned.
This is not to in anyway undervalue CAs history to date – which is clearly 
the most successful in the USA, and one of the most successful in the world in 
terms of RE deployment and decarbonisation of mobility.
Finally, in conclusion, this chapter argues that a combination of steady public 
policy targets and support (as has occurred in CA for 40 or so years, and for a 
shorter period in NYS) combined with the new institutions, centrality of cus-
tomers; balance between regulation and markets; and new regulatory incentive 
mechanisms in NYS are, at this time, the ‘best practice’ lessons coming out of 
both CA and NYS governance for DER.
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2.9 Conclusions and reflections from the country reports
The last decade has witnessed the beginning of what is likely to be a funda-
mental, irreversible transformation of the power and wider energy sectors, on 
a scale similar to that seen in information and communication technologies 
with the rise of the desktop PC and the smartphone. This is primarily because 
of decarbonisation and digitalisation. Digitalisation is part of the General 
Purpose Technology (GPT) family which has now effectively come to energy. 
When combining this with decarbonisation – a general societal transformation 
of the same sort as a GPT but in policy terms – a fundamental technological 
and societal shift is unleashed towards decentralisation.
These forces also suit differing country needs. For example, in India decentral-
isation fulfils goals of access, reduced pollution, domestic jobs and decarboni-
sation. In China, it supports regional development and technological growth 
as well as decarbonisation. In the United States, it fosters state independence 
from federal policies along with multiple state-based priorities, whether energy 
independence, security, GHG reduction, air pollution reduction, and so on. In 
Europe, it helps meeting climate change objectives and industrial strategies. In 
Australia, and an increasing number of countries and regions, the rapid growth 
of decentralisation is linked to the competitiveness of renewable energies under 
favourable climatic conditions – households can buy cheaper energy via onsite 
technologies than from suppliers.
With the increased deployment of renewables, primarily solar and wind, 
renewable generation has become the dominating investment opportunity 
globally, and changes the way in which the sector operates.
Enabling a system that can efficiently integrate these new technologies 
implies a fundamental change in energy governance. Most regulatory frame-
works have been designed to secure reliable operations of the centralised power 
system, but they may not have changed sufficiently to reflect the imperative to 
meet internationally agreed decarbonisation objectives. Change may be trig-
gered by climatic events, such as Hurricane Sandy in New York, or storms and 
heat waves in Australia. However, all country reports suggest that governance is 
a decisive factor in the successful process of the transformation, as governance 
can act as an accelerator or decelerator of the transformation.
The difficult task for regulators and policy makers is facilitating a rapid but 
smooth transformation from the ‘old’ energy system to the ‘new’ in a dynamic 
technological and economic environment.
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2.9.1 The eight requirements of rapid transformative governance
At the beginning of this chapter, we provided an overview of the key reasons for 
why these countries were reviewed to assess their potential and actual pathways 
to decentralisation. Derived from the country reports, eight areas that require 
political action are identified, and these are discussed below:
1. Transparency and ligitimate policy making and institutions.
2. Availability and transparency of data.
3. Customer focus, enabling customer choice.
4. Markets to encourage flexibility in supply and demand.
5. Local system coordinators and a coexistence of the central grid and 
decentralised micro-grids.
6. Reforming regulation – Including performance-based elements.
7. Reassessing investments in the long-distance transmission grid.
8. An integrated approached to sector regulation.
Transparency and legitimate policymaking and institutions
A transition towards a low-carbon decentralised energy system can take many 
technological pathways, and the distributional impacts of those choices can be 
both positive and negative on societal stakeholders.  Governance  mechanisms of 
the energy system transformation are most likely to be supported by the general 
public if they are ‘legitimate’ – and one important characteristic of legitimate 
policy making is transparency in how decisions are made. If the  policy-making 
process is flawed by, for example,  governmental institutions undertaking myopic 
regulatory decisions, pursuing short-term political interests, decision makers 
underestimating the complexity of the system, or corporations  successfully lob-
bying for their particular interests, legitimacy and authority may be jeopardised, 
and a regulatory regime may emerge that excludes alternatives which might suit 
social interests and  preferences better.
Some countries have established a consensus culture, entailing several dimen-
sions: the actual political process of voting in governments, proportional rep-
resentation versus First Past the Post (such as in the UK) the degree to which 
decisions are devolved, for example, federal versus state in the United States 
and Germany; and the extent to which local areas can in some way make their 
wishes known;49 the degree to which a society is knowledgeable about issues and 
so can meaningfully decide about them; the degree to which efforts are made 
by a society to ensure that society members are able to express their wishes, and 
the desired customer proposition is put in place. Transparent decision-making 
processes enhance public support for politicians and the overall transformation. 
 49 For the power sector, this translates into a possibility of buying of local networks, as 
it happened in Hamburg, Germany.
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For example, one of the principles of California’s energy policy is to ensure that 
the state’s implementation of these policies is transparent and equitable.
Denmark might be seen as a country that tries to find consensus in multiple 
ways, whereas other countries, for example Italy or Germany, may have imple-
mented to some extent a consensus culture, or try to do this in a very limited 
manner, such as China.
In political practice, creating ‘consensus’ is a conflict-laden road whatever the 
country. Countries have to establish structures and institutions to be able to deal 
with conflicts. For example, Danish governance is a set of rules and processes 
that enable conflicts to end up in solutions. This can be linked to the Danish par-
liament with its many parties, where the large parties need a smaller coalition 
partner to get majority in parliament. In effect, proportional representation in a 
national parliament may be more suitable for constructively handling conflicts 
than largely two-party regimes. However, a proportional system may lead to the 
fragmentation of political parties and create political instability or paralysis, as 
can be seen in Italy’s politics in the 1980s.
Government and communities need capacity – institutions, financial resources, 
human agency – to encourage consensus and understanding of what society 
wants:
•	Stakeholder involvement: One way to deliver ‘legitimate’ decision making is 
to ensure a process that is designed to be transparent, coherent, and to deliver 
an acceptable consensus. This requires listening to as many stakeholders as 
possible and keeping up to date with information about societal preferences, 
not just economics. For example, in the United Kingdom the Committee 
on Climate Change (CCC) is statutorily required to provide advice to the 
UK government on what level of GHG emissions there should be, and by 
when. However, whilst the government must provide a written reply to the 
advice, there are no direct requirements on actors within the energy system 
for themselves to work towards the CCC outputs, despite the importance 
of their recommendations to the energy system and the importance of the 
energy system in meeting the recommendations of the CCC.
•	Government involvement: Energy regulation needs to be recognised 
and voted on by elected representatives to ensure legitimacy and con-
sumer acceptance, rather than delegating decisions to an independent 
regulatory body. The distributional impacts of any policy will be dif-
ferent. For example, an energy policy that includes nuclear power as a 
decarbonisation technology will have very different impacts on differ-
ent stakeholders than an energy policy without nuclear plants. Making 
any trade-offs between outcomes that have a significant impact on one 
particular stakeholder group should not be the responsibility of a regu-
lator or a network company, but should be the direct responsibility of 
government and consistent with broader public objectives. In addition, 
160 Decentralised Energy — a Global Game Changer
efforts to harmonise national and regional policies may encounter 
challenges, as it can be observed between the European Union and its 
Member States. For example, the International Emissions Trading Asso-
ciation (IETA) detects problems within the European Emissions  Trading 
Scheme, whose operation does not consider the success of separate poli-
cies encouraging energy efficiency and renewable energy deployment 
(IETA 2015).
•	Local governance: A requirement of a smart and flexible energy  system is 
coordination and balancing at the distributed, decentralised level. Energy 
regulation should encourage the involvement of different actors at different 
levels. This can be individuals, but also cooperatives or  community groups, 
local authorities or small, decentralised  companies through to bigger, more 
conventional actors, as shown by Denmark,  California, New York State, and 
others. Larger entities can continue to be involved, but the new distributed 
energy resources require coordination at the local level if the system is to be 
run efficiently – that will need local governance, which of course needs to 
fit with the wider energy system governance.
Many traditional electricity generating companies are limited in their ability to 
transform their operations to keep pace with the changing technology environ-
ment. This is not only due to their nature of their existing assets, but also due 
to lack of familiarity and experience how to handle these new technologies to 
achieve optimal operational and financial outputs. Consequently, there may be 
political pressure to support these companies, either by slowing the changes 
to the regulatory environment, or by introducing specific measures to support 
their continual existence in the market, or both.
Large utilities may attempt to exert pressure on governments to implement 
policies and regulatory rules that suit their corporate strategies rather than 
the public interest, as is highlighted in some of the country reports, including 
China and Italy (Sections 2.3 and 2.7 of this chapter). Until recently, incum-
bent generators and large-scale investors in the power sector have had sig-
nificant influence on development of policies and regulations, for example, 
seeking assurance and the inclusions into contracts indemnity from policy 
changes that might have a material impact on their investments. Ensuring 
the greater engagement by consumers and people in the sector comes with a 
need for a greater role for them in participatory processes to set regulations, 
measures, and policy objectives. In many countries this has been recognised 
by policy makers, and there have been ample opportunities for consumers 
and people to be consulted on the introduction of new regulations and policy 
frameworks, including responses to draft regulations or white papers, oppor-
tunities to attend ‘townhall meetings’ and discuss topics such as transmission 
grid extensions or wind parks in roundtables with various relevant stake-
holder groups.
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Availability and transparency of data to enable entrants to pursue the route 
to market of emerging business models
The ability to measure, collect, analyse, and share data has become cheaper 
and quicker across all aspects of our lives. In the energy sector, this enables 
individuals to monitor their own consumption in real time, and for companies 
to immediately act upon it. This has significant implications for the efficiency 
of grid operations, for generation, distribution and consumption. With access 
to smart grid data, companies and grid operators can offer better customer 
services. New private sector entrants, local communities and cooperatives need 
system and consumer data to be able to figure out whether there is a business 
case for them to provide a new service. To ensure competition and a level play-
ing field, an entity that acts as a market monitor and data provider makes the 
data ‘freely’ available and controls that those with data or market power do not 
misuse that information.
Some countries or states are more active than others to package data in a 
more accessible way. As the report in Section 2.8 of this chapter has shown, 
some jurisdictions move from individualised customer data to system data. 
Both California and New York states consider assessments of their regulated 
distributed energy resources. For interested stakeholders, the data may be freely 
available, based on the argument that this will enable new entrants to under-
stand what the potential of distributed energy resources is in their states.
The introduction of smart meters, whose deployment is driven by domestic 
or regional policies, allows a first level of information. They cannot, however, 
work in isolation; rather they can serve as enablers to integrate new actors into 
the sector, as well as to integrate different segments of the energy value chain 
into a smarter system. In the EU, the European Commission expects that by 
2020, 72 per cent of electricity customers will have a smart meter (European 
Commission 2017). However, within the European Union there are already 
and are expected to be significant differences in the deployment rates. For 
example, by 2020 Denmark and Italy will achieve almost full coverage, while 
in Germany only 23 per cent market penetration is expected, due to concerns 
over economic efficiency. China is currently the world leader, with 450 million 
(from a global total of 700 million). In the United States, more than 60 million 
households have a smart meter, but adoption rates vary across states. However, 
privacy concerns, ownership of the data and cybersecurity all pose real threats 
to the rapid widespread introduction of smart meters (see also Burger, Trbo-
vich & Weinmann 2018). Furthermore, with the ever-increasing opportunities 
of digitalisation, the fear that newly installed smart meters may become out-
dated relatively quickly is reducing enthusiasm for wide-scale rollout in parts 
of Europe. While much of the public is willing to share personal information 
in other areas of their private lives, in particular communication and social 
networks, the power industry will have to show the benefits and safeguards for 
individual consumers.
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Furthermore, as private platforms are developed for new resource provisions, 
for example peer to peer trading, more data is derived which is ‘outside of ’ 
of the conventional energy system but which will become a larger and more 
important part of it. Whilst this creates further opportunities for new players 
in the energy system, it is also likely that there will be a need to understand and 
resolve fundamental questions regarding data security and the protection of 
consumer privacy.
Customer focus, enabling customer choice
It seems commonplace nowadays that energy policy is customer-focused. For 
example, in the European Union the legislation on electricity market reform 
proposes to put consumers at the centre of the Energy Union; to empower 
 consumers, to provide them with better information on their energy consump-
tion, to make it easier to switch supplier, and to be able to generate and store their 
own energy (European Commission 2016).
A central determinant of the new energy system is the ability of  customers 
to explore new, revenue-generating opportunities related to their energy use 
or self-generation. As the prices of supply technologies fall, as  governments 
encourage greater energy efficiency, and as ICT becomes smaller, cheaper and 
easier to use, more customers are becoming more actively engaged in the energy 
system. Households, community groups and energy co- operatives, small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) and heavy industry turn into producers, who can 
also play a significant role in balancing the grid (Hoggett 2016).
A combination of factors drives the changing role of consumers in the electricity, 
and wider, energy system. In many countries with liberalised markets, consumers 
are able to play an active role in power sector,
•	by switching their supplier, choosing a new supplier based on price, fuel 
mix, ownership structure or combined utility offer, with heating, water or 
communications;
•	by becoming prosumers (producers and consumers) through investment in 
individual or community level supply options, usually solar or wind;
•	by investment in energy infrastructure, such as storage or even grid, as an 
individual or as part of a community project.
In most countries the rise in the deployment of renewables was accompanied 
by, and in many countries, such as Australia, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and 
the United States, driven by small-scale solar and wind deployment financed 
by private residents – the rise of the prosumers. Increasing customer involve-
ment is seen as a key driver of the energy transformation in many countries 
(Energy Networks Australia 2017; European Commission 2016). When varia-
ble renewables contribute more significantly to overall supply, the success of the 
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transformation will depend on greater engagement of customers in three areas – 
as investors and operators, as willing participants who pay for the new market 
and consumers of new products, and as supporters of policies and measures 
that deliver decarbonisation.
Transactive energy is technically similar to what in Europe goes under a 
variety of titles including ‘Community self-consumption’ (France), and 
‘Tenant self-consumption’ (Germany). France, in April 2017, made changes 
to Article D of its Energy Code to support electricity self-consumption at the 
grid’s edge. Germany has likewise amended the German Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG 2017) to explicitly include self-consumption of PV  electricity 
by buildings tenants. Both of these anticipated changes  foreshadowed the 
 proposed fourth EU Electricity Directive, which substantially enhances 
measures to proactively support consumer participation in the energy system 
(Butenko 2018).
In a number of countries, such as China, Denmark, Germany, India, and 
Italy, households and micro-producers may suffer from disadvantages and 
discrimination in the electricity system, though. For example, in Germany 
auctioning and tender systems favour larger suppliers. In countries without 
liberalised markets, they are not able to choose suppliers, become autonomous, 
or feed their power into the grid.
China may be indicative of a development trajectory that emerging 
economies can pursue without customer involvement: While reforms have 
occurred, with the introduction of new ministries and a move towards inde-
pendent power production, individual consumers, either through their use of 
power or their rights, have marginal influence on the power sector. Despite 
this, the Chinese renewable sector is by far the largest producer and deployer 
of renewable energy, especially solar and wind. This is driven by top-down 
targets rather than bottom-up initiatives. This raises questions, can the 
 Chinese system create a long-term, sustainable and engaging power system. 
How to achieve ‘meaningful’ consensus has many dimensions – knowledge 
transfer, education, places for discourse, and decision-making processes that 
take note of individual preferences.
As the Finkel Review in Australia states: 
‘The retail electricity market must operate effectively and serve consumers’  
interests. Improved access to data is needed to assist consumers, service 
providers, system operators and policy makers. Increased use of demand 
response and changes to the role of networks and how they are incentiv-
ised are required to unlock these benefits. Governments also need to take 
steps to ensure that all consumers, including low income consumers, are 
able to share in the benefits of new technologies and improved energy 
efficiency’ (Finkel et al. 2017)
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There are multiple cases of significant consumer involvement in energy policy:
•	Germany offers an example of the success of long-term citizen’s empower-
ment. The beginnings of what is now known as ‘Energiewende’ date back 
several decades and have their roots in the oil, nuclear and environmental 
crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, which resulted in the transformation of energy 
supply as a bottom-up process. Citizens mobilised significant resistance 
against the conventional energy policy of those days and activated social 
engagement for structural changes in the energy policy and supply system. 
Decades of critical social debates about the existing energy policy led to 
a counter-proposal to the conventional energy supply, which was adopted 
by the government in the early 1990s and led to the unprecedented rise of 
renewable energies.
•	The commitment and investment of citizens still remains a key driving 
force of the German Energiewende: As outlined in the country report in 
Section 2.5 of this chapter, citizen energy has a market share of 47 per cent 
of the installed renewable electricity capacity in Germany. Therefore, while 
public involvement is important, key to longer-term consumer engagement 
is access to the market. The experience of cooperatives enabled a tested 
route for citizens to investment and gaining a stake in the sector.
•	A similar development has been seen in Denmark where wind power sur-
vived on a fragile home market due to a continuation of parliamentary 
support and subsidies for wind power, which probably would not have 
prevailed without the policy pressure from the many wind turbine share-
holders, including local citizens. As the country report in Section 2.4 of 
this chapter shows, the conflict regarding the establishment of the new 
heat and power integration infrastructure leads to the question how the 
sector can be rooted in a bottom-up and smart energy system to ensure 
that  further integration of renewables is possible without difficulties and 
unnecessary expense.
•	Following the Fukushima accident in Japan in 2011, German citizens 
expressed increased public and political concern over nuclear power, espe-
cially regarding the oldest reactors. This resulted in the introduction of a 
new direction for energy policy in Germany – the Energiewende (or energy 
turnaround); to phase out the use of nuclear power, by 2022; to accelerate 
the deployment of renewables and to increase energy efficiency. This was a 
dramatic change in the domestic policy, since at the same time the admin-
istration had only just introduced legislation to enable the nuclear power 
plants to continue to operate.
•	The nuclear accident in Fukushima also resulted in changes in nuclear 
power deployment rates in China, the cancellation of new build considera-
tions in Italy, following a referendum; recent announcements of no more 
nuclear in South Korea; and the cessation of all nuclear power in Japan, with 
local opposition delaying the restart of many reactors.
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•	A similar external event led to changes in the electricity sector in New York. 
Audrey Zibelman, the then chairperson of the NY State Department of 
Public Service (DPS) described how Hurricane Sandy was a major driver 
in the NYS decision to articulate a new vision for energy. Hurricane Sandy 
provided the desire for change of the NYS people, as well as the DPS focus 
of providing customers with the services they want – which includes secu-
rity and cost effectiveness.
Customers, together and as individuals, are driving energy policy by their 
investment decisions, too. This is currently most obvious with respect to resi-
dential solar installations – whether in sunny places like Australia or Italy, or 
non-sunny places like Germany, where the take-up of solar has been far greater 
than expected and is driving regulatory change. Governments should welcome 
these murmurating situations, because they have significant benefits from an 
investment point of view. If customers, individuals or consumer co-operatives, 
are de facto becoming the investors on the system, there is less need for inves-
tors from other sources or – as technology prices fall – state financial support 
or subsidies. Other potential decentralised murmurations, possibly storage and 
electric vehicles, may follow. A customer-focused energy policy would be sup-
portive of this murmurations and work with them.
Globally, competitiveness and levelised costs of solar PV and wind are chang-
ing, now routinely estimated below operating costs of coal-fired generation. On 
a retail level, tariffs faced by a vast majority of consumers, for example in India, 
are substantially higher than the cost of rooftop PV. Non-economic barriers, 
such as access to credit, are getting addressed by governments and regulatory 
bodies. Once they are minimised, growth of decentralised renewable energy 
supply is likely to further accelerate.
Decentralised renewable power can also be part of broader public policy 
goals by creating local employment, decreasing brain drain from rural areas 
and urban migration. As the report on China in Section 2.3 states, distributed 
generation and in particular solar are used as a tool for reducing poverty alle-
viation. In fully industrialised countries, such as Germany, substantial benefits 
for local employment have been observed.
On a global scale, significant differences in consumer focus remain, with 
many people still not having access to any or reliable supply, such as in India; 
or those that do, many have no choice about their supplier, payment system or 
tariff, such as in China. In the European context, for example, Italy also expe-
rienced a considerable growth in small-scale renewables systems, but policy is 
still dominated by large supply-side operators.
Designing markets to encourage flexibility in supply and demand
The greater deployment of renewables over the last decade has led to a 
 recognition of the need for a more flexible system in order to accommodate 
variable producers.
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To date four main mechanisms have been suggested to add the necessary 
flexibility, which are: interconnections, greater flexibility of generation from 
more predictive plants (often currently promoted through capacity markets 
or payments), storage, and demand side measures. These mechanisms vary in 
their suitability according to geographical and economic conditions of energy 
markets. For example, the transmission network and interconnections between 
systems may act as a flexibility backbone and as the ‘net’ balancer, for example 
in a largely integrated system with different climatic zones, such as in Europe. 
Flexible tariffs can sensitise customers to become aware of their energy use and 
encourage certain behaviours helpful to network operations. Decarbonisation 
in other sectors may create opportunities for further flexibility, in particular the 
electrification of transport and heating.
The extent to which these options are used will determine how quickly the 
system moves toward decentralisation, and bottom-up optimisation. For exam-
ple, capacity payments in the United Kingdom provide financial support to the 
incumbent producers, and help to maintain the status quo. In Italy, a capacity 
market is envisaged, where producers will receive a remuneration for the gen-
eration capacity they make available. The European Commission approved the 
design of the Italian capacity market in February 2018. Capacity payments can 
significantly distort the market and offer financial support for a broad range of 
operators, often which other policy objectives are seeking to phase out (as has 
been the case in GB and its support for diesel) (Lockwood 2017). In Germany, 
the government created a requirement that network operators procure 2 GW 
of capacity to be held in reserve outside the market. This scheme not only bears 
advantages for incumbent generators, but might further restrict the balanc-
ing market to, for example, the detriment of demand side measures. Similarly, 
exporting excess power through large interconnections may reduce the need 
for much smaller scale storage and also negatively affect the economic case for 
demand response.
A different framework for the provision of grid services may better fit the 
requirements of the new system in terms of cost recovery, with every unit, 
including the low-carbon ones connected to medium and low voltage net-
works, being able to participate in network services if they wish to, thanks to 
the low-cost control technologies now available. For instance, in the whole-
sale electricity market in Australia the reserve capacity is undergoing a review 
for change to a capacity auction to commence in 2021, including changes 
to rules for demand side management, due to the current over-capacity and 
associated costs to consumers. Trialling has begun to alleviate demand peaks 
during high summer temperatures or to control the frequency of the network 
with  virtual power plants (VPPs), composed of up to 1000 domestic solar and 
 battery systems.
One policy option is to work towards a hierarchy of flexibility measures, 
with priorities for those with higher system efficiencies, higher greenhouse 
gas (GHG) reduction potentials, and those that have longer-term value. This 
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is not a static consideration, especially given the system changes that large data 
management capabilities will bring, and the opportunity to evaluate and match 
supply and demand regionally or even locally.
This, plus an attempt to deliver greater integration across sectors, implies a 
move from the traditional top-down optimisation to a more bottom-up optimi-
sation. Regulation may achieve superior outcomes if it is based on principle of 
subsidiarity, where first the total energy use is reduced on a local level – house 
by house, street by street – and then resources are integrated as much as pos-
sible towards the next higher level, before expensive high-tension networks and 
interconnectors are built. Government or the regulatory agency could entitle 
a Distribution System Provider or Distribution System Operator to prioritise 
incentives for the different mechanisms.
Any monetisation of flexibility services will lead to a shift in the allocation 
of revenues among economic agents. Thus, while evidence is now showing 
that providing more value in the energy system for flexible operations enables 
a more cost-effective whole system development and operation (i.e. cheaper 
overall and therefore beneficial for customers), there will be resistance to 
those changes (Shakoor et al. 2017). A balance has to be found between the 
new rules and incentives within those markets, networks, tariffs and services, 
and new institutions and actors – whether distribution market coordina-
tors; system operators, and so on – who enable and coordinate the services 
and resources.
Strengthening the role of local system coordinators, thereby allowing for a 
coexistence of the central grid and decentralised micro-grids
In developing countries with fast growing electricity markets, such as India, 
the central grid suffers from low reliability and insufficient coverage. In this 
 context, the construction of decentralised micro-grids could be  encouraged 
and  incentivised to complement the existing infrastructure and leapfrog 
towards more reliable, decentralised supply. In industrialised countries and 
states with a fully functional and reliable central grid, such as  Australia or New 
York, decentralised micro-grids may be more resilient against  climatic events 
like Hurricane Sandy in New York or storms and heat waves in Australia.
To accommodate more generation on the distribution network its system 
operator needs to have greater power and more strategic oversight. The DNO, 
which has often been relatively passive, with a fixed rate of return on their asset 
base, may be replaced by a coordinating distribution entity.
In New York State, distribution system providers (DSPs) encompass a new 
system function intended to coordinate an area system operation and to stimu-
late markets in that area. The distribution utilities retain both wires and sys-
tem operator functions and have a public service obligation placed on them. 
The utility currently obtains its revenues from traditional cost of service. In 
the future, this is likely to move more towards performance-based regulation, 
one desired output of which would be a resource and cost-efficient system 
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operation. This is effectively a new way of allocating costs in the energy system 
– more closely reflecting its use and needs, and the value of different resources 
within the energy system – including distributed energy resources, flexibility 
and demand side management.
New York state illuminates that regulation is adapting to the new configura-
tion within energy systems. The state’s system coordinators are still obliged 
to fulfil public policy goals. They are incentivised to minimise infrastructure 
costs of system transformation, and to maximise customer satisfaction. Tar-
iffs become important to encouraging customer connection to their energy 
use, and this in turn links to network development (and network regulation) 
and meeting public goals. Currently network operators receive all the revenue 
related to networks, but over time new ways of paying for networks and other 
system functions may emerge – again more closely related to the system use, 
the providers of new services, and to what customers want the system, and 
networks, to do. Since liberalisation, electricity markets have always had cer-
tain links to network operation and system costs, but this is likely to become 
more complex, as greater levels of decentralisation and demand response 
occur. Thus, system operation, network charging, tariffs and markets – which 
have always worked together – are becoming more closely intertwined, and 
sophisticated. Australia is currently the world’s most extreme example of 
this. On-site generation has reached a point where it makes financial sense 
for households to use solar and storage, even without subsidies. However, 
network charging and the regulatory mechanisms are lagging behind this 
momentum, and many systemic problems could have been avoided if they 
had been addressed earlier.
In the example from New York, system operation includes managing the dis-
tribution wires. But equally, a distribution market facilitator could be a ‘system 
operator only’ company or not-for-profit institution, while the distribution 
wires company becomes a regulated entity with a new role. Whatever configu-
ration of the entity at distribution level, it will have to interact with the trans-
mission system operators. A new system coordinator must allow and encourage 
the development of systems that support different functions on the grid, such as 
demand side actions, generation and storage. Small actors will often combine 
activities to accumulate revenues and in doing so offer important supply and 
grid stability services. A distribution system coordinator needs to recognise 
these advantages of multi-functionalism. It is still too early to know how these 
entities will be set up and how their interactions will work – both in developing 
and industrialised countries. It is clear, though, that the roles of both distribu-
tion and transmission companies will change.
Reforming regulation – including performance-based elements
Often, new business models develop despite the system rather than with the 
help of it. In many countries, the existing system maintains payments for the 
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‘old’ technologies and services and does not provide payments for the services 
that would enable the new, flexible system, for example many of capacity mar-
ket incentives, which favour existing generators over demand side measures. 
Its institutions do not act as a driver, but as a barrier to emerging innovations.
Technology changes and the subsequent requirement for new operational 
regimes, coupled with emerging opportunities for active consumer engage-
ment, are driving the need for far-reaching regulatory reforms. The new regula-
tory framework should be ambition driven, shaping the regulatory framework 
towards clearly defined policy objectives. If the energy policy remains too 
focused on conventional centralised technologies, change may be slower and, 
in the longer term, more expensive, due to larger stranded assets and wasted 
opportunities (Shakoor et al. 2017).
The traditional cost-of-service method of regulation requires utilities calcu-
lating their costs for the next X amount of years, the regulator checking their 
calculations and agreeing on the money they can spend over the time period. 
This amount is then turned into a charge on customers.
By contrast, performance-based regulation (PBR) is a form of regulation 
that aims to incentivise outputs in return for payments. It is very different 
from the more traditional cost-of-service mechanism. PBR decides what it 
wants to achieve (desired outputs) and then establishes an incentive mecha-
nism whereby the utility is paid to the extent it delivers the desired outputs, as 
opposed to cost-of-service regulation. The value of outputs has to be worked 
out dynamically, as they will change over time, so that the payment to utilities 
per output is not too great or too low. Under the regime of performance-based 
regulation, inputs may change provided the desired outcomes are met, which 
means that there will be more flexibility of choice in delivering those outputs 
rather than being locked into the inputs. This regulatory regime is likely to lead 
to a better use of resources and cost-efficient system operation, as the report 
of the states of New York and California suggest. It also facilitates dynamically 
linking revenues, tariffs, connections and network operation charges with the 
desired market design.
Compared to cost-of-service regulation, PBR is also more flexible and better 
placed to incentivise these requirements from a public policy point of view, 
because outputs can be more easily changed. It also facilitates dynamically 
linking revenues, tariffs, connections and network operation charges with the 
desired market design.
Reforming regulation will encompass how to deal with winners and losers of 
the new regime. Trade-offs have to be discussed to ensure that, on the one side, 
networks are paid for and public service obligations are met, and on the other 
side the wishes of prosumers and users to have a high degree of autonomy are 
respected. In the move from cost-plus regulation to one where a higher propor-
tion of network fees are linked to performance-based regulation, the roles and 
responsibilities of all stakeholders need to be addressed.
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Reassessing investments in the long-distance transmission grid, given the rise 
of decentralised energy supply
As more customers connect to PV, they use fewer units of electricity, and the 
transmission and distribution lines must be paid for by fewer customers on 
fewer units, if the same governance for network regulation and for charging for 
network use is maintained. This increases the network portion of the bills and 
makes self-generation more economically attractive. This is the so-called ‘death 
spiral’ for the conventional energy supply industry. The reaction from some 
governments or regulatory agencies has been an attempt to stop subsidising 
the deployment of PV – rather than seeing it as part of a move to a sustainable 
energy system. Consequently, feed-in-tariffs for small-scale renewables have 
been reduced in an increasing number of policy frameworks, for example Ger-
many, and an additional network charge ‘or insurance premium’ is proposed 
for consumers that self-generate, because they use – in conventional energy 
provision terms – the grid as backup (Gosden 2016).
In many countries, the construction of new and reinforcement of existing 
transmission infrastructure incurs costs in the billion-dollar range for final 
customers. These investments may lead to stranded assets, because the uptake 
of local supply reduces the need for long-distance transportation of the elec-
tricity. Some countries, such as Australia, have recognised the need for a reas-
sessment of the necessity of long-haul transmission investments.
Network utilities have hitherto made their money primarily from their cost 
of service regulated payments; per unit of energy transmitted across their 
 networks; and from connections to their grids. They have been in control of 
how their network is used and operated – who connects and how much those 
connections cost. Increasingly, however, as technologies decentralise there 
are new ways of ownership, network connection and network use. With these 
changes, the structure and origin of revenues for network entities have to 
be reassessed.
More decentralised production changes the volumes of electricity flowing 
across different segments of the grid. The sources, predictability and vol-
umes on the transmission system will change as a result of new, sometimes 
large-scale renewable generation, such as offshore wind. By contrast, the ten-
dency towards more production and consumption within the same regional 
distribution grid may reduce the overall flows in transmission systems. Self- 
production has already resulted in an increasing number of consumers who 
have reduced their consumption from the electricity grid, leading to a decline 
in the overall revenues for grid operators. Given that the grid operation 
costs are largely fixed, grid operators will, all other factors remaining, have 
to increase their unit cost per kWh of transported electricity. In turn, this 
encourages customers to buy more on-site generation, and raises  important 
questions about how further grid costs need to be allocated to active and 
 passive consumers alike.
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In New York, the reduction in the revenue for utilities generated from elec-
tricity sales across the grid may be compensated for by payments for meeting 
specific policy objectives. In other countries, such as Australia, consideration 
is being given to a tariff similar to mobile phone charging, where the cus-
tomer would choose a plan based on their peak kilowatt usage, for example 
not exceeding 3 kW of consumption at any time. If consumption is above this 
limit they would have to pay a fee. In Italy, an increasing part of the bill will be 
charged per unit of capacity and not just on consumption.
New rules should enable distributed generation while ensuring the network 
remains reliable and secure. In Italy, electricity generation is a liberalised activ-
ity, and grid operators are obliged to connect all renewable generators at a cost 
which is proportional to the distance from the connection point. However, as of 
2018, the owner of a renewable energy plant does not have alternative solutions 
to self-consumption or sale to the grid. The direct sale of electricity to other 
consumers, as well as load aggregation, is not permitted, with the exception 
of the one-to-one supply under SEU (‘Sistemi Efficienti di Utenza’ or Efficient 
User System) scheme.
The next step in the operation of networks will be the ability of individual 
producers to sell directly to consumers. Blockchain and other open ledger tech-
nologies are now being tested in some countries – for example in Vienna with 
the municipal utility Wien Energie – and may accelerate changes in the regula-
tion of the network: In a peer-to-peer scheme, one neighbour might want to 
connect to the grid and sell to another neighbour, but might want to pay only 
for use of a few metres of distribution grid. How should this be paid for, and 
how will this feed into the overall cost of running an energy system?
Box 2: To upgrade networks or not?
As the share of decentralised renewable energies rises, the default 
response of a traditional government or regulatory agency is to allow 
and promote investments in the distribution and transmission grid. In 
Germany, for example, around 1800 km of high-voltage transmission 
lines are under construction to transport the offshore wind energy pro-
duced in the North Sea and in the Baltic Sea to the country’s industrial 
hubs in the South. As grid operations in most countries are still regu-
lated, the costs for reinforcement are borne by all consumers via grid 
fees and levies. In Germany, the costs of grid services and concessions 
have been almost uninterruptedly rising from 1.02 €-cts per kilowatt 
hour in 2009 to 6.79 €-cts in 2018 for an average household with a con-
sumption of 3500 kilowatt hours per year (BDEW 2018).
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At root, the way we cost our energy systems and energy provision is chang-
ing. Renewable electricity is not yet ready for a flat rate system, just taking fixed 
costs into account, but in many industrialised countries the cost of generating 
electricity is less than half the cost of the retail price to customers – the remain-
der is related to network, system and environmental costs.50
 50 In the United Kingdom, it is about one third, see http://www.energy-uk.org.uk/ 
customers/about-your-energy-bill/the-breakdown-of-an-energy-bill.html 
If energy systems with a larger share of intermittent, weather-dependent 
power sources continue to be operated in the same way, then reliability 
problems are likely to increase. Grid operators have to intervene more 
frequently to maintain the balance between supply and demand. This 
happens either by shutting down individual renewable energy plants if 
there is excess generation injected into the grid, or activating additional 
conventional capacity in case of excess demand.
For example, interventions in Germany’s largest transmission grid oper-
ated by private company TenneT increased from fewer than 10 interven-
tions per year in 2003 to almost 1000 interventions in 2014 (Weinreich 
2016). The costs of grid interventions of Germany’s four large transmis-
sion grid operators rose from €436 m in 2014 to €1130 m in 2015 and 
€848 m in 2016. The decline from 2015 to 2016 was caused by a lower 
intake of wind and solar energy in 2016, as well as optimised operations 
and redispatch of the grid operators, according to the German federal grid 
agency (ZfK 2017). In 2016, compensation for temporarily shutting down 
renewable energy installations amounted to more than €370 m (ibid.).
However, if a country starts to operate their electricity system differ-
ently, and adds cheaper flexibility resources, then these expensive net-
works upgrades are not required and reliability problems would occur 
less frequently, which keeps a cap on infrastructure cost increases.
In addition, transmission grid operators could start building expertise 
and a digital and technical infrastructure to cope with the new and 
more challenging system requirements. For example, German trans-
mission grid operator 50 Hertz was able to reduce costs for and quanti-
ties of congestion management from 2015 to 2017 by 47 and 41 per 
cent, respectively, because of the optimisation of redispatch, as well as 
new transmission connections (Reinke 2018).
Regulators should be open to differing analyses of different scales of 
development when deciding on their regulated company agreements.
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As renewables are becoming considerably cheaper, the non-energy costs of 
energy provision become greater, and the focus will turn to how to pay for 
networks, system operation and the social and environmental costs of energy 
use rather than for energy itself. This is an entirely new focus of energy system 
economics. Network charges and access rules, which role prosumers play in 
the system, and what obligations and rights they have, is a new fault-line in 
energy regulation.
An integrative approach to sector regulation
The conventional energy system tended to have separate sector regulation, for 
example in electricity and gas, and they were top down optimised with few 
players. As the energy system decarbonises and decentralises, the convergence 
of heat, mobility and power on the distribution level requires coordinated regu-
latory instruments and actions. Regulators have to be flexible to changes and 
establish processes whereby regulation can keep up with and be adaptive to 
changes – rather than undermining them.
The decarbonisation of the heat and cooling and the transport sector has not 
been as rapid as for power. Consequently, in addition to the promotion of the 
greater use of renewables in these sectors, for example biofuels in transport 
and district heating, the electrification of these sectors is being promoted to 
reduce emissions. In both contexts increased attention is being placed upon 
sector coupling, that enables the co-production, combined use and substitu-
tion of different supply and demand options. In addition, sector coupling may 
increase the resilience of the system, given the variability of renewable energy 
production.
With a Bloomberg New Energy Finance forecasts suggesting that there 
could be 11 million EV sales per year globally by 2025 (up from 1.1 million in 
2017), smart charging of electric vehicles could massively expand and create an 
unprecedented opportunity for grid balancing through customer engagement 
(BNEF 2018). In some countries, such as Denmark, piloting has already begun 
(Fuelincluded 2017).
From a regulatory perspective, sector coupling raises important questions of 
how to set up a framework that does not only optimise the deployment of dif-
ferent technologies and distributed energy resources in individual sectors, but 
also for an encompassing regulatory and institutional framework. The electri-
fication of new sectors is likely to increase electricity demand, which would be 
significant in many industrialised countries that have experienced no or little 
growth over the last decades.
Going forward, the development and implementation of a smart, holistic 
energy system will require coordination between the variable renewable pro-
ducers, the transmission system operator (TSO) and distributed system pro-
vider (DSPs), the municipalities and even the vehicle fleet owners to achieve 
maximum efficiency and stability.
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Most energy systems in the world have a very clear public service obliga-
tion on monopoly providers of services to customers, and they have customer 
licenses of some sort on the non-monopoly providers for other functions.
The changing energy world is altering the roles of different actors and stake-
holders, but there still needs to be a clear requirement on actors and stakehold-
ers to provide a certain level of service to customers. It is remarkable that the 
Public Service Commission (PSC) of New York, the Regulator, has come to the 
view that upholding their public service mandate, which is about a century old, 
can only be fulfilled by fundamental changes to their energy system – but they 
still hold fast to their mandate. Vulnerable customers will need to be looked 
after, and networks, if they are needed, still need to be paid for.
2.9.2 The way forward: transformation and acceleration
Energy systems are changing and becoming more decentralised for all the 
 reasons for all the reasons and drivers discussed above this transformation 
needs to be undertaken in the most cost-effective way possible if it is to be 
 accelerated with a parallel acceleration in greenhouse gas reduction. This  chapter 
argues, from  evidence taken from the country sections, that a key  enabler of an 
 accelerated transformation is a coordinating governance framework made up 
of 8 key  elements, we now move to business models which can thrive from in 
situations where those governance mechanisms are in place.
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Business models beyond subsidies – 
which core competencies are needed?
Christoph Burger and Jens Weinmann
3.1 Energiewende 1.0 – 3.0: matching phases of energy 
transition and business models
As outlined in the introductory chapter, the energy transition is fuelled by two 
main drivers, which are reflected in the two main parts of this book.
The top-down drivers are typically governments or states – or regulatory 
institutions within these territorial administrative entities – that are striving for 
a reduction in greenhouse gases or want to promote certain industries and their 
technologies. Examples of countries, their policies and governance structures 
have been presented in the previous chapter.
In contrast, this chapter of the book is dedicated to the bottom-up drivers: 
individual businesses and start-ups that exploit niches within the new energy 
system to generate revenues by creating or joining new markets and platforms. 
They are emerging alongside the established players in the energy sector, in 
particular the electric utilities.
Liberalisation of the energy sector is generally the pre-condition for allowing 
these players to emerge. Liberalisation (of certain parts of the value chain) cre-
ates opportunities for trading electricity and natural gas on wholesale markets, 
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with all types of financial instruments being offered by multiple players. How-
ever, a bottom-up movement is also possible in country settings that still favour 
a fully regulated configuration of the electricity supply. For example, govern-
ments can also demand/require that a certain share of a load-serving entity’s 
energy supply is derived from renewable sources (for a discussion, see also Kief-
fer & Couture 2015). These utilities could then issue tenders to other players and 
outsource the ramp-up of renewable capacity, with most closely following the 
existing model of independent power producers (IPPs), which supply certain 
amounts of energy, typically in long-term contracts with utilities or the govern-
ment. This model of transformation functions via command-and-control rather 
than market-based mechanisms. California versus New York state would be 
classical examples of these two differing approaches.
Whereas regulatory policies, implementation, and rollouts may differ after 
the electricity market is liberalised, the move towards decentralisation typi-
cally encompasses three phases, which we call Energiewende 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0, 
or Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III (see Burger & Weinmann 2017 in the Har-
vard Business Review for further details). In technical terms, they can roughly 
be associated with a deployment of ‘new’ renewable energies with a supply 
share of less than 10 per cent in Phase I, when renewables still represent a 
niche of the electricity supply. In Phase II, their contribution rises to 10 to 40 
per cent, and they become a major player in the supply portfolio. Phase III is 
characterised by an aggregate renewable-energy supply of more than 40 per 
cent, when they can be characterised as a dominant player by an aggregate 
contribution of more than 40 per cent and renewable energies as the dominant 
player (Baumgartner 2017).
This categorisation is only valid for the ‘new’ renewable-energy sources, in 
particular wind, solar, and biomass. For example, the United Kingdom meets 
some of its renewable targets by co-firing large, old coal stations with biomass. By 
contrast, countries with a high share of large-scale hydropower, such as  Brazil, 
Norway, and Paraguay, do not enter this classification as Phase III countries – 
despite the fact that renewable energies play a dominant role in electricity 
 supply – because the supply structure is based on centralised operations and 
control of the assets.51
Each of the three phases brings its own opportunities and challenges for pol-
icy makers as well as corporate players such as utilities and start-ups, as will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
 51 Hydropower has been in use for more than a century to produce electricity, and it 
does not feature the decentralised geographical pattern of ‘new’ renewable ener-
gies. In terms of structural similarities, in particular with regards to the financ-
ing and complexity of construction, offshore wind farms could be compared most 
closely to a conventional hydropower dam: Both require larger players with a 
strong financial endowment or backing by investors to provide the high levels of 
investment up front.
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•	Phase I (Energiewende 1.0): in Phase I of the energy transformation, 
countries explore opportunities to incentivise the deployment of renewable 
(non-hydro) energy sources. Start-ups benefit from public funding for the 
rollout and provide services. Owners of residential rooftop photovoltaic 
(PV), bioenergy villages, and also energy associations that operate wind 
turbines are at the heart of a ‘civic power’ movement, in which assets are 
owned by private individuals, without a utility being involved in the opera-
tion of the plants. In parallel, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
and some power companies are investing in and deploying renewables.
•	Phase II (Energiewende 2.0): Phase II of the energy transformation is char-
acterised by civic power emerging as a third force in the market, comple-
menting electric utilities and corporate new entrants in the energy sector. 
Civic power is one of the reasons why the decentralised energy revolution 
may become a ‘global game changer’ – it shifts the responsibility of electric-
ity supply back to the citizens of a country.
During Phase II, platforms are created that coordinate supply and demand 
or offer services such as aggregating existing capacity or loads (for peak shav-
ing). When multiple atomised actors are involved, data has to be gathered 
and analysed. Individual owners of assets may not be sufficiently knowledge-
able to deal with the complexities of the energy system, and they outsource 
that expertise to companies that specialise in providing these services.
Regulators start modifying the initial incentive systems in Phase II. A 
continuation of directly or indirectly subsidising renewable energies is often 
countered by public opposition because of the heavy burden for ratepayers.
Utilities adapt to the new market environment by reorganising their 
activities, as it happened for example in Germany, when incumbent utilities 
E.ON and RWE split their traditional thermal generation and trading units 
from their distribution, renewables and service-oriented business lines, and 
later merged these two new entities.
•	Phase III (Energiewende 3.0): Phase III of the energy transformation, or 
‘Energiewende 3.0’, has yet to be seen in any country. Non-hydro renewable 
energies will become the major player in the supply structure. The marginal 
costs of renewable energies such as wind and solar are practically zero, so 
there will be a resource abundance at certain times, and extreme scarcity 
(and high prices) at other times. Hence, storage will become a major issue 
for policy makers.
The electricity supply industry will be forced to leave its roots as public 
infrastructure service and transform into truly private businesses, offer-
ing customised solutions for each consumer, while independent system 
operators or private transaction platforms take over responsibilities of grid 
control. As with many other aspects of our lives, energy may become an 
individualised choice, with each of us determining the amount of risk we 
are willingness to take. The customer proposition may become central in 
this phase but it will not necessarily mean that customers will become active 
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beyond choosing a proposition they like. Energy will, of course, remain a 
public infrastructure service, but the state’s involvement will shrink, as hap-
pened in the telecommunications and aviation sectors.
3.2 Start-ups pave the way towards a new energy system
Compared to the ‘safety and reliability’ paradigm that has dominated the mind-
set of executives at electric utilities until very recently, start-ups typically have 
a different mentality and culture. A willingness to take risks and to ‘pivot’ – 
which means a radical change in the business model – are essential ingredients 
in their trajectory towards success. Large companies have started complement-
ing their traditional research and development units with external input to 
increase diversity and the spectrum of potential future business options. They 
acquire smaller companies with new ideas, for example Centrica in Great Brit-
ain, participate in accelerators, establish incubators and venture capital funds, 
foster a culture of intrapreneurship, that is, internal entrepreneurship, and are 
(slowly) changing their business models – from selling a commodity to becom-
ing a provider of integrated service solutions.
As in many other industries, the electricity supply industry benefits from 
innovations and unconventional ideas being brought to the market by start-ups, 
founders, and entrepreneurs. The focus of the interviews used in this part is, 
hence, on the insights generated by their experiences.
The start-ups with whom the interviews were conducted have been selected 
to mirror the changes that are taking place in both industrialised and develop-
ing countries. Start-ups in developing countries may have completely different 
business models than start-ups in industrialised countries. This is because the 
former use decentralised energy generation to complement the existing grid 
infrastructure in areas where grid connections are not established, whereas 
decentralised energy in industrialised countries is a substitute and replacement 
of existing supply (and respective institutional) structures.
Furthermore, they have been chosen as representative examples of the three 
phases of the energy transformation described above.
One case study of business models during Phase I of the energy transforma-
tion is Envio Systems (no. 1), a Canadian start-up that offers a low-cost solu-
tion to enhance the energy efficiency of existing commercial buildings. Moving 
towards a partially autonomous system with a larger share of renewable, inter-
mittent energy, Timo Leukefeld (no. 2) has developed a commercial solution for 
an (almost) energy-autonomous house, whereas Entelios (no. 3) has been one 
of the first providers of demand response services in Europe. For most indus-
trialised countries, Phase III of the energy transformation is a vision, a future 
perspective, but in the context of isolated, rural areas in the developing world 
it is factual reality. The business models of the three start-ups SOLshare (no. 4), 
Mobisol (no. 5) and Solarkiosk (no. 6) offer alternatives to the connection to 
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the central grid. By contrast, Australian start-up Power Ledger (no. 7) is a pio-
neer in peer-to-peer trading and Blockchain-based decentralisation of power 
supply in highly developed urban and suburban settings.
Innovators test new business models. Only a few survive, others inspire new 
ones. Scaling becomes important, and this might be a reason why many disap-
pear. Since some of the interviews have been conducted, substantial changes in 
the business models or career paths of the interviewees have taken place. Some 
of the startups have filed for insolvency, others have been acquired by larger 
competitors. All interviews must therefore be interpreted as snapshots of their 
situations of the world at a certain point in time. Despite these developments, 
the interviewees kindly agreed to authorise the publication of the interviews 
after providing updates on their ventures before the manuscript was completed 
and submitted to the publisher.
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3.3 Envio Systems: redefining building efficiency – Envio 
Systems targets an untapped legacy market
Interview with Reza Alaghehband, co-founder and CEO at Envio Systems, 
on August 26, 2016
Envio has developed an end-to-end commercial building management sys-
tem capable of turning any existing commercial building into a sophisticated, 
fully autonomous Smart Building. The company’s intelligent controls, digital 
infrastructure and web-based management platform can be easily and afford-
ably integrated into any type of facility, regardless of its size, age, or sophis-
tication level. According to the start-up, this is a breakthrough solution that 
affordably enables the AI (artificial intelligence)-powered, fully autonomous 
management of commercial buildings without the need to replace any exist-
ing infrastructure. It pays for itself from the energy savings in less than three 
years, which is a fraction of the cost of existing solutions. The systems cre-
ate smarter facilities that operate using 20–70 per cent less energy (Envio 
 Systems 2018).
3.3.1 Technology and business model
What are the barriers preventing 87 per cent of all commercial buildings 
from adopting advanced automation systems? The answer is simple: the costs 
heavily outweigh the benefits. We have developed our system as solution to 
this question.
With our system we wanted to overcome three major challenges: First, how can 
we eliminate structural complexity, which would require a high level of expertise 
to operate or troubleshoot? We decided to supply a pre-wired, easy-to-deploy set 
of systems ready for installation. Any electrician globally can install and test it 
using our simple app. It reduces the high cost of installation by enabling a wire-
less plug and play set-up. The second challenge was compatibility: How do we 
make it interoperable with the vast majority of systems? We developed adaptive 
and remotely configurable hardware flexible enough for every scenario. Third, 
how can we minimise customisation and circumvent an advanced configuration 
required for each facility? We achieve this with self-programming, commission-
ing, and learning devices configured via templates over the web.
Technology
The system we have developed is comprised of three key components. The 
first is the ‘Cube’, a plug and play IoT (Internet of Things) controller that 
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universally connects to any legacy device in a building (light switches, ther-
mostats, boilers, chillers, fans, pumps, valves, metres) to enhance them with 
bi-directional communication, web connectivity, and enable building-wide 
interoperability.
The second component is the Envio Gateway, which is a translator between 
communication protocols and legacy systems as well as a bridge between the 
Cubes to the cloud and back.
The third is our web-based platform, which collects, analyses, and visually 
displays all components and also hosts our algorithms. This is the key com-
ponent, in that it utilises real-time and historic information to determine the 
optimal setting for every single component, building-wide. Then it sends the 
settings back to the building for each Cube to execute.
How can we consolidate proven energy-efficiency functionalities that every 
building needs while preparing them for the future? Where can we create the 
highest dollar-for-dollar value? How can we integrate everything into one 
device? Instead of having redundancy in the hardware of our buildings, which 
increases costs and makes them less financially viable, we wanted to combine 
them and use one device with the advancements in processing power to col-
lect all that information. We wanted to be able to make active decisions and 
communicate with various building systems using the existing infrastructure. 
Rather than ripping things out and putting new equipment in, we simply inte-
grate the device with the existing equipment, making it smarter and helping it 
to operate more efficiently.
Commercial buildings operate similarly to factories, ensuring that the 
 people inside are comfortable by managing climate, lighting, and ventilation. 
Factories are only efficient when fine-tuned for consistency. The difficulty is 
that, in commercial buildings, there are dozens of completely unpredictable 
variables such as occupancy, outdoor temperature, heat loss, sunlight, and 
efficiency losses, which are unique to each building and constantly change. 
Using machine learning, our technology automatically learns and adapts to 
each building.
Our core IP is built right into the intelligence. Based on the sensor informa-
tion that is located around the area, the systems decide on what is being told 
to the radiators, the fans, etc., unless we give them other instructions based on 
additional information coming from all the sensors we have in the area. When 
rooms are occupied, in most cases we allow people to have full control over 
what is going on, depending on how they like their environment. But once they 
leave, the majority of the systems will continue to heat and light that room and 
have the same level of ventilation entering the building and the room. We pre-
vent that, and that is how we go about saving energy.
One of the first things we do is to implement our system within the building. 
With every Cube that we equip, we have about six sensors to monitor that area. 
In every room with a Cube, we are able to track the rate of heat loss and gain, 
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the efficiency of the fans, and the ventilation and heating system. We are able to 
tell what strategies and products would be most beneficial in which areas, and 
where they should target first. It is never a shotgun approach to put everything 
in because not every installation is going to give you the returns that you need. 
Our system diagnoses where the most energy is being lost and why. Using that 
information, one can make much more intelligent decisions. We recommend to 
the building owners and operators the best dollar-for-dollar investment.
Our Cubes are also equipped with a CO2 sensor for demand-control ventila-
tion. That is probably one of the highest cost components within our system for 
each system that we implement, but it pays for itself within that period, so it is 
extremely beneficial to have.
We are very satisfied with the functionality and the payback of our system. 
In most scenarios, we are offering a cheaper alternative to what our customers 
would normally be implementing. Energy conservation and efficiency in com-
mercial, industrial, and even residential buildings is a very straight-forward 
and repeatable process. First and foremost, you need to measure and under-
stand what is going on in there before you can even make any decisions. If you 
are just looking at a bill, you do not know whether the energy consumption 
primarily came at the beginning of the month, at the end of the month, or even 
if it is an annual total. Time-based information is needed to understand what is 
going on within buildings. Once you have that information, you can prioritise 
which features you want to implement. Many companies come in with tech-
nologies that just sense information.
For me, that is a giant waste of money, because sensing information is great. 
But I have found in 99 per cent of the cases that, unless there is a major flaw 
Figure 21: Envio Systems’ Cube.
Source: Envio Systems (2017).
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in the operations that they are completely missing, nobody is going to go and 
make the small adjustments that are continuously needed. The building may 
not have the capability for someone to make those small adjustments. But if 
you were to combine and utilise existing infrastructure and take the informa-
tion and do something with it autonomously, it would actually require some-
one to take that part on. It brings people on board in a more active way because 
everybody loves the technology: It is fascinating to see everything going on, 
Figure 22: Envio Systems’ BASE dashboard.
Source: Envio Systems (2017).
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and it is great to get people engaged with a system that is not difficult to use. 
Bringing together various parts and various functionalities under one platform 
gives users the opportunity to have something like an operating system for 
their building and an incredibly valuable asset.
One should first install the energy metering system along with sensors and 
controllers. This is because there are basic functionalities that buildings older 
than 20 years do not have, which we implement in order for them to operate 
more energy-efficiently. Those are a required package. The energy monitoring 
system needs to be incorporated, otherwise we do not know what effect, say, 
turning down the fans is having in real time. In our package, we encompass 
energy monitoring. We know where the baseline is for the average commer-
cial building, and we know the energy intensity per square foot/metre that 
should be used within these buildings. If a building’s usage levels are above 
that, one knows that something is wrong. Around 40 per cent of energy in 
buildings is wasted, somewhat analogous to marketing: 50 per cent of your 
marketing budget is wasted; the problem is to find that 50 per cent. Instead of 
spending a lot of money and time putting in one solution to fix one problem, 
you incorporate multiple solutions into one device using all the same intel-
ligence and share that intelligence with all the other rooms, then you have a 
synchronous system that looks not just at one part of the building but at the 
building as a whole. Implementation costs are lower because of the savings 
they produce. It would not make economic sense to buy separate sensors for 
the lights and HVAC if I installed current transformers (CTs) to measure and 
monitor electricity consumption. None of that would get a payback for you 
because of the redundancies in the hardware and the costs for manufacturing 
every single device. Sensors are incredibly cheap if you plug all of them into 
one device.
If consumers allow for active demand-side management, they will get ben-
efits from it. But it also opens up a market that they are not fully in yet and have 
not yet figured out how to penetrate.
Our system does not need to be connected to the grid. If a building has a 
decentralised energy system, one of the most valuable features is being able to 
control it so that the owners can balance the load.
It is not a challenge to create and develop a system like ours. The challenge 
rather is backward compatibility with existing systems and understanding how 
to integrate them. We have a competitive edge in analysing all the informa-
tion and having the building adjust to operating in the most energy- efficient 
way. It is no longer about simple control strategies. We are able to detect how 
much energy is being used by fans and the ventilation system, and we can 
control the pumps and the hot water boiler temperature. Over time, all of 
these systems become inefficient at different rates. We can determine the most 
efficient  solution – increasing the speed of the fan or adjusting the hot water 
temperature – by applying intuitive and real-time operations and adjustments.
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Business model
There is an opportunity for savings in every single building. In trying to make 
the solution viable, one has to determine the potential for reducing energy. If you 
want it to happen during a certain payback period, what would be the desired 
pricing model that fits with the reductions? The biggest component of selling 
energy efficiency is really the pricing model, understanding energy costs and 
prices, looking at the energy statistics and analysis, and generating energy savings.
We started in one of the markets with the lowest energy prices, almost glob-
ally, which was Calgary, Alberta, in Canada. The concept was that if we suc-
ceeded in making our system economically viable there, we could make it viable 
anywhere in the world. Alberta is not a very progressive province in terms of 
utility rebates, so we did not even have that luxury to fall back on if we made a 
business case. The cost savings had to be strictly from the energy savings that 
we produced.
Having worked for years within the industry, I know that there is a finite 
payback period of the systems and solutions implemented in terms of energy 
efficiency and conservation. We must meet that threshold. Any measure above 
that threshold may be realised, but it goes towards next year’s budgeting, or 
the year after, which creates a much longer sales cycle. That happens to be one 
of the killers of the existing business model. There is no chance for generating 
revenue to finance business operations so fast.
If you are targeting the B2B market, no matter how sexy it looks, the bottom 
line is what matters for them. As a general rule of thumb, investments should 
pay off over a period of 36 months. Sometimes it is less, but if it does not pro-
vide some payback within 36 months, it is usually a very, very difficult proposi-
tion to sell. You have to figure out the savings and work backwards to figure out 
your pricing model.
Simplicity is the key to our business model. I have been working on this 
business model for about six years now. It has evolved over time and adapted. 
The original business model was a shared savings approach. It failed because 
nobody would touch it. There were tremendous measurement issues. We 
thought our system would overcome that because we were putting sensors and 
measurement devices everywhere to detect exactly how much we were sav-
ing. However, what happens generally is that one has no control over what the 
customers install in their buildings over time, and it becomes too complicated.
We are currently conflicted about our pricing model, and we may go in a 
different direction. Together with a very large utility partner, we are creating 
something incredibly disruptive for the market. Instead of us charging for the 
controllers, we are looking at hardware-as-a-service model, whereby clients 
simply pay on a monthly basis for us to reduce their energy costs.
We normally have recurring revenue. We can reduce the cost of the hardware 
to a minimum. If we increase the software service revenue to about 75 per cent 
of the savings we are generating, we can provide the hardware free of charge to 
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rapidly capture market share. We can go to clients and offer them hardware and 
software at little to no cost, with no initial capital investment required. It will 
help them to reduce energy costs without any upfront costs and helps to resolve 
the value dilemma – the owner not being the operator.
The partnering utility derives benefits from being able to manage buildings 
more intelligently and to communicate with the interior devices of the build-
ing, bringing all these systems together and connecting them.
We do our pricing model by market. In Canada we have much lower pricing. 
We do it in 500 Canadian dollars because the utility rates and energy rates are 
much lower there. We increase our pricing model in markets where we have the 
opportunity for, say, utility rebates to increase gross margins.
We charge €15 per controller per month. On the platform, our customers 
can monitor how much energy they save. For example, if customer spend 
US$18,000 per month for our controllers, they may save US$25,000 per month 
in energy costs.
We would offer this service at a lower rate in places such as Calgary, but it 
would be lower on our list of preferred markets. In Canada, we would first 
target the province of British Columbia, where the government offers a rebate 
of 50 per cent.
3.3.2 History and organisation
We are currently employing about 14 people now. We add roughly one or two 
people per month. Realistically, within the next 12 months, we will need to have 
a total of 35–40 people. We retain our employees by having them be invested in 
the company so that it is not so easy to lure them away. The majority of our new 
hires will be working in the area of engineering and research and development. 
We will change the industry with our next product.
Our company will be set up in a decentralised way. If we are too centralised, 
we cannot react and manage appropriately. Our servers will be located wher-
ever we are on that continent. Due to legislation, we have to make sure that our 
European servers are within Europe. As our data is highly secretive, it has to be 
secured. We will most likely have our centralised R&D facilities in Berlin. Our 
goal is to create an entire platform that other hardware systems can integrate 
into. We want to overcome the problem of everybody designing their own user 
interface, and thereby overwhelming clients.
3.3.3 Scaling and cooperations
Scaling
We have developed the first Building Automation technology, which is 
designed for rapid global scalability. Within the building controls industry, 
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you will find that most companies are regional except for the big four (Sie-
mens, Johnson Controls, Honeywell, and Schneider Electric). This is due to 
the requirement of having specialised installers, who must go on site to install, 
configure, and commission the systems. Our solution can be installed by the 
building owners’ existing electrical contractors, and the set-up and configura-
tion is either automated or completed remotely. We continuously monitor each 
sensor and controller for failures. In case of such an event, they can quickly be 
swapped out and will automatically download the previous unit’s program-
ming within seconds.
Our focus is on where we can have the most impact in terms of profitability, 
so we target the key markets first, the ones with higher energy rates. In Europe, 
electricity rates are significantly higher than in Canada. California, New York, 
and almost any place on the US east coast is available because there are fewer 
natural resources. As people move more towards renewable energies, energy 
costs become significantly higher.
There are tremendous opportunities available in developing countries 
because scarcity creates an increase in price, and most of those countries are 
just deploying diesel generators to power things, which is much more expen-
sive than the costs for transmission lines and electricity here. Our system 
would allow for a more streamlined management of electricity grids, which 
would prevent blackouts and brownouts. Utilities could manage the grid 
better by simply turning down devices, which is a more granular control of 
energy consumption.
Cooperations
I recognised that we needed a partner a long time ago. The challenge was having 
people understand our business model, understand the industry, and say: ‘Wow – 
that is very different from what is out there!’ Except for those entrenched in 
the industry, people were not able to differentiate how we were different from 
Nest. It took a very long time to overcome that, and explaining and clarifying 
our value proposition was a challenge. We have a very long time to refine our 
business model. Gridpoint essentially bought three companies and tried to glue 
them together to create a product. It is a beautiful business model, except when 
overhead costs are so high that a company has to borrow hundreds of millions 
of dollars to keep operations going. Gridpoint did not realise how slowly the 
scaling process advances. As they move forward, they need to bring on the 
right team members and go to the right market. Unfortunately, they got to a 
point where investors became a little nervous about how deep they were going, 
so they were purchased.
The leading utilities know that they are behemoths and that they move incred-
ibly slowly. They know they have to disrupt their business model before a com-
pany like us comes and does it before them. They have to be proactive rather 
than reactive. Major utilities understand that their business model is going to 
be dead probably within the next 10 to 20 years. It will have a significant impact, 
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with big power stations just closing down due to government mandates, as well 
as decentralised energy taking a huge chunk of revenue away from them. They 
need to adjust their business model in order to stay alive.
Our biggest hurdle will be distribution. The utility would help us with 
distribution as well as logistics and operations. One of their biggest assets 
is information. They know how to scale and to deploy infrastructure almost 
better than any existing company. They know the market and who the largest 
energy users are. They can actually access their data and verify which build-
ings are most likely to be energy-inefficient and determine where to go with 
that information and how they can help them. If we establish a partnership 
with them, they can bring on the manufacturing side that we need support 
with and they can help us with the marketing and branding – they know the 
industry. They can provide some of their best engineers to us so that we can 
find out how to really take advantage of the data and the implications of that. 
They can provide us with resources that we cannot acquire fast enough to 
scale as needed.
We are also in talks with an elevator company. The reason why we would like 
to cooperate with them is that we would like to have the resources to service 
our clients. We would work with them as operators of our devices, whereas the 
cooperation with the utility would be mainly focussed on sales.
Most owners own more than buildings and have diverse portfolios. There 
are companies that own dozens, if not hundreds of buildings. We are currently 
working with a major property management company that is in a public– 
private partnership. Their role is to retrofit all city buildings to make them more 
energy-efficient to achieve the 2020 goals. Our first project together with them 
was a school, and it has already been implemented.
We are continuously looking for partners with whom we can easily bring 
onto a very sophisticated interface and exchange information between vari-
ous systems to help the owners operate their buildings more efficiently. We are 
looking for apps. We are looking for solar companies or storage companies as 
partners. We want to help in getting devices to hit the market faster. It is a long 
process to establish a product in the market. With our support, we can direct 
these companies to the right clients.
3.3.4 Market outlook and competitive environment
We are different from other providers such as Nest, which produces devices 
for residential applications. When you do a residential application in one loca-
tion, you are missing out on all the information around you. You are making a 
decision for maybe not only one specific room, but for the entire living area – 
upstairs, downstairs – which is a terrible way of going about it because you do 
not have sample data from other areas. Every single one of our Cubes is placed 
in various rooms to control that zone and that area, based on the information it 
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is getting rather than assuming that the one single room with the sensor is the 
norm within that building.
When we work in commercial buildings, we usually have access to the ven-
tilation system and ventilation controls, which provides a huge savings oppor-
tunity for us, just with being able to adjust ventilation based on the amount 
of carbon dioxide in there. Nest’s focus is not energy savings, but rather it is 
a business strategy. They are not selling their hardware based on the fact that 
their customers will save a certain fixed amount. Rather, they sell it to give cus-
tomers control – it gives you a little bit of information, and it looks very sexy. It 
is a consumer product.
3.3.5 Interviewee biography
Reza Alaghehband is a serial entrepreneur 
originally from Vancouver, British Columbia, 
now residing in Calgary, Alberta. He enjoys the 
challenge of disrupting the status quo through 
innovation and unique strategies. He possesses a 
Bachelor of Commerce in Entrepreneurial Exper-
tise from Royal Roads University. Reza has been 
a featured presenter internationally at universi-
ties, industry conferences, and multinational 
organisations discussing technology, entrepre-
neurship, and innovation. Reza was the youngest member to be accepted into the 
Service Core of Retired Executives (SCORE) in the organisation’s history.
He has been successfully founding companies in multiple industries, focussing 
primarily on materials engineering, renewable energy, and most recently energy 
conservation as the founder and CEO of award-winning Envio Systems, Inc.
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3.4 Timo Leukefeld: a business model for an energy-
autonomous house without subsidies
Interview with Prof. Timo Leukefeld, TU Freiberg, on April 6, 2017
Can a business model based on energy autonomy also be viable for indus-
trialised countries? Germany, for example, has one of the most reliable elec-
tricity systems in the world, with the System Average Interruption Duration 
Index (SAIDI) typically hovering around two minutes per year, and a 100 per 
cent electrification rate. Yet, Timo Leukefeld, lecturer at the Technical Univer-
sity Bergakademie Freiberg in the German state of Saxony, is promoting an 
energy-autonomous house that produces its own heat and power – including 
the electricity for an electric car – with solar power.
3.4.1 Technology
I am a lecturer at the Technical University Bergakademie Freiberg. Together 
with my team, I have developed a financially viable and commercially success-
ful concept for an energy-autonomous house.
I live and work in an energy-autonomous house that offers around 160 
square metres with a solar thermal rooftop collector of 46 sq. m), photo-
voltaic (PV) panels measuring 58 sq. m), a 9300 litre long-term water stor-
age tank, and an electric battery with a capacity of 56 kWh, based on lead 
technology. My consulting practice and I were in charge of the design of the 
energy-related installations.
Staff from the Technical University of Freiberg examined the energy perfor-
mance of the building over the last four years with 190 sensors and observed 
that the house reached almost 100 per cent electric energy autonomy, includ-
ing the supply for charging an electric vehicle. In thermal supply for heating 
and warm water, 70 per cent autonomy was achieved. The remaining 30 per 
cent of additional heating requirements could be met by using 3 cubic meters 
of fuelwood in the winter, which led to a carbon-neutral energy balance all 
year around.
The outer protection layer of my buildings fulfils similar quality standards 
as a so-called KfW 55 house, which uses 55 per cent less primary energy than 
a standard house. With the solar thermal system and PV panels, energy costs 
of a prototypical passive house can be further reduced – by more than two-
thirds. The electric vehicle can be charged 10 to 11 months per year with locally 
produced electricity. Only in December and January must additional electric-
ity be purchased from the energy supply company to charge the car’s battery. 
These buildings achieve very high levels of energy autonomy, and the costs for 
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energy services – including individual passenger transport – are significantly 
lower than the energy costs of ‘passive houses’, which achieve the bulk of their 
energy savings from passive sources, such as the heat produced by humans or 
technical devices.
The storage battery of my model house becomes part of a Smart Energy Grid 
with the objective to positively contribute to network stability and earn money 
from grid-balancing services. Instead of sending excess renewable power sup-
ply to neighbouring countries for free, or even paying money to get rid of the 
electricity generated by intermittent renewables – often accompanied by nega-
tive prices on the German wholesale market – the available electricity can be 
locally used inside the house for heating up the water in the reservoir. I favour 
lead batteries over lithium-ion batteries because they are still more economical. 
One can purchase lead batteries for €250 per kilowatt hour (kWh) of storage 
capacity. By contrast, in our current projects we purchase lithium-ion batter-
ies at a price, depending on the size of the battery, of around €700 to €800 per 
kWh, including value-added tax and installation.
Of course, when lithium-ion batteries will become cheaper in the near 
future, I would favour that technology, because those batteries have a longer 
life-time and better performance, and generally are better suited for electric 
mobility.
Figure 23: Features of Timo Leukefeld’s energy-efficient houses.
Source: Leukefeld (2018).
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According to my assessment, the battery of the associated electric vehicle 
is too small to participate in the balancing market. By contrast, most of the 
electric vehicles that are currently available have batteries with a capacity of 12 
kWh, but to effectively participate in the market they should contain a storage 
capacity of at least 50 kWh.
My team has expanded its planning approach from a single-family home to 
a residential building with seven flats. In this building, a battery of 54 kWh is 
installed, which may also be used for grid-balancing services.
Our energy-autonomous house has gained attention from media: Together 
with one of Germany’s major publicly financed TV channels, I have prepared a 
30 minute report about our concept, and many German newspapers and maga-
zines have visited or invited me and publicised our insights.
The energy-autonomous house is an element of decentralised energy supply 
that has great potential but also faces major obstacles in its implementation. 
So far, the experience with zero-energy or plus-energy houses – that means, 
houses that produce more energy than they consume – has yielded mixed 
results. For example, the German Federal Ministry for Construction,  Traffic 
and Urban Development (BMVBS) has screened and assessed 35 housing 
 projects that are supposed to have an overall positive (both primary and final) 
energy balance.
According to the assessment, most of the houses have failed to meet expecta-
tions, though. The most frequent flaw is with heat pumps that are operated in 
Figure 24: Energy-autonomous, single-family house in Freiberg.
Source: Leukefeld (2018).
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a sub-optimal way (see also Schwoof 2013). For example, one observed house 
had a heat circulation system that was designed to provide the same tempera-
ture level throughout the entire house. However, the family that inhabited 
the house wanted to have cool bedrooms and a warm living room, and they 
changed the heating system accordingly, which led to a substantially higher 
consumption of electricity than expected.
Other flaws are related to the technologies that are deployed. BMVBS remarks 
that most heat pumps based on air temperatures performed worse than heat 
pumps based on soil temperatures or ground water.
My second idea is to favour quality over quantity. In my opinion, the Ger-
man energy transformation (Energiewende) has been too focussed on quan-
tity: producing a maximum amount of green energy, irrespective of the 
timing and location of feeding it into the grid. When the quantity of undif-
ferentiated feed-in reaches a critical threshold, policies must switch to a more 
qualitative approach that takes the ‘where’ and ‘when’ into account. Annual 
energy balances that show a renewable energy surplus are often flawed – 
similar to so-called plus-energy houses, which may have a net zero-energy 
balance because of a surplus of energy production in the summer – but they 
would still require a lot of energy from the grid during the cold and dark 
winter months.
Heat pumps for residential housing are an expression and symptom of the 
‘quantitative’ approach. Their promotion is a flawed policy incentive because 
they tap electricity from the grid just during the months when there is very 
little solar power available, thus reinforcing the need for conventional backup 
capacity. According to my calculations, heat pumps consume four-fifths of their 
annual electricity total during the winter months, whereas PV panels produce 
four-fifths of their electricity total during the summer months. We call this phe-
nomenon ‘seasonal illusion’. A heat pump cannot be operated using a typical 
residential PV installation during the scarce sunshine hours that characterise 
northern European winters. It may lead to positive results in the overall annual 
energy balance, but the anti-cyclicality contradicts the objective of achieving 
qualitative autonomy, which means the house is energy-autonomous during 
almost the entire year.
3.4.2 Business model
By April 2016, three players had already implemented our concept.
The first business model was developed by a group of housing associations, 
construction companies, and private real-estate investors. Their business model 
is based on a 10 year contract between the company that builds and owns the 
house and the people who rent it. They agree on a guaranteed rent over the 
entire time horizon, which includes living in the flat, heat and warm water sup-
ply, electricity, and – in the near future – electric mobility.
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According to my experience, housing associations have to calculate with 
around €380 per square meter. For a multi-family dwelling with seven residen-
tial units, there is likely to be an additional cost of around 20 per cent, com-
pared to a conventional building. Depending on the location, monthly rent 
amounts to €10 to €15 per sq. m, including the leasing of an electric vehicle.
The persons who rent the flat or the house face approximately the same costs 
as if they lived in a conventional house and had to purchase their electricity, 
heat, as well as the petrol at the fuelling station for their cars. However, they 
enjoy a much higher quality of living. In addition, the houses have barrier-free 
access. They also contain a lift for assisted living requirements and many more 
amenities. They also know with certainty that their all-inclusive rent will remain 
stable over the first 10 years.
The second business model is for energy utilities. They become a modern 
contractor and plan and operate all energy- and transport-related services for 
the multi-family building. I believe that our generation has entered the ‘flat 
rate generation’, which favours fixed payments instead of separate bills. Hence, 
people who rent the flat, and pay a flat rate.
This all-inclusive package substitutes for separate payments for heating 
requirements, electricity consumption, the leasing of a car, and the fuel at the 
fuelling station. Under very special circumstances – say, if collectors of amphib-
ians have a set of energy-intensive terrariums and their consumption exceeds 
a certain pre-defined threshold of ‘normal’ usage of energy – they have to pay 
for the additional consumption at normal market prices, which is a payment 
scheme similar to contracts for internet roaming on a mobile phone.
Since the utility owns all energy-related installations, it can use them for vari-
ous additional and revenue-generating functions, hence combining the man-
agement of assets and data as a service model. For example, all excess electricity 
and heat produced during the hot and sunny summer months can be fed into 
the electricity grid or sold to neighbours via a local district heating system. On 
days when the tenants do not need the electric vehicle that they lease, it can be 
rented out to other parties.
All of our projects operate with some involvement of an electric utility. In 
a number of projects, they just act as a service provider, in others they are the 
main contracting party. Utilities are changing their business model ‘from sell-
ing commodities to services’.
The third business model is being pursued by banks. Two levels of involve-
ment are attractive to them. First, they offer single-family homes. The typical 
target customers are people who want to have retirement plans that bring larger 
financial benefits than through conventional savings. In Germany, these sav-
ings are heavily taxed, so in the end, revenues after one’s retirement are strik-
ingly low. Instead, if one invests a similar amount of income into energy savings 
via a turnkey autarky package, these investments are not taxed when people 
get older. In sum, overall monetary benefits are twice as high as a conventional 
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retirement plan, and people use their house as a guarantee for maintaining 
their standard of living when they stop working.
The bank typically steps in when people intend to build a house. The bank 
then offers to extend the credit in order to finance the measures to enhance 
the energy autonomy of the house. Via these investments, the future home-
owner saves money – in the case of the model house that was monitored for 
its performance over three consecutive years, savings of around €3500 per 
year for the integrated energy and mobility solution were recorded. This is 
a sizeable amount of money, taking continuous energy price increases into 
account, and extrapolating annual tax-free savings from the moment the 
owners move into the house until they pass away – in Germany at the age of 
81 years, statistically speaking.
In April 2016, a regional bank in Thuringia started one project of this type. 
The bank will promote the house over the course of three years. Its intention is 
to demonstrate how one can achieve high-quality living after retirement.
Banks also get involved in the business model based on multi-family homes. 
The bank then acts both as a financier and as the landlord of these residential 
units. It offers a 10 year lump-sum contract for potential tenants. Simultane-
ously, it offers a 10 year investment opportunity to potential donors with a very 
attractive and secure interest rate.
This investment opportunity also has a strong ethical component because 
investors know exactly where their money is going, they know the location 
of the building, and they can identify with their investments. One project of 
Figure 25: Planned multi-family building in Rostock.
Source: Leukefeld (2018).
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that type has also been launched by a regional bank. Its director reports that 
demand from investors is indeed very high.
In my concept, I have abandoned principles that have been common practice 
in my industry. Most notably, I do not want to rely on government subsidies for 
the financing of my projects. If credits or grants from, say, the German Devel-
opment Bank (KfW) are available for specific projects, they are of course inte-
grated into the financing scheme.
3.4.3 Scaling
In April 2014, my consulting practice counted fifteen projects, of which eleven 
had been initiated by housing associations, two by banks, and two by energy 
utilities. The six-unit block offered by a bank received 50 applications from 
potential tenants. Instead of investing €1 million in a conventional housing 
block, the bank invests €1.2 million. My team analysed the demographics of 
the people who sent enquiries about the housing projects and found that a large 
number of them were elderly and retired people.
The typical process of acquiring new customers involves an initial presenta-
tion at the partner institution, for example a bank, followed by workshops with 
the executive board and different business units, such as credit advisors, techni-
cal staff, and so on.
My consulting practice then enters the concrete planning phase for energy-
related installations. In addition, we support the institution in its marketing 
efforts and in the promotion of the project by targeting customer segments 
which we would consider interested in the project.
It is very likely that the business model might be further refined and opti-
mised, for example by extending the payback horizon and thereby reducing the 
rent and leasing costs, after a number of residential units have been in opera-
tion for a couple of years.
Another future option is to integrate commercial buildings and industrial 
sites into my practice’s portfolio. As long as the customer is not in an energy-
intensive industry, such as an aluminium smelter, our concepts would work 
in the same way as for residential buildings. Supermarkets with standardised 
buildings and commercial retailers would be potential candidates. With an 
increasing number of projects and publicity in the media, it might only be a 
matter of time until a player in that field approaches us. Working with large cor-
porate clients might pose risks for a small consulting practice like ours, though. 
Their corporate culture might be non-compatible with our ideas of coopera-
tion. If the power relation is too asymmetric, for example, the client might exert 
pressure and force us to reduce the price of our services.
The market for retrofitting existing building stock is much larger than the mar-
ket for greenfield constructions. Around a quarter of residential homes in Ger-
many would be suitable for renovation in order to become energy-autonomous, 
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according to our estimates, because these houses have large, uninterrupted 
rooftops facing south that could be used for solar heating and PV panels. How-
ever, the retrofitting of these houses faces two main barriers. First, investors 
would like to implement standardised solutions, but for a renovation, one has 
to take the diversity of existing buildings into account. Each renovation has to 
be adapted to the individual requirements of the object. Adequate insulation 
and modifications to the layout of the flat are basic requirements for a properly 
executed retrofit, which drive costs up.
The second barrier is related to rights and privileges that tenants enjoy: A ren-
ovation may increase rental costs by 100 per cent, but tenants are well-protected 
under German law. They would have to leave the flat and be replaced by new 
tenants willing to pay the required rent. However, especially if old tenants have 
inhabited the flat for a sufficiently long period of time, it is almost impossible 
to force them to leave under German law. They may successfully use the legal 
framework to oppose that increase in rents or the threat of getting kicked out.
With a renovation rate below 1 per cent of the existing building stock in Ger-
many, apparently all relevant actors are failing to establish a standard solution 
for how to increase the rate of renovations.
According to my assessment, both commercial buildings as well as the ret-
rofitting of existing housing stock will become relevant and attractive once the 
market segment with the best framework conditions – in particular, new resi-
dential units and new single-family homes – has been tapped. My consulting 
practice will have climbed further along the learning curve through the experi-
ences gained from ongoing projects. For instance, one of the learnings that has 
already taken place concerns the configuration of the water tank, which was 
modified in its design in order to be more easily integrated into multi-family 
homes. These improvements in design could also be applied later in the configu-
ration of commercial buildings, such as supermarkets.
3.4.4 Market outlook and competitive environment
Competition in the field of energy-autonomous houses is limited. A number 
of architectural practices and construction companies offer turnkey solutions. 
Pilot projects are often led by universities or start-ups based on academic 
research. Emphasis may not be exclusively on energy autonomy. For example, 
Graft Architects offers a plus-energy house that follows the cradle-to-cradle 
principle, which means that all materials can be fully recycled. It is built with 
‘healthy’, organic materials, such as wood and clay.52
 52 Source: Personal interview and subsequent email exchange between the authors and 
Lars Krückeberg (22/4/2016).
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From my experience, I believe that energy-autonomous houses can be com-
mercially successful. If we are able to acquire even more customers in Germany, 
it is likely that competitors in Germany and in other countries will follow suit. 
Reinforced by regulation, energy-autonomous houses will become the standard 
rather than the exception in the newly built urban and rural environment. How-
ever, these new structures constitute typically only around 1 per cent of total 
housing stock in industrialised countries. The major challenge for decentralised 
energy will be the renovation of the 99 per cent of existing housing stock.
3.4.5 Interviewee biography
Prof. Timo Leukefeld studied energy engineering, 
worked in academia, and then founded his own 
company, which planned and installed solar heat-
ing systems across Germany. In 2011, he switched 
to consulting activities, leaving the actual imple-
mentation to other players. His current work is 
based on three pillars: (1) applied research and 
development, including the position at the TU 
Bergakademie Freiberg through which he holds 
lectures about energy-autonomous buildings, 
(2) the concrete planning of either new or refurbished energy-autonomous resi-
dential dwellings or commercial buildings, as well as (3) offering keynote speeches 
across Europe. He also serves as a strategic advisor to the federal German govern-
ment and to commercial actors such as banks and housing agencies.
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3.5 Entelios: Demand Response – a decentralised approach to 
complement intermittent renewable energies
Interview with Oliver Stahl, founder and former CEO of Entelios, on 
 February 11, 2016
Entelios is one of Europe’s leading energy management solution providers for 
decentralised energy resources in the industrial, commercial, and institutional 
sectors. Entelios provides Demand Response services for large commercial and 
industrial energy consumers. Additional clients are European energy companies 
in need of value-adding energy services for their B2B customers, or interested 
in enhancing grid and supply stability through Demand Response. As a part-
ner, Entelios enables those companies to set up their own Demand Response 
programmes. Based on its leading solution suite and operational capabilities, 
Entelios offers automated industrial ‘Demand Response As a Service’. As one 
of the first Demand Response aggregators and white-label Demand Response 
solution providers in Europe, Entelios has been building operational expertise 
in Demand Response since 2010 (Entelios 2018).
3.5.1 Technology and business model
Entelios was the first European-focussed Demand Response service provider 
that offered fully automated Demand Response for distributed energy resources 
(loads, generation units, and storage) in industrial, commercial, and institu-
tional settings.
Technology
Together with two colleagues, I founded Entelios in 2010. I am a serial entre-
preneur who worked for quite a number of years in strategy consulting. I 
studied electrical engineering as well as business administration, among other 
subjects, at the University of Mannheim. I also worked in robotics and auto-
mation and did my MBA at the Sloan School of Management at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). While I was at MIT, in 2008, I was 
in search of a new business model that would fascinate me. I was given the 
opportunity to co-design and help organise a course called ‘Energy Ventures’ 
at MIT. For this course, we invited numerous CEOs from the energy sector 
and analysed where new business opportunities could emerge. Among the 
CEOs we invited was Tim Healy, the co-founder of the US company Ener-
NOC. EnerNOC has existed since 2001 and went public in 2007. During 
his lecture, Healy introduced us to the concept of Demand Response. In his 
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business model, he pools and aggregates the flexibility of industry players to 
increase or reduce their electricity demand – and also their supply, in case 
those industrial players have distributed energy resources (many have, not 
only for backup purposes). By selling these modifications in demand to the 
grid operator, EnerNOC financially compensates the companies that partici-
pate in the Demand Response scheme.
Business model
After my return to Europe in winter 2008/09, I had numerous discussions 
about the idea of setting up a similar business with established players in the 
energy industry. When I intend to launch a new business, I do not start it 
by developing new software. Rather, I sign a contract with a larger indus-
try player fairly early in the process. I present the idea and key milestones, 
which may be discussed with industry partners, but de facto I expect that 
the financial foundation of the new venture will be solid by then. For me, 
having customers early on is essential! If they are willing to pay, that is close 
to a ‘proof of concept’. With this approach, a start-up does not depend just 
on classic bootstrapping, in particular financial support from business angels 
and venture capital funds.
Stadtwerke München, the municipal utility of Munich, decided fairly early 
on that they wanted to head in the same direction as proposed in my idea. 
They were already operating a ‘virtual power plant’ (VPP), in their case a cer-
tain number of small power-generation units (Netzersatzanlagen), which they 
combined into a larger, virtual generation plant. For their VPP, they used gen-
eration units that they already had, colloquially speaking, in their backyards. 
We presented the idea to them, in particular the idea of targeting industry and 
commercial players, and convinced them. They then became our first indus-
try partner. Of course, we later received support from venture capital funds, 
but most important for me was that we were able to convince a large industry 
player of our business idea, and Stadtwerke München had already signed a con-
tract before we even approached venture capitalists.
We then talked to the transmission grid operators and convinced them that 
our ideas have a solid and beneficial basis. It certainly helped us that the busi-
ness model was already established in the United States and that Stadtwerke 
München supported us. For one year, we developed our software in collabora-
tion with Stadtwerke München as our partner. We did the first tests together 
with Stadtwerke München and the transmission grid operators. We also coop-
erated with the Forschungsstelle für Energiewirtschaft in Munich, one of the 
oldest German institutes doing research on energy efficiency. They helped us to 
comply with all technical standards and regulations. After one year, we received 
the necessary certificates, accreditations, and the approval that all of our opera-
tions were in compliance with the so-called transmission code, which sets the 
standard for the German market.
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We sell our Demand Response product on the market for balancing energy. 
This market had been traditionally dominated by large generating units oper-
ated by established energy players. Then we came along and intended to do the 
same, but with hundreds of small entities (distributed energy assets) that we 
combined. They are aggregated with customised software – up to the precision 
of one minute – and are in compliance with the requirements of the transmis-
sion grid operators.
This took us two years. During that process, we received the first Series A of 
venture capital. We had a lead investor from the Netherlands, plus the High-
Tech Gründer Fonds – the largest early-stage investment fund in  Germany – 
and a business angel from the Netherlands. This combination gave us a financial 
boost, but it took two additional years to become operational because we had 
to overcome numerous hurdles, most of them related to the complexity of the 
regulatory context.
The key question for business models in the so-called Smart Grid space 
always is: Who pays for the products or services provided? Demand Response 
encompasses three types of decentralised energy assets, which provide flex-
ibility for the electricity system – either generating units, energy-consuming 
devices such as lighting, or energy storage, which can be conventional galvanic 
elements, that is, batteries, but also other types of storage. For example, an alu-
minium producer may have the flexibility to control its production of alumin-
ium blocks, which are, to some extent, stored energy.
Many contracts are needed to deal with the transactions that occur in Demand 
Response. Ultimately, we take flexibility in energy consumption or production 
from one player in the market and give it to another one. In this process, we 
have to negotiate contracts with our industry partners, of course, but also with 
operators of the high-voltage transmission grid and the lower-voltage distribu-
tion grids, as well as the administrative unit in charge of the regional balancing 
processes (Bilanzkreisverantwortlichen). With each of these partners, four to five 
contracts have to be signed individually, which adds a certain degree of com-
plexity to the process.53
Paulaner Brauerei, a traditional Munich brewery that belongs to the Schör-
ghuber Corporate Group, was already active in corporate social responsibil-
ity and pursued a strategy of environmental awareness and protection. Hence, 
they also agreed to become our first major corporate client. We took their assets 
and connected them with our software. The contracts that we formulated with 
them later served as a reference for other clients. We took one company from 
an industry sector, such as Paulaner, and with that reference it was easier to 
approach their industry peers.
 53 Since the interview took place, new processes have been established that have sim-
plified and improved the legal procedures. 
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Not all industry sectors are equally attractive. The most difficult case was 
the chemicals industry. Processes there are already highly automated. Tiny 
changes in temperature can completely distort a chemical process. We went 
into an intense dialogue with industry players to find flexibilities. For example, 
a heating system based on oil or natural gas can be transformed into a bivalent 
process, with electricity as an alternative energy source. Excess electricity can 
then be absorbed by the system at short notice by switching the energy source 
from oil to electricity or gas to electricity. The companies became aware that 
just through minor modifications of a heating system they could have annual 
revenues of around €20,000 up to €80,000 per MW. It then took another three 
months to modify the facilities. In some cases, we also took over the costs to 
accelerate the process. With these incentives, we eventually also convinced 
players in the chemicals industry.
After six to seven years of actively promoting Demand Response, the indus-
try eventually started to change its mindset. Even some of Germany’s very large 
industrial electricity consumers are now interested in flexibility options and 
new business models. They want to actively engage in the energy transforma-
tion and earn money with flexibility services so that they can remain competi-
tive with their core products on the global market.
Money to build a company is easily made available as long as there is a mean-
ingful business model. It is not easy in the electricity sector because it is such 
a highly regulated market. There are many established players. For example, 
municipal utilities are currently in the process of redefining their strategies. 
Large utilities used to earn their money by selling electricity as a commod-
ity. This has largely disappeared. Final customers are moving towards energy 
autarky and one day may no longer want a connection to the grid. Medium-
sized companies are installing decentralised generation units in their back-
yards, such as small combined heat and power generation (CHP) units.
We moved into two strategic directions: On the one hand, as an independent 
aggregator, which is a completely new role in the market; on the other hand, we 
are a service provider with our software for larger utilities. We call it ‘Demand 
Response As a Service’. In the first line of business, we directly approach indus-
trial customers and aggregate their flexibility potential. In the second, we have 
software and a back end that we call the Network Operation Center (NOC). 
Traditionally, large utilities are not used to thinking in terms of megabytes. For 
them, it was always ‘make’, sometimes ‘buy’ – but hardly ever ‘lease’. Software as 
a service was not part of their mindset.
3.5.2 Scaling and cooperations
We have identified the top five industry sectors in Germany, including alu-
minium, silicon, chemicals industry, paper production, and breweries. We are 
looking for industries with a high degree of automation and annual electricity 
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consumption of more than 10 to 20 GWh. The top management CXO suite 
has to be aligned behind the idea because support of the procurement, where 
electricity purchases traditionally have been located in the organisation, is not 
enough. We have to convince the CEO, the operating managers of the facilities, 
and the CFO.
All facilities that have decentralised generation units, such as industry parks, 
are potential clients of ours, too. Water supply is also interesting because of the 
pump systems. There are hundreds of pumps, similar to gas pipelines. One has 
to become creative.
Scaling
We established one reference company in each relevant industry sector and 
then convinced their peers as well (reference selling).
We could build upon, to some extent, the established role model in the United 
States, but they have a different approach. Across the Atlantic, the main driver 
used to be the prevention of blackouts and brownouts, whereas in the German 
context, the driver is the integration of renewable energies and the mitigation 
of the volatility of those renewable energy sources.
In future energy systems, energy procurement will still have its role. Imagine 
a company that outsources its entire energy management. Energy Intelligent 
Software (EIS) is the key, and we can provide all services regarding procure-
ment, efficiency, Demand Response, and billing end-to-end. It is not a core 
competence of industry players to deal with energy procurement, although 
many became experts in that as well.
In the energy-intensive industry, for example paper production, it makes 
sense to have an energy procurement unit. They sometimes even have dedi-
cated trading floors. But for many other industries, it does not make any sense 
to entertain such a trading unit; they could easily outsource it. In the United 
States, we approach clients and suggest taking over these functions, or we pro-
vide adequate experts from our side who are either dedicated to one player or 
a pool of players.
Multinational companies receive hundreds of energy bills. We offer a solution 
that manages all of these contracts and matches the actual consumption with the 
billing processes. We currently have roughly 1 to 1.5 billion data entries in our 
IT centre every month. That is a Big Data business model. We see a company’s 
options for flexibility on a granular level that companies would typically not be 
able to see themselves. We can detect patterns in the energy consumption of par-
ticular energy assets, which gives us the transparency to predict how the device 
will behave at a specific hour of a specific day. When thousands of those pieces 
of information are combined into an aggregated flexibility package, the package 
can be sold. But we can also do predictive maintenance because probabilities in 
forecasting are high. If a device behaves in a strange way, that may be a hint that 
there is a planned or forced maintenance event, or even a shutdown or malfunc-
tion. One could add many business models on top of Demand Response.
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Currently, our most important challenge is to grow in the area of software 
and IT. On a global scale, there is no real software that provides a full-fledged 
end-to-end solution in energy management that is similar to solutions for cus-
tomer relations management or sales management. In this field, we want to 
position ourselves in the large enterprise segment. It is our objective to organi-
cally grow in this field.
Cooperations
Energy utilities are still sufficiently well-endowed to acquire companies and 
their proprietary technologies. Acquisition activities occur in cycles. Investors 
behave like lemmings: If a Demand Response provider is acquired, many other 
players in the same industry try to acquire similar companies. Our competi-
tor in France was acquired by Schneider Electric; another competitor from 
Austria and Slovenia was bought by a Japanese company; a Scottish company 
was acquired by a Swiss player. Then large industry players such as Siemens 
and General Electric became aware and also wanted to become active in this 
field, in particular to complement their activities in the Smart Grid. We were 
approached by the industry. We had one offer that we considered as not being 
sufficient, so we employed a boutique M&A consultancy to prepare our com-
pany for a potential takeover and invited a larger circle of potential acquirers. 
We realised that there are fundamental differences between the cultures of dif-
ferent companies. We had to ask ourselves whether we just wanted to become 
a business unit in a large multinational company with a workforce of 100,000 
employees. It might then not be clear whether we would still be an independent 
business unit in one or two years.
By contrast, EnerNOC has Demand Response as their core business model, 
so it was a win-win. My management board gave me the freedom to decide 
who to partner with. Obviously, we also had many discussions about who was 
the ‘right’ partner. EnerNOC had tried to enter the Demand Response mar-
ket in mainland Europe, maybe because they were too fast and somehow too 
‘American’ in approaching, for example, traditional German utilities. How-
ever, they successfully entered the markets in the United Kingdom, Australia, 
New Zealand, and even South Korea. In addition, they had a very similar cor-
porate culture and mindset, and we knew them a bit already. The story was 
just right.
Since the acquisition, the software aspects have become more important. 
When we were on our own, we did not have the entire software suite, which 
enables us to provide end-to-end energy management for our clients. We had 
software that was, in my opinion, world-class in terms of Demand Response. In 
other regions of the world, Demand Response is much slower and has longer 
lead times before it kicks in. Our software was much faster, which is why we 
were also attractive for EnerNOC, but we did not have all the other elements. 
If we sell a Demand Response product to a company, we are asked very quickly 
whether we can also help in other aspects of energy management. One of our 
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competitors that was acquired by Schneider Electric one year before us already 
had the whole software suite after the acquisition. It became a difficult situation 
thereafter from the perspective of competitiveness.
We also had a partnership with E.ON. But when a large player like E.ON 
joins forces with a start-up like ourselves, it is somehow also a proof of concept 
that our business model and our software solution are leading edge. Depending 
on the pre-defined milestones to be achieved, we also received financial sup-
port from them. The collaboration was handled mainly by E.ON’s sales unit, 
but sales are driven by the personal objectives of each key account manager to 
sell more power and gas, and Demand Response is just a small side product 
that only makes a marginal contribution to their target agreements. It takes 
time to establish that process and to formulate the templates for the contracts – 
often more time than a start-up actually has. We had to see success at a faster 
pace. It helped us to learn how to make our product more complete.
Now we have a sales unit for the utilities, and we have key account manag-
ers for individual industries, such as the paper industry. I am looking for sales 
managers who have access to CXO suites and a track record in high-level sales, 
someone with expertise in electric devices and a successful sales profile.
Energy utilities are scared of what could happen if Entelios ceases to exist. 
For instance, they would have liked to acquire Entelios shares, but I wanted 
us to be able to provide services also to their competitors in the future. None-
theless, we had to cooperate closely with larger utilities. In one instance, we 
were very disappointed when a player then tried to copy our product. But we 
had long-term cooperations with faithful players such as Dong from Denmark, 
Verbund from Austria, BKW from Switzerland, and the Stadtwerke München. 
They realised that they would not be able to manage the energy transformation 
by owning all the intellectual property and software, and they made efforts to 
find partners with whom they could jointly develop new products and services. 
Together, we have to build an ecosystem and a peer-to-peer landscape.
It is unclear where Entelios fits into the organisational structure of a tradi-
tional utility: The sales units have contact with the end-customers, but there are 
also the generation unit, the innovation department, and the trading unit that 
would potentially fit. Utilities did not know where to position us because we 
provide a product for the market for balancing energy and managing the con-
sumption as well as the production of energy assets, hence we should belong to 
the generation unit. But we also do trading, and we directly approach the final 
customers in the industry and aggregate their flexibilities in energy consump-
tion and production.
Fairly early in the process it became clear that we should be linked to the sales 
department if we wanted to be successful. For the sales personnel of a utility, 
who have been selling energy over decades, it is difficult to sell the opposite – a 
reduction in energy, which is a ‘totally different animal’. In the beginning, only 
very few sales managers were willing and demonstrated the ‘mental flexibility’ 
to focus on the new concept of Demand Response.
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Interestingly, large utilities launched spinoffs, new ventures that were 100 per 
cent owned, of course, by the utilities, with some internal but also external staff 
that were targeted directly for developing new business models for the energy 
transformation. I believe this is the right way. Those who have always worked 
in the old energy world have had a harder time imagining that their old world 
may one day completely disappear. Few understood that customers had to be 
approached in a completely new way.
For example, an industrial client may want to launch a new product. All the 
equipment that concerns building efficiency, energy provision, and all the tech-
nical details may no longer belong to its core competencies and strategy. When 
we started, municipal utilities did not have the idea of building and/or provid-
ing services, for example for a combined heat and power (CHP) unit and leas-
ing it to their industrial clients. In contrast, where would a municipal utility 
earn its money with an increasing number of residential customers who do 
not need a grid connection, because they have become energy self-sufficient? 
Utilities need to think of new business models. For example, municipal utilities 
could build new housing units and equip them with all energy-related technol-
ogy, including PV panels, heat pumps, and all other elements of building effi-
ciency. That utility may then no longer charge for electricity or gas, but rather 
a fixed, all-inclusive rent for the individual flats or housing units. A frontrun-
ner for those novel concepts is the Freiberg Institut (www.freiberg-institut.de/), 
under the leadership of Dr Timo Leukefeld.
3.5.3 Market outlook and competitive environment
Imagine walking into an industry player’s facilities and telling the management: 
From now on, I want to steer and control your assets. Then all sorts of resist-
ance emerges. For example, the people in charge claim that their facilities are 
already highly energy-efficient. Companies also raised questions about the reli-
ability of our operations, what would happen if we damaged their assets, and 
how much we really earned with our business model.
It is a paradigm shift. For more than 100 years, supply just matched demand, 
but now supply has become increasingly volatile with the deployment of 
renewable energies. When the wind blows at 4 am, residential customers 
are still asleep and industrial processes have not yet commenced. Today, the 
wind rotors have to be shut down, but in the future, we will explore oppor-
tunities to temporarily store the power. For example, at 4 am, all air pressure 
compressors (Luftdruckkompressoren) in Germany could be filled with air. 
Compressed air just acts as an intelligent storage device, similar to a block of 
aluminium or silicon.
The emerging business of aggregators managing flexibility and the under-
lying energy assets are typically active in biomass with small, decentralised 
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generation units, but they are operating in a completely different business 
model. We have observed large revenues but small profit margins. There are 
indeed already three larger aggregators that are active in load management 
and storage. An upsell is difficult for these assets. Selling additional ser-
vices to a rural community with biomass assets is difficult. We decided that 
we would not head into this direction, but instead focus on industry and 
commercial businesses.
In our nascent industry, competition is very healthy because it gives the 
impression to potential clients that there is an attractive market, and in the end 
the overall size of the market increases.
In the United States, establishing a new business model takes less time than 
in Europe. When brownouts were looming, people literally called large con-
sumers via telephone to shut down parts of their assets. They were much more 
pragmatic than here in Germany. Demand Response in the United States works 
via email, text messaging, and call centres, as opposed to our highly automated 
system in Europe. Second, politicians very quickly embraced the concept, and 
the US Congress ratified a Demand Response action plan, which led to a modi-
fication of the sector’s regulations and legislation. With this move, the role of 
the market aggregator became legally accepted. Third, large associations were 
founded, and lobbying activities were more pronounced.
In Germany, we have to be grateful to some extent to the Green Party for 
promoting renewable energies. But we could also blame them for not having 
thought about the wider system, for example adequate storage solutions, trans-
mission lines running north to south, and the reinforcement of the grids. It 
was a mono-dimensional approach, and now we have a transformation (Ener-
giewende) with huge flaws and ineffective markets. Above all, the self-imposed 
CO2 reduction targets cannot be achieved.
When we talk with associations about municipal utilities, they recognise the 
value of our business model, but they do not want to actively push it because 
they want to allow their subsidiaries to develop their own technologies and 
become market-ready.
In Brussels, we co-founded the Smart Energy Demand Coalition (SEDC, 
which is now Smart Energy Europe, www.smarten.eu), together with other 
innovative energy players and stakeholders. The former EU commissioner for 
energy, Günter Oettinger, quickly grasped the benefits of Demand Response. 
Not long thereafter, Demand Response was part of the energy-efficiency guide-
lines of the European Commission. In Germany, back then in 2014/2015, this 
had not yet been implemented into national regulations. This was probably 
because Germany had so many other questions to deal with on a national level, 
but it is clear that a further expansion of renewable energies – combined with 
a shutdown of all nuclear assets by 2022 and all coal plants by 2030 – without 
Demand Response will face challenges in terms of a stable supply situation. If 
no wind or sun are available, we have to have a backup option for the domestic 
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baseload of around 80 GW. Alternatively, we would have to install adequate 
storage capacity – but where should this come from?
Renewable energies cannot yet completely substitute for traditional power 
plants. In particular, we are lacking the transmission lines to transport elec-
tricity from the north to the south, but more importantly, we do not have 
sufficient storage capacity. One could imagine the gas grid with power-to-gas, 
or Demand Response, or stationary grid-scale batteries, or even batteries for 
residential households, as it is currently evolving in the United States. We 
need all these options, but we should have started much earlier, developed a 
comprehensive plan, thought about these options, and pursued R&D activi-
ties in these fields. We should have been focussing on these topics since the 
late 1990s.
In the United States, large electric utilities claimed that Demand Response 
is a retail-oriented business model, but it operates with wholesale prices. The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) allowed Demand Response 
to participate in wholesale markets, but some states claimed that this was 
beyond the FERC’s authority. But the US Supreme Court decided in favour 
of the FERC’s order. In January 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States 
announced that it sided with EnerNOC and the FERC in the case of EPSA v 
FERC. This gave EnerNOC a boost of confidence, which was reflected in its 
stock prices: It fell to US$4 and then rose again by 70 per cent on the day of 
the Court decision. If the Court had decided against us, a large portion of our 
portfolio would not have been able to participate in the capacity markets, and a 
large part of our cash flow would have been at risk.
3.5.4 Interviewee biography 
Oliver Stahl was founder and CEO of Entelios 
AG (www.entelios.com), and later, after the 
acquisition of EnerNOC, Managing Director 
Europe for EnerNOC. He still serves as Senior 
Executive Advisor to the company. Since April 
2017, he has been CEO and co-founder of 
Robotise (www.robotise.eu), a start-up whose 
mission is to introduce service robots into peo-
ple‘s everyday lives.
Oliver is a serial entrepreneur and was also 
a management consultant in a global consult-
ing firm for several years. He is co-founder and a board member at SEDC, Smart 
Energy Europe (www.smarten.eu), a European industry association with more 
than 50 member companies with a focus on Demand Response, demand-side 
management, and energy efficiency.
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Oliver started his career as an electrical engineer in the area of industrial auto-
mation and robotics. He studied business administration and educational science 
at the University of Mannheim, then at Loyola University and Northwestern Uni-
versity in Chicago. In 2008 he became a Sloan Fellow and received an MBA degree 
from MIT Sloan School of Management.
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3.6 SOLshare: decentralised energy supply – complementary 
or antagonistic to rural electrification
Interview with Sebastian Groh, Co-founder of SOLshare, on January 9, 2017
SOLshare is a Bangladeshi Ltd. ICT company founded in 2015 that has cre-
ated a revolutionary new approach to bring affordable solar electricity to eve-
ryone in Bangladesh and beyond through its peer-to-peer solar energy trading 
platforms. SOLshare is at the brink of creating the next generation of electric-
ity grids. The social enterprise pioneers a micro-energy transition model 3.0 
interconnecting solar home systems, monetising (excess) solar energy along 
the value chain in real time with mobile money, and empowering communities 
to earn a direct income from the sun (SOLshare 2018).
3.6.1 Technology and business model
In 2009 I started working at MicroEnergy International, a Berlin-based con-
sultancy specialised in decentralised energy services. We first looked at sharing 
electricity from an academic perspective. I did my dissertation on the topic of 
innovation and energy service supply along certain development processes as 
an economist, and a colleague of mine made contributions from an engineering 
point of view. We basically found two things. First, when a solar home system 
is designed, there is a trade-off between the rainy season and dry season. This 
means that either the battery has sufficient capacity to capture all of the power 
generated by the panel (but then it will never be fully charged during the rainy 
season), or a smaller battery is provided, albeit with the disadvantage of it never 
reaching full autonomy during the rainy season. After two days of constant 
rain, the system will go offline. In Bangladesh, we would like to have at least 
three days of full autonomy. We had to settle on somewhere in the middle. That 
also implies that around 30 per cent of what the panel could produce over the 
year cannot be stored by the battery and goes unused, which is 600,000 kWh 
daily! That is the equivalent of driving a Tesla Model S 68 times around the 
globe every day. There is a massive potential available across almost five million 
solar home systems just in Bangladesh.
Our second observation was that there were already lots of people shar-
ing their electricity, for example by going to a neighbour and asking them to 
charge a phone, or there was someone who did this on a commercial basis and 
took a certain fee for that. But we also saw people connecting their house-
holds with cables to their neighbours and paying per hour of light bulb use. 
They had to monitor this at all times, though. Translating these fees into kil-
owatt hours opened our eyes: from US$3.50 up to US$10 per kWh is what 
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we economists call the energy-poverty penalty, and what we entrepreneurs 
call a massive market opportunity. Combining these two insights creates an 
opportunity in which everybody can win. People are willing to share and pay 
for power, and there is excess electricity available. Plus, there are still many 
households that cannot afford a solar home system, despite the micro-credit 
schemes. However, the sharing scheme can be designed to be inclusive enough 
to make it affordable for them as well, while turning other prosumers into local 
energy entrepreneurs.
In Bangladesh, there is an extremely high density of these solar home sys-
tems. Our idea was to connect these systems and, based on the connections, to 
increase overall capacity through synergy effects. At the same time, in order to 
achieve a certain level of diversification, we would tap into the unused 30 per 
cent potential. We started from this idea and called it ‘swarm’ electrification, 
in which the swarm is more powerful than the individual unit and we would 
have peer-to-peer communication. Each system speaks to the next system. If 
one system drops out, nothing happens – a fairly resilient model. In contrast to 
a conventional mini-grid, which has a determined system size, our model can 
also grow organically.
If we interconnect solar home systems and incrementally add more genera-
tion and storage sources, we will have a much better business case because our 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) is limited to the cabling from house to house, 
as well as to a bi-directional metre, which we call the SOLbox. It essentially 
works as a net metre. Whenever a household is a net consumer, its balance 
decrease – not in kilowatt hours, but in Taka, the Bangladeshi currency. When-
ever a household is a net producer, the balance increases. The balance is directly 
mirrored on the mobile phone in a mobile money wallet. Then that money can 
be used in real time for payments of all sorts, not just energy. That is the biggest 
value proposition for our customers.
Technology
We develop the SOLbox in Bangladesh. Then we have a couple of suppliers 
in China from whom we order the printed PCBs (circuit boards). We pro-
duce the case in Dhaka and also do the assembling and testing there. Because 
of the evolution of the sector over the last 15 years, the local workforce is 
well-prepared.
The cabling and the WiFi tower should be covered by the membership fees. 
The partner organisations (POs) can get much better rates than us to purchase 
the cables due to their good relationships with the suppliers. We tell them when 
something is needed, then they buy it themselves and recover their costs, plus 
a margin via their subscription fees.
From the perspective of maintenance, our system is slightly more compli-
cated than the average system. We have developed a training-of-the-trainer 
concept: We are training the regional managers of the POs to then train 
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Figure 26: SOLshare’s field operations team providing technical support.
Source: SOLshare (2017).
Figure 27: Production facilities in Dhaka.
Source: SOLshare (2017).
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their staff – also in terms of marketing. They recommend that people get a 
mobile wallet if they do not already have one in order to avoid having cash 
in the field.
Business model
The Bangladeshi solar home system sector really started in 2002/2003 with the 
launch of the Infrastructure Development Company Limited (IDCOL), the 
governing body of the programme, which is under the Bangladeshi Ministry 
of Finance. Since then, around US$750 million of development finance money 
has gone into the sector, all channelled through the IDCOL to bolster the eco-
system of solar home supply. Up until 2016, more than 4 million solar home 
systems had been installed.
We basically run a mixed business model that has B2B and B2C elements. 
Our first customers were the implementers of solar home systems. We piggy-
back on the existing infrastructure and cooperate with more than 50 partner 
organisations of the IDCOL, which provide both technology and financial 
credit to the customers in a one-hand model. Over the last 15 years, the World 
Bank and other institutions have given loans at very low interest rates to the 
IDCOL, which passes it on to the POs at a slightly higher interest rate. The POs 
then provide two- to three-year loan contracts to the end-users at an interest 
rate of 8 to 12 per cent.
Our SOLbox is an additional component of their solar home systems. We sell 
it to the POs, for example Grameen Shakti or Bright Green Energy Foundation, 
among others – the former being the biggest PO with more than 1.7 million 
systems currently installed. The PO then integrates it into their solar home sys-
tems. We also retrofit (upgrade) existing systems, but always in cooperation 
with a PO.
Our revenue stream is threefold. We first have a margin on the SOLbox, 
which we sell to the POs. Secondly, similar to an Uber business model, we take 
a fee for every transaction. When neighbour A transfers money to neighbour 
B, there is a spread, and this money goes into our mobile wallet. This is the 
B2C component of our business model. However, we share this fee with the 
POs – also to give them an incentive to keep the grid running and encourage 
further expansion.
The third revenue stream is a fee for managing the grid, which the POs trans-
fer to us. They can decide by themselves how to charge the customers for this 
service. As we have WiFi towers in the villages, our SOLboxes communicate 
with the WiFi towers. We did not want to integrate a GSM chip into each box, 
which would have turned out to be too expensive. The WiFi tower is the sin-
gle point of communication to us. With this technology, we can monitor at all 
times how much electricity is being generated as well as how much is being 
consumed and traded. With this information, we can determine which appli-
ances are being used and which other appliances could be used with more 
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generation capacity or more storage capacity. These diagnostics and analytics 
are sold as a service package to the partner organisations.
Typically in mini-grids, there is a connection or subscription fee, which is 
either one-off or recurrent. Together with the POs, we are still looking for the 
optimal business case. Still, a lot of people need to be convinced that they can 
earn money with their solar home systems. The general understanding is that it 
is purely a consumptive good, but suddenly we have turned it into a productive 
good. Second, it is a connectivity good that we are pitching – together with the 
POs – to the end-users.
If a residential customer buys a new system, it costs about US$360 over the 
period of a 36 month loan. That is US$10 per month (ignoring interest to make 
it simple). The SOLbox is sold for US$24 to the PO. The PO then puts a 20 
to 30 per cent margin on top. We calculate a recommended end-user price of 
around US$30, which is less than a dollar per month of additional expenses. If 
customers sell 1 kWh for US$2 each month, they make a net profit from month 
one onwards. Obviously, it cannot be guaranteed that they will actually sell a 
kilowatt hour each month. Maybe when they want to sell, nobody will want 
to buy. To take that into account, we put a buffer system into the village – like 
a micro-utility, where the electricity is buffered. We then connected a water 
pump to the buffer system, which is a nice load because the water pumping 
can take place during the day and not so much in the evenings. The electricity 
Figure 28: The SOLbox.
Source: SOLshare (2017).
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can also be used for alternative devices such as corn shellers or rice cutters. 
Recently, we launched our first pitstop solar rickshaw charging stations, where 
rickshaw drivers can charge their vehicles during their lunch or tea breaks. In 
the evening this pays off, as they can ride their rickshaws an extra hour before 
they have to make their way to the closest national grid point.
In the traditional ABC mini-grid model (anchor, businesses, community) 
everything is designed for a specific anchor, usually an outside investment, 
which eventually takes out the return at some point. By contrast, in our sys-
tem the grid is designed for the community. The community grows its own 
capacity to power anchors, and the returns stay within the community as well. 
So one could refer to it as a reverse ABC model. An average household in 
Bangladesh earns between €50 and €100 per month, the ‘rich poor’ in the vil-
lages, plus around €1.50 from selling electricity. But we are targeting micro-
entrepreneurs: Knowing that one can earn money with our installations, local 
residents install extra panels and make additional profits. The price per panel 
is very cheap, meaning that one can make a lot more money. As a reference 
point, a kilo of rice costs about €0.50. With three to four kilograms of rice, one 
can get quite far.
We also have a second product. It is our retrofitting model from post-paid 
to pre-paid, which we call the SOLcontrol. There is a payment crisis in Bang-
ladesh, which means the repayments on loans for the solar home systems have 
significantly plummeted; repayment rates have dropped from up to 95 per cent 
Figure 29: The SOLcontrol.
Source: SOLshare (2017).
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down to 30 per cent. We are targeting this with two actions. In existing systems, 
we can easily retrofit them from post-paid to pre-paid to make them pay-as-
you-go. We are thereby trying to help the POs to keep their good customers so 
that they do not – through a domino effect – become bad customers, and to 
help them turn some bad customers into good customers. Enforcement is also 
better if we can electronically lock the system rather than go into the village and 
uninstall the systems, which is in most cases not happening anyway.
The SOLcontrol is a good learning case for supplying 150 households in the 
first month, and 5000 in the following months. We will grow with this expe-
rience, because, together with the SOLbox, the business model will become 
more complex. We are diversifying our business model every day and really 
have to simplify and focus. We have a lot of options in terms of pricing, but we 
have not found the optimal model yet. Maybe we will scale up with a different 
 pricing model.
3.6.2 History and organisation
SOLshare, located in Dhaka, Bangladesh, is a spinoff of MicroEnergy Interna-
tional, a Berlin-based consultancy specialised in decentralised energy services. 
The foundation was set through the Stanford Ignite Program in 2013, when I 
pitched the idea of swarm electrification for the first time, and the first business 
plan for SOLshare was developed. I was later joined by Hannes Kirchhoff, our 
CTO, and Daniel Ciganovich, our Director of Business Development, my two 
co-founders. In September 2015 SOLshare managed to install the world’s first 
cyber-physical solar peer-to-peer sharing grid in a remote Bangladeshi village.
3.6.3 Scaling
After having set up our first 10 grids throughout the country, we recently 
received the US$1 million UN DESA Powering the Future We Want prize in 
collaboration with Grameen Shakti. With the help of this prize, we are deter-
mined to set the foundation to interconnect the maximum amount of Grameen 
Shakti’s 1.7 million solar home systems in the upcoming years and also expand 
beyond the borders of Bangladesh, possibly even to Europe.
A major challenge here in Bangladesh is an aggressive approach for grid 
extension, indiscriminate of the associated costs. Electrification costs highly 
depend on the distance of how far the grid needs to expand to the next house-
hold and the associated load pattern. When we start interconnecting houses 
with cables, the closest house to the national grid could be the point of com-
mon coupling, that is, the one node that connects to the grid. In our R&D, we 
have built a Gridbox, which could potentially serve this purpose. The Grid-
box is something like a Smart Metre or a bigger SOLbox, but with additional 
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functionalities, such as converting the electricity from AC to DC and lower-
ing the voltage. In addition, it could control the entire network connected to 
it. The government would then only have to connect to the point of common 
coupling. What is behind the cable infrastructure has already been developed 
by us. The only problem is that the tariffs of the SOLshare grid are significantly 
higher than the subsidised tariffs of the national grid. We have to do a compara-
tive study on the costs of electrifying additional houses versus connecting just 
the point of common coupling and then paying the gap between the two tariffs 
to the connected households. That certainly depends on the distance, but it may 
be a commercially viable alternative. In Bangladesh, the range of DC appli-
ances are being expanded every year. Light bulbs, TVs, fans, and now fridges 
are available in high-efficiency direct current. Water pumps, rice cutters, and 
corn shellers can all run on DC. What can the national grid offer these people 
that is better than if we managed to fully electrify them on DC and on solar 
home systems?
If we connected households with the point of common coupling, the national 
grid company would have to compensate us for building the local grid infra-
structure. But this money does not have to come to us. It can go directly to the 
households and could even be a direct cash transfer.
We do not need the national grid. As our network can grow dynamically, 
we can incrementally add more capacity if we observe that there is more 
demand. We can then approach the households and suggest adding capac-
ity, with which they can earn a lot of money. The entrepreneurial drive and 
financial incentive provided by our platform should be sufficiently strong to 
let the grid grow organically. From the feed-in perspective, the grid could 
be quite attractive, though. At times, it could be used as a buffer, and when 
it encounters problems, one could switch off all the connected households 
with just one node. It often occurs that when the grid is down and then starts 
running again, it immediately crashes because all households still have their 
switches on and the whole load affects the grid’s stability. If the grid is down 
and then is switched on again, we can manage that gradually and thereby 
increase system stability.
The biggest challenge is getting aligned with the utilities and the government. 
The medium-term vision may depend on the aggressive rollout of the national 
grid. We plan our grid by giving people the financial incentive to make their 
local grid self-sufficient.
We can put our infrastructure on any system, including the low-cost modules 
of Chinese PV manufacturers. The appliances for the solar home systems are 
available everywhere in Bangladesh. Of course, if we build it on a poor-quality 
system, the question is: How long will it last? It is half the cost of a system 
provided by the IDCOL. It is available commercially and quick to install. One 
would not get any warranty. A recent World Resources Institute study showed 
that prices in Bangladesh are already very low compared to other countries, 
especially in East Africa, and the battery comes with a five-year warranty.
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3.6.4 International expansion
Since winning a couple of awards with our concept in 2016 and 2017, we have 
been receiving numerous requests from all over the world. In principle, we are 
interested – but not right now. First, we have to carve out a solid business model 
here in Bangladesh: For the SOLcontrol it is done, but for the SOLbox it has not 
yet fully proven itself. Once we have that, we can start expanding to other coun-
tries. Of course, we have to take other factors such as population density into 
account. Would it then also be a B2B model, or rather B2C? Is there already a 
network of solar home systems that we can piggyback on, or do we need to start 
in a greenfield environment?
Cooperations and new technology developments
Our financial partner for the money wallet is bKash – the largest mobile money 
provider in the world, among others – which has recently surpassed M-Kopa 
in transaction volumes. Mobile money means that customers have their mobile 
money on their phones. bKash agents are present all across the country and 
have small stores where customers can charge their phones and make pay-
ments. We set up one wallet for these people, which we call the ‘energy wallet’. 
Some people also call our system ‘the energy bank’. One time a rural woman 
approached us and said that she really liked our system, but what she was miss-
ing was knowing how much money (!) was in her battery. That is a typical asset 
calculation approach. It is amazing to see how people in remote areas of Bang-
ladesh have now started to realise that electricity now equals money for them. 
In urban Dhaka, we are far from that.
Recently, we have started to look into blockchain technology and the degree 
to which we could reap the benefits. We are collaborating with freeelio and the 
German Blockchain Association to develop a tokenisation model. We are set-
ting up a programme label: Energy Efficiency in Germany for Energy Access 
in Bangladesh, where utilities or private consumers can decide to transfer their 
money from electricity savings directly onto the metre of the Smart Metres in 
the SOLgrids in Bangladesh. This will become the most transparent, efficient, 
and safe way to make a conditional cash transfer to a developing country.
3.6.5 Market outlook and competitive environment
In Bangladesh, the rollout of the national grid was very aggressive. We did a 
study of 350 households in rural areas: Half of them were connected to the 
national grid and the other half were close by, but without access to the grid. 
The result was that the solar home system provided a significantly better elec-
tricity service than the national grid, based on the multi-peer framework for 
measuring energy access, as developed by the World Bank. Quality of access 
here is measured against multiple attributes such as capacity, affordability, 
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safety, reliability, and so forth. The national grid performed so poorly because 
of its reliability. The key indicator was the number of hours of available electric-
ity between 6 pm and 10 pm. During these hours, the national grid often suf-
fered from load-shedding in the rural areas investigated. What we observed on 
the ground is that if politicians promise households that they will be connected 
to the grid very soon, it is close to impossible to convince them to consider 
any alternative form of electricity supply. By contrast, with households that are 
already connected to the national grid and have had their experiences with 
it, we have a good chance because they know they need a backup – or even a 
complementary – system.
3.6.6 Interviewee biography
Dr Sebastian Groh is a 2013 Stanford Ignite 
Fellow from the Stanford Graduate School 
of Business (USA) and holds a PhD from 
Aalborg University (Denmark) and the 
Postgraduate School Microenergy Systems 
at the Technische Universität Berlin, where 
he wrote his thesis on the role of energy in 
development processes, energy poverty, and 
technical innovations. He has published a 
book and multiple journal articles on the 
topic of decentralised electrification in the 
Global South. Since 2014, Dr Groh has been working as the CEO and co-founder 
of SOLshare Ltd. and is an assistant professor at the Business School of North 
South University in Dhaka (Bangladesh).
On behalf of SOLshare, he received the Intersolar Award for Outstanding 
Solar Businesses, the UN Momentum for Change Award, both in 2016, as well 
as the 2017 Start-Up Energy Transition Award from the German Energy Agency 
(DENA) and the 2017 UN DESA Powering the Future We Want US$1 million 
Energy Grant, along with Grameen Shakti from Bangladesh. Dr Groh was further 
selected for the SE100 2017, a list of the top 100 Social Enablers around the world.
3.6.7 References
SOLshare. (2018), Create a network. Share electricity. Brighten the future. 
Retrieved February 10, 2018, from https://www.me-solshare.com/
3.7 Mobisol: developing a pioneering business model for off-
grid energy in East Africa by starting with the users
Author: Klara Lindner, Mobisol GmbH
‘A typical household in Bangladesh using kerosene lamps and rechargeable 
car batteries for lighting, TV, and other applications spends an astonishing 
€1.50 per kWh – compared to the subsidised price for grid electricity of only 
€0.03 per kWh in Bangladesh and the slightly higher price of more than €0.20 
in Germany’.54
3.7.1 Context and origin of the idea
Although the electricity plug has long become indispensable in our daily lives, 
a quarter of the world still lives in areas without any form of modern energy 
provision – with most of those affected residing in sub-Saharan Africa (620 
million). Countries such as Tanzania have electrification rates of 24 per cent. In 
rural areas, this number drops to less than 10 per cent. With the majority of the 
population living in village communities, this leaves 36 million people living 
off-grid in Tanzania.
In these unelectrified areas, only a few low-power-consuming activities are 
possible, and they are accessible only by people who own a diesel generator 
(and can handle its noise, fumes, and maintenance needs). In countries close 
to the equator, the sun sets at 6 pm, meaning it is completely dark at 6:05 pm. 
People who want to finish things thereafter, be it work, household chores, or 
homework, need to rely on candles, kerosene, or battery-run torches.
The majority of people living in these off-grid regions belong to the ‘base of 
the economic pyramid’ and have limited disposable income. In addition, the 
weak infrastructure in these areas – most of them are difficult to reach – makes 
this part of the population unattractive as potential customers for most compa-
nies around the world.
This is where Thomas Gottschalk comes into play. Driving around the globe 
with the ‘Solar Taxi’ in 2009, he noticed two things in the developing world. 
First, these people’s realities are far from the stereotypes we are commonly 
confronted with in Europe: People rarely live from subsistence farming 
only – there are flourishing informal markets everywhere, especially in those 
areas that have some kind of grid connection, thus allowing for diversified 
 54 Source: https://www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-
fact-sheet-the-potential-of-linking-microfinance-energy-supply-mar-2010.pdf.
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economic activities. Second, the mobile networks in most rural areas were 
better than in the village of Gottschalk’s grandmother back in Germany. And 
every person he met had a mobile phone, which they used not only for com-
munication, but – in more and more countries – also for transferring money 
from person to person. Apart from that, as he was trained as an energy engi-
neer, he knew of the price decreases in photovoltaic (PV) systems and how 
these, with their modular set-ups, are applicable in hard-to-reach areas. He 
sought out a handful of other like-minded people who had come to very simi-
lar conclusions. Together, we started to turn these three insights into a busi-
ness: Mobisol.
3.7.2 Phase 1 (pilot phase): what do we provide then, really?
The basic concept was thought up quickly: Sell self-sufficient photovoltaic sys-
tems to individual households in off-grid areas, let customers pay with mobile 
money over time, and remotely turn the systems on or off through a modem 
with a SIM card that is placed in each system. But what we did not know was: 
What is the concrete value proposition, how do we reach our customers, and 
what does the detailed revenue model look like?
We found an angel investor who was fond enough of the idea to make a small 
grant for us to get started. Rather than wasting time on a 50 page investor deck, 
we turned the concept into a tangible prototype. At this point, it was basically 
a light bulb and a solar panel connected to a microchip with an embedded SIM 
card. Sized to fit in a suitcase, we could take it anywhere we wanted and easily 
demonstrate the concept to potential partners: Give them the phone number 
of the system, and by sending an SMS with the text ‘1’, they would turn on the 
light and the penny dropped.
We first used this to get in touch with mobile network operators that were 
offering mobile money in off-grid areas and to create a service agreement 
with them. By that time, only four countries worldwide – Tanzania, Kenya, 
Ghana, and India – had implemented M-Pesa, the mobile money platform 
that radically eases the collection of small payments in rural areas. India was 
not included because we did not know anyone there, and the time zone dif-
ference would have made things even harder. So in May 2011, a small team 
of three set out on a field trip to Tanzania, Kenya, and Ghana with two aims: 
first, find a local, like-minded organisation to work with in rural areas; sec-
ond, and most important, go out and talk to future customers, understand 
the way they live, the way they earn a living, and the role that energy plays in 
their lives.
We hired a car, found a translator, and started the engine. For the next four 
weeks, we would meet local renewable associations, drink tea in Tanzanian liv-
ing rooms, attend weddings in Ghana, and hold discussions with the elders 
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of the Maasai tribes under the community tree. We quickly realised that the 
awareness about PV solar was high, but also that bad quality materials had 
ruined its reputation. People valued bright lights, but kerosene lamps were still 
‘good enough’. Getting access to ‘real electricity’ that powered stereos and TVs 
was what people really wanted. If there was something that they really wanted, 
they would find a way to pay for it. We realised that their ability to pay was 
much more volatile than we thought.
Based on this field research, we knew what the product of the pilot phase 
should look like: complete all-in-one kits big enough for real appliances (to 
fulfil willingness to pay), plus credit financed over three years (to ensure abil-
ity to pay). We wanted to include after-sales (to ensure long life), and favoured 
ownership rather than rental solutions (to make sure people take good care of 
the product).
So we designed a first offer that we could test with real customers: We went for 
three different PV all-in-one systems (60 Wp, 120 Wp, 200 Wp) and a 36 month 
credit and technical services agreement.
For this, a second hardware prototype was developed, now fully functional. 
We could remotely turn the PV system on and off based on incoming mobile 
money payments, and we could gather performance and usage data in real 
time to foresee maintenance activities through the modem inside the system. 
We used material from the Tanzanian DIY store for the casing, which was not 
only cheap, but ugly enough so that our pilot phase customers would under-
stand that this really was only a first shot and that we would warmly appreciate 
their feedback.
Figure 30: The suitcase-sized prototype and its demonstration to a potential 
partner.
Source: Mobisol/Lindner (2017).
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With our local partner organisation, we created a concept for awareness-
creation, marketing, and sales within a few months and started our pilot phase 
with 100 paying customers in October 2011 close to Arusha, Tanzania.
3.7.3 Phase 2 (becoming operational): how do we sell?
The product itself was clear now, but the remaining question was how to real-
ise the business model in a viable way? What are the key activities and key 
resources on our side, and what do key partners do? The most challenging 
parts were: How to organise the high-quality and cost-efficient installation and 
maintenance of the PV systems, and how to distribute these efficiently in rural 
East Africa?
Meanwhile, we had also found a pilot-phase partner in Kenya and decided 
to run a second pilot with another 100 customers to test different service 
approaches with them.
Ensuring proper system installation and after-sales service
Since we had all been trained as engineers, we did the system installation 
 ourselves in the beginning, but we quickly grasped that this would not be 
something feasible for a commercial roll-out. Our first move was to develop 
a plug and play kit that customers could install themselves. In co-creative 
sessions with real customers, we even managed to draft an accompanying 
manual. But we came to realise that even though our customers were now 
able to do the installation themselves, they simply did not want to. ‘This is like 
having to put the engine into your new Mercedes-Benz!’ is a quote from one 
of our pilot customers. People rather wanted someone knowledgeable to do 
the job.
Figure 31: The Mobisol Akademie in Arusha, Tanzania, and a trained installa-
tion technician in action.
Source: Mobisol/Lindner (2017).
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So we changed the approach and decided to bring local village technicians 
(who until then had been repairing houses, bikes, or phones) into the model. 
Through a two-week programme at the ‘Mobisol Akademie’, which we cre-
ated for this purpose, they were trained and certified as Mobisol Installation 
Technicians.
After gaining some experience, the technician could later take another 
 two-week training course and become a maintenance technician. The  real-time 
performance and usage indicators from each system fuel an online database, 
which is our backbone for maintenance. A web-based interface makes it 
possible to coordinate technical activities in the village in an  effective and 
viable way.
With that concept, we not only arrived at a feasible solution for us in the end, 
but we also made our customers even happier (they know and trust their local 
technicians more than foreign people) – and it created jobs in the village.
Figure 32: Mobisol’s maintenance interface.
Source: Mobisol/Lindner (2017).
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 Making sure that our customers gain access, no matter how remote their 
homes are
To come up with a cost-efficient distribution strategy, we looked at informal 
markets for inspiration: When a Tanzanian family builds their new home, they 
go to the nearest market, buy the bricks, and find a means for transporting the 
materials home – sometimes a bus on the right route, sometimes a car, some-
times a boat. Every village then has a mason, who is hired to build the house.
We already had the local technician, so we started to build up a decentralised 
network of sales outlets. Today, we have our MobiShops at marketplaces that 
our customers regularly visit and make sure the packaging is optimised for easy 
transport. As soon as the papers are signed, our customers go out and cover the 
last mile themselves.
All sales activities are coordinated and monitored using a CRM system we 
developed in-house. Not only our customers use M-Pesa: We also deliver all 
our payments to staff digitally and thus have fewer transaction costs, less cor-
ruption, and a viable business.
3.7.4 Phase 3 (commercial roll-out): how do we finance our growth?
During our pilot phase, we had already dropped the idea that Mobisol could 
become a manufacturer or perhaps a wholesaler from which local distributors 
could buy in bulk and assume the point of contact for the end-user – these 
local distributors did not exist at the scale we needed. If we wanted to make this 
work, we thus had to extend our activities and build up our own structures. So 
the major remaining challenge was finding a way to pre-finance the hardware.
We wanted to work independent of subsidies or donor funds with a limited 
project life. We were aiming for a full commercial model.
Microfinance institutions seemed to be interesting key partners, but we 
quickly realised that, at least in sub-Saharan Africa, they only operated in cities 
and not in rural areas, where we envisioned our market. That meant we had to 
Figure 33: Mobisol’s distribution centre and local promoters.
Source: Mobisol/Lindner (2017).
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talk investors and banks into lending us a lot of money directly so that we could 
bridge those three years between the purchase and completion of payment.
We already had the switch-off mechanism that helped lenders to sleep better, 
but we still needed a way to carefully assess the creditworthiness of interested 
households. How do you do that without the equivalent of a Schufa credit rat-
ing and with a dynamic ability to pay? In several iterations, we came up with 
a credit survey that carefully assesses all potential income sources on the one 
hand, and all expenses on the other. Surprisingly, applicants have two to three 
income sources on average, and one of the most important questions to under-
stand the expenses of a household was ‘How many wives do you have?’ Over 
time, we developed a double-check algorithm from the data we had gathered 
that allowed us to see who was trying to tweak the responses.
As the business evolved, we ‘walked up the finance ladder’: from angel inves-
tors and foundations in the beginning, to donor funds and impact investors, to 
finally becoming bankable and getting ‘ordinary bank loans’ from KfW Group, 
the German government-owned development bank, and the like.
3.7.5 Phase 4: how to become a market leader?
The year 2012 was all about piloting, prototyping, and iterating the business 
model. Then, in 2013, we sold 2500 systems in our Tanzanian market. In 2014 
we opened Rwanda and sold 10,000 in total. In 2015 we started to scale and 
reached 25,000 households. In June 2016, we reached the symbolic moment 
of empowering household number 50,000 and by then had become one of the 
three major players in off-grid electrification in sub-Saharan Africa (the other 
two were M-Kopa and Offgrid Electric).
Currently, we are facing two new challenges: We are aiming to cross the 
‘chasm’ of innovation between early adopters and mainstream customers, and 
we want to continue our regional expansion without having to simultaneously 
grow the company as well.
In contrast to markets of the Global North, so-called below-the-line mar-
keting plays a much more important role than do above-the-line activities 
in our context (direct communication vs. TV and radio ads). Through our 
‘Project Saturation’ we are currently developing marketing strategies tailored 
to different customer types and building long-term relationships with trust-
building entities and influencers, such as schools, health care facilities, and 
religious communities.
In parallel to this vertical growth, our regional expansion team is aiming 
at finding the right partners to start joint ventures in new regions. Our main 
lesson learnt is that having experience with renewable energy technologies is 
not an important criterion. What is much more crucial is for the partner to 
share a similar mindset of engaging in a long-term – and at the same time 
commercial – relationship with customers. For example, a motorcycle vendor 
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that is active nation-wide could be our next partner. By developing a ‘Mobisol 
Blueprint’ or operational manual, we aim to bring that partner up to a working 
level quickly.
The outcome so far is that we are now selling about 4000 systems per month. 
After Rwanda, we are now starting operations in Kenya in a joint venture with 
a national car (and solar) battery distributor and have pilot systems set up in 
two more countries.
3.7.6 Summary – finding new ways to serve the underserved
For us, the so-called developing world is no barren land but a green field for 
innovation. Mobile phones, mobile banking, and renewable energy technologies 
are only the start, and we see a potential for leapfrogging in many more areas.
A few things we are working on at the moment
Seeing the radical uptake of smartphones, we have also created a customer app 
that increasingly serves as a lean interface between us and the customer. As we 
have gained a strong reputation for good quality and generally ‘being there’ 
in the village, we are starting to create a position as a ‘gateway’ between our 
customers and other product and service providers and are currently testing 
that with electrical appliances and health insurance. Our most radical R&D 
project is targeted at overcoming the bad infrastructure in rural Africa. We 
Figure 34: A Mobisol marketing officer meeting potential customers at a 
Maasai market in Tanzania.
Source: Mobisol/Lindner (2017).
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are currently testing a drone delivery network for spare parts, piggybacking on 
the ever-growing network of customer homes, which could serve as battery- 
recharging stations.
3.7.7 Author biography 
Klara Lindner strives to connect human-centred 
design with sustainable energy provision. She 
joined the solar company Mobisol in its infancy, 
led the pilot phase in East Africa, and co-developed 
its pioneering business model. Alongside improving 
Mobisol’s customer experience, Klara became part 
of the research program Microenergy Systems in 
2013, investigating service design in the bottom-of 
the-pyramid/energy context. As a certified Design 
Thinking Coach, Klara has been using various 
workshop settings to teach creative thinking applicable to processes of innovation 
and change.
Figure 35: Mobisol drone landing on a customer house.
Source: Mobisol/Lindner (2017).
3.8 Solarkiosk: social enterprise and decentralised energy
Interview with Lars Krückeberg, Founding Partner of Solarkiosk, on 
 January 18, 2016
Solarkiosk enables and empowers the sustainable economic development of 
base-of-the-pyramid (BoP) communities world-wide through the provision of 
clean energy services, quality products, and sustainable solutions. Intertwin-
ing an award-winning technology solution with an inclusive business model, 
Solarkiosk fosters local entrepreneurship at the BoP. The first Solarkiosk pro-
ject was successfully implemented in 2012. By the beginning of 2018, Solarki-
osk had established six country subsidiaries and is involved with projects on 
three continents (Solarkiosk 2018).
3.8.1 Technology and business model
Technology
In our profession as architects, my partners and I are always keen on getting to 
know new, holistic approaches that step beyond the day-to-day business of an 
architecture workshop. The idea of providing decentralised energy via a kiosk 
resulted from the observation that informal markets exist all over sub-Saharan 
Africa, including areas beyond the grid, and kiosks are a familiar feature even 
in the most remote regions.
Typically, development projects in these regions include the construc-
tion of mini-grids, providing power to schools, selling solar lamps, etc. The 
organisations provide the hardware and then leave. As architects, we deal with 
energy from a perspective of sustainability – energy needed to construct a 
building, to operate and maintain it, to produce the materials needed for its 
 construction, etc.
We looked at the idea of a kiosk from a purely technical point of view: What 
type of – not too heavy – building could be manufactured on an industrial 
scale, such that it could be transported anywhere, erected very easily, and, once 
erected, could produce power in a safe and sustainable manner while requiring 
low levels of maintenance? You have to imagine it as a ‘power room’ in which 
other commercial operations are also possible. We talk about last-mile distri-
bution, both in retail and electricity production. This last mile is tricky, and that 
is why so few ventures have actually succeeded.
The idea was to develop a product that can adapt to any climate, can deliver 
clean energy in a sustainable way, is easy to transport, and is modular. That 
means it should be able to connect to other types of energy supply, such as wind 
or biomass, but it should also be extendable in a spatial dimension.
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We strive for an integrated solution in which architecture and solar power are 
so closely tied together that human error can be minimised.
Business model
We always had the vision that we wanted to have an impact, but a lasting impact 
can only be achieved if it is linked to a successful business model. We call it 
social business.
When we started, we perceived the world as being divided into two fac-
tions that have only since, say, 2014 converged: the business sector and the 
social sector. For the social sector, the premise existed that a project was not 
supposed to make a profit because it required ripping off the poor (although 
NGOs are also surviving on that). By contrast, the business sector does not care 
about social impact because it simply costs too much. The financial flows were 
separated accordingly.
It was very difficult to make people understand that, in this area, the combi-
nation of the two worlds is the only implementable option that allows for scal-
ability. Many NGOs initiate great projects, but they are often hard to scale, and 
their financial sustainability is rarely achieved.
With a business approach, the social impact may not be the only focus. How-
ever, the projects reach acceptance levels that have a positive feedback effect on 
performance and, hence, the continuation and expansion of the project.
Figure 36: On-site construction of a Solarkiosk.
Source: Solarkiosk (2017).
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Meanwhile, we started developing the business model for the kiosk – also 
based on the principle of modularity – and attracted the attention of one major 
investor who is active in solar energy. This investor allowed us to do a proof 
of concept.
Anyone who is familiar with the context of sub-Saharan Africa immediately 
realises that there is an immense business opportunity. These markets are very 
dynamic. Companies such as Mobisol and M-Kopa sell energy solutions that 
range from small lamps to proper solar home systems. The problem is that rural 
residents typically do not have any money and have to pay in instalments. The 
key to this business model lies in the financing system. M-Kopa is comparable 
to mobile banking service M-Pesa. There are currently deals being undertaken 
in the range of hundreds of millions of US dollars.
Similar to the kiosk, our business model is equally flexible. One has to gradu-
ally explore all the possibilities linked to it.
3.8.2 History and organisation
In Berlin, we have around 30 employees. Together with our six African affili-
ates, we now have a workforce of more than 100 people. Our subsidiaries are all 
locally registered companies.
It all began with a meeting between my partner, Wolfram Putz, and Andreas 
Spieß, who developed the idea of providing decentralised energy via a kiosk 
after making the observation that informal markets exist all over sub-Saharan 
Africa. Together with Wolfram Putz and Thomas Willemeit, we are the found-
ers of the architectural practice GRAFT, with subsidiaries on several conti-
nents. We are currently building a children’s hospital in Ethiopia and have been 
frequently visiting Ethiopia, which is our first project in sub-Saharan Africa. 
There we met Andreas Spieß, a lawyer from Berlin, who had founded a solar 
company called Solar23 in Addis Ababa in 2008, which is now one of the big-
gest solar system integrators in Ethiopia. Initially, Solar23 was a spinoff of Sie-
mens: When Siemens closed down its operations in solar generation, some of 
its employees became entrepreneurs.
We started with Ethiopia, which is a fascinating but difficult and very bureau-
cratic market environment with high barriers to entry, especially for found-
ing new companies. The population is very poor with limited buying power, 
even if they desperately need the electricity. Our assumption was that the poor 
would redirect the money that they would typically spend for ‘dirty’ energy, 
such as kerosene, diesel, or paraffin, to our cleaner and cheaper energy. No one 
in the world spends a higher proportion of their income for energy than those 
deprived people because these forms of energy – in particular diesel – become 
very expensive when they reach these remote areas. A cleaner source of energy 
has immediate influences on their lives because it makes them healthier and 
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saves them money. The idea is that these people will slowly climb up the ‘energy 
ladder’. In the beginning, a household may only have the financial resources to 
buy a pocket lamp, then comes a small home system, then a larger system, and 
so forth – up to the replacement of the diesel generator. The same is true not 
only for residential customers, but also for small businesses.
In Ethiopia and in Kenya, we delivered the proof that the concept actually 
works. We placed our kiosks literally at the end of the world to see whether 
people in these areas would accept them because there was no available data on 
such an endeavour. These are informal, but also untapped, markets. However, 
if you place half a dozen kiosks at the end of the world, the business is highly 
unprofitable because the supply chain is too expensive.
We tested in Ethiopia what would work and what would not work. We found 
the sites and operators and talked to the communities to get to know what 
locals really needed in order to create awareness, which was the task of our 
subsidiaries. We support them in marketing and give hints about best practices 
in other countries, but we learn from our operators and the agents in the field 
on a daily basis. Our local teams visit the kiosks up to one time per week to 
learn. However, scaling our business model, adding corporate functions and 
compliance mechanisms, optimising the logistics, etc., is all undertaken from 
our headquarters.
We started with the assumption that we have to convince people to come to 
the kiosk, which means we need traffic. So we have to offer something that peo-
ple need. Once they have arrived at the kiosk, they realise there is light at night 
and see that solar power actually works. Meanwhile, we can offer cold drinks, 
play music, and provide a social space. We opted for fast-moving consumer 
goods – one pillar of our sales strategy. In addition, we offer special products 
related to hygiene. The second range of products relates to solar energy. That 
is where the impact actually starts! From a pocket lamp to a full-fledged home 
lighting system, we provide energy solutions for the residents.
The major problem is awareness: People will only buy what they are familiar 
with. Unfortunately, a first wave of cheap, low-quality products from China had 
destroyed confidence in solar products because they failed very rapidly.
The third business line for our kiosks is energy services. When the kiosk 
generates electricity to operate its point of sale – including having the lights, 
a small computer, and a solar fridge on – the kiosk can sell its excess produc-
tion to other businesses connected to the kiosk. Alternatively, we can use the 
excess electricity for entertainment, for example for TV. The TV can then be 
transformed into a small cinema, and the operator of the kiosk can charge an 
entry fee to show football. We provide mobile phone banking, phone charging, 
internet services, and much more.
We had to take into account the need to achieve community acceptance: 
Who are the stakeholders in the community? What do the people in a par-
ticular community actually need? What are they interested in? And how to 
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create awareness? We had to start becoming retailers as well as experts in 
marketing and things we never dealt with before. We realised that we could 
not start at the end of the world, but rather that we had to expand outwards 
in rings and clusters.
We then founded a joint venture with a family in Botswana that operates 
one of the largest franchise chains in sub-Saharan Africa – real retail profes-
sionals. They showed us how retail in Africa is functioning. The first thing that 
they decided was that all goods and products that are delivered to – and sold 
at – a kiosk pass via the point of sale; everything that comes in and goes out 
is controlled. In fact, a kiosk cannot be successful without this control, oth-
erwise there may be theft. We sharpened our understanding of how to main-
tain close ties with our operators. We do not employ them – we would rather 
create a partnership with them and formulate precise contracts. We would not 
sell our kiosks because they would be too expensive. However, we would ena-
ble local entrepreneurs to start a business with it and create an environment 
where other businesses would also flourish in order to create an impact on the 
entire community.
We discovered that the platform, that is, the kiosk, has a certain value to others – 
and they are willing to buy it. This became our second pillar for revenues – a 
cross-financing tool, if you will – and enabled us to finance our expansion, 
which is quite capital-intensive, as well as improvements to the system.
Figure 37: A Solarkiosk in Botswana.
Source: Solarkiosk (2017).
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Wherever a kiosk is established, other businesses emerge, too. We started 
to introduce fast-food services. Our clean-cooking stoves have a fundamen-
tally positive health and environmental impact, in particular with regards to 
deforestation. The operators will pay us rent for the equipment; they are like 
a franchise.
Now we are learning how a kiosk is the nucleus and trigger for other ven-
tures, such as rental space, a cinema, and connectivity. We just signed a part-
nership with SES, the largest satellite provider in the world, headquartered in 
Luxemburg. With their support, we can bring the internet to the most remote 
places in the world. Of course, that is more expensive than a landline, but one 
of the criteria for the locations of our kiosks is the very absence of function-
ing transport, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure. In those areas, 
quantum leaps are possible, as telecommunications has demonstrated. It is not 
astonishing that Google, Amazon, Richard Branson, and Elon Musk have spent 
billions of dollars to reach these remote markets. It is a positive development to 
provide these people access to goods and information. But it is also a gigantic 
business opportunity. For that type of infrastructure, a person in charge has to 
be on site to market and sell this offer. People then also need devices to access 
the internet, and these devices have to be charged. When spending all these bil-
lions in space technology, investors expect these services to emerge automati-
cally, but that is not the case. Rather, they have to be initiated by organisations 
such as Solarkiosk. We are an analogue road to market, but we pave the digital 
road to market.
A kiosk typically creates about four new jobs. Our operators start earning 
money from day one of the operation of the kiosk. But we want to break even 
jointly for all the kiosks in a country, and also for our headquarters in Ber-
lin. That is only possible via scale, whereby we can increase our buying power, 
accommodate the high capital expenditure, and seize other opportunities 
because of our position as a monopoly provider. Our business plan is to break 
even within the next five years, but we have to build more than a thousand 
Figure 38: Potential use cases of a Solarkiosk.
Source: Solarkiosk (2017).
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kiosks to reach that target. To do so, you have to acquire the finance and find 
the people who believe in our venture.
3.8.3 Scaling and cooperations
We first worked together with a US software company, but we did not like that 
the data was being stored in the United States, and it was not available in all 
countries where we wanted to operate. We then decided to purchase  software 
developed in the respective countries, but the software was mostly targeted 
towards supermarkets as customers. For the informal market, solutions did 
not exist. People just counted the money themselves. So we came to the 
conclusion that we had to develop our own software and purchase the cor-
responding hardware.
We went to international conferences and presented our model. At that 
time, we had around 15 kiosks in three countries in operation. We soon real-
ised that interested people were approaching us because we had a unique 
selling proposition.
The European Union, USAID, and the World Bank started to allow for 
private-sector involvement in their projects or to explicitly integrate it. For 
example, the EU’s Electrify programme started to steer major financial 
resources towards the private sector – money that, in previous times, would 
have been exclusively reserved for NGOs. The decision makers redefined their 
ideas about social enterprise. Large investment funds were approaching us, too. 
At the same time, representatives of multinational corporations were approach-
ing us. They were either from the fast-moving consumer goods sector, or they 
were companies from the energy sector with a profound knowledge of the 
 African business context, namely Coca-Cola and Total.
In order to secure their future markets, Coca-Cola tried to develop something 
similar to our idea. They called it EKOCENTER, but it did not work. It also 
evolved from the idea of a social enterprise – a triangular relationship between 
government, business, and NGOs. This idea is not in the context of corporate 
social responsibility, but rather a profitable business that enables and empowers 
people. They painted a large container in red and added a massive number of 
gadgets and functions. In August 2013, their CEO and Chairman, Muhtar Kent, 
announced the launch of the first EKOCENTER in South Africa. Soon after-
wards, they realised that it was just way too expensive. They actively searched 
for alternative solutions and found us: ‘If you can’t beat them, join them!’ So we 
did a pilot with 25 kiosks with them in countries where we were already oper-
ating, as well as three new countries. The pilot was a success. Then we started 
phase 2 with 150 kiosks, which is ongoing. In the meantime, they have seriously 
started investing in our organisation and venture, and they believe in it.
The cooperation was based on the following agreement: We own the assets, 
we put them on site, we operate them and do the business. But EKOCENTER is 
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present for all decisions, we decide together on how to improve the operations, 
and the kiosks are branded ‘EKOCENTER powered by Solarkiosk’. For them, it 
is important to establish their EKOCENTER brand. Of course, we sell Coke in 
these kiosks. They are interested in developing village concepts with a focus on 
the social dimension by electrifying schools and medical dispensaries as well 
as a particular focus on water purification – a powerful lever for the physical 
and economic health of a continent. We could do that on our own – we even 
founded a charity together with the Siemens Foundation that focusses on water 
purification in Africa: the Solar Fountain GmbH. However, I do not personally 
believe that it is a viable business model. I am rather convinced that water sup-
ply should not be a commercial service to make a profit. Water is essential for 
survival, but electricity is not.
The other business partner that approached us early on was Total. We launched 
two pilot kiosks with them in Kenya. In the meantime, we have sold more kiosks 
to Total. We also sold 18 kiosks to Coca-Cola. There are some regions where we 
see no business potential but our partners do. There is exclusivity – maybe one 
day we will decide to tackle these regions, too. But for the moment, we just 
install the kiosks there and then leave the operations to our partners.
At the end of 2016, we had around 200 kiosks that are operated by us in six 
different countries. From the other kiosks, we can still learn. We are still in the 
learning process about cost optimisation and the lean management of retail 
space. The supply chain logistics are still a major bottleneck. The other one is 
Figure 39: Coca-Cola’s EKOCENTER.
Source: The Coca-Cola Company (2017).
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human capacity: Where do I find the right operators in Africa who can deal 
with the retail challenges, the marketing and technological challenges, as well 
as the real-estate dimension at the same time?
More recently, we started a pilot project with Coca-Cola and Ericsson in 
Rwanda. We provide energy and rent out the area for a telecommunications 
tower. In return, we pay for their internet service provider and the data used. 
These are complementary services. Customers who come to eat and drink at 
the kiosk may also want to use the internet. These types of experimental set-
tings could be called ‘de-risking’. The bottleneck is always the human factor: 
Which operators are capable of handling such a complex service? How to find 
entrepreneurs who are both loyal and realise their own ideas on top of our 
business, ideally women? They have to be sales agents, and sometimes they 
have to employ additional staff. Finding the right site for the location of the 
kiosk is equally challenging: even the best entrepreneur fails if the location 
is not carefully chosen because no traffic emerges. It is also difficult to trans-
port the kiosk into the countries, so we have set up local manufacturing units. 
Often the prices are lower when components are imported than if they are 
produced locally. But it is essential to have the option of producing compo-
nents locally.
We started with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Botswana. Later we added Rwanda, 
Tanzania, and Ghana. There are also kiosks now in Vietnam. We won an EU 
tender and are now building 40 kiosks in Ethiopia and 40 in Kenya with EU 
funding and using a local manufacturing workforce.
We started developing products for Connected Solar Clinics and Connected 
Solar Schools, in particular for governments and the United Nations. In early 
2016, we launched a Connected Solar School in the Jordanian refugee camp 
Zaatari, together with SES. We donated the Solar School, but we are convinced 
that there will be business opportunities in the future. Energy access for refu-
gees is essential, but connectivity is equally important, especially for education. 
The Connected Solar Clinic was built in the Jordanian region of Al-Mafraq, 
which hosts many Syrian refugees. Up to 30 per cent of the population there 
consists of refugees. We want to show that energy and connectivity are a solu-
tion for – let’s face it – the new cities of the world. That type of infrastructure 
could potentially be built in any slum or informal settlement around the world. 
It is particularly useful if water purification is added.
We offer a piece of infrastructure for the cities of tomorrow because it can 
become the nucleus of urban development due to its modular design. It can 
become a mini-shopping mall, a place for assemblies, even a security post 
because of the connectivity. There are an infinite amount of possibilities and 
synergies. We can imagine building a complete neighbourhood around a kiosk. 
Our advantage is that we provide the nucleus for clusters of businesses and ideas. 
We provide the platform to create new jobs and promote the local economy.
Of course, we do not want to stay in Africa. We plan to expand to Latin 
America and Asia, but we have to proceed step by step. We would not survive 
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by becoming too big too fast. We first have to develop deeper roots in the ter-
ritories where we are operating.
As soon as we are able to enter the wholesale business, everything will change.
3.8.4 Market outlook and competitive environment
One of our main competitive advantages is that we have successfully established 
the infrastructure and matrix organisation within the different countries. No 
competitor is able to replicate these structures so easily. Especially China has a 
strong strategic interest in Africa, but it tends to lack the soft skills. The confi-
dence of the communities is the key to success. That is why the multinationals 
turn to us, and without them it would not work. We would not prevent anyone 
from imitating us, but the model is very tricky in its implementation.
3.8.5 Interviewee biography 
Lars Krückeberg, M.Arch, Dipl.-Ing. Arch, Architekt 
BDA, Founding Partner of GRAFT
Lars Krückeberg studied architecture at the Techni-
cal University Braunschweig, Germany, the Universitá 
degli Studi di Firenze, Italy, and the German Institute 
for History of Art, Firenze, Italy. He graduated as Dipl.-
Ing. Arch in Braunschweig and received his Master of 
Architecture at the Southern Californian Institute of 
Architecture SCI Arc, Los Angeles, USA.
In 1998 Krückeberg established GRAFT in Los 
Angeles together with Wolfram Putz and Thomas Wil-
lemeit. With additional offices in Berlin and Beijing, GRAFT has been commis-
sioned to design and manage a wide range of projects in multiple disciplines and 
locations. GRAFT has won numerous national and international awards and 
earned an international reputation throughout its 15 year existence.
In 2009 he co-founded Solarkiosk GmbH together with Putz, Willemeit, and 
Andreas Spiess in Berlin and manages the company as acting CTO. Since 2012, 
affiliate companies have been incorporated in Ethiopia, Kenya, Botswana, Tanza-
nia, Rwanda, and Ghana.
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3.9 Power Ledger: peer-to-peer trading with Blockchain as 
decentralised transaction technology
Interview with Jemma Green, co-founder and chair of Power Ledger, on 
August 25, 2017
Power Ledger uses blockchain technology to enable households and buildings 
to trade excess renewable energy peer to peer to make power more distributable 
and sustainable for consumers. The Power Ledger system tracks the generation 
and consumption of all trading participants and settles energy trades on pre-
determined terms and conditions in near real time.
In October 2017, Power Ledger raised A$34 million through its POWR Token 
Generation Event. More than 15,000 buyers took part in Australia’s first Initial 
Coin Offering, with the Main Sale following a successful Pre-Sale at the start of 
September that saw the company raise A$17 million in just 72 hours (Power 
Ledger 2017).
3.9.1 Technology and business model
Technology
Of all blockchain start-ups in the energy sector, Power Ledger has advanced 
the peer-to-peer trading environment the most. Power Ledger facilitates peer-
to-peer energy trading – a concept by which renewable energy can be sold 
between buyers and sellers. This is an innovative business model capable of 
disrupting incumbent utility companies. Power Ledger has a unique service 
offering, as we partner with utilities, allowing them to on-board their custom-
ers to the platform. We call it ‘phased disruption’, and the response from the 
market has been very positive.
As for the technology, Power Ledger utilises blockchain technology, which 
is a secure, immutable, and transparent database. Because the platform man-
ages financial transactions, the security of the database is crucial. The ledger 
is distributed across many nodes (versions of the database that are continu-
ally shared and reconciled to reflect the same ledger). Blockchain technology is 
also cheaper and faster than traditional databases, which is necessary, as energy 
trading requires millions of transactions.
Our software, which is already live, connects to Smart Metres and brings the 
data into EcoChain, our proof-of-stake private blockchain.
For peer-to-peer trading, the platform is able to register and settle transac-
tions. Within a block of flats, for example, the platform allocates electricity to 
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each flat and enables residents to sell their excess electricity to their neigh-
bours. Our two-token structure enables us to process payments in the resi-
dent’s local currency rather than through cryptocurrencies. In this instance, 
people can load funds onto the platform, which is linked to a credit system 
called Sparkz. This enables consumers to use Sparkz to purchase electricity or 
for a producer to sell it. Then they are able to convert the Sparkz back to dol-
lars or any other fiat currency55 – customers do not need cryptocurrencies or 
Bitcoin at all. The only parties that need to access our POWR tokens directly 
are our application hosts.
The validation is performed via a proof-of-stake blockchain – it has a quick 
block time, can be used in any energy market, and was purpose-built for high-
volume transactions.
We also have a product called Asset Germination Events, whereby consum-
ers buy, hold, and trade fractional ownership of large renewable energy assets, 
such as batteries or solar farms, using our platform. For example, a solar farm 
could use the blockchain to issue ownership. If someone owns 3.7 per cent of 
that asset, then that person would receive 3.7 per cent of the revenue.
For the solar farm to connect to the grid, the operator would need a power 
purchase agreement, but by using the blockchain, they can sell to many more 
consumers. At the same time, a building might purchase electricity from their 
own solar farms down the road to manage that energy transaction.
Blockchain gives us the ability to transition to a low-cost, low-carbon, and 
resilient energy system. This makes the grid more resilient, because by using 
blockchain, we can create localised energy systems and enable consumers to 
access electricity from a diverse number of sources. Today, households with 
solar panels can sell their excess energy to a utility company, which then sells 
it to others. The energy goes back to the grid and may have to travel far before 
reaching its destination. Our platform allows solar panel owners to sell their 
energy to those closest to them, which means the energy does not have to 
travel as far.
With respect to data privacy, residents are not forced to participate in our 
scheme, but they could if they wanted to – and they would be remunerated 
for it. We had cases where consumers were offered A$25 to turn off their 
devices during peak demand. Of course, there are security concerns, but using 
blockchain technology mitigates this risk, as everything can be encrypted and 
anonymised. Blockchain is actually the solution to these concerns.
Business model
Power Ledger earns money via a daily fixed supply charge. We collect a small 
amount of revenue from each kilowatt hour sold. With the peer-to-peer trading, 
 55 According to Investopedia, fiat money is currency that a government has declared to 
be legal tender, but it is not backed by a physical commodity.
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there is also a premium on each kilowatt hour sold, like a transaction fee. The 
supply charge varies and depends on the daily fixed supply charge set by the 
retailers in the marketplace, so it is benchmarked against that. By contrast, the 
peer-to-peer trading charge depends on the volume of the market. For exam-
ple, we charge lower fees for higher voltage.
The tenant in a flat pays the electricity bill to the landlord. If the owner has 
rooftop solar, it provides them with an income stream and a return on invest-
ment for the solar panels and the battery. A solar system offers a return on 
investment of around 25 per cent in Australia. But homeowners can also pur-
chase differential power if they do not have sufficient solar power in their sys-
tems. Owners can also purchase electricity on the wholesale market and then 
sell it at retail cost to the tenants.
Australian legislation allows us to operate embedded networks within build-
ings and enables us to do trials for 1.5 per cent of the turnover of a company 
without an exemption. Thereafter, we can apply for exemptions from the regu-
lator to conduct larger trials.
At the moment, we offer a flat rate for electricity. If the right pricing is in place – 
taking into account the time of day – a rooftop producer may be remunerated 
for it. Even when you are uploading solar power during the peak period, you 
would not be adequately compensated.
3.9.2 History and organisation
In May 2017, we had nine staff members in our company, including blockchain 
developers and experts. Since that time, we have grown to about 20 staff mem-
bers, which includes energy experts, energy economists, and regulatory spe-
cialists. In addition, we have hired a business development team, a legal advisor 
specialising in blockchain issues, a chief operating officer, as well as added to 
our user interface and user experience (UX/UI) capabilities.
3.9.3 Scaling and cooperations
The first peer-to-peer trading project we did was in Busselton, south of Perth. 
That project ran from September to December 2016. The second project with 
peer-to-peer technology – a trial with 500 sites – was in Auckland with  Vector 
Limited and started in December 2016. In March 2017, we started the Gen 
Y Housing Project, which is a block of flats in Perth. In addition, we have 
signed deals with BCPG, one of the largest solar Independent Power Produc-
ers in Thailand, Tech Mahindra in India. In Europe, the Liechtenstein Institute 
for Strategic Development (LISD) will become the first Application Host to 
offer Power Ledger’s blockchain-based peer-to-peer energy trading platform 
244 Decentralised Energy — a Global Game Changer
in Europe, and we are part of a Smart Cities project in Fremantle, which is par-
tially funded by the Australian government.
There are lots of opportunities in Asia and Africa. In developing countries, 
the Power Ledger platform can provide a modern, low-cost, low-carbon alter-
native to the traditional energy-supply model. Even better, because of the abil-
ity to fractionalise an asset, the platform can give communities and individuals 
a chance to own a share in their local power-generating assets. Regulated mar-
kets such as those in California, New York, continental Europe, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Austria would also be of interest to us.
For the most part, utilities are aware that something needs to change. We 
want the Power Ledger platform to disrupt the energy industry, not to destroy 
its value, so we are working closely with traditional energy providers to demon-
strate new ways for them to stay relevant. Network operators need to find a way 
to keep people from defecting from the grid, and retailers need to find ways of 
connecting with their customers – so we are helping them achieve that.
The retailers we speak with realise that whether Power Ledger had come 
along or not, change would have happened – more renewables and grid defec-
tion, for example. There is also a lot of customer churn. One way for retailers 
to have a longer-lasting relationship with their customers is to offer peer-to-
peer trading. It is effectively cannibalising their incumbent market, but if they 
do not do it, someone else will. I think they realise disruption is inevitable for 
them, but the suffering is optional.
Our relationship with these utilities is not tense, but sometimes apprehen-
sive. You need to demonstrate and persuade 20 people, sometimes more, before 
you can move forward with a deal. We are creating a new market, which means 
we need to have a number of conversations, explain what the blockchain is, and 
get people comfortable with the company before moving forward. It is a long 
engagement process.
The retailer landscape is very diverse. We have not been met with any hos-
tile responses, but it does seem that the smaller retailers have generally been 
more responsive. In addition, there are some IT and electric vehicle companies 
involved as well as universities.
3.9.4 Market outlook and competitive environment
Our regulator, AEMO, hired Audrey Zibelman, who was previously the chair 
of the New York Public Service Commission and who has done a lot of work 
to manage that transition from a centralised to a hybridised system. That kind 
of market reform needs to happen in order to enable the technology to be 
deployed, not just by disrupting the technology but by managing the system 
resiliently during the transition. There is quite a lot of market reform that needs 
to happen, but there seem to be positive sentiments about renewable energies, 
with a couple of exceptions. For example, South Australia, where they have a 
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high penetration of rooftop solar systems, endured blackouts last year. It was 
a big political issue. The government said that renewables were to blame, but 
in my opinion, it was actually a problem with the software and interconnec-
tors. The argument that politicians put forward was that we should have fewer 
renewables.
This resulted in Elon Musk offering to put a big battery into the South Aus-
tralian grid to show how renewables could solve the issue. Musk spoke with our 
prime minister and the South Australian government. Now the government 
has announced that batteries will be part of the solution, and that it is not just 
turning on more gas-fired power stations. The other part of the discussion con-
cerns carbon emissions. Companies can just go on polluting, which means it is 
not a level playing field. We really need an instrument such as a baseline credit 
scheme or a carbon tax to address this issue. Politically, it has become a hot 
potato, and no one wants to touch it, but it needs to be addressed, along with a 
reform of the electricity market.
3.9.5 Interviewee biography 
Jemma Green, Chair of Power Ledger Pty Ltd, is 
a member of the board of directors
Dr Jemma Green has more than 15 years of 
experience in finance and risk advisory, hav-
ing worked for 11 years in investment banking 
in London. Whilst there, she completed a mas-
ter’s degree and two postgraduate diplomas from 
Cambridge University.
Jemma is a research fellow at the Curtin Uni-
versity Sustainability Policy (CUSP) Institute. 
Her doctoral research into ‘Citizen Utilities’ has produced unique insights into the 
challenges and opportunities for the deployment of rooftop solar PV and battery 
storage within multi-unit developments and the application of the blockchain.
Jemma is also experienced in the challenges of sustainable cities through her 
role as an independent Councillor of the City of Perth.
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3.10 Core competencies in the energy transition – insights for 
corporate and political decision makers
The conclusions of this chapter follow a dual structure. In the first part, the 
authors establish a categorisation of business models based on the conducted 
interviews and the contribution by Klara Lindner on Mobisol. In the second 
part, six core competencies for decision makers are derived from the interviews.
3.10.1 Three new business models for dealing 
with the energy transformation
Taxonomies of business models have seen widespread use to classify ways that 
companies generate money. One of the most holistic attempts is suggested 
by Gassmann et al. (2014). The authors claim that 55 business models are 
responsible for 90 per cent of the world’s most successful businesses (ibid.), 
ranging from classical models such as franchising and multi-sided platforms 
to digital models such as freemium and crowdsourcing. By contrast, Hamwi 
and Lizarralde (2017) outline three major business models they observe in the 
energy transition: ‘Customer-owned product-centered business models, where 
customers own the product related to the electricity generation or manage-
ment; third-party service-centered business models, where a third party offers 
energy services to the customer; and energy community business models, 
where resources are pooled and shared between community members’ (ibid.).
The seven interviews and contributions of the founders and executives of 
start-ups serve as an empirical basis to develop a taxonomy that bears simi-
larities to what is described by Hamwi and Lizarralde (2017), albeit we chose 
a different terminology that takes into account the blend of regulated and 
non-regulated elements of the value chain, and its role as part of so-called ‘criti-
cal infrastructure’.
The following three business models can be derived from the analysis:
•	New asset-ownership models: the start-ups SOLshare and Mobisol enable 
private energy consumers to become self-producers. Via different financing 
schemes, their customers will eventually own the devices they are using.
•	New service and operating models: the start-ups Envio Systems and 
Solarkiosk as well as Timo Leukefeld’s energy-efficient buildings belong to 
this category. In all three cases, services to establish or improve energy use 
are offered to final customers or intermediaries. Envio Systems builds on 
the existing energy supply infrastructure and specificities of each commer-
cial dwelling to increase its energy efficiency. Solarkiosk rents its kiosks to 
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local operators and lets them decide which services they want to offer to 
their customers. The tenants who occupy Leukefeld’s single or multi-family 
houses pay rent to the building agencies, banks, or utilities that are financ-
ing and constructing the buildings.
•	New platform models: for the first two business models, continuity can be 
observed, stretching from the first attempts of liberalisation to full-fledged 
decentralisation. The platform models, however, are an offspring of digi-
talisation, which allows for new markets of buyers and sellers of certain 
products and services. Entelios (in the area of Demand Response) and 
Power Ledger (in peer-to-peer trading) fulfil that role. They do not enable 
consumers to acquire assets, nor do they rent any devices or own any assets 
themselves. They only provide the intelligence to coordinate the assets that 
belong to their customers.
Combining the three phases of the energy transformation with the taxonomy of 
business models, Figure 40 shows the categorisation along the two dimensions.
In the following sections, the three types of business models are presented in 
greater detail and complemented by additional examples.
New asset-ownership models
Together with the water supply, transport, telecommunications, and waste man-
agement sectors, the energy sector – in particular, the grid-based infrastructure 
Figure 40: Business models and phases of the energy transformation
Source: Authors’ contribution.
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of electricity and natural gas supply – requires capital-intensive investments up 
front to establish pipelines and transmission lines; generation plants and trans-
formers; metering devices at the final users’ residences; data and billing centres; 
and many more technical features.
In the traditional configuration of the electricity supply industry, assets 
were owned by the state, state-owned enterprises and municipalities, or by 
regulated private entities. Following the rapid expansion of energy demand 
in the 1980s and 1990s – especially in developing countries – new entrants 
from the private sector were able to build, own, and operate – or to build, own, 
and transfer – assets under long-term contracts with utilities. Simultaneously, 
many countries in the Western hemisphere started liberalising their power 
and gas sectors and opened parts of the value chain to competition, especially 
generation and retail.
Since liberalisation, the public ownership of assets has decreased. The 
large-scale privatisation of distribution and generation first occurred in Latin 
America and the Caribbean – starting with Chile under Pinochet in the 1980s – 
followed by Eastern Europe and Central Asia after the fall of Communism in 
the 1990s and 2000s.
Privatisation typically implied transferring ownership from a public enter-
prise to a multinational investor or utility that would take over the assets. For 
example, European energy incumbents such as Finnish utility Fortum, German 
E.ON, or Italian Enel entered the Russian market when the state-owned assets 
were sold. However, with liberalisation, a substantial number of new players 
entered the electricity market. In particular, newly created wholesale markets 
encouraged traders to start dealing with electricity and natural gas as com-
modities; insurance and hedging instruments were offered by players from the 
financial services world. In these cases, they would not own the assets.
The most fundamental change in terms of ownership occurred with the rise 
of decentralised energy. By incentivising PV installations with feed-in tariffs, 
homeowners, farmers, and energy cooperatives were encouraged to install 
PV panels or wind turbines. Ownership of power-generating assets became a 
mass-market phenomenon.
Australia has become the world leader in rooftop solar, with more than one 
solar panel per inhabitant (Stock, Stock & Bourne 2017: 7, also see the country 
profile in this book). At the end of 2016, Germany had more than 1.5 million 
privately operated PV plants (BMWi 2017) and around 27,000 wind turbines 
(BWE 2017), all of which were overwhelmingly owned by private entities.
Between 2012 and mid-2016, the United States experienced almost uninter-
rupted growth in residential PV installations (Perea 2017), reaching around 
2.3 GW in 2017. Forecasts of consulting practice GTM Research estimate this 
capacity will grow to more than 4 GW in 2022 (ibid.).
Asset ownership can also materialise in energy associations or energy 
cooperatives. By contributing a certain amount of money, citizens who do 
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not have the possibility to set up renewable-energy facilities on their land or 
rooftops can donate a certain amount of money and participate in an associa-
tion. In Germany, the number of energy associations rose from 66 in 2001 to 
more than 850 in 2017, and total membership is around 180,000 and grow-
ing (Bundesgeschäftsstelle Energiegenossenschaften 2017). A survey by the 
 German Cooperative and Raiffeisen Confederation DGRV (2015) reveals 
that more than a fifth of the members pay €1000 or less to become part of the 
association, and around a third pay between €1000 and €3000. Hence, even 
for people with smaller budgets, it is easy to be a co-owner of a PV plant or 
a wind turbine.
Energy associations typically have a geographical proximity to their assets. 
They are often part of a local initiative, with residents, regional banks, and even 
municipalities sometimes serving as the driving forces. Meanwhile, digitali-
sation has made it possible to detach ownership from location. Over the last 
decade, crowdsourcing platforms have mushroomed, often to raise money 
for cash-strapped entrepreneurs. The most popular platform was Kickstarter, 
through which the creators of the Fairphone as well as Elon Musk and his elec-
tric car company, Tesla, raised money for their ventures. Crowdfunding typi-
cally follows a simple principle: anyone in the world is invited to invest money 
in a certain project – often as an upfront investment – and receive a product 
or service during the later stages of the venture. In the energy sector, crowd-
funding platforms such as ‘crowdener.gy’ or ‘econeers’ raise money for specific 
projects, most often in the field of renewable energies.
Asset ownership, hence, has become a globally dispersed phenomenon. 
As opposed to donations to charities or non-governmental organisations, in 
crowdfunding the intermediary is digitalised – donors and receivers directly 
interact with each other.
In the near future, though, asset ownership may advance to the sphere of 
cryptocurrencies and decentralised ledger protocols such as blockchain. Own-
ing real assets with a virtual currency sounds like a logical inconsistency. How-
ever, the value of a cryptocurrency is based on a consensus of the value of the 
currency among those who have invested in it. It is a system of faith and specu-
lation, similar to most market-based assets.
The buzz term in this dimension is ‘initial coin offering’ (ICO). In an ICO, 
the issuer offers so-called tokens (Orcutt 2017). A token can represent a cer-
tain amount of a virtual currency, but it can also be cloud storage space, as in 
the start-up Filecoin, or it can correspond more closely to traditional stocks 
of the issuing firm, as in decentralised autonomous organisations (or DAO, 
see Burger et al. 2016 for a discussion). In the energy industry, Australian 
start-up Power Ledger raised US$24 million in October 2017. Around 15,000 
supporters invested in the ICO. Power Ledger’s tokens are called POWRs and 
are convertible into Sparkz, which is the virtual currency for Power Ledg-
er’s users to trade electricity among themselves (St. John 2017). Another 
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application suggested by Power Ledger is ‘autonomous asset management’. 
According to information issued for Power Ledger’s token generation event 
in October 2017, this application provides a platform for shared ownership 
of renewable-energy assets as well as for trading renewable-asset ownership 
(Power Ledger 2017).
Of course, ICOs in the energy sector are still niche applications of a niche tech-
nology. In addition, public authorities such as the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission and, in the case of Power Ledger, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) are exploring how to deal with ICOs from a 
regulatory perspective. For example, ASIC interprets ICOs as a type of ‘Managed 
Investment Scheme and therefore subject to the Australian Corporations Act’ 
(Thomsen 2017). With multiple applications foreseeable, ICOs may become the 
virtual mirror image of the dispersed ownership of decentralised energy assets.
Sebastian Groh’s insights from Bangladesh reveal that decentralised asset 
ownership can be particularly advantageous in the context of developing coun-
tries, where a connection to the central grid represents a certain elevation 
in social status, but may also coincide with a lower quality of power supply 
because of multiple interruptions. He observes that swarm energy based on 
micro-grids proves to be more resilient and reliable than the central grid. Via 
their mobile phones, those who own their own PV systems can use the money 
they earn from selling electricity in real time. However, the success of these sys-
tems depends on the regulatory framework and the willingness of governments 
to consider decentralised energy as an acceptable alternative to the central grid 
and provide financing schemes for rural residents.
Klara Lindner’s contribution on Mobisol’s success story shows that start-ups 
operating in this difficult environment of rural, decentralised electrification 
need to be in control of the whole value chain – including devices such as TVs 
and mobile phone chargers, which they sell in conjunction with battery and 
rooftop solar – to ensure quality and reliability.
New service and operating models
Long before the liberalisation and privatisation of the electricity sector, com-
panies specialised in service operations, optimisation, and the maintenance of 
energy installations, in particular in the area of building efficiency. The most 
prominent example is energy performance contracting (see also Burger & 
Weinmann 2013 for a discussion). Since the 1970s, energy service companies 
have assisted utilities as sub-contractors to increase energy efficiency, typically 
based on energy audits. A new industry emerged that was able to deliver turn-
key projects for large industrial and institutional customers (IFC 2007; Li, Qiu 
& Wang 2014). According to the National Association of Energy Service Com-
panies of the United States, the industry experienced a period of stagnation 
after the collapse of ENRON in the mid-2000s (IFC 2007: 9), but recovered 
soon afterwards. Based on a market survey by US company Navigant, the Euro-
pean Commission’s Joint Research Council publishes estimates of the European 
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market to be around €2.4 billion, with moderate growth of 1.7 per cent per year 
by 2024 (Boza-Kiss, Bertoldi & Economidou 2017).
Business models in energy performance contracting may include the financ-
ing or leasing of assets, but typically the owner of the dwelling or industrial 
facility also owns the assets, which the contractor has installed, after the con-
tracting period has ended.
As the increasing deployment of renewable energies leads to a more inelastic 
primary energy supply, it also becomes more attractive for companies, house-
holds, and utilities to increase their individual elasticity of demand and exploit 
financial opportunities related to fluctuations in wholesale market prices. Busi-
ness models based on efficiency services and the optimisation of the opera-
tion of energy assets – including the equipment of dwellings, such as lighting 
and windows – require in-depth knowledge of the complex interplay of all the 
energy-related components of each object. With the use of practically unlim-
ited computing power and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms – also called 
machine learning – the barriers to entry in this field have been significantly 
reduced, and new players can more quickly and easily access the market than 
before. For example, MeteoViva is a start-up that uses local weather forecasts 
to optimise heating and cooling. The co-founder of Envio Systems has pre-
sented his company’s business model in this book. He and his colleagues have 
developed a low-cost solution – compared to incumbent multinationals such 
as Johnson Controls, Schneider Electric, and Siemens – for retrofitting existing 
commercial and industrial buildings.
Not only new entrants, but also European energy utilities are moving towards 
service models. As in many other industries that are also moving from a ‘tech-
nology push’ to a ‘market pull’. Customer-centricity has become a core element 
of their new strategies. For the electricity supply industry, this step is particu-
larly challenging. Before liberalisation, residential customers were represented 
as standardised load profiles, anonymous numbers that could be easily aggre-
gated, with minimal interaction occurring between the utility and user except 
for billing and meter readings. As regional monopolists, utilities did not have 
to take the differing preference sets of customer segments into account. With 
liberalisation, though, residential consumers started to become a relevant, 
non-negligible factor, since they could choose between different suppliers. Still, 
most utilities concentrated on defending their incumbent positions by offer-
ing differentiated tariff schemes adapted to each household’s preferences. Most 
importantly, the cost and origin of electricity supply became the differentiating 
factors. Utilities realised that some customer segments were willing to pay a 
premium for climate-friendly primary energy sources, whereas other segments 
would choose primarily based on a comparison of costs per kilowatt hour.
The situation has fundamentally changed now. New entrants from other 
industries, in particular companies operating in information and communica-
tion technologies, such as Google, Apple, and telephony operators, have dis-
covered electricity supply as a service they can provide in a package together 
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with home automation, entertainment, as well as safety and security features. 
Building efficiency becomes part of a larger bundled service, for example with 
devices such as the intelligent thermostats provided by Nest and Tado, the 
manufacturers of heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning control systems 
equipped with – and linked to – machine learning algorithms, and aesthetically 
appealing as lifestyle gadgets. In early 2014, US company Google acquired Nest 
for US$3.2 billion (Heisler 2016). Even though the acquisition might not have 
resulted in returns that would justify the high price tag, according to Heisler, 
Google’s intention was to become a holistic service provider with access to 
energy consumption data and, more generally, the Smart Home.
Most of the pilot projects and large-scale field trials, which provide more com-
plex services than the previous standard uniform tariffs, focus on  differentiated 
electricity prices (day – night, weekdays – weekend, summer holidays –  regular 
working weeks, or even more fine-grained differentiations of retail tariffs 
according to actual wholesale market prices). However, they have not yielded 
satisfactory results in terms of energy savings and residential demand shifts. 
Even the European Commission admits that residential consumers are only 
shifting 3 per cent of their demand when tariff schemes include a financial 
incentive to shift demand (European Commission 2018). Hence, business 
models that focus solely on shifting and optimising residential demand suffer 
from the fact that this type of demand is more inelastic than anticipated. The 
differences in tariffs simply do not provide a sufficiently rewarding incentive 
for consumers to change their habits when washing clothes, boiling water for 
tea, or baking a cake. Uniform tariffs are comparable to an insurance premium 
that residential consumers are willing to pay in order not to bother about the 
real (i.e. wholesale market) price of power. One has to bear in mind, though, 
these are very early days in terms of automation of household appliances, and 
it may get easier with new generations of white goods to access value at that 
granular level of residential, domestic consumption.
By contrast, service models that include other factors of convenience, such 
as making the home safer or allowing for assisted living, are more likely to 
attract the attention of customers. Utilities have realised that their expertise 
in these fields is limited. Even during liberalisation, their willingness to enter 
alliances was limited. They instead set up their proprietary business units, such 
as in trading, but now utilities have start establishing alliances. For example, 
German utility EnBW has founded a company called Qivicon, together with 
partners from telecommunications as well as white goods and Smart Home 
device manufacturers.
Service and operating models become attractive for a few reasons:
•	Cash-strapped utilities may no longer have the financial leverage and shy 
away from investing in capital-intensive infrastructure, such as large-scale 
power plants. In addition, they fear stranded assets and the risks associated 
with an uncertain regulatory and market environment.
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•	By contrast, they do have the expertise for providing services, at least in the 
field of energy, within their existing workforce. Often that type of human 
capital is dispersed across different business units, though, and has to 
become reorganised to provide a single point of contact for customers.
The less capital-intensive nature of these service-oriented business models 
makes it easier for new entrants and start-ups to enter the sector, too. The disrup-
tive changes of digitalisation lower barriers to entry because hardware becomes 
less important than software, AI algorithms, and the customer interface.
Envio Systems is one example of a company that has utilised the hardware-
as-a-service model, much like a marketing tool to attract cash-constrained cus-
tomers to enter a service contract with them. Even though their payback period 
is substantially shorter than their high-end competitors, such as Siemens and 
Schneider Electric, the case of Envio Systems shows that the market for retrofit-
ting existing buildings is still challenging.
Timo Leukefeld confirms this view. By contrast, his strategy is building and 
renting out new single-family and multi-story houses that are equipped with 
PV panels, solar thermal installations, a stationary battery, and a large water 
reservoir to store the heat. In this case, the configuration of the dwellings can be 
optimised according to the energy-efficiency standards. His practice cooperates 
with real estate developers, banks, and utilities. It is highly successful because 
tenants pay only slightly higher rents than in conventional houses. He believes 
in the ‘flat rate society’, where energy is part of a larger convenience package.
In the developing world, service and operating models are prospering, too. 
Solarkiosk has chosen a franchising approach of renting out its kiosks, because 
otherwise they would be too expensive for the shopkeepers in the countries 
they are targeting. It also leaves a maximum amount of autonomy to the opera-
tors of the kiosks – namely which products they want to sell and which services 
they offer – because the founders of the start-up believe that local residents 
would know best about the demand structure. Solarkiosk also shows that coop-
erations can be highly beneficial, as is the case with having Coca-Cola as a 
financial partner.
New platform models
Even before the liberalisation started, the electricity (and to some extent also 
natural gas) sector had some characteristics of a platform model: An entity – in 
most cases the grid operator, the utility, or a regional transmission  operator – 
was in charge of coordinating multiple generation units and power plants, 
which were sometimes owned by private operators. As opposed to grid opera-
tions, which are a critical part of the infrastructure with elements of a natural 
monopoly, liberalisation in the generation part of the value chain added whole-
sale markets as trading platforms. Organisations such as the European Energy 
Exchange in Leipzig, with its subsidiaries and partners all across Europe, are 
providers of the IT infrastructure, but neither own assets nor operate them.
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In Phase I of the energy transformation, they are the relevant references for 
buyers and sellers of energy, either directly or indirectly via brokers. When a 
country enters Phase II of the transformation, regulation often changes from 
fixed instruments such as feed-in tariffs to market-based mechanisms to com-
pensate owners of renewable-energy assets. They have to develop their own 
strategies for how to earn money on the market, or they can shift that respon-
sibility to aggregators. These companies typically offer a package of services 
to the owners that is centred around the timing and duration of operating the 
assets. They combine individual assets into virtual power plants. In Germany, 
Next Kraftwerke is the largest aggregator, combining a total of more than 6800 
generation units, most of them renewable energies, with a capacity of almost 6 
GW under its digital umbrella (as of February 2019).
This service is not limited to generation units. It can also integrate Demand 
Response for peak-shaving or ancillary grid services such as balancing energy, 
which become increasingly important when the share of renewable-energy 
intake rises above certain thresholds. Oliver Stahl, the founder and former 
CEO of the Demand Response solution provider Entelios, was interviewed for 
this book. His company not only aggregates and coordinates participants in 
the pool, but also offers this service to utilities that may not have the relevant 
expertise. In the interview, Stahl describes three major hurdles for Demand 
Response. The first is to make potential customers aware of the financial attrac-
tiveness of temporarily reducing their demand and gaining their confidence. 
Entelios picked one customer per industry sector as a role model in order to 
convince other players from the same sector. Second, not all industries are 
equally well-suited for Demand Response. In particular, the chemicals industry 
showed some hesitation because many processes are highly sensitive to fluctua-
tions in energy supply. Third, becoming an integrated segment of a utility did 
not work because the representatives of the sales department – the most likely 
business unit to internally host a Demand Response provider – had an antago-
nistic incentive system and working culture.
In Europe, one of the largest companies offering Demand Response to com-
mercial and industrial consumers is the Belgian start-up Restore, which targets 
the primary reserve and frequency control markets and operates in all ancillary 
services and capacity markets in Europe.
Some countries that have started moving from Phase II to Phase III of the 
transformation offer possibilities to establish peer-to-peer trading platforms. 
Australian start-up Power Ledger is one of them. Individuals can trade energy 
without interference from a utility as the intermediary. Depending on the regu-
latory context, these options are easier to implement in separate micro-grids, 
which are semi-detached from the central grid, because there is a higher degree 
of administrative autonomy.
Platform models have become very popular in many parts of the busi-
ness world. Hospitality, accommodation, and transport services are offered 
that connect private individuals with other private individuals. Once energy 
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services become largely decentralised, platforms may not only allow for trad-
ing, but also for more complex interactions. Australian start-up Power Ledger 
envisages smart demand and supply management, whole-market settlements, 
carbon trading, and even certain services in the management of transmission 
networks, such as network load-balancing, as future applications of its platform.
3.10.2 Six core competencies for corporate decision makers
How can corporate and political decision makers optimise their actions 
towards the transformation of the energy sector? The interviews with founders 
and entrepreneurs in the field of decentralised energy systems yielded impor-
tant insights.
Digitalisation
The core competency that all industries are currently establishing is expertise 
in digitalisation – a theme that is present in all interviews – be it with artifi-
cial intelligence in the case of Envio Systems, the remote operating centres of 
Entelios, Mobisol, and SOLshare, or the blockchain-based application platform 
of Power Ledger. Beyond the capability of navigating in the digital sphere, the 
authors have identified five core competencies that will be decisive in tomor-
row’s decentralised energy markets.
Customer centricity
Customer centricity is an overarching, recurring theme in all of the interviews, 
which comes as no surprise, given that customers are coming into the focus of 
companies across almost all sectors.
Some of the start-ups presented in this chapter have customer-centricity 
within their corporate DNA. For example, demand-side management can only 
succeed if clients are treated individually in their energy-consumption and 
energy-savings patterns. Similarly, Envio Systems is developing a digital clone 
of each dwelling that is equipped with its Cubes, because retrofitting existing 
building stock requires a high degree of customisation – as opposed to building 
efficiency being implemented, for example, in greenfield real estate develop-
ments, where certain technological features can be replicated across all objects. 
Solarkiosk leaves it up to the operators of its kiosks as to which products and 
services they want to sell, since these people have a better understanding of 
the local context and the needs of future clients. Their approach combines the 
two worlds of charity projects with business ventures into a social enterprise. 
As Lars Krückeberg, co-founder of Solarkiosk, comments with regards to the 
context of developing countries, ‘The combination of the two worlds is the only 
implementable option that allows for scalability’.
Other start-ups have developed standardised solutions but use a customer-
centric approach in refining their technologies and business models. For 
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example, Klara Lindner reports that Mobisol developed a plug and play kit in 
co-creation sessions with real customers. Later they realised that their custom-
ers were not willing to do the installations by themselves, so they adapted their 
business model to accommodate that wish by hiring local village technicians, 
who would be in charge of the installations.
The core competency required in all these areas is not customer-centricity 
per se, but rather finding the balance between listening to users while ensuring 
a high degree of standardisation. Customer-centricity comes at a price, and the 
core competency required is to drive costs down by developing new forms of 
mass customisation.
Financing and enabling of asset ownership
Start-ups have developed diverse strategies for how they can help prosumers to 
finance decentralised generation assets. Especially in developing countries, the 
major hurdle of a large upfront investment has been removed; in rural settings, 
residential owners of rooftop solar systems can generate additional revenues – 
for example by charging their neighbours’ mobile phones or selling electricity 
on the micro-grid – to repay their debts, as the interviews with SOLshare and 
Solarkiosk and the contribution about Mobisol show. Start-ups use advanced 
transaction systems that are adapted to local markets, with the additional 
advantage of full transparency of money flows via apps on their mobile phones. 
For instance, SOLshare co-operates with bKash, currently the largest mobile 
money provider.
Financial competencies stretch into the sphere of cryptocurrencies. Aus-
tralian start-up Power Ledger does not rely on Bitcoin, the most popular and 
widely known cryptocurrency, but enables transactions with a virtual currency 
called Spark, which consumers can use to purchase electricity or as producers 
to sell it. Power Ledger also spearheads the financing revolution in terms of 
crowdfunding and ICOs. In October 2017, Power Ledger raised more than €20 
million through its token generation event. More than 15,000 buyers took part 
in Australia’s first ICO.
Technology leads and product innovation
Despite the fact that the power supply industry is moving from product to ser-
vice orientation, all start-ups have developed intellectual property in terms of 
product innovations. Envio Systems relies on its Cube, which is equipped with 
sensors like a CO2 sensor, to detect whether any person is actually present, 
and then uses proprietary artificial intelligence to optimise the consumption 
patterns of its clients. Mobisol works with its own direct current (DC) system, 
which is complemented by the household appliances of partner manufactur-
ers running on DC. SOLshare produces its SOLbox and SOLcontrol devices 
directly in its workshops in Bangladesh. Solarkiosk developed and tested the 
containers that would later be transformed into kiosks under extreme climatic 
conditions in laboratories of the Beuth School of Applied Sciences in Berlin 
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before the first kiosks were shipped to Africa. Power Ledger has built a propri-
etary IT architecture based on blockchain transaction protocols. Entelios also 
uses its own software to coordinate automatically the loads of its clients.
Technological advances and innovations give start-ups the leading edge and 
competitive differentiation. If companies rely on a pure service model, they can 
easily be crowded out by larger and financially stronger rivals.
Partnerships and bundled services
In a complex and highly dynamic market environment, no single company is 
able to provide all the elements of its value proposition by itself. Especially in 
the regulated world of utilities, which were the sole providers of energy, part-
nerships were not necessary because tariffs were a product of negotiations 
between suppliers and regulatory agencies or the government. Liberalisation 
has opened up the market to a range of combinations – packaged offers that 
may include entertainment, security, and individual transport in addition to 
core energy services. Consumers may enter, as Timo Leukefeld calls it, ‘the flat 
rate society’, where renting a house includes all turnkey solutions of conveni-
ence, plus free access to electric mobility. Leukefeld cooperates with real estate 
developers, banks, and utilities to build his dwellings. Energy is the trigger and 
remains an important element of his value proposition, but it is complemented 
by other products and services.
Similarly, Solarkiosk has teamed up with Coca-Cola, Ericsson, and Total. 
Envio Systems is seeking partners in major property management companies 
and with an elevator manufacturer. SOLshare has strong ties to Grameen Shakti, 
with whom it received the US$1 million UN DESA Powering the Future We 
Want prize. The municipal utility of Munich became the first industry partner 
of Entelios and already signed a contract even before its founder, Oliver Stahl, 
had approached venture capitalists for additional financing. In its international 
expansion, Power Ledger has deals, for example, with BCPG, one of the largest 
solar IPPs in Thailand; Tech Mahindra in India; and the Liechtenstein Insti-
tute for Strategic Development, which will become the first application host to 
offer Power Ledger’s blockchain-based peer-to-peer energy-trading platform 
in Europe.
With the increasing convergence of the energy and transport sectors, digitali-
sation affecting all aspects of our lives, and US tech giants entering energy mar-
kets, executives face no other option than to enter partnerships and alliances if 
they want to survive in the marketplace.
Platforms/ecosystems
Digitalisation allows multiple players to enter markets and match supply and 
demand. As companies such as Uber, Airbnb, and eBay have demonstrated in 
other sectors, ownership of physical assets may not be necessary to succeed in 
the marketplace. The value proposition is derived instead from the coordina-
tion of providers and seekers of certain services. Sometimes these markets do 
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not exist and have to be established: Entelios triggered the market for Demand 
Response in Germany, as much as EnerNOC contributed to similar develop-
ments in the United States. Start-ups and cash-constrained utilities may seize 
the opportunity to provide the IT architecture to connect sellers and buyers, 
often with technologies that circumvent conventional routes.
Australian start-up Power Ledger has demonstrated with its token genera-
tion event that platform applications will change how the electricity supply 
industry functions, for example: peer-to-peer trading; smart demand and sup-
ply management with remuneration and payment settlements; management 
of consumer exposure to the risk of non-supply; collection of big data; Smart 
Contracts for carbon traders; management of transmission networks; network 
load-balancing; and power ports that allow electric vehicles to become mobile 
storage discharge facilities.
Many ecosystems do not yet exist, but those companies and governments 
that foresee their benefits and start with the implementation may be the win-
ners in the energy world of the future.
3.10.3 A world of entrepreneurial activity
The business models of the seven start-ups that have been presented in this 
chapter are of course only a fragment of the wide spectrum of entrepreneurial 
activity that has emerged across the globe. Start-ups in all continents seize the 
opportunity of decentralisation to launch their ventures – some of them focus-
ing on new business models with existing technologies, others developing new 
generation technologies or platforms. Innovation has moved from research labs 
and R&D departments of manufacturers and utilities to a generation of young 
ventures – with digitalisation as the major driver for reducing barriers to entry.
As outlined in Section 3.1 of this chapter, the global energy transformation can 
be differentiated according to three distinct phases, which may vary and overlap 
across countries and regions. The next chapter summarises the insights from 
both regulatory conditions and business models within the respective phase.
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The three phases of the energy 
transformation – combining governance 
and business model innovation
This chapter merges the findings of the two preceding chapters – on the importance 
of governance and the simultaneous development of business models – in moving 
from the conventional, fossil fuel-based energy system to one that is decentralised, 
renewable and based on energy efficiency. It highlights characteristics of three dis-
tinct phases during that transition and concludes that it is vital to align govern-
ance (policies, network rules, market rules, institutions etc.) with flexible system 
operation to achieve a smooth transition. In the context of developing countries 
with incomplete grid infrastructure, regulatory incentives and business initiatives 
may lead to a leapfrogging effect from Phase I to Phase III, though.
4.1 Three phases of the transformation
The transformation towards a decentralised energy system entails both regu-
latory incentives as well as entrepreneurial initiatives. There are three broad 
phases in moving from the conventional, fossil fuel-based energy system to one 
that is decentralised, renewable and based on energy efficiency.
In technical terms, Phase I can roughly be associated with a niche deploy-
ment of decentralised renewable energies; in Phase II, their contribution rises 
to become a major player in the supply portfolio, enabled by governance which 
provides value for the necessary system flexibility requirements; and Phase III 
is characterised by decentralised renewable energies as the dominant player 
within a flexibly operated system.
The following table describes the main features of each phase.
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Table 5: Overview of the three phases of energy transformation.
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4.2 Phase I (Energiewende 1.0): grid-based and connected 
energy system with decentralised renewables as a niche  
(<10 per cent)
4.2.1 Governance of Phase I: centralised system regulation 
promoting renewables, local industry, and lead markets
Most countries in the world have ratified targets for the rollout of renewable 
energies (Ren21 2017a). The encompassing objective typically is the move 
towards less carbon-intensive energy supply, thus contributing to the reduction 
of greenhouse gases.
Governance in Phase I is driven by incentivising the deployment of renewa-
bles. In some countries, the introduction of regulatory incentives to promote 
renewable energies was accompanied by objectives related to industrial policy, 
in the attempt to create lead markets for solar cell manufacturers or wind tur-
bine producers. For example, the Danish wind turbine industry and the Ger-
man photovoltaic manufacturers greatly benefitted from direct and indirect 
subsidies and support schemes governments imposed to promote these tech-
nologies (Lipp 2007; Nicolini & Tavoni 2017; Strunz, Gawel & Lehmann 2016).
Some of these joint renewable and industrial policies were successful, for 
example the development of Danish wind turbine producer Vestas on the back 
of policies to support domestic wind energy. Vestas is still among the world’s 
leading wind turbine manufacturers, providing a role model of where public 
and corporate interests have been aligned.
Other incentives such as those for solar photovoltaics in Germany led to 
short boom for some German photovoltaic manufacturers. In the longer 
term, those manufacturers, for example SolarWorld (DW 2017), could not 
compete with companies from countries with much lower unit production 
costs, in particular China. The ambition of the German government to create 
an East German ‘Solar Valley’ in the state of Brandenburg did not yield the 
expected results. Most of the companies either went into bankruptcy when 
the incentives were reduced, or were acquired by Asian competitors (Fuchs 
2015). However, it has also led to the development of ‘second’ generation pho-
tovoltaic knowledge in Germany, as well as the development of inverters and 
fittings – which make up 40 per cent of the cost of the panels (Wirth 2018). In 
the longer term, higher shipping costs and long delivery times may improve 
the competitiveness of German and European manufacturers vis-à-vis their 
Asian competitors (ibid.).
Other countries, such as the Netherlands, decided to follow a wait-and-see 
strategy and initiated incentive schemes only after the costs per kilowatt hour 
were substantially reduced.
The advantage of that strategy is that it avoided any boom-and-bust of Dutch 
manufacturing industries and saved direct subsidies, that is, Dutch taxpay-
ers’ money. The benefits have to be counterbalanced, though, with potentially 
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negative consequences for countries like the Netherlands in terms of innova-
tion capabilities, because of the limited involvement and experience with new 
energy technologies and system operation.
In Phase I, energy governance encompasses direct policies primarily in sup-
port of new capacity, but also other issues related to network access rules, mar-
ket rules and design, retail competition rules, and so on. The most common 
policy incentives in support of renewable energy development are feed-in tar-
iffs (FITs), net metering, and renewable portfolio standards. All instruments 
have their pros and cons (SSREN 2012):
•	Feed-in tariffs (FITs) are based on a fixed remuneration per kilowatt hour 
fed into the grid, typically over a time horizon of ten to twenty years, and 
can be considered a long-term purchase agreement. FITs typically guaran-
tee a fixed price per kWh, an offtake contract, and priority access to the net-
work and electricity market. This means that risk is substantially reduced 
for investors, and it is possible to borrow money on the contract. There are 
multiple examples of FITs in different countries, including Australia, China, 
Denmark, and the United States, with Germany generally seen as the most 
successful case – see country Section 2.9.
FITs tend to be technology specific, which means the remuneration 
given depends on the technology and its investment costs. With this instru-
ment, governments can steer their support towards individual renewable 
sources which would not be competitive in market-based approaches, for 
examples auctions. Historically, solar power has benefitted from FITs.
In Phase I of the energy transformation, feed-in tariffs provide mar-
ket certainty for investors (Cox & Esterly 2016), but they may become too 
expensive in later stages and be replaced by more market-based instru-
ments: ‘Policymakers have recently been moving towards designing FITs as 
a premium in addition to the current market rate for electricity, known as 
feed-in premiums’ (ibid.).
•	Another Phase I type policy in support of scaling technologies is Net Energy 
Metering (NEM), also called Net Metering. It allows residential owners of 
photovoltaic panels to sell their surplus electricity to the local utility at retail 
rates – the meter in effect turns back for every kWh that is injected from 
home into the grid. In return, households benefit from a net reduction of 
their utility expenses. NEM originates from the United States, and has been 
a popular instrument there. As of November 2017, 38 US states, Washing-
ton DC, and four territories offer net metering incentives (NCSL 2017). 
Especially in states in the south-western part of the United States with high 
solar radiation or in states with high electricity tariffs, such as in the New 
England states in the north-eastern part of the country, net metering can 
significantly lower the electricity bill of prosumers.
•	The third major instrument in Phase I are Renewable Portfolio Standards 
(RPS), also called Renewable Energy Standards – again, usually found 
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in the United States, and often in conjunction with net energy metering. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards force utilities to reach a certain percentage 
of renewable energies in their portfolio within a given time frame. Depend-
ing on their design – for example, through tendering or auctions – they 
are often intended to encourage competition between external providers as 
well as between technologies to achieve the maximum reduction of green-
house gas emissions at the lowest price.
When choosing policy incentives, policy makers have to consider their effect 
on promoting centralised or decentralised generation infrastructure, illustrated 
in Figure 40. The set-up of the instruments may have a fundamental impact 
on the infrastructure. With quotas, capacity payments, or renewable portfolio 
standards investor-owned utilities (IOUs) tend to build central infrastructure 
in line with their current business model and core competencies, whereas FITs, 
Net Metering, or Demand-Side Response (DSP) tend to attract decentralised 
infrastructure enabling a faster transformation towards Phase III.
During this first phase of development, the system is dominated by incum-
bent generators and suppliers, and grid operations remain centrally controlled 
by transmission and distribution system operators, as they have been for pre-
vious decades. The total contribution of power generation from new renewa-
bles hovers below critical thresholds. There is very limited impact on system 
operation, system costs, average electricity costs or on displacement of fossil 
fuels and nuclear power in the merit order. Utilities, system operators, and 
private companies are able to use the first experiences of intermittent sources 
within electricity systems to learn to develop and apply forecasting models 
and develop processes for information exchange, billing and accounting, and 
potential operational issues (Baumgartner 2017).
However, although the actual percentage of decentralised renewable electric-
ity may not be high, it is also possible for countries to find the ownership of 
their generation transformed during this first phase – as with Denmark in the 
1980s and 1990s (see also Section 2.8).
Figure 41: Policy incentives in centralised and decentralised systems.
Source: Authors’ contribution.
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4.2.2 Business models and core competencies of Phase I
In Phase I of the energy transformation, the traditional business model of 
power companies remains relatively unaffected by the deployment of renewa-
bles as their contribution remains low. Incumbent utilities continue to supply 
the vast majority of power, balancing against largely predictable demand fluc-
tuations. The main investment uncertainties are about future demand and the 
price of fossil fuels.
Business models evolve around new offers in terms of financing, installation 
and operations of decentralised renewable energy assets. Private investors are 
attracted to participate in the energy market because of the low-risk purchase 
guarantees, available through instruments such as feed-in tariffs or net meter-
ing. Bioenergy villages and energy associations are founded, which rely on par-
ticipatory decision-making and financial contributions from their members.
In this phase, it is not the volume of renewable energies that is transformative. 
For institutional investors, one of the most appealing attributes of renewables 
is that they are scalable. Cost reductions of renewable technologies have made 
even smaller-scale deployment economic, enabling small and medium-sized 
companies to enter into a market previously dominated by vertically integrated 
utilities, and small domestic or commercial level consumers to become pro-
sumers. Consequently, decentralised generation, combined with energy effi-
ciency and balancing of localised markets, creates the knowledge and human 
resource foundation for a broader decentralised supply industry.
Start-ups, utilities, and new entrants from other sectors, in particular infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) and finance, gather expertise 
from the experience with first installations and pilot projects. In the first pio-
neering countries and states of the energy transformation, such as California, 
Denmark, and Germany, innovation has mainly focused on technologies and 
products, in particular the decline of unit costs of technologies such as solar 
cells and wind turbines, whereas in countries that have started later with pro-
grams to promote decentralised renewables, the momentum shifts from prod-
uct to service innovation – with sophisticated financing models, integrated 
solutions such as smart homes, and a digital ecosystem.
4.3 Phase II (Energiewende 2.0): decentralised renewables 
growing in importance with partially autonomous solutions
4.3.1 Governance of Phase II: setting the ground for 
Energiewende 3.0 with performance-based regulation
When the system moves into Phase II, policy makers start modifying incen-
tive systems, as the costs of renewable technologies fall and their deployment 
becomes more widespread. Simultaneously, government and regulators develop 
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a deeper understanding of the key decisions they have to make if they want 
cost-effective, higher percentages of renewables (REN21 2017b). The early-
mover countries are observed to abandon the initial subsidy schemes and estab-
lish more market-based mechanisms, such as auctioning, in parallel to FITs for 
smaller scale technologies. However, late-adopter countries are able to benefit 
from the impact of the first movers.
In this phase, the challenge for managing the governance framework is to 
ensure stable market conditions while creating a regulatory environment that 
encourages innovation and new market actors. The governance framework sets 
the policy direction and creates the regulatory framework to implement instru-
ments that support and incentivise new actors or penalise uncompetitive prac-
tices, either via top-down or bottom-up processes.
In Phase II, governance has to lay the foundations for flexibility and energy 
efficiency, integrating consumers, developing mechanisms to deliver meaning-
ful consent from people and society for the transformation, as well as electricity 
with heat and transport, and to evaluate network costs versus decentralised 
solutions. All these elements become crucial for a smooth transition to and as 
part of Phase III, where differing proportions of central to decentralised sys-
tems co-exist. Management of the process and expectations of the stakeholders 
involved becomes an important part to enable adaptation to new circum-
stances. Participatory approaches to integrate customers’ requests and wishes 
into the public discourse are established, for example with regards to a higher 
density of wind turbines next to residential neighbourhoods, or the construc-
tion of new transmission lines (or the reinforcement of existing lines).
As the percentage of variable renewables increase, and if the system is oper-
ated in the same way as during Phase I, security of supply shifts to the attention 
of regulators and policy makers. The transmission and distribution grids have 
to be reinforced and expanded in certain areas. The distribution grid is affected, 
because conventional lines were laid out to unidirectionally satisfy residential 
demand. If entire neighbourhoods or even villages start producing their pho-
tovoltaic energy with decentralised units – and no adequate local storage solu-
tions can temporarily absorb the power – supply may exceed local demand, and 
the electricity has to be transported to the next load centre. Large-scale wind 
power makes additional investments necessary at higher-voltage transmission 
levels, because – similar to photovoltaics in rural areas – wind power tends not 
to be produced in areas with high demand, such as urban agglomerations and 
their adjacent industrial sites.
Thus, increasing amounts of renewables  requires new ways of regulation and 
operation of the system  so that expensive additional transmission and distribu-
tion capacity can be kept to a minimum. The type of regulation and compensation 
mechanisms has a fundamental impact on how much  additional transmission 
and distribution infrastructure capacity is required and the  number of interven-
tions needed by the grid operators, and this of course also affects the final cost 
of electricity to the customer (Shakoor, Davies & Strbac 2017).
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As outlined in Section 2.9.4, the move to more flexible system operations is 
likely to reduce costs and ensure security of supply. It is not only a key  requirement 
for Phase II but also the enabler of Phase III of the energy  transformation. If 
the system becomes flexible very fast, Phase II may be substantially shortened 
and the transformation can occur in a non-disruptive way. Ensuring sufficient 
flexible resources and coordinating them efficiently is therefore a central aspect 
of the transformation from a fossil-based electricity system to a decentralised one.
Flexibility measures can include, for example, building short-term stor-
age facilities, such as stationary batteries, improving industrial and resi-
dential demand-side response, reducing short-term and long-term energy 
 consumption, and implementing local markets. Flexibility is closely linked to 
energy efficiency. Incentives to increase energy efficiency include both meas-
ures directed towards end users to enhance the efficiency of their buildings 
and appliances, as well as incentives to increase efficiency of energy system 
operations. The coordination of heat, electric mobility and decentralised 
power generation offers new possibilities to adapt demand to inelastic supply 
by intermittent renewables.
The least expensive solution to increased flexibility and efficiency during 
Phase II is demand-side response, though. As a platform model, it builds on 
the existing assets, exploits their flexibility potential, and brings down peak 
infrastructure needs and peak costs. The interview with Oliver Stahl, founder 
of German demand-response pioneer Entelios, in Section 3.5 of this book pro-
vides insights into the underlying mechanisms and business models.
Each of the policy interventions of Phase II will of course have to be coun-
terbalanced with questions of privacy and data protection (see also Burger, 
Trbovich & Weinmann 2018). Until now, society has collectively embraced the 
transfer of private information as a compensation for services it gets for free 
by providers such as Facebook, Google, What’s App, or Amazon. Sociologists 
call this willingness to share certain aspects of one’s life the ‘Privacy Paradox’ 
(Wittes & Liu 2015; van Zoonen 2016; Wittes & Kohse 2017). Understanding 
what this means for society, and hence energy, is still in its infancy.
While there is a logical progression from Phase I to Phase III, how long 
any country needs to stay in Phase II is not pre-determined, and may in 
future be shortening as new technologies become economically viable and 
widely  available. As Chapter 2 has shown, a key determining factor will be the 
 governance framework and the efficiency of its coordination that can accelerate 
or slow down the rate of new technology deployment.
4.3.2 Business models and core competencies of Phase II
In Phase II of the energy transformation, the deployment of decentralised 
renewables becomes non-negligible and increasingly affects system and market 
operations.
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The larger intake of renewable sources typically reduces wholesale market 
prices. On the European Energy Exchange, the spot-market power price fell 
to €29 per Megawatt hour in 2016, down from more than €70 per Megawatt 
hour in 2008. This trend is caused by the low operating costs of renewables, 
which crowd out more expensive coal and gas-fired thermal plants on the 
dispatch curve in the conventional marginal cost electricity market design 
(Thalman 2015).
In the short term, low wholesale prices are beneficial for consumers. If prices 
fall below certain thresholds of viable commercial operations, though, utili-
ties may start mothballing or even dismantling central power plants. From a 
public perspective some of this may have positive effects – for example, the 
closure of coal plants to curb greenhouse gas emissions. However, flexible nat-
ural gas plants may compensate for supply fluctuations in the move towards 
systems with a higher share of decentralised renewable energies. In this situa-
tion, closure of flexible gas plants may not be in the mid-term public interest. 
Consequently, policy makers may modify the regulatory framework by setting 
up capacity markets for targeted flexible generation. In addition, they have to 
establish appropriate compensation mechanisms for stranded nuclear or fossil 
assets of utilities.
For conventional electric utilities, Phase II of the energy transformation 
leads to fundamental changes in their business model. Declining revenues 
from wholesale markets and thermal plants turning into stranded assets leads 
to financial stress. The orientation towards customer centricity and mind shift 
from large scale to small scale, in particular individualised energy efficiency 
solutions, cannot be expected to occur over night. Moreover, utilities have to 
deal with dwindling market shares in the new system, as new entrants threaten 
their positions. Digitalisation and falling technology prices enable players from 
other sectors and even start-ups to step in and establish themselves offering 
integrated solutions in the utilities’ core markets. Utilities become aware that 
they cannot compete with tech giants and ICT firms on their own – hence, they 
start entering partnerships and alliances with telecommunication companies, 
providers of smart goods or start-ups to provide complex service solutions, 
for example in the smart home or electric vehicle charging markets. Product 
innovation then becomes a joint effort, connecting the digital ecosystem with 
smart devices.
As already highlighted, the introduction of feed-in-tariffs, especially for solar 
and wind, has enabled individuals, energy associations and local communities 
to invest in renewable energy. This is now expanding with consumers show-
ing active engagement in combined storage and solar systems. New business 
models are enabling installations without, or with less, government support. In 
Germany and Australia, individual households with batteries and solar PV are 
being offered free electricity when they are unable to generate their own supply, 
in return for their batteries being used to maintain grid frequency – the crea-
tion of virtual power plants (Energy Brainpool 2016; Griffith 2017).
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Increasing automation and data processing capabilities are leading to the 
development of new apps and platforms. A wide range of companies emerges, 
which automatically aggregate consumers buying power (such a Labrador 
power in the United Kingdom) and develop opportunities for flexible demand 
(such as Tempus Energy in Australia). These companies require consent from 
consumers to enable them to facilitate the automatic switch between suppliers 
and to vary consumption. The success of these companies is determined both 
by the regulatory environment in which they operate, and the on-going trust 
of consumers. Data management and automation is likely to reduce the need 
for active engagement of consumers to reduce their energy consumption; how-
ever, it will not eradicate it. If there is a societal consensus to curb greenhouse 
gas emissions, conscious lifestyle changes and consumer behaviour shifts are 
also needed.
The major change in business models during Phase II is the focus on custom-
ers’ needs. Energy is no longer a commodity to be sold via the meter, it rather 
becomes a unique combination of technologies adapted to each individual 
rooftop (with respect to PV installations), to the topography of the territory 
(with respect to wind turbines), or to the agricultural intake from local farmers 
for biomass co-generation technologies. Decentralised deployment of renew-
able energy technologies supports local businesses and technicians, thereby 
creating local value.
4.4 Phase III (Energiewende 3.0): decentralised renewables as 
dominant player with fully autonomous solutions
4.4.1 Governance of Phase III: consumer-
focused, ambition-driven regulation
The third phase of the energy transformation, or ‘Energiewende 3.0’, is char-
acterised by decentralised renewable energies becoming the major player in 
the supply structure. Phase III is yet to exist in any developed country. Some 
countries and regions, such as Australia, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, as well 
as some states in the United States, experience prolonged intervals in elec-
tricity supply when new renewable energies account for the main source of 
primary electricity. For example, in March 2018 Portugal’s renewable energy 
production exceeded power demand and accounted for more than 100 per 
cent of mainland electricity consumption (Reuters 2018). However, so far, 
even countries with higher proportions of decentralised renewable genera-
tion have not moved to becoming highly flexible energy systems. This flexibil-
ity characteristic can be seen as a key determinator of moving from Phase II 
to Phase III. Governance – meaning market design, network rules and incen-
tives, tariff policy, its coordination and so forth – has been changed by the 
time a country becomes a Phase III country.
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In rural settings of countries in the developing world, such as India, key 
characteristics of Phase III already exist, albeit often on a very low level of the 
energy ladder, and with substantial financial disadvantages for local residents.
The transformation is likely to occur in most geographic contexts, but its 
dynamics may vary across countries and continents. Different phases might 
co-exist across regions of a single country, for example in urban versus rural 
settings. Some countries might opt for largely remaining within the Phase I 
configuration, for example, if energy generation is predominantly based on 
large, central hydropower dams, which often produce cheap and climate-
neutral electricity. Especially in developing countries with low electrification 
ratios, companies and governments may be able to leverage lessons learned in a 
Phase I environment and leapfrog directly to Phase III with largely autonomous 
island systems.
In the first two phases of the energy transformation, the pace of deployment 
of renewables is to a large extent determined by the national governance frame-
work, including the ability of local administrations to be involved.
As electrification occurs in new sectors, such as transport, and to improve the 
efficiency of electricity generation, the governance framework needs to enable 
the co-existence of different systems: central grid-based, autonomous decentral 
entities and regions, further integration of heat and e-mobility. As the energy 
system decentralises, the importance of a distribution level system coordinator 
increases, to not only manage technical operations in the interest of all stake-
holders, but also to stimulate new markets and thus enable new entrants and 
innovators. The increasing coordination function of the distribution system 
operator, leads to their development as a platform provider or Distribution 
System Platform.
At the heart of the future system must be performance-based regulation, 
which not only ensures supply obligations to be met, but also wider social and 
environmental sector goals to be delivered. This means that reforming regula-
tion will encompass how to deal with winners and losers – and this is more 
than creating an open and transparent decision-making process. Society as a 
whole has to enter a public discourse over price stability and security of sup-
ply, jobs and corporate interests, climate change and effects on the local envi-
ronment, for example wind turbines or large PV fields, and how to deal with 
stranded assets, in particular obsolete long-haul transmission lines.
Regulatory instruments, such as the introduction of capacity payments dis-
cussed in Phase II, can give rise to supply stability, but may also, in some cases, 
support incumbents’ fossil-fired power plants that were scheduled to be moth-
balled because of environmental reasons. With intermittent solar and wind 
intake, there will be a resource abundance at certain times, and extreme scar-
city (and high prices) at other times. Hence, storage will become a major issue 
for policy makers.
The need to rapidly decarbonise the economy may impose targets and objec-
tives that require the deployment of low-carbon technologies even at a faster 
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rate than the market would ordinarily deliver. This may lead to additional 
policy-driven market interventions. Under the right regulatory environment, 
the next wave of technologies could be rapidly deployed at scale, as they have 
uses beyond the traditional power sector. While the development of batteries is 
being driven by and for electric vehicles, it will have important implications for 
both grid level and individual electricity storage.
The balance between public and private ownership and engagement within 
the power sector varies between countries. However, in general the most rapid 
move towards Phase III will occur within systems which encourage innovation 
and entrepreneurship, and this is likely to be delivered by the private sector, 
providing the market is fair and transparent and constructed to value the char-
acteristics of renewable energies and demand-side response, and appropriate 
governance mechanisms are in place.
4.4.2 Business and core competencies of Phase III
In Phase III, private platforms, autonomous residents, and local grid ecosystems 
will co-exist with the central grid, leading to an increasing diversity of business 
models that range from convenient standard packages for energy services with 
flat rates, similar to insurances, to fully customised solutions for self-producing 
individuals or communities. Multinational companies, such as Google, Amazon, 
or Apple, will co-exist with start-ups and local initiatives.
The electricity supply industry will be forced to leave its roots as public 
infrastructure service and transform into truly private businesses, offering cus-
tomised solutions for each consumer, while independent system operators or 
private transaction platforms take over responsibilities of grid control.
Digitalisation will of course be a main driver for innovation. It will cope with 
the complexities of the energy grid using sensors, smart meters, drones, and 
augmented/virtual reality in fields as diverse as predictive maintenance, cus-
tomer care, and weather forecasts. Companies that embrace Artificial Intelli-
gence and Neural Networks to detect patterns in their data will have a latent 
advantage over companies that solely rely on conventional computational 
methods. However, energy supply will always entail a technical, engineering 
component. Manufacturers of their own technological devices may have a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis data-only companies.
Private platforms and ecosystems with micro-trading and coordination of 
local balancing markets will emerge. Australian start-up Power Ledger has 
issued the first Initial Coin Offering in the Australian energy sector and builds 
a blockchain-based application platform to facilitate peer-to-peer trading, 
monitoring of flows in the transmission grid, and plans to implement many 
other transaction-related functionalities.
Globalisation will allow for dispersed business operations. For example, 
start-ups Mobisol and SOLshare have established remote operating centres in 
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Berlin, from which they track and monitor the performance of their installa-
tions in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Services offered in remote, rural 
areas integrate energy in a holistic package of services, as in the case of Solarki-
osk. Energy companies and start-ups team up with players such as Total or 
Coca-Cola to correspond to customer needs.
In the past, trickle-down effects of innovations typically happened from 
industrialised to developing countries, but in Phase III new business models 
and digital technologies may first emerge in the developing world and then find 
their way to the industrialised nations. Born out of the need to experiment with 
autonomous micro-grids, with integrated rooftop systems, and with payment 
and financing methods based on the Blockchain, start-ups and entrepreneurs 
in developing countries may establish decentralised energy ecosystems that 
complement or even substitute the central grid.
This stage of transformation creates increased risks of stranded assets for 
existing technologies and their operators. Without transitional assistance, 
incumbents may delay the sector transformation. While governance bodies 
often focus on Phase I objectives and on how to adapt regulation, they may 
neglect the impact of these policies on future infrastructure.
Thinking from Phase III backwards may be an alternative approach in cor-
porate and political decision making, allowing for a more rigorous strategy 
and adaptation.
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Global game changer – leading the future
The final chapter summarises the governance principles, from the country chap-
ters, and the core competencies, drawing on the experiences of the new business 
model case examples, which are necessary to further accelerate the transition to a 
decentralised energy system.
5.1 Six reasons for decentralisation as the key driver of the 
global energy transformation
The energy system is undergoing radical change with decentralised renewables 
as a key driver due to the following trends:
(1) The increasing competitiveness of renewable energy generation 
in liberalised markets – meeting grid parity and heading towards 
energy system parity: renewable energies have attracted major invest-
ments in industrialised countries with an established and reliable 
energy system. As costs have fallen, the motivation to install solar and 
wind power units in these countries has shifted from publicly spon-
sored incentive schemes to grid parity and attractive financing models 
even without subsidies and government aid.
(2) The global spread of decentralised energy generation: since 2010, 
cumulative investment in distributed capacity has been around US$400 
billion, moving energy supply onto rooftops and smaller acreages. Not 
only is this provision of services, but in countries such as Germany, 
Italy, or Australia community-owned initiatives have also become 
engaged in ownership or operation of grid infrastructure.
(3) Decentralised storage gaining importance: storage via batteries is 
a key technology to increase flexibility and adapt the energy  supply 
system to intermittent renewable generation. Advances in storage 
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technologies are speeding up with the race of global car manufactur-
ers to electrify the transport sector, and prices for lithium-ion batteries 
have decreased by 18 per cent between 2017 and 2018.
(4) Decoupling growth and energy intensity via renewables and energy 
efficiency: the energy intensity of the global economy is improving due 
to technological progress and systemic changes. Despite rising GDPs 
in many countries, including China, energy consumption per unit of 
economic output are stable or falling, also because of structural changes 
in their economies – with less reliance on energy-intensive industries 
and a shift to services and digital production.
(5) Value creation with decentralised renewable energy generation: 
renewable energies, in particular solar and wind, not only account 
for an increasing share of employment in the manufacturing of these 
 technologies, but also in local value creation – either in construction and 
installation, or in operation and maintenance. Especially in  countries in 
the developing world, renewable energies are drivers for local employ-
ment and value creation.
(6) Digitalisation as an enabler of disruptive changes in energy markets: 
the core competency that all industries are currently establishing is 
expertise in digitalisation – be it with artificial intelligence, the remote 
operating centres, or blockchain-based peer-to-peer platforms – 
digitalisation lowers barriers to entry for start-ups and facilitates new 
business models, increases customer choice, and is the necessary pre-
condition for decentralised transactions.
5.2 Preparing for the three phases of the energy 
transformation: the 8+3+6 model
Three phases in moving from the conventional, fossil fuel-based supply 
 structure to a decentralised, renewable system can be observed. As outlined in 
Section 3.1 and Chapter 4, Phase I can be associated with a niche deployment 
of decentralised renewable energies, contributing less than 10 per cent to total 
power generation. In Phase II, their contribution to total power generation 
amounts up to 40 per cent and becomes a major factor in the supply portfolio, 
whereas Phase III is characterised by decentralised renewable energies as the 
dominant player within a flexibly operated system with an increasing number 
of fully autonomous solutions not connected to a central grid.
Political and economic decision makers can prepare for the different phases 
of the energy transformation by thinking from Phase III (Energiewende 3.0) 
backwards to leapfrog or to allow the three energy phases to co-exist.
Based on the analysis of the country reports, the following eight recommen-
dations for regulation and governance have been derived.
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5.2.1 Regulation and governance: eight key 
principles for political decision makers
(1) Transparency and legitimate policymaking and institutions
 The governance system needs to be able to offer clear policies and regu-
lation that applies simultaneously to large and decentralised generation 
and public and private sector actors.
(2) Availability and transparency of data
 Transparency of the system needs to enable all stakeholders to engage 
in the way in which the system is operated and, as the system digitalises, 
have access to affordable and secure data.
(3) Customer focus, enabling customer choice
 People will affect the future energy system in three areas – as investors 
and operators, as willing participants and as customers who pay for 
innovative products that enhance their quality of life, and as voting 
supporters of policies and measures that deliver decarbonisation.
(4) Markets to encourage flexibility in supply and demand
 The least expensive solution to increase flexibility and efficiency during 
the transformation is demand-side response. As a platform model, it 
does not require an expensive supply infrastructure but builds on exist-
ing assets, exploits their flexibility potential, enables peak-shaving and 
thus brings down peak costs.
(5) Local system coordinators and a coexistence of the central grid and 
decentralised micro-grids
 Access to payments for flexibility services will be key to enable the pro-
duction of power from solar and wind to be efficiently integrated into 
the system. This requires a more active role for regional operators of 
the distribution system and a greater focus on a bottom-up approach to 
system operation.
(6) Including performance-based elements into sector governance
 The new regulatory framework should be based on performance rather 
than cost-of-service. Performance-based regulation defines desired 
outputs and then establishes an incentive mechanism whereby the util-
ity or company is paid to the extent it delivers the desired outputs, as 
opposed to cost-of-service regulation. Inputs may change provided the 
desired outcomes are met, which means that there will be more flexibil-
ity of choice in delivering those outputs rather than being locked into 
the inputs.
(7) Reassessing investments in the long-distance transmission grid
 If a country starts adding decentralised renewables in combination with 
cheaper flexibility resources, then expensive networks upgrades may 
not be required and reliability problems may be less relevant, thereby 
keeping a cap on infrastructure cost increases.
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(8) An integrative approach to sector regulation
 Ambition-driven regulation does not only ensure supply and balanc-
ing obligations are met, but wider social and environmental goals are 
delivered along a pre-agreed timeline. As the energy system decarbon-
ises and decentralises, the convergence of heat, mobility and power on 
the distribution level requires coordinated regulatory instruments and 
actions. Regulators have to be flexible to establish new processes and 
encourage innovation across sectors.
5.2.2 Business models: three business models plus six 
core competencies for corporate decision makers
The real ‘global game changer’ related to the energy transformation is that 
many of the new technologies are modular and deliver services for individuals 
or communities at the distribution level, as well as at transmission grid scale. 
Electricity supply diverges from the previous model of central generating units 
and heads towards decentralised installations, from public ownership and large 
corporate entities who control the assets to a dispersed and fragmented owner-
ship structure, often dominated by private individuals, such as homeowners, 
farmers, or energy associations. Corporate leaders can prepare their companies 
for the different phases of the energy transformation by thinking from Ener-
giewende 3.0 backwards, preparing for the new business models via
(1) New asset ownership models: the infrastructure of electricity supply 
requires capital-intensive investments up front to establish transmis-
sion lines, generation plants and transformers, metering devices at the 
final users’ residences, data and billing centres, and many more tech-
nical features. The rise of decentralised energy fundamentally changes 
ownership structures. By incentivising PV installations with feed-in 
tariffs, homeowners, farmers, and energy cooperatives are encouraged 
to install PV panels or wind turbines. Ownership of power-generating 
assets has become a mass-market phenomenon – both in developing 
and in industrialised countries. Financing these capital-intensive invest-
ments has moved from traditional methods with credits to crowdfund-
ing, partial ownership via energy associations, and – most lately – initial 
coin offerings and cryptocurrencies.
(2) New service and operating models: business models based on effi-
ciency services and the optimisation of the operation of energy 
assets  –  including the equipment of dwellings, such as lighting and 
windows – require in-depth knowledge of the complex interplay of all 
the energy-related components of each object. With the use of practi-
cally unlimited computing power and artificial intelligence algorithms, 
the barriers to entry in this field have been significantly reduced, and 
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new players can more quickly and easily access the market than before. 
Service models that include complementary convenience factors, such 
as safety and security features of private residencies, or allowing for 
assisted living, are likely to succeed in the marketplace.
(3) New platform models: digitalisation and the decentralised attributes 
of the energy transformation enhance platform models because of their 
low asset-intensity. Individual small-scale assets are bundled into vir-
tual power plants to sell electricity en gross, for example on the whole-
sale market. Platforms are not limited to generation units. They can 
also integrate demand-side management for peak-shaving or ancillary 
grid services such as balancing energy. Aggregators open platforms and 
decentralised peer-to-peer trading marketplaces based on decentral-
ised ledger technologies, such as Ethereum, and future reliability will 
be resolved via localised optimisation and balancing of decentralised, 
regional hubs.
Based on the analysis of the business cases, six core  competencies for compa-
nies to develop have been identified:
(1) Digitalisation
 All industries are currently establishing is expertise in digitalisation – a 
theme that is present in all interviews – be it remote operating centres, 
blockchain-based applications, or digital sales channels. Data manage-
ment will be a key driver for commercial success; the use of Artificial 
Intelligence for data analytics and smart customer interaction will give a 
competitive edge to those companies who embrace these new machine 
learning tools.
(2) Customer centricity
 At the core of the business models that trigger and accompany the trans-
formation will be the customer. Utilities, start-ups and new entrants 
from other industries will offer services and value propositions that suit 
each customer segment. It may not be customer centricity per se, but 
rather finding the balance between listening to users while ensuring a 
high degree of standardisation. Customer centricity comes at a price, 
and the core competency required is to drive costs down by developing 
new forms of mass customisation.
(3) Financing and enabling of asset ownership
 Companies have developed diverse strategies for how they can help 
prosumers to finance decentralised generation assets. Especially in 
developing countries, the major hurdle of a large upfront investment 
has been removed; in rural settings, residential owners of rooftop solar 
systems can generate additional revenues to repay their debts. Moreo-
ver, financial competencies stretch into the sphere of cryptocurrencies: 
Start-ups enable peer-to-peer transactions with virtual currencies and 
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spearhead the financing revolution in terms of crowdfunding and ini-
tial coin offerings (ICOs).
(4) Technology leads and product innovation
 Technology and product innovation will not only occur in the digi-
tal sphere, but also as tangible objects embedded in the new system – 
be it proprietary devices to steer micro-grids, customised sensors to 
enhance building efficiency, or drones to verify the functionality of 
rooftop solar panels in remote regions in Africa or South Asia. Techno-
logical advances and innovations give start-ups and established compa-
nies the leading edge and competitive differentiation. If businesses rely 
on pure digital service models, they can easily be crowded out by larger 
and financially stronger rivals.
(5) Partnerships and bundled services
 New business models will also result from new partnerships that share 
financings, infrastructure and asset ownership. In a complex and highly 
dynamic market environment, no single company is able to provide 
all the elements of its value proposition by itself. With the increasing 
convergence of the energy and transport sectors, digitalisation affecting 
all aspects of our lives, and multinational companies entering energy 
markets, executives face no other option than to enter partnerships and 
alliances if they want to survive in the marketplace.
(6) Platforms and ecosystems
 Digitalisation allows multiple players to enter markets and match sup-
ply and demand. Ownership of physical assets may not be necessary to 
succeed in the marketplace. The value proposition is derived instead 
from the coordination of providers and seekers of certain services. 
Sometimes these markets do not exist and have to be established, such 
as the market for demand response in Europe and the USA.
Figure 42 highlights the main insights.
The global transformation of the energy sector has just started. Certain major 
international institutions, as well as many political and corporate decision 
makers across all continents, are taking key roles and responsibilities in the 
process. If the rise of decentralised energy not only continues at the current rate 
of acceleration but is able to speed up as a result of good governance, then the 
globe may be on track for meeting the required greenhouse gas cuts whilst also 
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